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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM NO. 346

COMMUNISM IN AFRICA

24 January 1951

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Map: Africa Administrative

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SUBJECT: Communism in Africa\*

GENERAL

Communism in Africa presents a potential rather than an immediate threat to US security. Although the ultimate aim of the USSR in Africa is certainly to deny Africa's resources and military potential to the Western Powers, the Kremlin is currently concerned with preparatory phases and intermediate goals. Moreover, the effectiveness and extent of European control in Africa, combined with the overwhelming illiteracy, inaccessibility and provincialism of the natives, will continue to delay the progress of the Communist movement there.

In so large and diverse an area as Africa, Communist strength and intentions vary considerably from region to region. In general, Communist activities seem for the present to be designed to:

(1) Embarrass the European Colonial Powers whenever possible, in and out of the UN, and to undermine the stability of the colonial administrations in Africa;

(2) Limit the use of the Continent as a base for military operations of the Western Powers; and

(3) Interfere with the flow to the Western Powers of certain strategic materials for which Africa is the major world source. For example, in addition to uranium, Africa currently furnishes 80 percent or more of US supplies of chemical chromite, battery grade manganese, and asbestos, nearly all the US supply of corundum, columbite, industrial diamonds and cobalt. Africa is also the only source of latex outside of the Far East.

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\* Except Egypt, which is considered an integral part of the Near and Middle East.

Note: This report has not been coordinated with the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State, the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force. It contains information available to CIA as of 1 December 1950.

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In their efforts to achieve these aims, the Communists concentrate on two principal groups. The first includes the so-called nationalist movements which frequently have no true nation-consciousness but which do express the natives' widespread desire to obtain freedom from European control. Support of these independence movements gives Communism an immediate means of fomenting trouble for the Western Powers and offers the long-range prospect of obtaining the friendship of leaders who eventually may occupy positions of authority in their countries. The second group includes the labor unions, which are generally numerically weak, are built on an illiterate and undependable membership, lack adequate funds, and are led by corrupt individuals. Thus, these unions provide a natural medium for disruptive Communist tactics, but a poor avenue to firm Communist control of the labor force.

Communist agitators make the most of the lack of social legislation and the failures of the colonial administrations to provide security of employment and satisfactory working conditions. They also exploit the feelings of inferiority and the anti-white sentiments of most natives, especially the floating detribalized elements in urban and industrial areas. The Communists are specifically interested in those leaders and intellectuals who have been embittered by their contacts with white men or who cannot find what they regard as suitable employment. The Communists make special efforts to cultivate Africans studying abroad.

Communism in Africa appears to draw its inspiration and direction principally from the Communist parties in the colonial powers, rather than from the few Soviet missions. The French and British Communist parties, especially the former, maintain liaison with African Communists and continually make strenuous efforts to influence native nationalist leaders. In a relatively few cases there are direct connections between Communist sympathizers in the different colonial dependencies. The USSR has very limited open contact with Africa, having in the whole continent only the legation in Addis Ababa and consulates in Algiers, Pretoria, and Capetown. The Soviet Satellites have only a few widely scattered consular and commercial offices.

International Communist and Communist-front organizations have recently displayed an increasing interest in Africa, which, however, still comes after Europe and Asia as a target for penetration and propaganda efforts. Soviet Communist propaganda is paying more attention to African affairs, describing the nationalist movements in sympathetic terms ordinarily

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reserved for pro-Communist organizations. The attention of European Communists is directed toward the colonial areas as fields of growing importance. Although their participation is numerically small, more African delegations are being admitted to international Communist front organizations. Increasing numbers of selected Africans are being sent to the USSR and the Satellites for special training.

Among the formidable obstacles impeding the spread of Communist influence in Africa are the extreme dispersal of the population and its general political and economic immaturity, the inaccessibility of vast areas, and the almost total illiteracy of the savage and semi-savage peoples who live in ancient, tribal, and communal societies which until recently have been satisfactory. Additional obstacles include the opposition to Communism of the traditional native hierarchies, the hostility of Islam and other religions, and a natural native distrust of what frequently appears to be a white-sponsored movement.

These impediments to Communist penetration are augmented by the activities of the governments, which without exception are hostile to Communism, and with varying efficiency maintain surveillance of possible Communist agitators. The advantage of modern weapons over the primitive arms of the natives provides their white rulers with the means to impose decisions with comparative ease. The British are combatting Communism's appeal to native nationalism by granting the natives a progressively greater share of political responsibility; the French are increasingly associating native representatives with the governmental machinery in consultative capacities.

Communism's degree of success varies considerably among the different regions of Africa. In French North Africa, the Communist Party operates in the open, and with 60,000 members furnishes the bulk of known Communists in Africa. The close political and economic ties between French African territories and the home country facilitate the movement of Communist organizers, and full advantage of this opportunity has been taken by the powerful French Communist Party. Although the political integration of Algeria with France gives Communism in that area freedom of action similar to that which it enjoys in France, the movement is hampered throughout North Africa by the strong influence of a hostile

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Mohammedanism and by the opposition of the vigorous native nationalist movements.

To the west, in Spanish Morocco and Spanish Sahara, the Franco government has successfully suppressed all possibly Communist activities. The tiny Communist group in Libya has virtually no followers within the native population.

In West Africa, particularly in the territories governed by France, Communism has achieved some success by capitalizing on native discontent with colonial rule. The area has no Communist Party, but Communist sympathizers control the single important native party in French West and French Equatorial Africa, the Rassemblement Démocratique Africain (RDA). The natives leading this group accept Communist guidance and have affiliated with international Communist organizations.

Nationalism is not Communist-oriented in the British territories of the Gold Coast, Nigeria, and Sierra Leone, where the UK has reduced the occasion for radical agitation by promoting self-government. Nevertheless, some native leaders have Communist contacts and often disseminate Communist propaganda in apparent attempts to further their own nationalist aims. There is no known Communist activity in Gambia, Liberia, or Spanish or Portuguese Guinea.

The Communist Party, with a strength estimated at 1200-2000, operated in the Union of South Africa until June 1950, when it was banned by legislative action. The Communist Party's influence among the natives was limited, however, since most of its leaders were white. Nevertheless, the prevalent racial tensions, which are being intensified by current South African Government policies provide the Communists with a continuing opportunity. Virtually no identifiable Communist influence has appeared in relatively backward South-West Africa or in the British territories of Bechuanaland, Basutoland, and Swaziland.

Communism has no appreciable strength elsewhere in Africa except in the French territories of Madagascar and Réunion, where in both places it has supported the nationalist movements and become an important force in trade union organizations. In the Belgian Congo and in the generally backward Portuguese colonies, the authorities have so far successfully

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suppressed what little Communist activity has occurred. There is virtually no Communist influence in the Rhodesias, Nyasaland, or British East Africa, although in the latter the presence of a community of white settlers and a still larger immigrant Indian minority provides tensions of considerable potential for Communist exploitation. Independence movements in these areas are not far advanced, and the Communists have made little progress in influencing the active trade unions.

In northeastern Africa, also a politically backward area, the only organized Communist group is the minuscule Communist Party in the Italian-administered territory of Somalia. The Soviet legation at Addis Ababa has achieved no apparent success in the propaganda and subversive efforts it is reported to direct in Ethiopia and throughout eastern and central Africa. Communists have exerted influence upon a minor Sudanese nationalist organization through contacts with students in Egypt. In the Sudan, however, as in British and French Somaliland and Eritrea, Communism is negligible.

