




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International Issues Review

31 January 1979

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INTERNATIONAL ISSUES REVIEW

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CONTENTS

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INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM: THE OUTLOOK

FOR 1979 [Redacted] 9

This article, based on a forthcoming ORPA study, International Terrorism in 1978, discusses the short-term outlook for terrorist activities.

[Redacted]

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CONVENTIONAL ARMS TRANSFERS

PROSPECTS FOR CONVENTIONAL ARMS TRANSFER

RESTRAINTS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA [Redacted] . . 16

Despite the low volume of arms sales to Southeast Asia and the absence of an arms race among either the recipients or the supplier states, political and ideological competition divides the region into rival supplier-recipient groups and presents obstacles to effective restraints on conventional arms transfers to the area. This situation has been intensified by the Vietnamese invasion of Kampuchea.

[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

NUCLEAR POLITICS

OVERVIEW OF LDC ATTITUDES TOWARD THE INTER-
NATIONAL NONPROLIFERATION REGIME

[Redacted]

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Growing LDC interest in nuclear energy and changes in international nuclear politics reinforce North-South, supplier-consumer tensions inherent in the international nonproliferation regime. This article outlines general developing-country attitudes and demands in the nuclear arena that threaten to complicate upcoming multilateral conferences.

[Redacted]

INTERNATIONAL COMMUNISM

SOFIA: TOWARD A WORLD COMMUNIST
CONFERENCE?

[Redacted]

34

At a Communist conference in Sofia last month the Soviets expressed interest in convening a high-level gathering of Communist leaders. The interparty disputes that surfaced at Sofia suggest, however, that the preparations for and holding of such a conference will reflect more preoccupation with current internecine disagreements than with broader North-South or East-West issues.

[Redacted]

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International Terrorism: The Outlook For 1979*



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Although 1978 recorded an increase in the number of international terrorist attacks and their attendant casualties (see figure 1 and table 1), most established patterns of terrorist behavior continued. Terrorists concentrated on attacking Western diplomatic and business facilities, emphasized simple types of operations (see table 2), and preferred to strike targets in the industrialized democracies. There was some improvement in intergovernmental cooperation against terrorism, as represented by the Bonn Anti-Hijacking Agreement formulated last June. This article discusses what these and other recent developments portend for the near term.



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* * *

Several trends seen in 1978 are expected to carry over into the new year:

- Regional patterns of victimization and location of operations are likely to remain virtually unchanged. Representatives of affluent countries, particularly government officials and business executives, will remain attractive targets. Western Europe, Latin America, and the Middle East--probably in that order--again are likely to be the main trouble spots. American persons and property will continue to be attacked on occasion, although improvements in US official and corporate security should deter many potential attacks.

*This article summarizes conclusions of a forthcoming ORPA study, International Terrorism in 1978.




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Deaths and Injuries Due to International Terrorist Attacks,¹
1968-78

Figure 1



1. Casualty figures are particularly susceptible to fluctuations due to inclusion of especially bloody incidents, e.g., exclusion of the 1978 explosion at a Beirut building housing Palestinian guerrilla organizations, which some reports credited to rival terrorists, would subtract 150 deaths from that year's total. Inclusion of the mass suicide/murder by the Peoples' Temple members in Guyana in November 1978 would add more than 900 deaths.

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- Acts of terrorism related to the Palestinian issue will almost certainly continue. Despite recent statements by moderate Palestinian leaders regarding the possibility of living in peace with Israel if a Palestinian mini-state is created, extremists can be expected to demonstrate their rejection of a political solution of the Arab-Israeli dispute. Attacks within Israel, at times victimizing nationals of third countries, were undertaken even by the moderates during 1978.
- The vast majority of incidents will continue to involve bombings and incendiary attacks, in part because neither poses great risk to those who cause them. Although added security precautions at sensitive facilities, a business exodus from unstable areas, and paramilitary rescue squads may deter spectacular confrontational attacks, these measures clearly cannot protect all potential--if less sensitive--targets from simple hit-and-run operations. [REDACTED]

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Businesses will continue to search for defensive methods. In 1978, several multinational corporations preferred to pay off terrorist ransom and publicity demands rather than cooperate in government-declared non-concessions policies. Many organizations were formed solely to advise executives on how to cope with political violence. Representatives of other nongovernmental organizations, including educational institutions and the media, explored ways of cooperating with governmental efforts to combat terrorism. [REDACTED]

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Despite success in obtaining support for several antihijacking agreements, the development and implementation of more effective international countermeasures will continue to be impeded by differing moral perspectives among states, a broad resistance to the perceived infringement of sovereignty in any curtailment of the right to grant political asylum, and a natural reluctance on the part of many states to commit themselves to any course of action that might invite retribution--either by terrorist groups or by states sympathetic to the terrorists' cause. This divergence in perspectives makes the chance of passage of a West German - sponsored

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UN convention against the taking of hostages relatively low. On the other hand, regional cooperation by like-minded governments faced with similar problems is expected to expand. West European successes may set an example for governments in other regions. [REDACTED]

