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4. SITUATION IN INDONESIA

25X1A	The reported decision of the Ali cabinet to resign on 13 March may have been precipitated by South Sumatra's break with Djakarta. The cabinet's resignation would immediately follow the scheduled announcement on 12 March of President Sukarno's latest version of his "nation-saving concept."

Meanwhile, tension in East Indonesia is increasing between the territorial commander, Lt. Col. Samual, and the commander of a special army unit located in Samual's territory. The commander of this unit, made up principally of Javanese troops, is directly responsible to Djakarta. This commander has refused to recognize Samual's 2 March coup in the area, and the possibility exists that a countercoup will be attempted.

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5 .	SARIT	MOVING	TO	CONSOLIDATE	POSITION
	IN TH	TI.AND			

IN THAILAND		
	General Sarit, presently the temporary	
	commander in chief of all Thai military and police forces, appears to be mak-	
	ing a strong effort to establish himself	
as the strong m	an of Thailand. Although he has repeatedly	
	yalty to Premier Phibun,	
	he now has let it be known that	
	nother man for the premiership unless he	
•	Phibun on a number of demands. Chief desire to assume permanent command of	
_	s, inclusion of more of his supporters in the	
	d the complete elimination of police director	
general Phao's f	action from public positions.	
	Phibun probably hopes to work out a	
	ween the Phao and Sarit factions, in order	
	own position. For the moment, however, e acceding to Sarit's demands, and is re-	
	tated that he would agree to Phao's removal.	
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Polish foreign minister Rapacki's recent visit to Moscow, ostensibly to sign a treaty concerning the Baltic Sea frontier, has aroused popular fears of renewed Soviet pressures on Poland. General opinion in Warsaw is that the actual purpose of his trip is a "more important and dangerous" matter,	25X 1
The Soviet ambassador to Poland has scow for more than a month, possibly to participreparation of a new Polish policy,	\exists

Comment


While so far Gomulka's concessions to the pro-Soviet faction of his party are in accord with his own views and his efforts to restore party unity, he would probably resist further Soviet demands, particularly any interference in Polish economic affairs.

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8. SOUTH VIETNAM ANTICIPATES ACCELERATION OF VIET MINH TERRORISM



Comment

The assassination attempt against President Diem last month, a suspected coup plot in the armed forces, and the recent increase in dissident activities have raised fears in Saigon that an organized terrorist campaign by the Viet Minh aimed at overthrowing the Diem government is developing.


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9. OVERSEAS CHINESE-VIETNAMESE RELATIONS



Diem, however, has shown no disposition to back down on his goal of "Vietnamization" of the local Chinese. Unless some "face-saving" solution is achieved before the new deadline of 8 April, rising agitation among the nearly 1,000,000 Chinese in South Vietnam could lead to communal violence.

10. JAPANESE REACTION TO FAIRLESS COMMITTEE PROPOSALS FOR ASIA

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25X1A	Japanese press and trade circles are skeptical of the Fairless Committee proposals for an Asian common market, the American embassy in Tokyo reports.
	The Asian common market proposal is felt to be premature because of Southeast Asia's lack of economic capacity and its political instability. Furthermore, there is some fear that regionalization of trade through various common markets would create economic blocs which would be detrimental to world and Japanese trade.
	The Japanese favor co-ordination of economic aid programs, interpreting this to mean US-Japanese co-operation in Southeast Asian development. They cite the "long history of past Japanese failures" to evoke American interest in such a scheme, however, as evidence that no concrete developments are likely.
	Comment The Japanese are giving priority to re- establishing their economic position in Southeast Asia but are concerned lest an aggressive approach on their part be interpreted in Southeast Asia as an effort at economic domination.
	The Japanese feel that the European Common Market will inevitably work to their disadvantage, and apparently have decided to oppose any restrictive aspects which develop.

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