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State Department review completed

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25X1A	25X1A CONTENTS 25X1A 1. JAPANESE LEFTISTS PLAN ANTI-US RALLY	
		25X1
014	3. INDONESIAN GOVERNMENT REPORTEDLY MAY USE AIR FORCE AGAINST SUMUAL 25X1A	
015	4 WEST STREET STREET THOSE ISSUED TO THE	
015	5. BRITISH STATEMENT REGARDING BRITISH SHIPS TRADING WITH COMMUNIST CHINA 25X1A 25X1A	25X1A
0/5	20/(1/	
		25X ²
010	25X1A ANNEXConclusions of the Watch Report of the Intelligence	
	Advisory Committee 25X1A	25X1A
	7 June 57 Current Intelligence Bulletin Page 2 25X1A	

Approved For Release 2003/03/10 : CIA-RDP79T00975A003100370001-6

1. JAPANESE LEFTISTS PLAN ANTI-US RALLY

	25X1A	
5X1	The Japan Socialist Party, in co-contion with the leading leftist organize in Japan plans a large-scale demandabolition of the "unequal treaties" United States. Socialist sources the embassy that the Communist refile will probably participate in the strations, which will be held on the eve of Prime Min Kishi's departure for Washington. The timing of the designed to put the Socialists in a position to attack K his return for the "failure" of his mission to realize aspirations.	zations onstra- d the with the nave told ank and e demon- ister rally is
25X1A		
5X1		

Comment Leftists in Japan have refrained from violence since the 1952 May Day incident, which caused a severe loss in popular support for the Communist Party. Lessening of the furor over the Girard case, which the rally originally intended to exploit, has eliminated some of the danger of violence, but the Communists reportedly intend to keep the issue alive by demanding severe punishment.

7 June 57 Current Intelligence Bulletin Page 3

25X1A

			N GOVERNMENT REPORTEDLY M AGAINST SUMUAL	AY USE	
25X^	1A [25X1A		
20/1	''`		The Djakarta government n		
			to bombing in an effort to d	- .	
			Col. Sumual, territorial co		
	L		in East Indonesia, if currer		25X1
	OEV4	tions with ai	rmy chief of staff General Nasution	<u> 1a11, </u>	23/
	25X1		and the same within Comments	and offered	
25X1			ecent changes within Sumual's con		
			had so far failed to solve the probl		
OEV4			ed he will not leave his post unless	forced to do	
25X1		so.			
		Comment	Sumual has shown no dispos		
		talks in Mak	assar between Nasution and East I	<u> </u>	
			s appear to be aimed at achieving a		
		settlement.	appear to be aimed at acmeving a	peaceful	
		Doctionities.			
		resources a ever, may b	Continued efforts by the certain a bloodless coup in East Indonesia tits command, can be anticipated. The employed as a final alternative.	n, using any Force, how- The air force	
		and the navy	, both quite small, are loyal to the	government.	
		·			
		7 June 57	Current Intelligence Bulletin	25X1 P age 5	
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4. WEST GERMAN OPINION INCREASINGLY FAVORS FIRST-STEP EUROPEAN INSPECTION ZONE

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a first-step disa

The American embassy in Bonn reports that majority sentiment in West Germany is increasingly receptive to a European inspection zone as part of

a first-step disarmament agreement, despite Chancellor Adenauer's apparent resistance to this proposal. In his statements on the subject to date, Adenauer has indicated a fear that any approval by Bonn of an inspection zone including German territory would be viewed by West Germans in an election year as abandoning Bonn's pressure for progress on reunification.

Many influential West German politicians and newspapers--including some of the opposition--have recently stressed that even though such a first-stage agreement assumes the continuing partition of Germany, Bonn should do nothing to disturb the London negotiations, since the only road to reunification leads through a general detente and agreement on disarmament.

The embassy feels that public opinion in an election year may bring Adenauer to endorse a first-step agreement even if it is limited to Europe, while at the same time stressing its importance in creating a better atmosphere for reunification.