Throughout the continent, Communism feeds upon existing discontent and endeavors to provoke more. Native sentiment favors such aims as fuller participation in government, higher and non-discriminatory wages, improved living conditions, better educational facilities, elimination of racial barriers, and the realization of democratic freedoms championed by the Western Powers. Wherever natives, pressing such demands, despair of achieving them from the ruling powers, the Communist potential becomes greater. Until such a point of despair is reached, Communism will encounter too much opposition in Africa to become a serious threat.



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## COMMUNISM IN AFRICA

### 1. North Africa.

The northwest corner of Africa, known to the Arabs as the Maghreb (Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia), is the part of the continent most closely related historically and geographically to Europe. With the exception of the Union of South Africa, the population has the highest percentage of Europeans (approximately 7 percent); the Moslem natives themselves, although backward by European standards, are considerably more advanced politically than the majority of African peoples. The present social structure of the Maghreb is compounded of a traditional semi-feudalistic agricultural order with a thin overlay of modern industrialism.

In this more advanced area near Europe, Communist ideology was able to take an earlier and stronger hold than in the more remote and primitive regions. Even in the Maghreb, however, and despite the poverty and chronic discontent of the masses, the Communist parties have remained numerically small and predominantly European.

In North Africa, International Communism has encountered opposition not only from the European administrations, but also from a self-conscious and growing nationalism which regards Communism as an alien rival. In this three-way struggle for power, the Communists are the weakest; fully realizing this, they adopted the strategy of attempting to make common front with the nationalist parties.

Although the nationalist leaders are still cool toward the Communists, some of the lower echelons are showing signs of impatience and a growing willingness to accept the proffered Communist hand. Favoring rapprochement, from the nationalist point of view, is the manifest advantage of any alliance that would help them to resist governmental pressure;\* against it is the basic conflict between nationalistic desires for independence and Communist subservience to Moscow. The

\*E.g., all important nationalist papers in Algeria have joined the Committee for the Preservation of the Freedom of Expression organized by the Communists in order to capitalize on recent French repressive activities directed against one of the nationalist publications (L'Algérie Libre).

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Mohammedan religion also looms as a formidable, though not insurmountable, obstacle to the spread of Communism among the masses.

The antagonism of Moslem culture and the opposition of native hierarchies have slowed the spread of Communism, but the Communists continue their efforts to influence the nationalist movement, through collaboration with the nationalist leadership. More recently the Communists began appealing to the rank and file.

Despite their now open insistence on following the Stalinist line, the Communists continue to flavor their propaganda heavily with appeals to nationalist aspirations and resentments in order to take advantage of any friction between the French and the natives. Communist propaganda in North Africa on issues elsewhere (as Indochina, for example) will continue to be presented in nationalist terms.

Communist propaganda in North Africa consistently attacks the Arab League, impugning its motives and ridiculing its promises -- especially as the latter kindle hope of a non-Communist road to nationalist independence.

a. Algeria.

Because Algeria is politically integrated with metropolitan France, the Algerian CP has virtually the same status and rights as the CP in France. Four of the thirty seats in the French National Assembly to which Algeria is entitled are presently held by Communists.

The CP in Algeria has six regional centers -- Algiers, Blida, Bone, Constantine, Oran and Tlemcen -- and is organized in the conventional Communist pattern.

Resistance to Communism by the traditional native hierarchies is not of major importance in Algeria because the old tribal discipline has largely disintegrated and native loyalties are scattered and weak. The nationalist opposition is divided between two parties, the Union Démocratique du Manifeste Algérien (UDMA) and the Mouvement pour le Triomphe des Libertés Démocratiques (MTLD), of approximately equal strength; neither is well organized. Neither of the nationalist parties has organized a labor union, and the native union movement has fallen into Communist hands.

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Party strength is estimated to be about 15,000. The European population is largely more conservative than in France; the Moslems, for reasons of religion, political apathy, and nationalistic sentiment, are generally unreceptive to Communism. The Party has made some converts among native intellectuals but little progress among the uneducated rural masses.

The most powerful potential force controlled by the Algerian Communist Party is the network of labor unions affiliated with the General Confederation of Labor (CGT) of France. The Communists have almost full control over the Algiers dockers, and dominant influence over many other unions. Although the Communists control the labor union machinery and are capable of creating disturbances in vital sectors of the Algerian economy, they are limited by the weak discipline of rank-and-file union membership. The large supply of non-union casual labor also limits the ability of union leaders to enforce their will, as evidenced by the ease with which MDAP shipments have been unloaded despite union obstructionism.

There is considerable Communist influence among the European skilled workers at vulnerable military installations. For example, Communist sabotage orders would probably be followed by Communist skilled workers in the naval base at Mers-el-Kebir, and at similar installations.

Communist strongpoints in the interior are Blida, where there is a vigorous railway workers union, and Sidi-Bel-Abbes, which has a Communist mayor, René Justrabo, who is also the sole Communist member of the Algerian Assembly.

The most widely read Communist paper is that of the CGT, the Alger Republican, which has considerable influence with CGT members and is probably making some impression even on illiterate Moslems in the interior who gather in cafes and public places to hear it read aloud. In its current drive for financial support the MTLD as a party and various UDMA leaders as individuals have seen fit to subscribe substantial sums. The weekly Liberté, chief Communist Party organ, parrots the pro-Communist L'Humanité of Paris.

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The Communists in Algeria, as elsewhere in North Africa, have long followed a policy of collaboration with the nationalist movement at almost any price. However, the limited response to this policy, particularly by the UDMA, was based on opportunistic and temporary considerations rather than on any inclination to form a lasting alliance. Since the stiffening of the Communist Party line, and the open break with the UDMA, Communists have slackened their attempts to collaborate with nationalist leaders.

Although the MTLD has consistently cold-shouldered the Communists, it contains elements potentially vulnerable to Communist exploitation. The MTLD leader, Messali Hadj, was a Communist in his youth, but is not likely to return to Communism.

The Algerian Communist Party is in continuous contact with the Soviet Consulate General in Algiers, which is the only Soviet diplomatic post in North Africa. Normal liaison between the two is probably maintained by the Secretariat of the Algerian Communist Party and the Soviet Vice-Consul, who is reported to be Soviet intelligence head in Algeria.

Representatives of the Algerian Communist Party attend international congresses sponsored by the USSR. Alice Sportisse and André Ruiz were delegates to the World Congress of Democratic Youth at Budapest, and Mme. Baya Allaouchiche went to the Moscow Council, International Federation of Democratic Women, and to the Peiping Asian Women's Conference. Abdherramane Boughama, Secretary General of the Algerian Association of Friends of USSR, represented Algeria at the October 1949 Rome meeting of the Soviet-front World Committee of the Partisans of Peace.

The Algerian Communist Party is closely connected with the Communist Party of France. Working relations between the two Communist organizations are more intimate than in the case of Morocco or Tunisia.

The French Communist Party (FCP) maintains in Algiers a permanent delegate for North Africa, Léon Feix, who relays instructions from Paris and is believed to report to the Secretariat of the FCP through André Marty. The Algerian Communist Party was represented by its Secretary, Larbi Bouhali, at the 12th National Congress of the French Communist Party held near Paris in April 1950.

