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20 July 1956



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# CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

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## OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

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State Dept. review completed

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**1. AMBASSADOR BOHLEN SEES ANTI-STALIN CAMPAIGN  
CONTINUING INSIDE USSR**

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Ambassador Bohlen believes that the 30 June resolution of the Soviet party central committee was intended to mark the end of a phase in the anti-Stalin campaign only insofar as foreign Communist criticism is concerned. He believes that recent Western press reports emanating from Moscow, which have stressed the party's demand for "iron discipline," may have created the misleading impression in the West that the campaign as a whole has been suspended.

Within the USSR, the ambassador sees no signs of abatement in the revision of historical and other texts, which is by its nature a long-term process, and he cites recent publications and domestic propaganda activity in support of this view.


Bohlen believes, however, that the central committee resolution is intended to be the basic pronouncement on the Stalin issue for some time to come, and he doubts that the party will publish the official text of Khrushchev's secret speech in the near future.

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25X1A 2. **INDONESIA BEING SUBJECTED TO IMPRESSIVE  
COMMUNIST CAMPAIGN**

[REDACTED] 25X1A

Ambassador Cumming in Djakarta believes that the already impressive Communist campaign to win Indonesia will be accelerated during the remainder

of the year in order to gain maximum advantage from the projected visits to Soviet bloc countries of President Sukarno and Prime Minister Ali. He notes that not only the Soviet Union and Communist China are participating, but also the European Satellites and even North Vietnam.

The ambassador reports an alarming increase in the strength of the Indonesian Communist Party.

**Comment**

The extent of increased Indonesian relations with the Sino-Soviet bloc will depend in great degree on President Sukarno's impressions of the Soviet Union, Communist China, and the Satellite countries which he will visit beginning in late August.

Indonesia appears eager to extract the maximum benefit from the Orbit's cultural offensive, and the government--having placed renewed emphasis on "balancing" its foreign policy--is receptive to suggestions for expanding diplomatic and commercial relations with bloc nations. It recently announced its intention to accept Soviet economic assistance.

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[REDACTED]

### 3. US EMBASSY IN ROME THINKS SOVIET ECONOMIC AID OFFER TO ITALY LIKELY

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The American embassy in Rome believes it likely that the USSR "will soon extend its new economic penetration tactics to Italy." The embassy has unconfirmed reports that Moscow plans to make an aid offer, and points out that Italy is a logical place for Moscow to try to undermine American influence by offering to finance the 10-year Vanoni plan.

Such a move, in the embassy's opinion, would strengthen the position of the Italian extreme left and also those center elements which favor leftist participation in the government. The embassy says that rejection of a Soviet offer would, in the absence of an alternative source of aid, probably bring down the government.

#### Comment

In April, the secretary general of the Italian Foreign Ministry told Ambassador Luce that the USSR might soon offer economic assistance which the Italians might find hard to refuse. In December 1955, Molotov spoke to the Italian ambassador in Moscow of possible economic aid. Shortly thereafter the Soviet ambassador in Rome, in a conversation with Premier Segni, referred to a strengthening of economic relations between the two countries.

In the event of a Soviet offer, pressure on the government for its acceptance would be exerted not only by leftist elements but by some business groups interested in East-West trade.

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
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**4. TUNISIANS INSIST ON FRENCH TROOP WITHDRAWAL**



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The Tunisian Constituent Assembly on 17 July unanimously adopted a resolution supporting the government's position that French troops must evacuate Tunisia

and expressing full confidence in the government's tactics.

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 the Tunisians insist that any move to resume talks will have to be made by France. The Tunisian government is ready to consider a complete break-off of the negotiations and to explore closer ties with other states, particularly the United States. 


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**Comment**

The Tunisians are willing to permit France to use the naval base at Bizerte under a regional defense arrangement, but they oppose "unilateral French occupation." The French Foreign Ministry is attempting to create the impression that suspension on 13 July of French-Tunisian negotiations on defense matters is a "minor family row which does not affect basic good relations."

Paris hopes that its sponsorship before the Security Council of Tunisia's application for UN membership will serve to clear the atmosphere. This gesture, however, is not likely to mollify the Tunisian government.

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