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International pressures to halt governmental aid to terrorists is likely to meet with mixed degrees of success. Libya, often characterized as a major patron of various terrorist groups throughout the world, has recently taken steps toward improving its image in the West. In November, Colonel Qadhafi met with the West German Interior Minister to discuss closer cooperation against terrorists. The Libyans also expressed interest in discussing international terrorism with high-ranking US representatives. In December, the Libyan Interior Minister vowed to arrest and extradite any German terrorists seeking refuge. Since 1977, the Libyans have refused to grant asylum to airline hijackers. [REDACTED]

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The coming year is expected to be characterized by some new developments as well. Terrorists will try to adapt their tactics to counter the countermeasures adopted by government and private security services. These adaptations probably will include changes in target selection, improvements in terrorist planning and other aspects of tradecraft, and, possibly, an overall increase in technological sophistication, (for example, use of more compact conventional explosives). [REDACTED]

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West German terrorists, having suffered reverses during the past year, are likely to feel greater pressure to remind their domestic and international sympathizers that they remain revolutionary leaders by engaging in operations at home or overseas. [REDACTED]

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Although the oscillations in the overall level of terrorist activity in recent years render predictions hazardous, it is doubtful that there will be many more terrorist incidents in 1979 than in 1978. A cyclical pattern seems to have been established. For the typical terrorist group, a period of considerable activity lasting several weeks or months usually is followed by a lull, as governments adapt to terrorist tactics, group leaders are arrested, problems of logistics or morale arise, and popular sympathy wanes. In

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time new terrorist recruits may appear, new methods may be developed, and a more favorable political climate may return. Then a new cycle for that group may begin. But as new or revitalized groups arise, others become dormant, and some eventually disappear. [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

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TABLE 1

GEOGRAPHIC DISTRIBUTION OF INTERNATIONAL
TERRORIST INCIDENTS 1968-78

Target	1968	1969	1970	1971	1972	1973	1974	1975	1976	1977	1978	TOTAL*
North America	35	7	23	24	18	18	38	51	37	23	20	294 (9.7)
Latin America	41	71	113	70	49	80	124	48	105	46	61	808 (26.6)
Western Europe	16	31	58	38	112	141	151	109	179	129	166	1,130 (38.1)
USSR/Eastern Europe	0	1	1	2	1	0	1	2	0	2	3	12 (0.4)
Sub-Saharan Africa	0	7	8	4	4	4	9	18	16	20	24	114 (3.7)
Middle East and North Africa	18	32	60	52	35	21	47	56	62	48	61	492 (16.1)
Asia	1	12	19	24	43	10	11	13	14	8	16	171 (5.6)
Oceania	0	5	1	2	3	1	1	0	0	3	3	19 (0.6)
Transregional	0	0	0	0	4	0	0	0	0	0	0	4 (0.1)
Total	111	166	282	216	269	275	382	297	413	279	354	3,044

*Figures in parentheses are percentages of the total accounted for by each region.

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TABLE 2

INTERNATIONAL TERRORIST INCIDENTS, 1968-78, BY CATEGORY OF ATTACK

	<u>1968</u>	<u>1969</u>	<u>1970</u>	<u>1971</u>	<u>1972</u>	<u>1973</u>	<u>1974</u>	<u>1975</u>	<u>1976</u>	<u>1977</u>	<u>1978</u>	<u>TOTAL</u> ¹	
Kidnaping	1	3	32	17	11	37	25	38	30	22	27	243	(8.0)
Barricade-hostage	0	0	5	1	3	8	9	14	4	5	11	60	(2.0)
Letter bombing	3	4	3	1	92	22	16	3	11	2	5	162	(5.3)
Incendiary bombing	12	22	53	30	15	31	37	20	91	57	69	437	(14.4)
Explosive bombing	67	97	104	115	106	136	239	169	176	131	133	1,473	(48.4)
Armed attack	11	13	8	8	9	10	21	11	21	14	36	162	(5.3)
Hijacking ²	3	11	21	9	14	6	8	4	6	8	3	93	(3.0)
Assassination	7	4	46	12	10	18	12	20	48	23	29	199	(6.5)
Theft, break-in	3	7	22	10	1	0	8	8	5	0	12	76	(2.5)
Sniping	3	2	7	3	4	3	3	9	14	6	9	63	(2.1)
Other actions ³	1	3	11	10	4	4	4	1	7	11	20	76	(2.5)

¹Figures in parentheses are percentages of the total accounted for by each category of attack.

²Includes hijackings by means of air, sea, or land transport, but excludes numerous nonterrorist hijackings.


³Includes occupation of facilities without hostage seizure, shootouts with police, and sabotage.

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


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Prospects for Conventional Arms Transfer Restraints
in Southeast Asia 

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The outlook for cooperation among less developed countries (LDCs) in developing effective regional arms control regimes in various parts of the world falls among the more important factors that must be considered when charting US efforts to curb international conventional arms transfers (CAT). This general subject will be addressed again in a forthcoming assessment of the climate for arms control in Southeast Asia.



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
Trade in conventional arms has been relatively less active in Southeast Asia than in other regions, but is growing steadily in both volume and number of suppliers. Total arms sales and assistance to the nine Southeast Asian states during the 1973-77 period was approximately US \$2.8 billion, or 3.5 percent of total world sales over that five-year period.** The five members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations--Indonesia, Malaysia,



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**The nine are Burma, Indonesia, Kampuchea, Laos, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam. See Tables 1-5 for details.

