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30 September 1961

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CENTRAL

INTELLIGENCE

BULLETIN



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State Dept. review completed

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

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	4. Angola: Portuguese apparently have failed to regain control of areas outside of towns in north. (Page 11)
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•	Angola: A	ccording to the American C	onsulate in Luanda,	_
	Portuguese aut	horities are expected to an DAILY BRIEF	nounce soon that the	OK
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, 3	25XApproved For R	elease 2003/04/17 : CIA-RDP79T00	9 75 A006000030001-1	
25X1	have been "sub probably will co which will end The Portug of the areas ou is tenuous at be restore econom will probably b	limited military objectives" stantially accomplished." The oincide with the beginning of Portuguese offensive operations apparently have failed the tests of towns, and their contest. They are therefore unlinic activity in the region; more able to consolidate their herefor further offensive action.	he announcement the rainy season, ions. to regain control atrol of many roads ikely to be able to breover, the rebels old on rural areas	25X1
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Portuguese to Announce Limited Success in Angola Offensive

The objective of the Portuguese offensive in northern Angola was to eradicate major pockets of resistance in the interior and to close the Congo border. By reinforcing the border posts, Portugal seems to have reduced rebel movements from the Congo, and the Portuguese forces did destroy some rebel centers. Furthermore, the American Consulate in Luanda reports that all towns in the northern area have been reoccupied and all roads have been traveled at least once. The Portuguese apparently have fortified the major towns and have set up a network of airstrips by which the towns can be supplied during the rainy season, when overland movement will be almost impossible.

It is doubtful, however, whether the development of Portuguese strong points will offset the anticipated rebel consolidation in the countryside. Moreover, by burning plantations and attacking harvesting parties, the rebels have disrupted the production of coffee, a crop which accounts for half of Angola's earnings abroad and constitutes Portugal's main dollar earner. The fighting has driven the native population, which previously had done most of the coffee picking, into the bush or across the border into the Congo. Proposals that this labor be replaced by Portuguese "soldier-farmers" who would occupy a "buffer zone" between the rest of Angola and the Congo have so far not been implemented.

Although the long-term outlook for the Portuguese is un-	
promising, leaders of the Angolan Peoples' Union (UPA), the	
principal rebel organization, reportedly are extremely discour-	•
aged as a result of several difficulties confronting them.	25X1
UPA President Holden	
Roberto is under increasing pressure to collaborate with the	
Communist-backed Popular Movement for the Liberation of	
Angola (MPLA), which allegedly is also supported by the Gi-	
zenga group in the Leopoldville government.	25X1
Christophe Gbenye, the	25X1
Congolese Government's Gizengist interior minister, has said	
he was willing to help the Angolans, but would not deal with a	
series of separate organizations. A merger of the two groups	
would greatly benefit the MPLA, which seems to have few ad-	
herents in Angola.	
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Approved For Release 2003/04/17 : CIA-RDP79T00975A006000030001-1 THE PRESIDENT The Vice President Executive Offices of the White House Special Counsel to the President Military Representative of the President The Special Assistant for National Security Affairs The Scientific Adviser to the President The Director of the Budget The Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization The Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration Chairman, Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board The Department of State The Secretary of State The Under Secretary of State The Director, International Cooperation Administration The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration The Counselor and Chairman of the Policy Planning Council The Director of Intelligence and Research The Treasury Department The Secretary of the Treasury The Under Secretary of the Treasury The Department of Defense The Secretary of Defense The Deputy Secretary of Defense The Secretary of the Army The Secretary of the Navy The Secretary of the Air Force The Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs) The Assistant to Secretary of Defense (Special Operations) The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy Chief of Staff, United States Air Force Chief of Staff, United States Army Commandant, United States Marine Corps U.S. Rep., Military Committee and Standing Group, NATO Supreme Allied Commander, Europe Commander in Chief, Pacific The Director, The Joint Staff The Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force The Department of Justice The Attorney General

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