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9 June 1960



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
INTELLIGENCE

BULLETIN



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NEXT REVIEW DATE: 2010
AUTH: NN TC 2
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State Dept. review completed

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DAILY BRIEF

I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

II. ASIA-AFRICA


Pakistan: President Ayub has authorized his subordinates to explore the sincerity of recent Soviet indications of willingness to extend economic aid, particularly in oil and other mineral exploration. A major motive in this-- he informed Ambassador Rountree of his move on 4 June-- appears to be to take advantage of recent Soviet saber-rattling over the U-2 incident to press for increased US military assistance.

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III. WATCH COMMITTEE CONCLUSIONS

On the basis of findings by its Watch Committee, the United States Intelligence Board concludes that:

(A. No Sino-Soviet bloc country intends to initiate hostilities against the United States or its possessions in the immediate future.


(B. No Sino-Soviet bloc country intends deliberately to initiate direct military action against US forces abroad, US allies, or areas peripheral to the orbit in the immediate future.

Note: There are no indications of Chinese Communist intentions to launch a major attack in the Taiwan Strait area in the near future. The Chinese Communists may, however, use the occasion of the President's visit to Taiwan for military demonstrations in the Taiwan Strait area to emphasize their hostility toward the US.

NO




(C. The following developments are susceptible of direct exploitation by Soviet/Communist hostile action which would jeopardize the security of the US in the immediate future: None.



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Pakistani Inquiry About Possible Soviet Aid

Pakistani President Ayub, in an apparent effort to stimulate US interest in giving additional aid, has informed the US Embassy that he has authorized the Foreign Ministry to explore the sincerity of recent Soviet indications of willingness to give economic aid, particularly in oil and minerals exploration. Although the Pakistanis have often cited the success of India and other neutrals in securing aid from both the Communist bloc and the West, they would probably be unwilling to jeopardize good relations with the US by accepting extensive Soviet aid.

Ayub, however, may also believe that suggesting willingness to improve relations with Moscow will help reduce Soviet pressure on Pakistan over the U-2 incident. Soviet leaders probably consider that Pakistan's strong ties with the West preclude the prospect of substantial Soviet gains, but may respond with a specific offer in the hope of prejudicing Pakistani ties with the US.

Ayub's statement to Ambassador Rountree that as an economy measure he is considering a reduction of Pakistani military units to 80 percent of full strength may have been designed to underscore the need for additional US assistance. It seems unlikely that Ayub would take this step, since it would probably weaken the army's support for his military regime. Moreover, he appears especially concerned over long-term Soviet pressures on Pakistan, particularly through Afghanistan.

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Scientific Adviser to the President

Director of the Budget

Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization

Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration

Special Assistant for Security Operations Coordination

Chairman, Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities

Special Assistant for Foreign Economic Policy

Executive Secretary, National Security Council

The Treasury Department

The Secretary of the Treasury

The Department of State

The Secretary of State

The Under Secretary of State

The Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs

The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs

The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration

The Counselor

Director, International Cooperation Administration

The Director of Intelligence and Research

The Department of Defense

The Secretary of Defense

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Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs

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The Secretary of the Navy

The Secretary of the Air Force

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The Director, The Joint Staff

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Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy

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Commandant, United States Marine Corps

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Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff

Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army

Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy

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