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








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Major Arms Suppliers to Southeast Asia (1973-77)

Table 5

**Total Sales and Percentages
(Millions of US Dollars)
Percent**



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*Excluding US sales to Kampuchea, Laos and South Vietnam.



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25X1 the Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand--received 72 percent, the three Indochina states--Kampuchea, Laos, and Vietnam--27 percent, and Burma, one percent of the total transfers. The United States dominated the ASEAN market (51 percent), while the Soviet Union dominated the Indochina market (82 percent). Other suppliers--mainly West European nations, Australia, and several LDCs to the ASEAN states, and China to the Indochina states--provided smaller amounts of military assistance and equipment on cash or credit terms. For the near future, arms transfers will probably continue to flow along already established supply lines. [REDACTED]

Despite the small volume of arms sales to Southeast Asia and the absence of an arms race among the recipient or the supplier states, political and ideological competition divides the region into rival supplier-recipient groups and presents significant obstacles to establishing broad and effective restraints on conventional arms transfers. The extent to which arms restraints win the voluntary cooperation of the regional and other states concerned will depend on the nature and strength of the motives driving both suppliers and recipients, the nature of such restraints, and the manner in which they are negotiated and implemented. [REDACTED]

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Motives for Buying Arms

Recipient states buy--and produce--arms for complex reasons involving internal security against insurgencies, national prestige and pride, self-reliance and independence from foreign sources, and defense against external threats. There is currently no arms race and little chance of armed conflict between the two groups of recipients--ASEAN and Indochina. [REDACTED]

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The emergence of a new and pro-Vietnam regime in Kampuchea has had a significant impact on ASEAN perceptions of the Sino-Soviet rivalry and of Vietnamese ambitions in the region--largely by confirming suspicions. In the short term, the ASEAN states are not likely to react to the Vietnamese move in Kampuchea by heavily arming themselves or by forming a mutual defense pact. Nonetheless, over the longer term, this development adds pressure on these nations to continue to buy arms and, possibly, to accelerate their purchase

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schedules. The volume and sophistication of these arms purchases will be constantly constrained, however, by supply and budgetary restrictions. [redacted]

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Although they have always been suspicious of the ASEAN nations' relationship with the United States, the three Indochina states do not consider the ASEAN states a serious military threat. Their main reasons for acquiring arms have been to build military capabilities against each other, the USSR or China. Vietnam and Laos will probably continue to receive military assistance, possibly of increasingly higher sophistication and volume, from the USSR. The new regime in Kampuchea will benefit indirectly from Soviet assistance to Vietnam. [redacted]

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Supply of Arms

Supplier states supply arms to promote existing or expanding political and economic leverage. Strategic concerns are of relatively minor importance in motivating arms sales to the ASEAN states but they are a factor of growing importance in Soviet assistance to Vietnam. [redacted]

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West European and LDC arms suppliers to the ASEAN states have indicated growing interest in expanding relations--and arms sales--to this market. Specific problems with US sales restrictions and general dissatisfaction with the high cost and unreliability of the US supply line have motivated the ASEAN countries to shop elsewhere. ASEAN decisions to buy more from non-US suppliers could enhance the potential for competition among these suppliers for the US share of the market. [redacted]

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Conditions Influencing Possible Arms Restraint

The implicitly hostile division of supplier-recipient relationships into rival groups would, on the one hand, make it essential that all participate in an arms restraint regime and, on the other hand, make it difficult to reach an agreement on broad and effective CAT curbs in Southeast Asia. This problem has several components:

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- While the non-Communist suppliers--the West European nations and the LDCs--might be persuaded to agree to some form of restraint, the intensity of the Sino-Soviet rivalry in the region would make it difficult for both China and the USSR to reach an agreement on CAT controls.
- With the recent emergence of a pro-Vietnamese-- and by extension, pro-Soviet--regime in Kampuchea, China has lost its closest ally in Southeast Asia and an important battle in its efforts to curtail Soviet influence in Indochina. Although China is not currently a major arms supplier to the region, it is considered a major power and would have to be included in any negotiations on restraining arms sales.
- The USSR might be willing to discuss CAT restraints in Southeast Asia if it can protect its special interests in Vietnam, Laos, and Kampuchea, and if it sees an opportunity to exploit conflicts of interest between China and the West or among Western arms suppliers. Under such conditions, however, CAT negotiations would be meaningless.
- Vietnam's attitude toward CAT controls will be influenced by both its own and Soviet interests. Despite its friendship and cooperation treaty with the USSR, Hanoi has attempted to maintain a degree of independent action and would probably be reluctant to restrict its ability to acquire arms from either the Soviets or other suppliers.
- The ASEAN states would not accept CAT controls without the full participation of the Soviet Union, China, and Vietnam.

