	31 January 1957
	Copy No. 131
CURRENT	DOCUMENT NO
INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN	NO CHANGE IN CLASS.  F1 DECLASSIFIED  CLASS, CHANGED TO: TS S C  NEXT REVIEW DATE:  AUTH: HR 70-2  REVIEWER:

#### CONTENTS

	1.		MY OFFICER DEVELOPM	S REPORTED ENTS	BITTER (	OVER		25X1A
	CV3.	ALGERIAN	25X1A STRIKE APP	ARENTLY SU	SPENDED[	25X1	A	
								25X1
	° 5.	CHOU EN-L (page 7).	AI REPORTE	ED BIDDING F	OR US SUI	PPORT	25X1A	
	<sub>⟨</sub> √\(\sigma\) 6.	SINGAPORE ERING MER	'S GOVERNM GER WITH C	IENT PARTY OMMUNIST-I	REPORTE NFLUENC	D CONSI ED RIVA	D-	
25X1D								
	31 .	Jan 57	Current In	ntelligence Bu	ılletin	Pag	ge 2	

Approved For Relea 25 2003/03/28 : CIA-RDP79T00975A002900390001-7

1. SOVIET ARMY OFFICERS REPORTED BITTER OVER 25X1 SATELLITE DEVELOPMENTS 25X1A 25X1 "majority of intelligent" Soviet army officers are openly criticizing the Soviet regime over the Polish and Hungarian uprisings. They believe the disorders would never have occurred if Stalin were still living, and that they were possible only because Khrushchev gave the Satellites free

> Soviet army officers do not understand why the restoration of order in Hungary was delayed, permitting the "reactionary" groups to gain strength. They are indignant that the Soviet army has been the butt of insults from the people of Hungary and Poland, "countries which were liberated by the Soviet army!' They resent the Soviet army's status as a "guest" in East Germany, with practically all controls in the hands of the Germans. They are further dissatisfied with the USSR's policy of giving assistance to the Satellites which results in a higher standard of living than that of the Soviet people.

The officers characterize Khrushchev and Bulganin as upstarts trying to consolidate their power.

Comment

rein.

Since Stalin's death there has been an atmosphere more conducive to expressions of dissatisfaction, which probably have increased as a result of recent events in the Satellites. Possibly reflecting the Soviet concern over this dissatisfaction, Marshal Malinovski recently demanded a campaign against ideological weaknesses in the ranks of the Soviet army, similar to the propaganda campaigns directed toward other segments of the population.

In the past the army has shown no inclination to act in an independent way. Its leaders have reportedly been zealous in safeguarding the interests of the military, but seemingly have been willing to leave general political questions to other leaders.

This is the first report of such criticism within the Soviet army. Its extent and significance cannot be determined at this time.

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#### 3. ALGERIAN STRIKE APPARENTLY SUSPENDED

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A general return to work of Algerian workers who began an eight-day strike on 28 January probably indicates a suspension rather than an end of the strike threat. A resumption of the strike, possibly accompanied by serious disorders, seems probable when the UN General Assembly begins its debate on Algeria.

The American consul general in Algiers reports that almost all Moslem workers and merchants in that city complied with the strike call on Monday. The strike did not, however, disrupt all activities, as essential services were maintained on a reduced scale by Europeans with the help of the military and, for the first time, convicts.

Page 5

### Approved For Release 2003/03/28 : CIA-RDP79T00975Δd02900390001-7 25X1A

## 5. CHOU EN-LAI REPORTED BIDDING FOR US SUPPORT

25X1A In an interview he granted to select Polish journalists while he was in Poland, Chou En-lai reportedly remarked that US support would strengthen Communist China "against the USSR!" Chou is said to have commented that if Communist China had been a mem-

ber of the UN. Soviet tanks would not have been used in Hungary. The US and British embassies have received the same story from different sources. The American embassy believes Chou expected his remarks to reach the Western press.

Chou reportedly also told the newsmen that Soviet leaders were jittery over the present situation in Eastern Europe, the Near East and elsewhere and argued that for this reason "no provocation" should be permitted which would give an excuse for Russian intervention. Chou also underscored the fact that continued US opposition required the interdependence of Communist countries, especially in economic matters.

#### Comment

The Chinese have often stated that they would welcome diplomatic relations with the United States, and Chou probably said little more than that to the Poles.

Many visitors have come away from private talks with Chou En-lai with the impression that Communist China regards a Sino-American relationship as a potential hedge against the USSR. Nevertheless, the Chinese share with Moscow a strong hostility to the West and are unlikely to take any steps in the foreseeable future which would jeopardize the extensive economic and military support they are receiving from the USSR.

31 Jan 57

Current Intelligence Bulletin

Page 7

# 6. SINGAPORE'S GOVERNMEN'T PARTY REPORTED CONSID-

ERING MERGE	R WITH COMMUNIST-INFLUENCED RIVAL
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as saying, "We with the PAP as Labor Front st	Singapore's Chief Minister Lim Yew Hock of the Labor Front (LF) and Chairman Toh Chin Chye of the Com- munist-manipulated People's Action Party (PAP) have announced that a er discussion. The chief minister is quoted want to work for a united socialist front and other socialists." The secretary of the ated that the time is ripe for a merger and ain difficulties" blocking the alliance are not

Comment

25X1A

Although the two parties have been political enemies for the past six months because of the PAP's Communist connections, some form of co-operation has practical appeal for both parties. Co-operation with the Labor Front would enable the PAP to overcome the setback it has suffered as a result of Chief Minister Lim's antisubversion program and to infiltrate Singapore's administrative machinery.

For its part, the poorly organized Labor Front would welcome the support of the PAP's ex-	
cellent organization and mass following.	
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31 Jan 57

Current Intelligence Bulletin

Page 8

25 X 1 A Approved For Release 2003/03/28 : CIA-RDP79T00975A002900390001-7

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