




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


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**OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY**



State Department review completed


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
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ok 2. **BULGARIAN REGIME REPORTED HIGHLY CONCERNED
OVER PEASANT UNREST**




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
ok 4. **SITUATION IN INDONESIA**



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**2. BULGARIAN REGIME REPORTED HIGHLY CONCERNED
OVER PEASANT UNREST**


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 The Bulgarian cabinet and the party central committee have met recently to consider emergency measures to deal with Bulgarian peasants who are forcibly resisting intensified government "terrorist tactics" aimed at accelerating collectivization, according to the Greek legation in Sofia. Two central committee members were dispatched to supervise operations in troubled areas. The Greek legation reported that peasants were fighting police and militia in northeastern Bulgaria.

Comment These steps by the government and the confirmed large-scale deportations of "unreliable elements" from Sofia in March indicate the Bulgarian leaders are taking strong action to keep unrest from becoming a serious problem.

Although there has been no previous indication that the regime is pressing the collectivization drive so strongly as to cause major unrest, many of the peasants among the 20 percent who have so far escaped collectivization are probably more rebellious than those already in collectives. They may, therefore, be offering strong resistance to the government's efforts to make Bulgaria the first Satellite with fully socialized agriculture.

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4. SITUATION IN INDONESIA



Sukarno is continuing his consultations with various political figures in an effort to form a workable "emergency cabinet." He apparently is still determined to have leftist representation in the cabinet; there are reports that he has included in the talks more Nationalists, Communists, and Communist sympathizers than other party representatives. He doubtless expects that Moslem opposition to Communist participation in the cabinet could erupt into violence.

General Nasution, the army chief of staff, reportedly gives every indication of supporting Sukarno. Although Nasution does not have the personal support of all the territorial commanders, whose reactions will determine the success or failure of Sukarno's plans, none of these disaffected commanders is reported willing to make a personal denunciation of Sukarno. 



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