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Implications for the United States

At present, the major implication for US policy lies in the impact of a CAT restraint proposal on relations with the ASEAN countries. Gaining a sympathetic hearing by the ASEAN states on arms matters will depend not only on the substance of the proposed restraints, but also on the manner in which the proposal is presented and the extent to which the respective governments are consulted during the process. The five states would probably oppose any restrictions on their abilities to improve the quality of their forces in accordance with their own perceptions of their requirements for individual and collective self-defense, but they might be inclined to support controls on the introduction of highly sophisticated or clearly provocative types of weapons to the region--largely because none currently plan to acquire them. [REDACTED]

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Their preference for relying on the United States, not only for arms but also for political and security support, their general dislike of the USSR, and their desire not to antagonize Vietnam (which has the largest military establishment in Southeast Asia) or China (whose intentions they suspect) would make the ASEAN states especially sensitive to extraregional initiatives without close prior consultation. [REDACTED]

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In the long run, a US-initiated or sponsored proposal to restrict arms sales to Southeast Asia could have the adverse impact of straining relations with the ASEAN group. Military assistance from the United States has long been regarded by the ASEAN states as a key symbolic barometer of US concern for their security and, by implication, for regional stability. US security assurances have helped to obviate the need for these nations to depend on alternate suppliers or to maintain large arms inventories. [REDACTED]

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During the past few years, however, the ASEAN governments have voiced an uncertainty about the US commitment to their security, and about US military capabilities (particularly, naval forces) in the region. While the ASEAN states clearly prefer US equipment, they have already demonstrated a readiness

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to turn to other suppliers and to undertake local production. Under these circumstances, attempts to place restraints on arms sales, particularly if initiated or sponsored by the United States, could further undermine confidence in Washington's reliability and could motivate these states to increase their arms purchases generally and to rely more heavily on non-US sources of supply.



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
TABLE 1

Arms Sales to Southeast Asia*
1973-1977, by Supplier
(Millions of US Dollars)

YEAR	1973		1974		1975		1976		1977		TOTAL (1973-1977)		Percentage of Worldwide Sales
	Amt	%SEA	Amt	%SEA	Amt	%SEA	Amt	%SEA	Amt	%SEA	Amt	%SEA	
United States	110	24	114.2	22	172.5	39	217.5	30.3	406.6	74	1,020.8	37	3
USSR	210	46	169	33	124.4	23	97.2	13.5	8.4	1.3	609	22	2.3
Netherlands	--	--	35.6	7	--	--	174	24.3	--	--	209.6	7.5	42
West Germany	9.9	2.2	9.3	2	30	5.6	10.5	1.5	100	18.5	159.7	5.5	3.5
Spain	--	--	6	1.2	100	19	--	--	4.5	.9	110.5	4	26
China	47.3	10.3	53.9	10.6	8.8	1.6	--	--	--	--	110	4	13
Sweden	2.7	0.6	21.3	4	--	--	79.3	11	--	--	103.3	3.7	32
Australia	7.3	1.6	59	12	6.7	1.2	1.2	0.2	0.2	0.5	74.4	2.6	36
United Kingdom	1.7	0.4	19.8	4	24.2	4.5	11.4	1.6	17	3	74.1	2.6	1
Italy	4.6	1	2.5	0.5	3.7	0.7	60	8	--	--	70.8	2.5	2.5
France	23.3	5.1	--	--	14	2.6	4.5	0.6	--	--	41.8	1.5	0.4
Singapore	30.1	6.6	6.5	1.3	4	0.7	--	--	--	--	40.6	1.5	95
Rep. of Korea	--	--	--	--	--	--	35	5	0.9	0.2	35.9	1.3	2.3
Israel	5	1.1	--	--	1.2	0.2	13.5	2	4.4	0.9	24.1	1	8
Yugoslavia	1.8	0.4	2.2	0.4	5.3	1	10.9	1.5	0.3	0.05	20.5	0.7	2.4
Other	3.3	0.7	10.2	2	4.7	0.9	3.8	0.5	6	1.1	71.6	2.6	
TOTAL	457		509.2		499.5		718.8		548.3		2,776.7		

*Sales are understood to mean agreements not deliveries. US sales by fiscal year, all others by calendar year. Excluding US sales to South Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia.

SOURCE: DIA Foreign Military Assistance Handbook; OER Trade and Aid Statistics



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
TABLE 2
Arms Sales to ASEAN
1973-1977, by Supplier
(Millions of US Dollars)*
(Amount to ASEAN, Supplier's Percentage of Total to ASEAN,
Percentage of Supplier's Worldwide Sales and Non-Communist Third World Sales)

