

TOP SECRET

Approved For Release 2002/10/21 : CIA-RDP79T00575A002900330001-3



24 January 1957

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
**CURRENT
INTELLIGENCE
BULLETIN**

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DOCUMENT NO. 33
NO CHANGE IN CLASS.
[] DECLASSIFIED
CLASS. CHANGED TO: TS 2005
NEXT REVIEW DATE: _____
AUTH: HR 70-2
DATE 12-27-75 REVIEWER:

**OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY**

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DIA
review(s)
completed.

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1. HEAVY SHIPMENTS OF SOVIET ARMS ARRIVING IN SYRIA

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At least four shiploads of Soviet bloc arms have arrived in Syria since the end of December.

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the military storage areas of the port are filled with ammunition crates, artillery and some military vehicles. An American official at Aleppo observed one convoy from Latakia consisting of 115 trucks, some of which were transporting multiple-barreled anti-aircraft guns.

Although the Syrians are urging rapid delivery of materiel, the crated MIG-17 aircraft which arrived in Latakia on 13 December apparently remained in the port area until mid-January, when they were moved to Hama airfield. Syria's desire to accelerate arms deliveries may indicate preparation to oppose any Israeli diversion of the Jordan River in the spring.

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3. SITUATION IN INDONESIA

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President Sukarno's announcement of his plans for an "advisory council" apparently has brought a reassessment of attitudes among the political parties remaining in the Indonesian government. The realization that the council, under Sukarno's leadership, would decrease the influence of the parties is reported

to have had a restraining effect on some political leaders who had been considering an early withdrawal from the coalition cabinet. The Nahdlatul Ulama party in particular, whose support is necessary for the Ali regime's survival, is said to believe that the cabinet's preservation provides the best means of forestalling the early implementation of Sukarno's plans.

Meanwhile, army chief of staff Nasution reportedly is going to Central Sumatra, for talks with dissident army commanders Simbolon and Hussein. Nasution is believed generally willing to support Sukarno but probably hesitates to do so publicly until he has restored his authority over the military in Sumatra. Since army support is essential to the success of Sukarno's plan, Sukarno probably will wait for at least a semblance of army unity before pushing ahead with his plans for a "council!"

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4. JAPANESE SOCIALISTS DROP MODERATE LEADERSHIP

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The Japanese Socialist Party, which holds approximately one third of the seats in both houses of parliament, at its national convention on 17-19 January turned further to the left. Two moderate leaders were replaced by extreme leftists and the leftists gained a majority on the Central Executive Committee.

The party approved a statement which included a justification--but not full approval--for the Soviet intervention in Hungary, referred to American "oppression" on Okinawa, and called for abrogation of US-Japan security arrangements, recognition of Communist China, and repudiation of Nationalist China.

The left wing, with strong labor union support, is attempting to create a "labor class party," and the convention brought on an open clash with the rightists, who desire to expand the party's popular base among farmers and small businessmen.

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