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The Polish Consul, a fanatical Communist, probably promotes Soviet-Communist interests in the area.

The Spanish Communist Party has followers in Oran, which has the largest Spanish population of any city in North Africa.

b. Tunisia.

The Tunisians are the most sophisticated people of Africa and the Tunisian nationalist movement is politically the most mature and best organized in North Africa; the rapidly developing independence of adjacent Libya under UN sponsorship has greatly increased Tunisia's nationalist aspirations.

To counteract both Communism and nationalism, the French started a reform program in July 1950 designed to increase native participation in the Tunisian Government. Determined resistance of the conservative French colonists has, however, almost smothered even the moderately progressive reforms proposed by the French Resident General. The slow pace of reforms will increase nationalist discontent and may weaken the popular support for the Neo-Destour (nationalist) Party if it continues to participate in the government. Already the acquiescence of Habib Bourghiba, Tunisian Neo-Destour Party leader, in continuation of the French Protectorate in return for French promises has aroused the ire of most Moroccan and Algerian nationalist leaders. General dissatisfaction among Tunisian nationalists with the progress to date has enabled the Communists to advance their claims of being the only true spokesmen for Tunisian "liberation."

The labor situation in Tunisia is distinguished by the existence of the General Union of Tunisian Workers (UGTT), which is a powerful nationalist union composed almost exclusively of Moslems and overshadowing the rival Communist union.

Since the Communist Union of Syndicates of Workers of Tunisia (USTT) lost most of its members to the UGTT, the Communists have tried to get control of the nationalist union by indirection. The WFTU in July 1949 accepted the long-pending application of the UGTT, thus bringing both unions under Communist influence, but in the face of

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increasingly shrill Communist demands for "all or nothing" cooperation, the UGTT left the WFTU in July 1950. The UGTT has scrupulously refrained from associating itself with USTT demonstrations which back Soviet foreign policy in the guise of supporting native nationalism.

Present Communist strength in Tunisia is centered in the relatively small urban proletarian element; any extension of Communism will depend on its ability to take the leadership away from the nationalists.

The French have been able to keep Communists out of the administration and will, in all likelihood, continue to do so. French naval authorities banned the Communist paper, L'Avenir de la Tunisie, from the naval arsenal at Ferryville because of its subversive influence among the skilled workers.

The Tunisian Communist Party is militant, alert, and ingenious; it is capable of carrying out limited strikes and causing turmoil among agricultural as well as urban workers who receive inadequate pay.

The USSR has no official representation in Tunisia, but occasional instructions probably are passed to the Tunisian CP by the Soviet Consulate General in Algiers. Also, some Communist orders may be sent from Moscow via Paris, though in routine matters instructions probably originate with the French CP.

The Tunisian CP is directly subordinate to the French CP. Léon Feix is in frequent touch with the Tunisian CP and attended a meeting of the Central Committee at Tunis in January 1950. At the 12th National Congress of the French CP held outside Paris in April 1950, Tunisian Communists were represented by Mohammed Ennafaa.

c. French Morocco.

The expansion of Communism in French Morocco is seriously hampered by the hostility of the Sultan and the exclusiveness of Moroccan nationalism. The aversion to Communism of the traditional native hierarchies throughout North Africa is strongest in Morocco, where the Sultanate is powerful and the social system has been least disturbed.

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The groups being rallied to support of the French Protectorate are opposed not only to Communism but also to the pro-independence stand of the reigning Sultan and the Istiqlal. For example, the Islamic brotherhoods are strongly conservative and orthodox sects, bearing much the same relation to Islam as monastic orders bear to Catholicism. Their outstanding leader in North Africa is the Sherif Abdelhai El Kattani, who is extremely anti-Communist and pro-French.

The Protectorate Government's policy of proscribing native labor unions while tolerating the membership of natives in the Communist-controlled General Confederation of Labor (CGT) is a great asset to the Communist Party in French Morocco. The Protectorate Government, however, apparently would rather leave control of union labor in the hands of the Communists than permit the formation of a native labor movement, as demanded by the Sultan and the Istiqlal (nationalist) Party. The Government believes a native union would be a more serious threat to French hegemony.

The dissemination in Morocco of printed Communist propaganda is considerably restricted by French censorship, which does not exist in Algeria or Tunisia. In addition to local control of publications, there is almost daily censorship of Communist newspapers published in France and shipped to Morocco. Spanish Communist newspapers (printed in France at present) are also under regular censorship.

Special US treaty relations with Morocco, antedating the French Protectorate and never abrogated, give the US equal rights with all foreign countries including France, and cause constant friction between the US and the French Protectorate authorities. This situation, and the direct US-French negotiations which arise from it, give the Communists an excuse for both anti-US and anti-French propaganda.

Communist Party membership is about 20,000. The Protectorate will probably be able to control Communism with police measures and use of the armed forces.

The bulk of the Party following is among the union members and middle-class intelligentsia of the small European population. However, active Communists and fellow-travelers are sprinkled through the administration and armed forces, particularly the lower grades, in sufficient numbers to constitute a potential nuisance. They have also

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infiltrated the teaching profession as they have in France. Most dangerous potential strength is in their control of the CGT.

Present Party membership is almost entirely urban, being largely concentrated in the Casablanca area, where the destitute proletariat forms a convenient pool for Communist recruitment.

The Resident General of Morocco is a vigorous and alert anti-Communist equipped with ample legal power (the state of siege decree of 1912 has never been lifted) and military force. The activities of the Party are closely watched, but it has not been banned as have the nationalist parties. French policy is probably influenced by the continued legal recognition of a large Communist Party in metropolitan France. There is also some evidence that the French tolerate the Communists to encourage competition with the Istiqlal, the leading nationalist party.

Communist periodicals, besides being heavily censored, are subjected to harassment. For example, L'Espoir was suspended in 1949, and Le Petit Marocain, organ of the Communist-dominated Union Générale des Syndicats du Maroc, lost its printing presses in 1950 to a new conservative daily of the same name. In November 1950 the UGSCM began publishing a new daily, Les Nouvelles Marocaines, slanted to appeal to the working masses rather than to the intellectual Communists. The former Party leader, Ali Yata, an Algerian, was recently arrested and expelled from Morocco.

Despite these handicaps, the Moroccan Communist Party is very active and will probably take quick advantage of any opening. It is presently capable of instigating limited intermittent strikes and keeping alive some social ferment.

The measure of Communist strength will, however, eventually bear a very close relationship to the degree of success which the Communists achieve in their efforts to utilize nationalist energies. This, in turn, will depend to a large extent on the nationalists' estimate of their chances of attaining their objectives without Communist support. The grave concern recently expressed on that score by nationalist leaders to US officials was possibly exaggerated in the hope of influencing US policy, yet there can be little doubt that morale is declining and that there is some Communist infiltration of Istiqlal ranks. In September 1950 a unit

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of the Istiqlal located within 50 miles of the capital seceded from the party and announced its intention of cooperating with the Communists. The statement issued by the defecting unit expressed strong anti-US sentiments and impatience with Istiqlal policy.