YEAR SUPPLIER	1973		1974		1975		1976		1977		1973-1977			
	Amt	%ASEAN	Amt	%ASEAN	Amt	%ASEAN	Amt	%ASEAN	Amt	%ASEAN	TOTAL	%ASEAN	%WW	%Non-Communist Third World
United States**	109.7	56	114.1	40	172.4	52	217.2	36	406	75	1,019.4	51	3	25
Netherlands	--	--	35.6	12.5	--	--	174	29	--	--	209.6	10	42	52
West Germany	3.5	5	7.9	3	30	7.5	--	--	100	19	147.4	7	3.5	6
Spain	--	--	6	2	100	25	--	--	4.5	1	110.5	5.5	26	27
Sweden	2.7	1	21.3	7	--	--	79.3	13	--	--	103.3	5	32	63
Australia	7.3	3.5	59	21	6.7	2	1.2	0.2	0.2	0.05	74.4	4	36	36
United Kingdom	1.7	1	19.8	7	24.2	6	11.4	1.8	17	3.1	74.1	4	1	1
Italy	4.6	2	2.5	1	2	0.5	60	10	--	--	69.1	3	2.5	3
Singapore	30.1	15	6.5	2	4	1	--	--	--	--	40.6	2	95	96
France	23.3	12	--	--	14	3.7	--	--	--	--	37.3	2	0.4	0.5
Rep. of Korea	--	--	--	--	--	--	35	5.5	0.9	0.1	35.9	2	2.3	2.3
Israel	5	2	--	--	1	0.3	13.5	2.1	4.4	0.8	23.9	1	8	8.5
Yugoslavia	1.8	1	2.2	1	5.3	1	10.9	2	0.3	0.05	20.5	1	2.4	2.4
Other	3.2	1.5	10.2	3.5	3.9	1	27.1	0.4	5.4	0.9	49.8	2.5		
TOTAL	199.0		285.2		364.3		604.8		538.7		2,015.8			

*Sales are understood to mean agreements not deliveries. US sales by fiscal year, all others by calendar year; percentages rounded off.

**Excluding sales to South Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia.

SOURCE: DIA Foreign Military Assistance Handbook, March 1978; OER Trade and Aid Statistics



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TABLE 3

Arms Sales to Indochina*
1973-1977, by Supplier
(Millions of US Dollars)**

(Amount to Indochina, Supplier's Percentage of Total to Indochina,
Percentage of Supplier's Worldwide Sales)

YEAR SUPPLIER	1973		1974		1975		1976		1977		1973-1977		%WW
	Amt	%Indo	Amt	%Indo	Amt	%Indo	Amt	%Indo	Amt	%Indo	TOTAL	%Indo	
USSR	210	78	168.7	76	124.4	93	97.2	92	8.4	88	608.7	82	2.3
China	47.3	18	53.9	24	8.8	7	--	--	--	--	110	15	13
Other	10.3	4	--	--	--	--	8.1	8	1.3	12	19.7	3	
TOTAL	267.6		222.6		133.2		105.3		9.7		738.4		

*Kampuchea, Laos, and Vietnam; excluding US sales to South Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia from 1973-1975.

Arms Sales to Burma
1973-1977, by Supplier
(Millions of US Dollars)**

YEAR SUPPLIER	1973		1974		1975		1976		1977		1973-1977	
	Amt	%Indo	Amt	%Indo	Amt	%Indo	Amt	%Indo	Amt	%Indo	TOTAL	%Indo
West Germany	0.4		1.4		--		10.5		--		12.3	
France	--		--		--		4.5		--		4.5	
Switzerland	--		--		--		1.5		0.6		2.1	
Italy	--		--		1.7		--		--		1.7	
United States	0.3		0.1		0.1		0.3		0.6		1.4	
USSR	--		0.3		--		--		--		0.3	
Israel	--		--		0.2		--		--		0.2	
TOTAL	0.7		1.5		2		16.8		1.2		22.5	

**All sales by calendar year; percentages rounded off; sales are understood to mean agreements not deliveries.

SOURCE: DIA Foreign Military Assistance Handbook, March 1978; OER Trade and Aid Statistics



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
TABLE 4

Arms Sales to Southeast Asia
1973-77, By Recipient
(Millions of US Dollars)

<u>Recipient</u>	<u>1973</u>	<u>1974</u>	<u>1975</u>	<u>1976</u>	<u>1977</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>	<u>TOTAL (Percent)</u>
Indonesia	17.6	99.5	194.7	255.1	124.3	691.2	25
Vietnam*	267.6	222.6	131.4	55.3	9.7	686.6	24.7
Thailand	88.6	58.6	47.4	141.8	150.7	487.1	17
Philippines	31.5	48.3	78.5	71.7	93.9	323.9	12
Malaysia	41	61.2	22.1	102.3	49.4	276	10
Singapore	20.2	17.5	20.8	58.7	120.4	237.6	8
Laos*	--	--	1.1	50	--	51.1	2
Burma	0.4	1.7	1.9	16.5	0.6	22.5	1
Kampuchea*	--	--	0.7	--	--	0.7	0.3
						<u>\$2,776.7</u>	

Source: DIA Foreign Military Assistance Handbook, March 1978
OER Trade and Aid Statistics

*Excluding US sales.



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[Redacted]

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Overview of LDC Attitudes Toward the International
Nonproliferation Regime [Redacted]

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Developing countries will raise many of their concerns--especially calls for transfer of nuclear technology for peaceful purposes and an end to the superpower arms race--at the Second Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference, to be held in May 1980. Increasing demand by less developed countries (LDCs) for nuclear power, in particular, may split the conference along North-South lines on a number of issues important to the United States.* In preparation for the conference, the International Issues Division of the Office of Regional and Political Analysis will publish a series of profiles examining the views of selected LDCs on nuclear affairs. This article begins the series by outlining the general attitudes and demands of the developing countries. [Redacted]