7 June 57 Current Intelligence Bulletin 25X1Apage 6

5.	BRITISH	STATEMENT	REGARDING	BRITISH	SHIPS
TRADING WITH COMMUNIST CHINA					

	STATEMENT REGARDING BRITISH SHIPS WITH COMMUNIST CHINA	
25X1A		
Royal Na stated tha	A British Admiralty spokesman has declined specific comment on recent Chinese Nationalist warnings that British merchant ships trading with st China will be fired upon, but stated that the vy will "afford protection" to such ships. He at British ships can always call for protection igh seas."	nt n e
ment with Navy con with Nati	Britain has used similar language of state its policy on numerous previous, but presumably still wishes to avoid involven the Nationalists on this issue. In the past, amanders have exercised great caution in contonalist units, and Britain has at no time main atic naval patrol in the Taiwan area.	ous e- Royal tacts
three des	The Royal Navy now has two cruise stroyers, and three frigates in the Far East.	ers,
25X1A		
7 June 57	Current Intelligence Bulletin	Page 7
	25X1A	

6. GOMULKA DISCUSSES AMERICAN LOAN

25X1A

Gomulka's speech of 5 June to Poznan workers of the Cegielski factory, where last year's riots started, reaffirms Poland's intention to follow a course designed to reap economic benefits from both

the East and West. He endorsed acceptance of an American loan, although he disabused those who expected miracles from Western economic aid. He assured the workers that the US credit of \$95,000,000 would be approved, but complained that it was too small and the interest rate higher than that charged by Communist nations. He emphasized, however, that the aid was important since it would not only help to alleviate Poland's present economic difficulties, but could pave the way to a relaxation of international tensions.

Gomulka promised Poland would continue to seek such aid from the West. While he is known to be suspicious of the West, he nonetheless probably sees Western ties as advantageous for his economy and a form of insurance against Soviet domination.

25X1A

7 June 57

Current Intelligence Bulletin

Page 8

25X1A

8.	INDONESIAN GOVERNMENT	REPORTEDLY	FACES
	SERIOUS FINANCIAL CRISIS		

	SERIOUS F	INANCIAL CRISIS	
25X1A	40 to 50 per tion to the i the disaffed the governr	An official of the Bank of Indexpressed serious concern to embassy officers over the embassy officers in legal exponent export permits for Approximately 10 permits for Approximately 10 permits and extended provinces. The bank official standard can come to terms with the profinancial situation will be "virtually be"	o American fect of the orts on the of payments. ril and May is ed the situa- smuggling in ted that unless vinces without
	exports is pengaged in over the issue the product Djakarta, ke particularly increasingle ports, with	Indonesian national income in pendent on the export of a litteral products, petroleum and tin. The produced in the non-Javanese province a bloodless revolution with the centre sue of regional autonomy. Revenue at its interest of the hands of the produce in the hands by copra in East Indonesia and rubber by being diverted into direct barter to the result that the central government and export charges.	mited variety he bulk of these ces, currently al government derived from a still goes to of Indonesians in Sumatrais rade with foreign
	•	25X1A	
	7 June 57	Current Intelligence Bulletin	Page 10
		25X1A	
			7

Approved For Release 2003/03/10 : CIA-RDP79T00975A003100370001-6

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ANNE	<u>K</u> No'. 357			
	Watch Report 357, 5 June 1	1957		
	of the Intelligence Advisory Comr	nittee		
	Conclusions on Indications of H	ostilities		
Intellig	On the basis of findings by its Watc gence Advisory Committee concludes	•	;	
A .	No Sino-Soviet bloc country intends ties against the continental US or it immediate future.			
В.	No Sino-Soviet bloc country intends ties against US forces abroad, US a eral to the Orbit in the immediate f	allies or areas pe		
C.	Early deliberate initiation of hostil. Arab states is not probable. Althoubetween the Arab states and Israel Arab states themselves, these are serious conflict in the immediate for	ugh tensions cont and among certain not likely to lead	inue in	
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7 June	57 Current Intelligence E 25X1A	Builetin	Page 11	
	23/1/			

Approved For Release 2003/03/10 : CIA-RDP79T00975A003100370001-6