In view of the close working relationship of the Communist Parties of North Africa, and the long-standing Soviet interest in the territory, it is probable that instructions, and some money are received through the Soviet Consulate General in Algiers. The Consul General or his representative visits Morocco periodically. He also has had an unofficial representative in Casablanca, a Mr. Moses Daljansky, manager of the Société Multex, and holder of a Soviet passport issued in 1947. Daljansky has reportedly been in close association with the Union des Patriotes Sovietiques, a small group of pro-Communist Russians residing in Morocco. On 24 April 1950, Daljansky was arrested and deported.

The Communist-line weekly newspaper, L'Espoir, until it ceased publication, used Soviet material extensively. The amount of direct Soviet supervision in Morocco is actually relatively small, the main chain of command being through Paris.

The Communist Party in Morocco is directed and largely financed by the parent organization in France, with orders coming either directly from Paris or through Léon Feix, French Communist Party representative in Algiers. The normal line of communication appears to be from Feix to Maitre Henri Bonnet of the Moroccan Communist Party.

Prominent French Communists sometimes attend Moroccan Communist Party Politburo meetings, and a group of pro-Communist members of the Assembly of the French Union, on a tour of North and West Africa in 1949, held a lengthy meeting with Moroccan Communists. The Moroccan Communist Party was represented by Ahmed Magrobi at the 12th National Congress of the French Communist Party held near Paris in April 1950.

The Spanish Communist Party also has a branch in Casablanca, where there is a large colony of Spanish political refugees.

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d. Spanish Morocco.

The Spanish Government, fundamentally and unreservedly anti-Communist, has declared Communism illegal in all its territories. It is believed that no clandestine Communist activity takes place in Spanish Morocco. The Spanish Government maintains a sizable army and tight political controls in the protectorate. There is, at the present time, no apparent Soviet or Spanish Communist Party effort to organize the area.

e. Spanish Sahara.

So far as is known, there is no Communist organization or activity in Spanish Sahara (Rio de Oro).

f. Tangier.

Because of its singular status as an internationalized zone, Tangier is clearly an important potential Communist center. Its freedom from controls and investigations, its cosmopolitan atmosphere, and its crossroads location make it an ideal clearing house for international Communist operations. The free money market of Tangier offers opportunities to the Communists for secret financial manipulations.

Both the Spanish and Moroccan Communist Parties have small branches in Tangier with a combined membership, including youth and women's sections, of about 300. Both Parties are legal in Tangier, but are believed to have instructions to remain relatively unobtrusive for the time being. Prospects for any immediate substantial membership gains among the local population are slim. The bulk of the Europeans are Spaniards, who realize the danger of associating with Communism; the natives are unreceptive because of the influence of Islam and the anti-Communism of the nationalists.

There are a number of Communists in the International Administration, the highest degree of penetration being in the Public Works Department. Despite Communist efforts, the labor unions on the whole tend to be non-Communist. Four prominent Communists were expelled from the Zone at the request of the Spanish Consul General in April 1948.

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The Soviet Union is entitled to be represented on the Committee of Control (the Tangier international governing body) and to appoint a Consul General in Tangier, but these rights have not yet been exercised. Nor is there any evidence of a direct link between the Soviet Consulate-General in Algiers and the local Communist Parties. Soviet Communists, however, may have inspired the unsuccessful attempt in November 1947 to amalgamate the Spanish left-wing parties under the name of "Frente Democrática Tangerina."

Spanish and Moroccan Communist Parties in Tangier probably receive instructions from France via Casablanca. The directing influence of the Moroccan Communist Party is certainly French, and its most active native members are either Algerians or Moors from French Morocco. There is frequent liaison between the Casablanca headquarters and the Tangier branch of the Moroccan Communist Party.

g. Libya.

(1) Tripolitania.

There is very little Communist activity in Tripolitania. No legal CP exists as such, and the estimated strength of Communist groups is about 150. Activity is confined almost entirely to small Italian left-wing groups in Tripoli, of which the most important organization is the Italian Popular Democratic Front headed by Alvaro Felici.

The Communist activity of these groups is undoubtedly directed from Italy, but there is little accurate information on the extent and frequency of directives. There is no evidence of any communication with Soviet diplomatic or consular missions, nor of lateral links with other Communist groups in North Africa or Egypt. Therefore, there is no formal government effort to suppress the limited Communist activity.

(2) Cyrenaica.

There is no known significant Communist activity in Cyrenaica.

(3) Fezzan.

There is no known Communist activity in the Fezzan.

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2. West Africa.

a. French West Africa.

There is no Communist Party in French West Africa despite the obvious Soviet interest in the area and the absence of any legal prohibition of the Party. Since the leaders of the only significant native movement, the Rassemblement Démocratique Africain (RDA), are in close contact with the Communist Party in Paris, the non-existence of an overt Communist organization probably reflects a deliberate party tactic. Communist activity, therefore, consists of infiltration of the local labor unions, and working within the RDA, where the Communists are faced with the difficult problem of utilizing the large but relatively backward membership.

The labor unions in French West Africa are new, weak, and scattered. About half their members are white; the others are natives unaccustomed to disciplined work habits. In addition, the native Africans display the sudden shifts in enthusiasm typical of primitive peoples. While they might be, and are, influenced temporarily by Communism, they are equally susceptible to any other attractively-presented new notion.

The RDA was organized in 1946 when increased political rights were given to the natives of French West Africa under the new French Constitution. It is a native anti-colonial political party which bases its appeal on the necessity for better economic conditions for the natives. Generally there is little understanding of or feeling for nationalism among the inhabitants; political interest is limited almost entirely to intratribal matters and the natives, largely because of their own limitations, have been unable fully to take advantage of the political power accorded them. The RDA has attempted to stir up native racial feeling and to disrupt harmonious relations between the colonial administrators and the natives, and it is increasingly apparent that its top leaders are actively promoting Communist objectives. The RDA probably is not nominally Communist because of the antagonism of the superstitious native religions for Communism. The failure of the RDA to propagate fundamental Communist theories is attributable to a realization that the inhabitants are culturally unable to understand them. The fact remains, however, that the RDA is the leading Communist-inspired organization in Africa. Its president, Felix Houphouet-Boigny, and its secretary general, Gabriel d'Arboussier,

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have both indicated their faith in the USSR as the champion of world peace and social justice.

During the past few months, there has been increased Soviet emphasis on this area, expressed in propaganda, the visits of French Communist Party officials, and trips of RDA officers to the USSR and international Communist gatherings. The major appeal of the Communists is to native demands for racial equality. The US and the colonial nations are presented as imperialist powers determined to make war on the USSR -- the defender of peace, progress, and universal liberty. French colonial officials apparently have taken no steps to eradicate this impression; they have however, violently suppressed Communist-inspired riots and disorders, the instigators of which have been vigorously defended by the RDA. Despite the pro-Soviet leaders in the RDA, the Communist movement in French West Africa is not likely soon to gain sufficient strength to be a serious menace, for the basic fact remains that while some natives would like to be rid of the French colonial administrators, their own simple immediate needs are largely met in the communal life of the tribes. In addition, the natives' main line of conduct is determined by the power which exerts dominant control on the spot.