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* * *

The Changing Energy Environment

While the interest of developing countries in nuclear energy and disarmament long predates the 1968 Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), their early efforts in the nuclear power field were largely symbolic--centering on the acquisition of small research reactors that were generally as important for prestige purposes as they might have been for scientific applications. The LDCs attached little urgency to building nuclear power plants until the 1973 oil embargo demonstrated the susceptibility of their traditional energy supplies to external events. As oil prices rose and the developing countries found themselves unable to win price concessions from OPEC, they began to consider turning to nuclear power as a desirable alternative. The nuclear supplier states,

[Redacted]

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competing for profitable contracts, encouraged this trend. The developing world now has 28 nuclear power plants in existence or under construction. [REDACTED]

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The turn to nuclear power, accompanied by demands for increased access to nuclear technology, has complicated LDC relations with the nuclear supplier states. Only a few countries--advanced Western nations and the Soviet Union--have the industrial base necessary to produce nuclear power reactors for export. (Several others have successfully constructed power plants for domestic use.) The same set of developed nations generally controls nuclear supplies, such as fuel and heavy water. Moreover, nations within this group also control the bulk of existing nuclear weapons. This control--"monopoly"--over the world's nuclear assets has drawn increasing fire from the developing world, giving a North-South dimension to nuclear affairs that is becoming increasingly troublesome, particularly to the United States. [REDACTED]

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Access to Technology

In pushing for access to peaceful nuclear technology, the LDCs cite Article IV of the NPT. This article acknowledges the "inalienable right" of all treaty parties to develop nuclear technology for peaceful purposes, with special attention to be devoted to nonnuclear weapons states (NNWS) and developing countries.* [REDACTED]

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The growing LDC interest in nuclear energy has triggered changes in international nuclear politics that reinforce the North-South, supplier-consumer tensions inherent in the international nonproliferation regime. Since the conclusion of the NPT, the views of supplier

*Article IV was included in the NPT to induce NNWS to undertake the formal commitment to forgo nuclear weapons development by balancing NNWS rights and obligations. In a similar balance, the International Atomic Energy Agency was given the dual responsibility of promoting peaceful use of nuclear energy and inspecting for compliance with international safeguards. [REDACTED]

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25X1 countries concerning peaceful applications of nuclear technology have undergone considerable revision. Led by the United States, these countries have evinced a growing reluctance to export the most sophisticated technology to developing nations because of its possible use in nuclear weapons development programs. Requirements for renegotiation of nuclear contracts in compliance with the US Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978 heightened the sensitivity of nuclear consumer countries to their vulnerability to changes in supplier policy. [REDACTED]

25X1 The LDCs view the curbs on nuclear exports as direct violations of Article IV obligations. At the coming review conference, these countries are certain to demand an end to such discriminatory treatment and a return to the Article IV undertaking. Continued failure of the advanced countries to live up to the LDCs' expectations in this area could cause them to reconsider their commitments to the NPT, possibly leading to the eventual withdrawal of some of them and the consequent weakening of the international nonproliferation regime.* [REDACTED]

Nuclear Discrimination

Nuclear programs have become a symbol of national development and status in the Third World. This has contributed to LDC sensitivity to the preferred treatment accorded to the nuclear weapons states under the terms of the NPT. The requirement for the application of International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards, reinforced by on-site inspections, to the nuclear facilities of NNWS signatories of the NPT has been a source of irritation to the LDCs. To be equitable, in their view, the NPT should place safeguards on the nuclear facilities of all signatory states, regardless of nuclear weapons status. The United States and the United Kingdom have offered to place their civilian nuclear facilities under safeguards, but the Soviet Union--the other nuclear weapons state signatory to

*All parties to the NPT have the right to withdraw from the Treaty with cause after giving three months' notice. [REDACTED]

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the NPT--has not.* The US-UK offer is unlikely to defuse LDC objections to this aspect of the Treaty in any case, since the two countries continue to exempt military facilities and nuclear weapons stockpiles from international inspection, thus perpetuating their privileged status. [redacted]

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The developing countries have also attempted to gain greater representation on the IAEA executive organ, the Board of Governors. At present, LDCs hold 18 of the 34 Board seats. By increasing their ability to dominate the Board, expanded LDC representation would enhance the influence of developing countries on nuclear affairs and their ability to promote their particular concerns. Furthermore, it would confirm the legitimacy of their interest in nuclear development. [redacted]

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Nuclear Disarmament

Demands by the LDCs for increased access to nuclear technology are complemented by their calls for nuclear disarmament. Their demands on this issue frequently cite Article VI of the NPT, which represents an effort to balance the obligation of the NNWS to forgo nuclear weapons development with pledges that the nuclear weapons states signatory to the Treaty will seek an end to the nuclear arms race with the ultimate objective of achieving complete disarmament. [redacted]

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As one means of furthering realization of the Article VI undertaking, the LDCs have specifically urged the superpowers to conclude a second strategic arms limitations treaty and a comprehensive test ban (CTB). Signature of these treaties could take place before the NPT Review Conference. If it does, some developing countries may express qualified approval of these treaties, but the more outspoken LDCs may denounce them as inadequate, especially if they are for limited terms. LDC skepticism about the disarmament value of the treaties will probably be reinforced by

*France and the People's Republic of China have not signed the NPT. [redacted]

