


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15 September 1959



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
# CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN



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15 SEPTEMBER 1959

I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

Chinese Communists trying to press to curtail activities of Dalai Lama.



II. ASIA-AFRICA

Laos--UN subcommittee "presence" to provide breathing spell for Vientiane; Moscow calls for reconvening 1954 conference on Indochina.

Japan Socialist party faces possible split.

III. THE WEST

Paraguayan Government's stability appears threatened by dissident members of ruling Colorado party.



# CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

15 September 1959

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## DAILY BRIEF

### I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

OK  
Communist China - India: Peiping apparently is trying to put pressure on Nehru to muzzle the Dalai Lama, who plans to present his case to the UN. Lengthy Chinese Communist press and radio commentary on 13 September echoes charges made by Foreign Minister Chen Yi that the Indians are condoning activities of the Buddhist leader which are hostile to Communist China. The Chinese are suggesting that these activities will have "serious consequences" for Sino-Indian relations. In trying to implicate the Dalai Lama in "cold-war conspiracies," the Chinese hope to detract from any sympathy which might be given to his appeal for UN intervention in Tibet. [redacted]

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### II. ASIA-AFRICA

Laos: The presence of the United Nations fact-finding subcommittee in Laos is expected to bolster Laotian morale and should provide a breathing spell during which the nation's presently off-balance military posture can be rectified. (Strong support is building up for an arrangement whereby some form of United Nations presence can be retained indefinitely in Laos as a help in deterring covert Communist operations.) [redacted]

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NO  
\*Meanwhile, the USSR moved to undercut the work of the subcommittee by issuing a 14 September statement challenging the legality of the council's action and calling for a conference of the participants in the 1954 Geneva conference on Indochina. The statement contains an implied threat of Communist retaliatory pressures by warning that "annulment" of the Geneva agreements would destroy the "only legal basis for the maintenance of peace in Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia." [redacted]

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OK  
Japan: The opposition Japan Socialist party is facing a possible split as the right-wing Suehiro Nishio faction walked out on the party convention in Tokyo on 14 September and threatened to bolt the party. Nishio's action was taken in opposition to the extreme leftward trend of the party. However, Nishio's group of about 30 Diet members would need the support of other right-wing Socialist groups before it could form an effective third party, and a compromise may still be worked out. [redacted]

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### III. THE WEST

OK  
Paraguay: The stability of the Stroessner government seems increasingly threatened by the activities of dissident members of the ruling Colorado party. One important member of the dissident group has predicted serious uprisings against Stroessner between 15 and 30 September. He also anticipates the possibility of the formation of a government-in-exile, probably in the hope of exploiting the strong hemisphere sentiment against dictators.

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DAILY BRIEF

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[REDACTED]

Approved For Release 2003/01/29 : CIA-RDP79T00975A004700130001-5  
 I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

Peiping Accuses New Delhi of Abetting Dalai Lama

Peiping has accused India of abetting the Dalai Lama in activities hostile to Communist China. This new effort to increase pressure on Prime Minister Nehru to muzzle the Tibetan leader began on 13 September with a speech by Foreign Minister Chen Yi on the Sino-Indian border issue. Chen said the Dalai Lama's appeal for UN intervention in Tibet far exceeded "what is allowed under the international practice of asylum."

The same day, Peiping propaganda media, without attacking the Dalai Lama directly, charged that "reactionary forces in India and abroad are using the Dalai Lama as a tool against China." The Dalai Lama's various press conferences and his meetings with Indian officials and foreign diplomats in New Delhi were cited as evidence of Indian complicity in "conspiracies against the Chinese Government." Implying that continued political statements from the Dalai Lama would lead to even greater strains in Sino-Indian relations, one broadcast quoted a left-wing Indian newspaper as warning that "if supporters of the Dalai Lama use India as a base for their activities, it would necessarily involve India in a conflict with China."

This propaganda treatment contrasts with Peiping's reluctance to mention the Dalai Lama for several months, in order to avoid drawing attention to Tibet. The Chinese probably now believe that some discussion of Tibet is bound to arise in the UN and, by implicating the Dalai Lama in cold-war "conspiracies," they may hope to detract from any sympathy which might be given his appeal.

Peiping's latest allegations against New Delhi will be particularly annoying to Indian officials, since they have taken pains to advise the Dalai Lama against taking a strong anti-Chinese stand during his stay in India. New Delhi probably will respond by again denying any responsibility for the Dalai Lama's actions and dissociating the Indian Government from his policies. [REDACTED]

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[Redacted]

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## II. ASIA-AFRICA

### The Situation in Laos

The presence of the UN fact-finding subcommittee in Laos is expected to bolster Laotian morale and should provide a breathing spell during which the nation's presently off-balance military posture can be strengthened. (Laotian Foreign Minister Khampan Panya told British Foreign Secretary Lloyd in London recently that he expected the Communist partisans to "lie low" while the subcommittee was in Laos, and that he doubted there would be further border crossings from North Vietnam during that time. Khampan believed that under such conditions his government could regain control of the situation throughout Laos.)