During the past two years, internal opposition to the pro-Communist policies of its leaders has contributed to a decline of the RDA. Over-all membership has fallen from an estimated 1,000,000 to between 200,000 and 300,000, centered chiefly in the Ivory Coast. In that territory, RDA representation in the local General Council, which has 27 seats, has dropped from 25 to 9, not as a result of the resignation of members, but rather by their resignation from the RDA. The pro-Communist contingent has now belatedly demanded that the Rassemblement purge itself of un-reliables. The "hard core" strength, however, probably remains essentially the same as in 1946 and its underground efficiency appears to have increased.

There is no Soviet diplomatic or consular representation in French West Africa. Direct Soviet influence is therefore negligible.

The Communist Party of France, hopeful of tightening and extending its control of the RDA, follows closely all activities of the organization, with the aid of RDA leaders. Raymond Barbe, chief of the African Affairs Committee of the French Communist Party, and Andre Tolle, CGT leader in Paris, use Soviet models for circulars and letters of

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instructions directed to subordinate officials of the RDA, but it is questionable how much effect these instructions have on the mass of RDA membership, which has little or no comprehension of Communist doctrine.


There have been indications recently that the RDA deputies in the French National Assembly are tending to break away from the Communist Party line which they have heretofore followed unswervingly.

b. British West Africa.

There are no overt Communist parties in British West Africa, nor has Communism made any serious inroads among the native peoples. However, several prominent leaders of native nationalist movements, which are more vocal and widespread than in British East or Central Africa, maintain contact with the British CP. They may well promote a Communist alliance and adopt Communist methods when such tactics would contribute to their acquisition of power.

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Revised constitutions in Nigeria and the Gold Coast will mean near-autonomy status for both colonies, probably within a year. Political extremism in both, and interregional jealousies especially in Nigeria, however, will challenge stability under the new constitutions.

There is only limited liaison between British West African nationalists; such liaison as does exist is through London via organizations like the West African Students' Union and the fading Communist-penetrated West African National Secretariat. The latter specifically has aimed at building a federation of West African states. There is sporadic contact between British West African nationalists and Communist sympathizers in French West Africa.

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In British West Africa, several important nationalist leaders are capable of using Communist methods and of attempting revolutionary action to achieve personal power. Their greatest assets are the anti-white and anti-imperial attitudes of West African natives. Their debits are local tribal authority and conservatism, ignorance, and provincialism.

There is no evidence of direct contact between West African groups and Soviet authorities. There is, however, a limited Soviet propaganda effort in British West Africa.

The British CP has taken considerable interest in the British West African colonies, whose natives it considers more politically mature than other Africans. Its Africa Committee has maintained close contact with the West African National Secretariat in London, a Communist-penetrated organization (not controlled by the British CP) whose chairman, Awooner-Renner, an associate of Nkrumah in the Gold Coast, is an avowed Communist. The party also aids the Communist-infiltrated West African Students' Union in London, whose members are invited to the party's meetings, classes, and social events. The CP African News Letter is distributed in West Africa and much Communist-line material is published in nationalist newspapers.

(1) In Nigeria, Communism is almost non-existent, though some nationalist leaders are in touch with the British CP and receive its propaganda material. One of the most important nationalists is Nnamdi Azikiwe. Although he is no Communist, his main organization, the National Council for Nigeria and the Cameroons, remains the most active nationalist organization whose propaganda occasionally contains Communist coloration. In the trade union field, Communist opportunity is growing through the influence of Nduka Eze, who to a considerable extent is sympathetic towards Communist ideology. Eze is the head of one of the three major labor federations that joined in the spring of 1950 to form a single Nigerian Labor Congress, and he has been endeavoring to affiliate the Congress with the WFTU. Eze's paper, The Labour Champion, which ceased publication in June 1950, carried the slogan "Towards the Creation of the Socialist Republic." The World Federation of Democratic Youth and the Women's International Democratic Federation have tried unsuccessfully to cultivate appropriate groups in Nigeria.

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25X6A (2) In the Gold Coast

The political consciousness of the native has developed more rapidly here than elsewhere, and native political leaders will gain a large measure of control after elections under the new Constitution early in 1951. The most rabid and influential nationalist is Kwame Nkrumah, who in 1945 became the first secretary of the West African National Secretariat in London, at which time he may have joined the British CP. For several years thereafter Nkrumah advocated the over-all unification of West Africa into a Soviet Socialist Republic, and made several abortive attempts to promote West African unity. Now Nkrumah acts principally through the strongest political party in the Gold Coast, the Convention Peoples Party, which he was instrumental in forming. Its program has called for direct action to force the granting of dominion status to the Gold Coast, but nevertheless it is expected to participate in the forthcoming elections that will bring a lesser degree of self-government. Nkrumah is in jail at least until December 1951 for sparking the abortive general strike and civil disobedience campaign of January 1950. Though he is a trained agitator well versed in revolutionary technique and has Communist contacts, the evidence indicates that he would not be dominated by either Moscow or London. He is a nationalist and opportunist adapting Communist support to his own ends.

(3) In Sierra Leone the only nationalist leader of any importance is Wallace Johnson. He is not a Communist, but has reportedly received aid from Communist sources. Johnson is prominent in two local nationalist organizations, the West African League and the West African Youth League. The latter is the more influential and publishes a newspaper of its own which prints much Communist-line material. The League maintains some contact with Nkrumah in the Gold Coast and with the West African National Secretariat in London of which Johnson is the official representative in Sierra Leone.

(4) The Gambia presents little danger of Communist penetration, and the same is true of the Cameroons and Togoland trust territories.

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c. Liberia.

No CP exists in Liberia and the Government opposes any manifestation of Communism. The only available vehicle for Communist propaganda was The African Nationalist, a newspaper published by C. Frederick Taylor, a naturalized Liberian. The paper, currently suspended, has appeared intermittently but the source of its funds is not known. Ostensibly The African Nationalist was anti-administration rather than pro-Communist.

d. Portuguese and Spanish Guinea.

No information is available on political activity in Portuguese or Spanish Guinea.

3. South Africa.

a. The Union of South Africa.

Until the Party formally announced its dissolution on 20 June 1950 (just prior to the passage of legislation to outlaw it), the Union of South Africa was the only area in British Africa having an avowed CP and serving as a base for Communist agents and propaganda. It is still the only British African area having Soviet consulates. There is little evidence, however, that the South African CP, directly or indirectly, controlled Communist activities in any territory outside the Union. The Party is probably retaining as much as possible of its pre-dissolution influence.

When it existed, the South African CP was always small, but it shrank further in the postwar years. Its recent membership has been estimated at 2,000, approximately 500 of whom were Europeans. (The 'hard core' consisted of about 400.) The party had little electoral strength, polling only .1 percent of the total vote in the general election of May 1948, but it had two elected officials representing natives: Sam Kahn is one of three natives' representatives in the Union's House of Assembly, and Fred Carneson, Secretary of the Cape Town CP, represents natives of the Cape Western constituency in the Cape Provincial Council.

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Most of the Communist leaders are affluent intellectuals -- idealists who are too unfamiliar with the workers' background and problems to win wide support. Because of the gulf between the leaders and the natives, the party has been largely unsuccessful in recruiting native followers. The only natives on the Central Committee of fourteen -- Moses Kotane and Mofutsyana -- are intellectuals themselves.

The Party strength has concentrated in the Union's three principal cities, Cape Town, Johannesburg, and Durban. Publications have included The Guardian, Inkululeko, Freedom, and the Democrat, all with very limited circulations; The Guardian, a weekly, was the most frequently published periodical.