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public debate on the merits of such arms control agreements. Developing country critics of the US-USSR agreements will demand the destruction of remaining nuclear stockpiles of the weapons states and a permanent end to what they term vertical proliferation, that is, the development of increasingly sophisticated nuclear capabilities by the nuclear weapons states. Neither a second strategic arms treaty nor CTB is thus likely substantially to defuse LDC demands for superpower nuclear disarmament. [REDACTED]

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Traditionally, the developing countries have made nuclear disarmament a precondition to their willingness to discuss conventional arms control. This linkage is now eroding, possibly because of the progress--however slow and inadequate--in nuclear arms control. In the Program of Action issued at the conclusion of the UN Special Session on Disarmament (SSOD) in June 1978, the LDCs agreed to recognize conventional armaments as a "priority" item for disarmament discussion. Nevertheless, they continue to stress nuclear weapons in their call for arms reduction. [REDACTED]

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LDC statements also link superpower arms control arrangements with an increase in the money that they believe should be available from those countries for Third World development programs. They argue that military buildups divert funds that by rights should be devoted to improving conditions in the developing world and that therefore they are entitled to any money saved through arms control arrangements. They have attempted--and failed--to gain formal acceptance of this linkage at a variety of international meetings, including the SSOD, but can be expected to continue to pursue this goal at the NPT Review Conference. Thus, even though they will probably be dissatisfied with the strategic arms control treaties, they will still demand increased superpower funding for development projects. [REDACTED]

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Negative Assurances

To offset the lack of satisfactory progress toward nuclear disarmament and the perceived disadvantages of NNWS status, the LDCs have urged the nuclear weapons

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25X1 states to undertake negative assurances, that is, to enter into agreements not to use nuclear weapons against NNWS.* The nuclear weapons states have been willing to make qualified unilateral statements that limit their individual freedom to use their nuclear arsenals but that generally fall short of the sweeping commitments desired by the developing countries. The final declaration issued by the SSOD acknowledged these unilateral statements but called for more effective measures to avoid the use of nuclear weapons, particularly against NNWS. [redacted]

25X1 The NPT presently does not contain any provision governing, or limiting, potential use of nuclear weapons. The developing countries, having failed to convince the nuclear weapons states to accede in their demands for negative assurances at the SSOD, are likely to attempt to force incorporation of negative assurance language into the NPT itself, or, at a minimum, into the Conference Report.** [redacted]

Role of the Nonaligned Movement

25X1 The developing countries voice their nuclear demands in a variety of international forums, with India and Yugoslavia as their most aggressive representatives. Yugoslavia is a signatory of the NPT, but India has refused to sign because of the treaty's alleged "discriminatory nature." [redacted]

Yugoslavia has been trying to create a consensus on nuclear energy within the nonaligned movement. Last month, Belgrade hosted a meeting of nonaligned countries calling themselves the Nonaligned Countries Coordinating

25X1 [redacted]

25X1 **The NPT can be amended with the approval of a majority of all parties to the Treaty, including all the nuclear weapons states party to the Treaty and all members of the IAEA Board of Governors. [redacted]

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Group for the Peaceful Use of Nuclear Energy.* The conference was attended by most of the group's 14 member states but was boycotted by other major developing country nuclear users, such as India. The final conference document reiterated traditional LDC demands concerning nuclear energy and disarmament. Significantly, it also called for coordination of the LDC positions to be taken at the NPT Review Conference. [REDACTED]

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The developing countries can be expected to accelerate their preparations for the review conference during the coming months. Nonaligned demands, particularly for increased access to advanced nuclear technology and more progress in superpower disarmament, promise to be a troublesome factor at the NPT Review Conference. The United States, as a major power behind the drive to curb the export of sensitive nuclear technology, will probably be singled out for particular criticism by the LDCs in that forum. [REDACTED]

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*Members of the group are Algeria, Argentina, Central African Empire, Cuba, Egypt, Ethiopia, Gabon, Indonesia, Libya, Morocco, Niger, Nigeria, Tunisia, and Yugoslavia. India was invited to join the group but decided not to. The Central African Empire and Niger did not attend the December meeting. The next group meeting is slated to be held in Algeria this spring. [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

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Sofia: Toward a World Communist Conference?

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From 12-15 December 1978, delegations from 73 Communist or pro-Communist parties, including 21 party chiefs and 79 politburo, secretariat and central committee members, attended a conference at Sofia, Bulgaria, held under the rubric "Construction of Socialism and Communism and World Development." The conference appears to have been a prelude to further multilateral party gatherings over the next year or so. As the theme of the December meeting suggests, the Soviets and their Communist party colleagues may attempt to use such conferences to focus attention on a number of global issues, such as detente, disarmament, relations between industrially advanced and less developed countries, and human rights. If the Sofia experience is an indication, however, such substantive issues are likely to receive less attention than inter-Communist rivalries.

[REDACTED]

* * *

The Soviets appear to be trying to organize a high-level worldwide gathering of Communist parties, despite the troubles encountered at a lower level meeting held last month in Sofia.

