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14 December 1961

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# CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN



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## DAILY BRIEF

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Dominican Republic: [The National Civic Union (UCN), the largest opposition group, appears to be losing some of its support. Business and professional people, who form the backbone of the UCN, are showing considerable disillusionment with its leaders for political mismanagement and intemperance during the UCN-inspired general strike, which failed to achieve its objectives. Student groups, on the other hand, are showing a more pronounced inclination toward revolutionary action, and the extreme leftist-led 14 June party (PCJ), which was inactive during the strike, may win more adherents.]

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[Two moderate opposition groups, however, have also gained influence since the beginning of the strike, and may be in a position to compete effectively with the PCJ's extremist leaders if UCN influence continues to decline. These groups, the moderate leftist Dominican Revolutionary party and the "30 May group," are both pro-US.]

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

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

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
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USSR-Denmark: The USSR's note to Denmark protesting the establishment of a joint Baltic NATO Command with West

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Germany probably is aimed primarily at focusing international attention on Soviet allegations of West German militarism and aggressive intentions and at bringing pressure on Denmark to delay implementation of the joint command agreement. Although the Soviet statement warned that Denmark's actions "are complicating the situation of Denmark's neutral neighbors," it does not appear to foreshadow any immediate Soviet moves to revive the demand for military talks with Finland. The assertion, however, that the USSR, in the face of West German and Danish "war preparations," will be compelled to "adopt the necessary measures" . . . to safeguard its own security and that of its allies closely parallels the arguments Moscow used on 30 October in demanding defense consultations with Finland. Repetition of this line probably was intended as a reminder to President Kekkonen of the "watchdog clause" in the communiqué he signed with Khrushchev on 25 November, which expressed Moscow's "hope" that Finland "will attentively follow" developments in Northern Europe and the Baltic and, in case of necessity, suggest "appropriate measures" to the Soviet Government. [REDACTED]

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#### CONCLUSIONS OF SPECIAL USIB SUBCOMMITTEE ON BERLIN SITUATION

The USIB has approved the following conclusions reached by its Special Berlin Subcommittee which reviewed the situation for the period 29 November through 12 December 1961:

1. During the period under review there have been more threatening implications in Soviet and East German statements and indications of preparations to increase pressure on the Western position in Berlin. We believe, however, that the USSR will not undertake any action which in the Soviet view would imperil the possibility of negotiations, particularly pending the outcome of the consultations among the Western

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powers. Nonetheless this does not exclude harassing tactics designed to emphasize the consequences of a failure to hold East-West negotiations.

2. There is evidence that within the next several weeks new controls will be instituted along the Berlin sector boundary. All civilians may be required either to present passports or obtain visas for entry into East Berlin. Without directly denying access to Allied military traffic, the East Germans may attempt to enforce some degree of control designed to face the West with the alternatives of accepting East German regulations or denying themselves access to East Berlin. In this connection, heavy construction at the crossing points to East Berlin seems intended to deter forcible breach of the barriers. In general we believe that the East Germans will continue to maintain a state of tension in Berlin and to move gradually to gain acceptance of the wall as a full-fledged international frontier.

3. A new development since 30 November has been the extensive Communist charges that the American troops being rotated to Berlin are not guaranteed free access because they are subordinate to NATO command. This new line appears to be partly for the record to reinforce claims that the "outmoded occupation in West Berlin" aggravates "international tensions." However, slowdowns and delays on technical pretexts appear likely to continue on the autobahn, and temporary restrictions may be instituted. Recent East German charges of sabotage against the West Berlin portion of the S-Bahn installations, and warnings that such action could have serious consequences for Berlin's rail traffic with the outside world, may also presage institution of some new restrictions on rail access.