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[Redacted]

At a recent special session of the SEATO council representatives in Bangkok it was concluded that it was essential for at least a nucleus UN group to remain in Laos to help deter the resumption of covert aggression by North Vietnam. (An assessment of the Laotian situation submitted to the British Foreign Office by Sir Robert Scott, Britain's Commissioner General for Southeast Asia, concludes that North Vietnam will not abandon its aims of overthrowing the pro-Western Laotian Government, and therefore the UN should "continue to show itself in Laos for some time to come." Scott, who visited Laos last week on a one-man fact-finding mission, reported his belief that the North Vietnamese have interfered in Laos' internal affairs by various measures short of large-scale military support but possibly including introduction of small numbers of regular Vietnamese forces.)

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[Redacted]

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(Emphasizing that a serious crisis could develop unless the internal situation in Laos is consolidated, Scott urged that Britain consider what practical, nonmilitary help it can give Laos, and he advised that the West must be prepared in the event an appeal for armed forces is made.)

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[Redacted]

(Meanwhile, UN Secretary General Hammarskjold believes that the real value in UN action taken to date is the establishment of a)

[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

[Redacted]

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("presence" in Laos. He is anxious to shift from Security Council action to General Assembly action, which could legally enable him to appoint a personal representative to Laos.)

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[Redacted]

[Redacted]

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Meanwhile, the Soviet Government's 14 September statement calling for a conference of countries which participated in the 1954 Geneva conference on Indochina is designed to undercut the work of the Security Council subcommittee by challenging the legality of the council's action on 7 September. A threat of Communist retaliatory pressures against Laos, Cambodia and South Vietnam is implied in the warning that Western moves to "wreck" the Geneva agreements of 1954 "may lead to far-reaching consequences for the peace and security of Indochina." The statement added that "annulment" of these agreements would destroy the "only legal basis for the maintenance of peace in Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia."

[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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[REDACTED]

Japanese Socialist Party Faces Possible Split

The opposition Japanese Socialist party is facing a possible split. The right-wing Suehiro Nishio faction walked out of the party convention in Tokyo on 14 September and is threatening to secede. Nishio's action climaxed a long-standing power struggle in which the right wing has advocated a broadly based party instead of the class party demanded by the left wing and by Sohyo, the principal Japanese labor organization. The present crisis appears to be more serious than any that has confronted the party since it was formed by the merger of the Right Socialist and Left Socialist parties in 1955.

For the first time in a decade the popular vote of the Socialists declined in the June election for the upper house. This intensified Nishio's opposition to the party's continued trend toward the extreme left. The leftists, rejecting all moderate criticism, backed a reorganization plan that would permit them to exploit their numerical superiority to elect party officials. The left wing also displayed willingness to support Communist objectives despite right-wing efforts to have the party adhere to a "realistic neutralist" policy which would not be anti-US.

Nishio's faction comprises about 30 members of the approximately 250 Socialists in the upper and lower houses of the Diet. He will need the support of many more moderate right-wing elements to have any prospects for a successful third party. Some efforts appear to be under way to prevent a split in the party, and a compromise may still be worked out.

[REDACTED]

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### III. THE WEST

#### Paraguayan Government Stability Weakened by Plotting

The stability of General Alfredo Stroessner's regime in Paraguay seems increasingly threatened by the activities of dissident members of the ruling Colorado party, including some of the leaders arrested in late May. At that time, as a result of political difficulties growing out of the student strikes, the state of siege was reimposed and Congress dissolved.

Serious uprisings against Stroessner between 15 and 30 September reportedly have been predicted by Lt. Colonel Nelson Rolon, one of the arrested leaders who escaped to Brazil. [REDACTED] Rolon is connected with "clandestine movements" in Paraguay, Brazil, and Argentina. Rolon was also quoted as stating that if the Colorado party convention, scheduled for 19 September, does not censure Stroessner, the clandestine movement will form a government-in-exile. Such a move would probably be calculated to exploit the strong sentiment in the hemisphere against dictators.

Another important dissident who escaped to Brazil with Rolon--former Ambassador to the United States Osvaldo Chaves--recently arrived in Argentina to try to unite all groups seeking Stroessner's ouster. Thus far the major non-Colorado opposition groups have been reluctant to cooperate with one another, but they may be more inclined to cooperate with the dissident Colorados, who have influential connections within Paraguay.

The recent stresses in the Colorado party have been reflected in shifts in government posts and opposition in the Colorado Youth group, but thus far no change has been reported in the strong military support for Stroessner. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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**The Vice President**

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