Communist-oriented labor leaders are not influential, because the labor movement itself is of little importance in the conservative political and economic structure of South Africa. Since the War it has suffered a further decrease in influence. In 1946 its ranks numbered only about 170,000, excluding members of native unions, who are barred from official labor registration privileges. Communists are estimated to be in key positions in more than 25 percent of the European and mixed trade unions (Communists are reported to be on 78 out of 248 union executive boards) and in all non-European unions. The only European union under Communist control is the Garment Workers' Union, although Communists are strong in the Tobacco Workers' Union, Tailoring Workers' Industrial Union, and Diamond Workers' Union. They have also exerted pressure upon the important coordinating body, the South African Trades and Labor Council. The Council's strength has been reduced by the defection of three right-wing unions.

Among non-European unions, the important African Mine Workers' Union formed in 1941 is headed by a Communist, J.J. Marks, who is also chairman of the Council of Non-European Trade Unions in the Rand area. This union claims a membership of 10,000. Communists are also active among Natal's Indian Workers, constituting a majority of the officials of unions whose members are mainly or entirely Indian. But the party has encountered difficulties in further extending its influence among non-European native unions, because the natives distrust all European organizers.

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Of the Indian population at large (three percent of the total population), about a quarter is under Communist influence. Communists hold positions of leadership in the politically important South African Indian Congress and in the Indian Congresses of Natal and the Transvaal. The president of the Transvaal Indian Congress, Dr. Y.M. Dadoo, is the most important Indian Communist and is high in the party hierarchy.

At the time of its dissolution the party was also enjoying more success among the "coloreds" (mixed breeds constituting about nine percent of the population), who resent the government's apartheid program of stricter segregation.

Among the natives, who make up some 68 percent of the population, the Communists have had much less success. They have done best in native trade union activity, where they have long been active, and they have won an election or two among the natives. Moreover, they succeeded in gaining native sympathy during the passage of the government's anti-Communist legislation, by claiming it was but one part of the government's broad program of repressive racial legislation. Despite their efforts to exploit native embitterment at apartheid, the Communists through most of 1949 and early 1950 were losing ground to Bantu nationalism. They were defeated in elections of the Natives' Representative Council and the African Advisory Board. The important African National Congress, at its December 1949 meeting, elected only one Communist to its executive committee. The delegates felt that the Communists "want to keep us a proletarian community while the other racial groups become the ruling hierarchy."

Subsidiary Communist organizations have been of little significance. The Young Communist League had a membership of about 60. A front organization, the Society for Good Will and Friendship with the USSR (formerly Friends of the Soviet Union), had a Johannesburg unit in close contact with the Communist Party there, and a branch in Cape Town.

The Communists have an excellent opportunity to exploit the bitterness caused by the racial legislation of the Malan Government. The non-Europeans outnumber the ruling white minority by approximately four to one and might some day be used by the Communists to participate in riots, strikes, and demonstrations. The CP undoubtedly considered this long-term possibility when it alone among organized parties opposed racial discrimination.

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The immediate Communist potential is small, the ability of the Communists to exploit their basic opportunity, or retain their present influence as an underground party, being limited by:

- (1) Ignorance and conservatism among non-Europeans, particularly the uneducated natives, whose preoccupation with day-to-day problems of food and jobs makes persuasion difficult.
- (2) Mutual antagonisms among non-Europeans, particularly the natives, who have a long-standing dislike for the Indians and are developing an exclusive nationalism which prevents cooperation with all other races.
- (3) The Communists' own lack of sufficient organizers with contacts among the workers and repressed races. This is particularly serious with respect to the natives, who now tend to distrust all white organizers.
- (4) The Communists' internal rivalries and dissensions, particularly between those wishing an orthodox emphasis on class warfare and those wishing to focus on the racial problem.
- (5) The Communists' uniquely unpopular position within the white community in opposing the color bar.
- (6) Widespread anti-Soviet feeling among all segments of the population.

There is a Soviet Consulate at Pretoria and a Consular Agency at Cape Town, which together have fifteen Soviet staff members. There is no reliable evidence of close contact between these missions and Communist organizations within the Union. The domestic CP itself has observed the Party line only as it seemed to fit South Africa's special problems.

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The South African CP had occasional contacts with US Communists and the Socialist Unity Party (SED) in Germany, and exchanged regular communications with the Communist parties of the UK and of other Commonwealth countries.

The legislative ban on Communist activities in the Union of South Africa, under the terms of the "Suppression of Communism" bill passed in June 1950, is drawn in stringent terms, and the Party, already handicapped, can expect no easy underground operation. Passage of the bill followed earlier restrictions of Communist activities.

It is not yet clear how extensively the government will use its powers under the new law. The act is sufficiently broad in scope to prevent resurgence of the party under another name, or its operation with any facility through front groups. On the other hand, since the legislative ban now formally extends to all groups promoting hostility between races, there is the decided possibility that the government might apply it to non-Communist groups that aim merely to obtain substantially greater rights for non-Europeans.

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b. South-West Africa.


In South-West Africa there is no evidence of native Communism. However, the Rev. Michael Scott, a Johannesburg resident who represented the Herero tribesmen before the UN Trusteeship Council in opposing South Africa's incorporation of the mandated territory of South-West Africa within the Union, is believed to be a Communist.

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4. Central and East Africa.

a. Madagascar and Réunion.

Communists in Madagascar and especially in Réunion have achieved varying influence by working through the labor movement and by supporting elements of the population wishing complete autonomy and separation from France, but they are now losing ground. Their greatest influence has been exerted by the General Confederation of Labor (CGT). A 1949 report of the WFTU claimed that the CGT had 17,000 members on the two islands, but its strength has been waning.

Communists have displayed occasional popular strength in Réunion, which, as a department of France, affords most of the liberties of the French homeland. Two of the three Deputies elected to the French National Assembly in 1946 are Communists, including the Party leader, Raymond Verges. Communists also held about two-thirds of the seats in the Réunion General Council. In the October 1949 elections, however, they lost control in a major swing to the Gaullists.

Communism has never attained popularity among the natives of Madagascar. Though Communists have been working on the island ever since the 1920's, Communism, apart from influence exerted through the CGT, remains essentially a small and weak movement. In the last several years a succession of Communist Deputies sent from France have directed the party's activities. They supported the 1947 nationalist rebellion, and have endeavored to form Communist cells of former rebel leaders not jailed or sentenced.

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Further French influence is exerted by the Franco-Malagache Committee operating in Paris, which may be controlled by the French CP. The Committee published a booklet, L'Affaire de Madagascar, containing an article blaming the 1947 rebellion on provocation by French agents collaborating with South Africa, the UK and the US, rather than on the discontented elements in Madagascar.

Overt activity consists largely of the publication of a newspaper and propaganda pamphlets in Malagasy. Press censorship rests with the High Commissioner, who frequently suspends the paper, which is immediately re-issued under another name. At least five titles have been used for it: Tenimiera, Tari-Dalana, Fraternité, Itinimiera, and Antenimiera. This anti-colonial Communist journal, with 10,000 readers, is reported to be the most widely read of any Malagasy paper.

b. British East Africa.

