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25X1A Approved For Release 2004/03/11: CIA-RDP79T00975A00040d510001-0 25X1 FAR EAST 3. New Communist tactics used in Malaya: The activity of Communist-led bandits has been 25X1A substantially higher during the past week than in any similar period since the "emergency" was proclaimed in 1948. The most ominous development is the approaching labor crisis on large rubber plantations, where 10,000 rubber tappers are already idle as a result of Communist threats to kill any tapper who defies a non-work order. The US Consul General expresses alarm at the apparent inability of the authorities to counter this new and eminently successful technique. Comment: This tactic has not been employed before by the Communists, probably because it would, in the long run, create hostility among the workers. It has apparently been reserved, therefore, for use at some critical juncture like the present, when new appointments to the top posts in the Malayan administration are being made and new vigor is promised in the British guerrilla suppression campaign. 25X1

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6. Dutch would be sensitive to US pressure in dispute with Indonesia:

In commenting on the crisis in Dutch-Indonesiar relations, the US Ambassador in The Hague has stated that any US action favoring Indonesia

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in the dispute over West New Guinea's sovereignty would be regarded by the Netherlands as undue pressure and would be "most unfortunate" in its repercussions on the Dutch rearmament program. The Dutch resentment against the US role in the achievement of Indonesian independence has only recently begun to diminish, and any approach to the Dutch on New Guinea would revive this sentiment and tend to confirm the Netherlands' "worst suspicions."

The Dutch Foreign Minister, who appeared quite pessimistic on the whole subject of Dutch-Indonesian relations, has stated that he "would not be surprised" if Indonesia denounced the union statute next week, in which case he did not know what steps either side could then take.

January as a result of domestic controversy over policy on New Guinea, has consistently suggested a postponement of action on Dutch-Indonesian problems until after the 1952 parliamentary elections.

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	8.	Egyptian King seeks curb on extremist "Liberation Battalions":
25X1A		King Farouk has directed the Egyptian Govern- ment to restrain the activities of the so-called "Liberation Battalions." The Egyptian Minister of Interior accordingly issued a public statement
25X1A		to the effect that all Liberation Battalions would be put under governmental control. The US Ambassador in Cairo reports, however, that subsequent violent opposition to this announcement on the part of extremist elements has apparently caused the Minister of Interior to waver in taking any further action.
		Comment: These battalions are being formed by violently nationalistic Egyptians, including the Moslem Brotherhood, for possible use against the British. While the battalions are militarily insignificant, the leaders throughout the Arab world fear that unless these extremists are controlled, there is a real danger that similar groups will spring up in other Arab states to threaten the existing order.
25X1A	9.	Greek Army officers fear trend to left:
25X1A 25X1A		Greek Army officers see in recent internal developments a government trend to the left. Prime Minister Plastiras' amnesty program for political prisoners, including Communists, the seating of seven parliamentary deputies who had been exiled as Communists, the withdrawal of the British police mission, the Greek Govern-
25X1A		ment's pressure for abolition of the United Nations Balkan Commission, and the contemplated disbandment of the civilian Armed Defense Battalions are taken as evidence of the leftist trend. The US Military Attache in Athens adds that the Greek officers fear that the present trend will create conditions favorable to the return of Communism.
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Strongly rightist in sympathy, and to them these developments probably appear more alarming than they are in fact. However, the Greek Foreign Office has information that bands of Greek Communists are preparing once again to infiltrate into Greece, and the suspension of UN border observation could increase their chances for success. The amnesty program may be greatly modified or abandoned if the ailing Plastiras disappears from the political scene.

WESTERN EUROPE

#	o. France again rejects US Austrian treaty strategy:
25X1A	In an aide-memoire to the American Embassy, the French Foreign Office has once more re- jected the strategy proposed by the United States
5X1A	on the Austrian treaty question. This new state- ment repeats previous objections to the abbreviated treaty draft and reverses recent indications of a more receptive French attitude.

The Embassy believes that some concessions will have to be made to obtain French agreement and suggests as a possible compromise strategy (1) resumption of negotiations on the old draft treaty, (2) public announcement in the event of failure that the West is considering a new proposal, and (3) an attempt by the Western delegates to negotiate some instrument equivalent to the abbreviated treaty for presentation to Moscow.

Stated their position in categorical terms, it is not certain that their objections to the abbreviated treaty as such are fundamental. Aside from their professed concern for preserving the mechanism of treaty negotiation, the French Government appears to desire only that the West shall move cautiously in its efforts to reach a settlement. The French thus desire to protect the measure of agreement achieved on the old draft treaty, to offer further concessions to the Soviet Union, and if the Russians remain adamant, to denounce publicly Soviet obstructionism and to withdraw the concessions made previously.

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