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


2 March 1961

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN



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State Dept. review completed

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

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2. India-Congo: Nehru warns Khrushchev solution to Congo problem impossible unless the issues of Hammarskjold's status and the Congo are separated. (*Page i*)

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4. France: New nuclear test will coincide with resumed US-UK-USSR test ban talks in Geneva. (*Page iii*)
 5. Communist China: Peiping revives "100 flowers" concept; calls for limited increase in scientific freedom of expression. (*Page iii*)

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
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

DAILY BRIEF



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
India-Congo: Nehru's reply to Khrushchev's letter of 22 February on the UN and the Congo reaffirms the strong support of the UN which he has previously expressed.

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Subsequent discussion by the subcommittee indicated that both Nehru and Defense Minister Menon are thinking in terms of sending a brigade-size unit (about 3,000 men) of Indian soldiers to the Congo. A final decision, however, awaits assurances from Hammarskjold that Belgian personnel are in fact being withdrawn from the Congo. In addition, Nehru is awaiting a reply from Nasir to a letter sent on 26 February in which the Indian leader sought to persuade Nasir of the desirability of reinforcing the UN forces in the Congo. Furthermore, Nehru is reported especially concerned about avoiding clashes between Indian troops and any African troops which might be sent unilaterally to support the Gizenga regime.

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
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
France: The fourth French nuclear weapons test in the Sahara is expected to be a tower shot in late March or April. The test will coincide with US-UK-USSR test ban talks which are to be resumed in Geneva beginning 21 March. De Gaulle, determined to obtain "full membership in the atomic club," continues to maintain that France would not agree to a test ban unless it were bound up with agreements on the destruction of nuclear weapons stockpiles. Paris is apparently willing to face the increasingly hostile reaction which is expected from African and Middle Eastern states, including a censure move in the United Nations. The announcement that later French tests will be underground is unlikely to calm this hostile reaction.

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Communist China: Peiping appears to feel the need for a limited liberalization of scientific thought and an increase in freedom of expression among the country's intellectuals. An editorial published in the 28 February issue of the party journal, Red Flag, reviving the concept of "let 100 flowers bloom," states that the findings of scientists should be welcomed even if they lack a "Marxist-Leninist viewpoint." The Chinese Communists have recently released and allowed to appear in public several prominent intellectuals who were arrested in the aftermath of the 1957 liberalization fiasco. Remembering the campaign against those who had expressed themselves too freely before, the intellectuals will be extremely wary about the new invitation to "bloom and contend."

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Ecuador: Foreign Minister Chiriboga [redacted]

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[redacted] intends to resign at the cabinet meeting on 3 March, unless President Velasco agrees to change his increasingly favorable policy toward Cuba. Chiriboga's resignation could provoke a cabinet crisis. The foreign minister's stand is directly related to the return from Havana of the pro-Cuban, pro-Soviet former minister of government, Manuel Araujo, a key lieutenant of Velasco who publicly denounced Chiriboga on 21 February as a "State Department servant." Araujo reportedly plans to promote mass unrest and may have gained a dominant influence over Velasco in regard to policies toward both Cuba and the Soviet bloc. [redacted]

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WATCH COMMITTEE CONCLUSIONS


On the basis of findings by its Watch Committee the United States Intelligence Board concludes that:

- A. No change from last week.
- B. No change from last week.
- C. No significant military activity has occurred in Laos during the last week. There are no indications that the Communist forces in the Plaine des Jarres intend to launch

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[a counter-offensive in the immediate future, although they have the capability to do so. There is an unconfirmed report that the Communists have a plan to initiate operations at an unspecified time in the south of Laos. They have the capability to initiate such action on a small diversionary basis using Pathet Lao - Kong Le resources. Large-scale action would require outside resources such as Viet Minh; we consider this to be unlikely at this time. Meanwhile, the Communist bloc continues its build-up of Souvanna Phouma as the "legal" prime minister and persists in its refusal to negotiate except on its terms.]

- D. [None of the contending factions in the Congo seems able at present to impose a military solution, although the situation appears to favor whichever faction is willing to take the initiative. Out of fear of each other and distrust of the UN, the factions will go as far as they think they can get away with in resisting any UN move to neutralize their forces. Under the impetus of the Kasavubu-Kalonji-Tshombé agreement, the start of political compromise is possible, but there is no evidence Gizenga is willing to enter into political negotiations with the other factions.]

