

TOP SECRET

DOCUMENT NO. 37
NO CHANGE IN CLASS.
 DECLASSIFIED
CLASS. CHANGED TO: TS S
NEXT REVIEW DATE: 2010
AUTH: HR 76-2
DATE: 5 JUN 1980 REVIEWER:

14 December 1959

Copy No. C 65




25X1
25X1

CENTRAL

INTELLIGENCE

BULLETIN



25X1

State Department review completed

TOP SECRET

25X1

25X1

Approved For Release 2003/01/29 : CIA-RDP79T00975A004800370001-8

Next 1 Page(s) In Document Exempt

Approved For Release 2003/01/29 : CIA-RDP79T00975A004800370001-8

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

14 December 1959

DAILY BRIEF

I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

OK

Bulgaria: Changes in party and government organization decreed by the central committee of the Bulgarian Communist party on 8 and 9 December appear designed to overcome lags in the economic "leap forward" program, as well as to strengthen First Secretary Zhivkov's control. No leading party or government officials were purged, but a number of Zhivkov protegés were appointed to leading party organs, and middle-rank party functionaries apparently loyal to Zhivkov are to be moved into key positions in the economy.

II. ASIA-AFRICA

NO

Indonesia - Communist China: Indonesia's reply to the latest Chinese Communist protest against resettlement of Overseas Chinese clearly reaffirms Djakarta's intent to proceed with its ban on alien retailers in rural areas. Foreign Minister Subandrio, while reiterating Indonesia's readiness to implement the long-pending citizenship agreement with Peiping, firmly rejected Foreign Minister Chen Yi's protest over

25X1

the "intolerable" treatment of Chinese nationals in Indonesia and accused Chinese Communist Embassy officials of interference in the domestic affairs of Indonesia. Peiping will probably attempt to increase pressure on Djakarta by renewed hints of economic retaliation and intensified propaganda against "reactionary" forces in Indonesia.

25X1

25X1
25X1



Morocco: Crown Prince Moulay Hassan has asked the United States to sell him secretly up to \$600,000 worth of small arms for distribution to "pure and uncontaminated elements" in case of trouble during the King's absence from Morocco next month. The American ambassador comments that the crown prince may intend to arm rightist elements who are as likely to provoke as to resist the increasingly aggressive Moroccan left. Members of the prince's entourage are known to believe that the King should replace the present civilian cabinet with one composed of "nonpolitical" army officers and technicians.

25X1

25X1

no

(Page 2)

25X1

25X1

III. THE WEST

Brazil: The Brazilian presidential office has ordered "the same official attitude" toward all foreign countries, including the US and the USSR, Pressures have been growing for such a move in the belief that it would contribute to Brazil's economic improvement and enhance its importance in world affairs. There has been no confirmation that Brazil means to modify its long-standing policy

25X1

25X1

OK

14 Dec 59

DAILY BRIEF

ii

25X1

25X1

(support of the US, although Rio de Janeiro has recently shown disappointment over its economic relations with Washington.)

25X1

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

Paraguay: The government of dictator Stroessner, aware of plans for the invasion attempts of 12 December by Paraguayan exiles in Argentina and Brazil, placed security forces on "un-usual alert" on the night of 11 December, and has announced defeat of the attempt. The armed forces are believed capable of handling the situation, and present indications are that the military remain loyal to the Stoessner regime. Attempts to oust the increasingly unpopular dictator can be expected to continue, however.

NO

25X1

Nicaragua: Further guerrilla incursions into Nicaragua are planned for late this month or early January. Rebels are believed active in both the southern and northern border areas, where Costa Rican and Honduran armed forces are inadequate to control them. [Redacted] rebel plans for a landing on the Caribbean coast by Nicaraguan rebels from Cuba to coincide with planned border crossings. The Nicaraguan armed forces are believed capable of suppressing the expected incursions, which will probably involve fewer than 100 rebels.

NO

25X1

25X1

[Redacted]

25X1

[Large Redacted Block]

25X1

[Redacted]

I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

Bulgaria Shakes Up Leading Party and Government Bodies

Probably in reaction to difficulties encountered since the reorganizations last spring, and specifically to problems brought out at central committee plenums since last summer, the Bulgarian party central committee on 8 and 9 December proposed organizational changes which apparently will strengthen party First Secretary Zhivkov's control over the country's efforts toward achieving the economic "leap forward." The proposed changes in the government will be formalized by the National Assembly on 21 December.

The Committee on Industry and Technical Progress, the Committee for Construction and Architecture, and the Ministry of Trade--all concerned with areas of the economy which have been under severe criticism during the year--have been split into a number of new committees and ministries. The professional qualities of the chiefs and deputy chiefs appointed to these newly formed organs--most of whom were important party officials in the provinces--cannot be judged. Their loyalty to Zhivkov--whose "leap" has apparently not enjoyed wholehearted support within the party--can be safely assumed, however.