There are no Communist parties in British East Africa, but in the embryonic nationalist movements, which are much less advanced than those of British West Africa, there is an excellent field for Communist proselytizing among both the natives and the immigrant Indian community. Communism's appeal here is as a means to nationalist revolutionary ends, not as an end in itself.

Though the strong sense of social, political, and economic inferiority of East African Indians and Africans makes them vulnerable to Communist intrigue, relatively little has been done to extend Communism in the area. The chief danger until recently lay in the presence of a number of local Communist sympathizers, whose influence has declined since the imprisonment of their leader, Makhan Singh, an avowed Communist. Strikes have been and probably will continue to be their principal course of action.

In Kenya and to a lesser extent in Tanganyika, the complexities and antagonisms of a multi-racial society of permanent communities are especially favorable for Communist exploitation. The principal bars to the success of Communism will be the racial rivalries and the ignorance, conservatism, and exclusive tribal discipline of the Africans.

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There is no reliable evidence of Soviet activity in East Africa, despite persistent, unconfirmed rumors of its existence. The possibility of such activity is small because of the high cost of sending agents enormous distances over difficult terrain.

Some attention has been paid to East Africa by the British Communist Party, but there is no East African organization in the UK comparable to the West African National Secretariat.

Some Communist propaganda has probably entered East Africa from Addis Ababa and from the Union of South Africa. The Union's relatively strong CP, prior to its dissolution in June 1950, had taken particular interest in the Indian community in East Africa. With the possible exception of some contact with the Somali Youth League, there is little to suggest contact with any other outside Communist or Communist-influenced organizations. There have been contacts, however, with individual British and US Communists.

(1) In Kenya there are three prominent leaders with Communist contacts -- Jomo Kenyatta, Peter Koinange, and Makhan Singh, the last being a member of the Indian CP who in June 1950 was ordered banished by the Kenya Government. The organizations controlled by these men provide the most promising opportunity for Communism. Singh's East African Trades Union Congress, which was declared illegal by the government in early 1950 but was not rendered powerless in fact, included Indian and African members, and under Singh's energetic leadership did much to merge the political aspirations of both communities. Singh was not successful, however, in effecting a rapprochement between the East African Indian National Congress mainly a Hindu organization, and the Kenya African Union, which is the foremost African nationalist organization. The latter is headed by Kenyatta, a Moscow-trained Kikuyu native. Associated with him is Koinange, another Kikuyu with Communist views. The size of the Union's membership is not known, nor the degree to which its general membership has been influenced by Communism. At the present time a serious effort is being made by several African nationalist leaders, Koinange being prominent among them, to form an over-all African executive body to coordinate the political and economic objectives of all influential African organizations, the Kenya African Union among them. Latent discontent among the semi-detribalized, proletarianized natives of Mombasa in particular continues to encourage agitation and greater organizational development.

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(2) In Uganda the only known native leaders having Communist views are Semakula Mulumba and his cousin Spartas. Their organization, the Bataka Party, is the principal medium for subversive activity in the protectorate. It instigated the riots in the Buganda Kingdom in the spring of 1949 against the Bugandan king and, indirectly, the British Government. The Bataka Party has been proscribed by the Government, but works underground and is still influential among the important Baganda tribe.

(3) In Tanganyika and Zanzibar there are no Communist-minded nationalist leaders, or Communist-influenced nationalist organizations. The only organization offering a possible medium for Communist activity is the African Association of Tanganyika and Zanzibar. It has branches in all large towns and is believed to have been responsible for the Dar-es-Salaam dock strike in 1947.

(4) In Mauritius and the Seychelles little is known of Communist activity. Mauritius has a largely Indian population, and such labor leaders as Guy Rozemont, head of the Labor Party, are influential and leftist in their views.

c. British Central Africa.

There is a negligible amount of Communist activity in British Central Africa.

Among the approximately 150,000 European residents, there is little likelihood that Communism will have any immediate significant influence. Since the political consciousness of non-Europeans is still largely undeveloped, and there is only an embryonic trade union group, the potential for Communist penetration remains small. Communism will probably be limited for some time to dissemination of propaganda.

There is no direct Soviet influence in British Central Africa. The only important connection with other Communist sources has been with the recently outlawed South African CP. Area details follow:

(1) In Southern Rhodesia, known Communist activity has been limited to the distribution of newspapers published by the recently-banned South African CP. The Southern Rhodesian Government outlawed Communism in July 1950.

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(2) In Northern Rhodesia there are a few European Communists and sympathizers, mostly in the native labor union in the copper belt, who have exerted some influence. The Guardian and Inkululeko have also been circulated in the colony.

(3) In Nyasaland, where the native population shows little sign of political consciousness, Communism has no influence.

d. Belgian Congo.

There are no legal political parties of any sort in the Congo.

Some scattered Communist efforts have appeared in the Congo during the past year, but have had little effect on either Europeans or natives. Congo Sureté's latest estimate is that there are no more than eight Cominform-indoctrinated Communists in the country. The Governor-General of the Congo has expressed fear of Communist infiltration into the Belgian Congo. In the more backward areas, however, the low standard of social and political development presents an almost impenetrable barrier to Communism; in the more developed areas the tribal communities tend to be rigidly conservative. The Czech Consulate in Leopoldville, as well as Czech and Hungarian trading firms in the Belgian Congo, are reportedly providing direction and possibly funds for Communist activities.

There are no known Communists in the Administration, nor in the two local trade unions. Underground Communist activities are reportedly carried on in the two centers of Leopoldville and Elisabethville, but with little success. Such known Communists or sympathizers are mainly Belgians and detribalized natives. Communism is reported to have made headway within the latter group. The vast majority of natives remain unaffected by Communist propaganda.

There has been one newspaper in the Congo with Communist tendencies -- L'Informateur Congolais, which ceased publication in 1950. Its owner, Raymond Cloquet, was expelled from the Congo early in 1949 for the publication of an unsigned article denouncing and ridiculing Belgian colonial administration. It is believed that the paper receives financial and editorial assistance from the Communist

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organ Le Drapeau Rouge of Brussels, for which Madame Cloquet had worked before her departure for the Congo. Although perceptibly more circumspect since the departure of Cloquet, the paper's general tendencies have persisted under Alexis Peclers, who succeeded Cloquet early in 1949. Jacques Masa, a prominent native labor leader in the Congo, is known to have attended Communist-sponsored meetings in Brazzaville.

Communist activities in Africa will be combatted by security officers from Accra, Nairobi, and Salisbury, French Equatorial Africa, and the Belgian Congo who will exchange information through the British Consul General in the Congo.

Belgian officials are specially concerned over the possibility of Communist infiltration from Brazzaville, French Equatorial Africa, directly north across the river from Leopoldville; orders have been issued for reinforced control of the Congo borders with Northern Rhodesia as well as with the French colonies.

The Kitawala (the Watch Tower Bible and Tract Society, or Jehovah's Witnesses), which teaches an anarchist doctrine and claims that the day will come when the position of the whites and natives will be reversed in Africa, was banned from the Congo in 1949.

The Congo's commercial importance to Belgium will assure continuation of strong security measures. The rich, natural resources, as well as the highly important uranium deposits, however, might result in increased Soviet effort in this area.

e. French Equatorial Africa (FEA), French Cameroons and Togoland.