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
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Peiping Announces New "100 Flowers" Campaign

Where previously the slogan was "let politics take command," the 28 February issue of Red Flag says that science and politics "are not the same thing" and that however helpful a correct world outlook may be, "Marxism-Leninism cannot replace actual study in the various branches of science."

Scientific work, states Red Flag, must not merely repeat "successes achieved by our predecessors," but should strike out in new fields. The withdrawal of Soviet technicians last summer probably brought home to the Chinese the extent of their dependence on the USSR for scientific and technological information and their pressing need to expand their scientific capabilities. If a modicum of freedom of expression will help achieve this end, Peiping finds the risk worth taking. Red Flag rationalized the acknowledgment that non-Marxists can make valuable contributions to research by stating that such individuals "lean toward materialism" without knowing it.

Peiping admits that the concept of "let 100 flowers bloom" may spill over from the academic into the political sphere but somewhat defensively states that "Marxists-Leninists are not afraid. . . because of that." In 1956-57 when Mao Tse-tung originated "100 flowers," the criticisms voiced by the intellectuals obviously shook the leaders. Mao was termed "hot-tempered, imprudent, reckless, and desiring to be a benevolent god." The anti-rightist campaign which followed saw the arrest and imprisonment of many intellectuals and the creation of a stultifying atmosphere in academic circles. Presumably neither the intellectuals nor the regime desires a repetition of the 1957 excesses.



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Violence May Break Out in Ecuador Over the Cuban Issue

Chiriboga told Ambassador Bernbaum in early February that he was greatly concerned over the Ecuadorean political situation, and predicted another postponement of the eleventh Inter-American Conference now set for Quito on 24 May. He noted President Velasco's desire for closer relations with Cuba, his friendship for Araujo, and his refusal to take action against Communist or Cuban activities in Ecuador.

The potential for violence over the Cuban issue was indicated recently by Communist-backed student unrest in both Quito and Guayaquil which caused demonstrations against Chiriboga and the incumbent minister of government. The Castro regime has cultivated relations with Velasco, particularly by expressing support for Ecuador in its long-standing boundary dispute with Peru.

Chiriboga also stated to an American official on 28 February that a military coup was being planned in Guayaquil. Such an attempt has been considered by a group of about 50 high-ranking officers, under the leadership of the former army commander, who were retired soon after Velasco was inaugurated last September. As minister of government, Araujo accused these officials of treason--a move which touched off a political controversy and helped precipitate his resignation. Although Velasco has a substantial following among the officer corps, he might alienate it if he reappoints Araujo to a top government position and follows a pro-Castro, pro-Soviet policy. Chiriboga said he had information that at a cabinet meeting last Saturday Velasco agreed to repudiate Araujo and threaten him with jail if he continued his activities; but Chiriboga also said he was certain Velasco will not follow through on this.

Araujo recently spent about three weeks in Cuba, and he has reportedly maintained close contact with the Cuban Embassy in Quito. An advocate of close relations with the bloc, he possibly contacted one or more bloc missions while in Havana.

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THE PRESIDENT

The Vice President

Executive Offices of the White House

The Special Assistant for National Security Affairs

The Scientific Adviser to the President

The Director of the Budget

The Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization

The Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration

Chairman, Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities

The Department of State

The Secretary of State

The Under Secretary of State

The Director, International Cooperation Administration

The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs

The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration

The Counselor and Chairman of the Policy Planning Council

The Director of Intelligence and Research

The Treasury Department

The Secretary of the Treasury

The Department of Defense

The Secretary of Defense

The Deputy Secretary of Defense

The Secretary of the Army

The Secretary of the Navy

The Secretary of the Air Force

The Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs)

The Assistant to Secretary of Defense (Special Operations)

The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff

Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy

Chief of Staff, United States Air Force

Chief of Staff, United States Army

Commandant, United States Marine Corps

U.S. Rep., Military Committee and Standing Group, NATO

Supreme Allied Commander, Europe

Commander in Chief, Pacific

The Director, The Joint Staff

The Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff

The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army

The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy

The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force

The Department of Justice

The Attorney General

The Federal Bureau of Investigation

The Director

The Atomic Energy Commission

The Chairman

The National Security Agency

The Director

The United States Information Agency

The Director

The National Indications Center

The Director

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