No leading party figure appears to have suffered a loss of power by the proposed changes. Stanko Todorov was relieved as a party secretary but was appointed candidate member of the politburo, a deputy chairman of the Council of Ministers, and head of the State Planning Commission. He has been active this year and is probably committed to support of Zhivkov. Tano Tsolov, one of two new party secretaries, was once minister of heavy industry and, since last spring, has been head of the Committee for Industry and Technical Progress. The other new secretary, Boris Velchev, has been first secretary of the Sofia Okrug (District) party committee. With these appointments, four of the five party secretaries probably can be considered Zhivkov protegés.

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

II. ASIA-AFRICA

25X1

Moroccan Crown Prince Asks for Secret Supply of Small Arms

Moroccan Crown Prince Moulay Hassan has proposed to the American Embassy in Rabat that the United States sell him urgently and secretly a small quantity of arms, including rifles and machine guns. Presumably he is making a similar approach to other sources. This request is unrelated to an earlier one by the prince, who is chief of staff of the army, that the United States equip five battalions of shock troops. The prince proposes to distribute the small arms to "pure and uncontaminated elements" for use in case trouble develops while King Mohamed V is touring the Middle East in January. The prince claims to have \$600,000 in cash in secret funds unknown either to the Moroccan defense or finance ministers.

The US ambassador believes that the arms desired by the prince probably would be distributed to rural tribesmen or rightist elements in the Casablanca area, who are as likely to provoke as to resist leftist action. The ambassador feels that existing army and police forces are capable of dealing with any disorders arising in the near future from leftist sources.

The prince unsuccessfully urged the King late last summer to use army and security forces to suppress increasingly aggressive leftist elements. Officers in the prince's immediate entourage have indicated to American officials their belief that the King should oust Premier Abdallah Ibrahim and replace the present cabinet with army officers and nonpolitical technicians.

The King, who is planning to visit Cairo, Damascus, Amman, Riyadh, Baghdad, and Beirut from 5 January to 4 February, may, as he has in the past, include potential trouble-makers in his entourage in order to lessen the likelihood of disturbances during his absence.

[Redacted]

25X1

[Redacted]

25X1

[Redacted]

25X1

25X1

III. THE WEST

25X1
25X1

Brazilian Foreign Policy Shift Toward Neutralism Reported

Under a new policy emanating from the presidential office, Brazil, acting as a "third force," will now treat all nations-- including the US and the USSR--with "the same official attitude, following the policy of other neutralist nations,"

25X1

Such a policy directive has not yet been specifically reported by other sources and probably would be opposed by some presidential advisers, but pressures for such a move have been strengthening in Brazil.

The policy change is said to result from Rio de Janeiro's disappointment with Washington's current policy, which, they charge, "has failed to give Brazil the favored treatment Brazil has traditionally given the US." Specific complaints mentioned were US aid to African coffee production and "apparent US favoritism toward Argentina"--the latter a persistent expression of Brazil's traditional concern over Argentine competition for leadership in Latin America.

Another reported reason for the shift is Brazil's estimate that the future world political split will be between the Afro-Asian and white blocs rather than between the US and the USSR. Brazil considers its racial make-up of white, black, and yellow suitable for maintaining a neutralist position.

Pressures for enhancing Brazil's international position and economic situation through neutralism have influenced but not controlled President Kubitschek's proposal for a joint inter-American campaign against underdevelopment--"Operation Pan America"--and the sending of a trade mission to Moscow. On 9 December this mission signed a draft agreement calling for \$107,000,000 worth of trade each way during 1960-62. The first secretary of the Uruguayan Embassy in Moscow stated that, from contacts with the Brazilian mission, he has gained the impression that the mission's visit is a prelude to resumption of diplomatic relations, which may take place in about six months.

25X1

25X1

Approved For Release 2003/01/29 : CIA-RDP79T00975A004800370001-8

THE PRESIDENT

The Vice President

Executive Offices of the White House

Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
 Scientific Adviser to the President
 Director of the Budget
 Director, Office of Defense and Civilian Mobilization
 Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration
 Special Assistant for Security Operations Coordination
 Chairman, Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities
 Special Assistant for Foreign Economic Policy
 Executive Secretary, National Security Council

The Treasury Department

The Secretary of the Treasury

The Department of State

The Secretary of State
 The Under Secretary of State
 The Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs
 The Deputy Under Secretary for Political Affairs
 The Deputy Under Secretary for Administration
 The Counselor
 Director, International Cooperation Administration
 The Director of Intelligence and Research

The Department of Defense

The Secretary of Defense
 The Deputy Secretary of Defense
 Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs
 The Secretary of the Army
 The Secretary of the Navy
 The Secretary of the Air Force
 The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff
 Commandant, United States Marine Corps
 The Director, The Joint Staff
 Chief of Staff, United States Army
 Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy
 Chief of Staff, United States Air Force
 Assistant to Secretary of Defense for Special Operations
 Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff
 Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army
 Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy
 Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
 Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
 Commander in Chief, Pacific

The Department of Commerce

The Secretary of Commerce

Federal Bureau of Investigation

The Director

Atomic Energy Commission

The Chairman

National Security Agency

The Director

National Indications Center

The Director

Approved For Release 2003/01/29 : CIA-RDP79T00975A004800370001-8

Approved For Release 2003/01/29 : CIA-RDP80-01975A004800370001-8

TOP SECRET

Approved For Release 2003/01/29 : CIA-RDP80-01975A004800370001-8

TOP SECRET