The most influential pro-Communist force is the well-organized Rassemblement Démocratique Africain (RDA), which has branches in all four territories of FEA, in the Cameroons, and in Togoland, as well as one councillor in the Assembly of the French Union. Overt, French-directed Communism has made slight progress in the governments themselves, where some minor officials are known to have Communist tendencies.

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There is no Soviet or Satellite consular representation in this part of Africa, nor is it believed that any effectual Soviet activity exists, although Communist agents may have contact with the Soviet mission in Ethiopia. The French security organization is fully aware of the potential danger of infiltration and is working in increasingly close cooperation with the British security officials to combat it.

f. Angola and Mozambique.

Communist activity in Angola and Mozambique is not important at present, nor is it soon likely to be. No overt Communist activity is tolerated by the Portuguese administration of these colonies, in which no nationalist nor labor movements of any strength have developed.

25X1X7 Although Communism may be considered non-existent in Angola, [REDACTED] in 1947 a Communist center was discovered at Lobito Bay. It was supposedly controlled by the Brazzaville Communists (French Equatorial Africa), who also directed a parallel organization called the "Association of Mutual Assistance" at San Salvador in north Angola.

Communist activities in Mozambique have for years been centered in the Movimento Nacional Democrático de Moçambique (MND). It attempts to penetrate cultural and sporting groups and work through young people and anti-Salazar organizations. There is close liaison with the Union of South Africa Communists, and to a lesser extent with those in Lisbon (who in turn are said to receive material from France and Italy).

In October 1949 a number of allegedly Communist-minded agitators were arrested in Lourenço Marques after forming a front group called the League of Young Mozambican Democrats.

In general, Communist activities in Mozambique are fed from across the border with the Union, but organization is weak and is not considered dangerous at the present time.

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5. Northeast Africa.

a. Somalia (formerly Italian Somaliland).

In the Italian-administered territory of Somalia, there is an organized Communist Party in Mogadiscio consisting of about 50 Italians and having little influence. The limited Communist activity has received its inspiration only through Italian sources. Although the Somalia Youth League naturally accepted Soviet support for its efforts in the UN to obtain early independence for Somalia, there is little evidence of SYL sympathy for, or other collaboration with, Communism.

b. British Somaliland.

It is believed that there is as yet no Communist infiltration into British Somaliland. Possible sources of future activity might be in the Rassemblement Démocratique Africain (RDA) branch in French Somaliland, the Eritrean and Somali Communist Parties, or possibly the Somali Youth League, which in October 1947 claimed 9,000 members in British Somaliland, a claim believed to be highly exaggerated.

c. French Somaliland.

Government officials of French Somaliland claim no knowledge of the existence of any Communist organizations in the territory. The deputy to the French National Assembly, Jean Martine, is reported to be a former Communist. There is a weak and unimportant branch of the RDA in French Somaliland.

d. Eritrea.

There was a small Eritrean CP in existence from 1944 to February 1949, composed principally of Italians. However, in February 1949 it was disbanded.

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There is no evidence that Communism has made any headway among the native population, nor is there evidence of Soviet activity.

e. Ethiopia.

It is not likely that Communism will become a significant factor in Ethiopia under the present Government. Communist activity in Ethiopia is limited and there are no indications that it has made effective progress. There is no CP or any other party functioning in Ethiopia. The Ethiopian Government will continue to oppose any manifestation of Communism.

The Soviet Legation in Addis Ababa disseminates Communist propaganda and maintains an Exhibition Hall on the main street of the city. This exhibition consists for the most part of photographs showing aspects of life in the USSR, stressing freedom from racial discriminations. Russian language classes were conducted from April to mid-August 1950 and reopened in September. The decline in enrollment from 70 students in May to less than 10 in July was reportedly due to Imperial disapproval. There have been unconfirmed reports that the Soviet Hospital might be engaged in subversive activity, as well as rumors that the USSR is using Addis Ababa as a base for its underground work throughout the entire continent of Africa.

There appear to be a few members of the Greek and Armenian Communities who have Communist or leftist leanings, but they exert little influence and are not now considered to be a threat.

f. Sudan.

There is no legally constituted CP in the Sudan. The Sudanese Movement of National Liberation has Communist tendencies, but it is not considered significant, nor is there evidence that it is in contact with any Soviet diplomatic or consular missions. It is, however, in touch with left-wing elements in Egypt; liaison is apparently maintained through students returning to the Sudan from Egyptian universities. Two persons reported to be active in the group are Ahmed Nadeef and Mohammed Omer Beshir.

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AFRICAN MEMBERS OF COMMUNIST DOMINATED INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS

(1 September 1950)

World Federation of Trade Unions (WFTU)

General Confederation of Labor (CGT) of France has following affiliations:

Algerian General Confederation of Labor

Union of Trade Unions of the Ivory Coast, Dahomey, Dakar, Niger, Senegal and Mauretania, the Sudan, Guinea, Haute-Volta, the Chad, Togo, the Cameroons, Ubangi-Chair, the Middle Congo, Madagascar, Reunion.

General Union of Confederated Trade Unions of Morocco

Trade Union of Workers of Tunisia (USTT) (June 1947)

General Confederation of Workers of the Belgian Congo (June 1947)

Nigerian Trade Union Congress

Sierra Leone Council of Labor

Northern Rhodesia Mine Workers' Union

Southern Rhodesia Trades and Labor Council (Jan 1949)

Trade Union Council of Mauritius

South African Trades and Labor Council

Maltese General Workers' Union (Jan 1949)

World Federation of Democratic Youth (WFDY)

Union of Algerian Democratic Youth

Tunisia

Youth Union of Morocco

Nigerian Union of Students

Gold Coast

Union of South Africa

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International Union of Students

Association of North African Students in France

Association of Moslem Students of North Africa

Students' Section of Youth Union of Morocco (Sep 1949)

Algeria (Aug 1950)

Tunisia (Aug 1950)

Dakar (Aug 1950)

Union of Students of Madagascar (or Association of Students of Malagache Origin) (Sep 1949)

Réunion (Aug 1950)

League of Nubian Students

Nigerian Students Union (Aug 1950)

Gold Coast (Aug 1950)

National Union of South African Students

Women's International Democratic Federation

Union of Women of Algeria

Algerian Association of Moslem Women

Union of Women of Tunisia

Union of Girls of Tunisia

Ivory Coast


Madagascar

Liberia (?)

Moroccan Union of Women

SECRET





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 (SENDER WILL CIRCLE CLASSIFICATION TOP AND BOTTOM)

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
 OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP

TO	25X1A9a	INITIALS	DATE
1	OCB [REDACTED]		
2			
3			
4			
5			

FROM	B/Pub, O/RR	INITIALS	DATE
1			7 Feb '51
2			
3			

APPROVAL  
 ACTION  
 COMMENT  
 CONCURRENCE

INFORMATION  
 DIRECT REPLY  
 PREPARATION OF REPLY  
 RECOMMENDATION

SIGNATURE  
 RETURN  
 DISPATCH  
 FILE

REMARKS: Attached cc 52-98 of IM-346 to be disseminated as follows:

- 52-61 State
- 62-76 Army
- 77-86 Navy
- 87-96 Air
- 97,98 JIG

No other external dissemination has been made on this IM

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FORM NO. 30-4  
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