4. The Ulbricht regime continues to be faced with worsening food and consumer-goods shortages, a lack of raw material, fuel, and labor for industry, and unrelieved discontent among

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industrial and agricultural workers. Nevertheless, Ulbricht indicated at the recent central committee plenum that he would press ahead with a hard-line political and economic program. The regime may be considering the reintroduction of rationing of essential commodities in the course of the winter, which, coupled with increases in selective work norms and prices, would heighten popular discontent. [redacted]

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WATCH COMMITTEE CONCLUSIONS

[redacted] On the basis of findings by its Watch Committee, the United States Intelligence Board concludes that: [redacted]

[redacted] No Sino-Soviet bloc country intends deliberately to initiate direct military action in the immediate future. [redacted]

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BERLIN: [redacted] There are indications the Communists will continue their pressure on the Western position in Berlin, including measures designed to harass and restrict Western access and to gain acceptance of the Berlin wall as an international border. However, their present military activity does not suggest that they expect these measures will significantly raise the risk of an early serious military confrontation. [redacted]

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SOUTH VIETNAM: [redacted] Viet Cong subversive and military activity continues at a high rate with no markedly successful counteractions by government forces. [redacted]

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
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Political Situation in Dominican Republic

Recent developments are resulting in a shifting in the attitudes of various opposition groups and in the tactics they are considering, and may result in a change in their relative strengths. These developments include the failure of the UCN-inspired general strike to force President Balaguer's resignation, the collapse on 10 December of negotiations between the government and the opposition, and the authoritative political role being played by the military under the leadership of General Rodriguez Echevarria. Political moderates have been outraged at General Rodriguez' role and disillusioned at Balaguer's failure to resist military pressure; civilian members of the cabinet are openly critical of Balaguer's weakness.

Some elements of the UCN are reported planning to break with UCN President Fiallo and set up a rival organization, while others are considering preparations for clandestine activity if the political impasse continues. A labor federation formed last summer with UCN guidance now is seeking to break away from the organization.

A principal beneficiary of public disillusionment with the UCN has been the Dominican Revolutionary party (PRD) headed by Juan Bosch. This moderate leftist party has close ties with such reformist Latin American leaders as Venezuelan President Betancourt and ex-President Figueres of Costa Rica. Bosch informed the American consul general on 11 December that the PRD had gained more than 30,000 new adherents since the beginning of the strike and now has a total registration of 101,000. This compares with a peak membership claimed by the UCN of about 250,000 last September. The PRD is the only opposition party which has agreed publicly to participate in the national elections planned by Balaguer next May.

The "30 May group," composed of civilians and military men who were involved in the plot that resulted in Trujillo's


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assassination on 30 May, is playing an increasingly significant role as the public becomes aware of the heretofore unsuspected wide extent of the plot. Individuals associated with this group include elements in the military and civilian branches of the government as well as in the opposition. The group, which the American consul general describes as "almost embarrassingly pro-US," appeals to moderates disturbed by the bombast of the UCN and the revolutionary climate its actions tend to stimulate. Leaders of the "30 May group," who provide a valuable point of contact between elements in the mutually antagonistic government-military and opposition groups, are attempting to work out a new solution to the political impasse.

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
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Danish-Soviet Relations

In view of the Soviet diplomatic offensive in Northern Europe over the past several weeks, the Danes in all likelihood anticipated a strong reaction from Moscow after parliament on 7 December approved the Joint Baltic Command. The Danish Government pressed ahead on the command proposal in the face of opposition within the governing Social Democratic and Radical Liberal parties, and despite Moscow's 30 October note to Finland which singled out the proposed command as one cause of the alleged heightened tension in Northern Europe.

The Soviet charge that this move will "further complicate the positions of Denmark's neutral neighbors" may be an effort to bring public opinion to bear on the government to prevent effective implementation of the joint command. With latent anti-German sentiment a factor, and with the deep concern in both official and public circles concerning the future of Finland and Sweden, the Kampmann government may well hesitate to undertake any further actions at this time which Moscow might use as a pretext to renew pressure on Helsinki and Stockholm. The initial press reaction in Sweden to this latest Soviet note, however, is that the move was not unexpected and that this was Denmark's affair.

A reference in the Soviet note to Denmark's easternmost island of Bornholm repeats charges made over the years by Moscow that Denmark is violating an understanding of 1946 when Soviet occupation troops withdrew from Bornholm and Denmark agreed not to permit foreign troops to be stationed there. The USSR claims that by including Bornholm in one of the four subordinate commands of the Joint Baltic Command, Denmark intends to permit the island to be occupied by foreign troops. [redacted]

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