[REDACTED]

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Even before the Sofia meeting, the Soviets began sounding out the idea of holding such a conference in the near future. Whether the Sofia conference was a positive step toward this goal is not clear, but the kind and the extent of the coverage given to it by Soviet media suggest that the Soviets feel that the results of the Sofia meeting were not entirely negative, and that a further and more ambitious effort to convene a world gathering is worthwhile.

[REDACTED]


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The Sofia meeting, apparently hastily arranged by the Soviets sometime in late October, was largely devoted to a broad attack on China and thinly veiled criticism of

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Romania for being out of step with the rest of the Warsaw Pact countries on such issues as opposition to China and increasing military expenditures. All East European delegations and most of the other pro-Soviet parties represented were led by high-ranking party officials. By contrast, the delegations from the major West European Communist parties that have kept the Soviets at arms length for some time--including the Italian, French, and Spanish--were headed by their relatively low-ranking representatives to the editorial board of the journal "Problems of Peace and Socialism."



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Available information on the Sofia meeting and the continuing polemical exchanges between Moscow and Bucharest indicate that the conference did not change the attitudes or tactics of the independently minded Communist parties with regard to such key issues as opposition to China and increasing Warsaw Pact military expenditures.

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An additional sign of Soviet difficulties at Sofia was the absence of Yugoslavia, signaling Belgrade's continuing opposition to Soviet policies. [redacted]

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The difficulties the Soviets encountered at Sofia are likely to bedevil any attempt in the near term to convene a major international Communist gathering. The last worldwide meeting was in Moscow in 1969, while the last gathering of European Communist parties was held in East Berlin in 1976. The latter, initiated by the Soviets to mobilize the European parties against the Chinese, was preceded by two years of intense consultations and was convened only after the Soviets agreed to Romanian, Yugoslav, and Eurocommunist demands to recognize the independence of each Communist party. Soviet attempts to hold another summit conference will be viewed by these parties as an effort by Moscow to erode the earlier progress toward independence. The leaders of the Italian and French Communist parties have recently reasserted their categorical opposition to either a world, or even an all-European, gathering of Communist parties under Soviet sponsorship. Failure of the Sofia participants to issue a joint communique testifies to the determined resistance of several of the Communist parties in attendance to Soviet attempts to bring them in line. Some of the parties that did not attend the Sofia conference (for example, the Yugoslavs) may try to organize a boycott of any Soviet-sponsored, worldwide Communist summit meeting. Even some of those who were represented at Sofia (especially those who sent lower level representatives) may join such a move. [redacted]

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[redacted]

The Soviet media have not only described the Sofia meeting as marking a "new stage" in the Communist movement, but have dropped hints that Moscow would like to repeat the experience on a larger scale. The Soviets may believe that they have little choice but to make such an effort. They may be sufficiently concerned over China's opening to the West--both to Western governments and

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West European Communist parties--as well as over increasing Chinese diplomatic activities in Eastern Europe to settle for whatever vocal support they might be able to get.

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PARTICIPANTS AT THE SOFIA IDEOLOGICAL CONFERENCE

12 - 15 December 1978

<u>Ruling Parties</u> (12)	<u>Level of Representation</u>
Bulgarian Communist Party	Politburo
Communist Party of Cuba	Central Committee
Communist Party of Czechoslovakia	Politburo; Secretariat
Ethiopia	Provisional Military Council
Socialist Unity Party of Germany	Politburo; Secretariat
Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party	Secretariat
Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party	Secretariat
Polish United Workers' Party	Secretariat
Romanian Communist Party	Executive Council
Communist Party of the Soviet Union	Politburo
Communist Party of Vietnam	Central Committee
Mozambique Liberation Front (Frelimo)	Central Committee
 <u>Non-Ruling Parties</u> (6)	
Socialist Vanguard Party (Algeria)	(Unknown)
Communist Party of Argentina	Central Committee
Communist Party of Austria	Chairman
Communist Party of Bangladesh	Secretariat
Communist Party of Belgium	Central Committee
Communist Party of Bolivia	Central Committee
Brazilian Communist Party	Secretary General
Communist Party of Canada	Secretary General
Communist Party of Chile	Central Committee
Communist Party of Colombia	(Unknown)
Congolese Labour Party	(Unknown)
Popular Vanguard Party (Costa Rica)	Politburo
Reconstruction Party of the Working People (Cyprus)	Deputy Secretary General
Communist Party of Denmark	Chairman
Dominican Communist Party	Central Committee
Communist Party of Ecuador	Politburo
Communist Party of Egypt	Politburo
Communist Party of El Salvador	PPS*

*Member of Editorial Board of Problems of Peace and Socialism.

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<u>Non-Ruling Parties (Cont.)</u>	<u>Level of Representation</u>
Communist Party of Finland	Politburo
French Communist Party	PPS
Communist Party of (West) Germany	Chairman
Communist Party of Great Britain	PPS
Communist Party of Greece	Secretary General
Guatemalan Party of Labor	Central Committee
People's Progressive Party of Guyana	Secretariat
Unified Party of Haitian Communist	(Unknown)
Communist Party of Honduras	Politburo, Chairman
Communist Party of India	Secretariat
Communist Party of Indonesia	(Unknown)
Tudeh Party of Iran	First Secretary
Iraqi Communist Party	First Secretary
Irish Workers' Party	Secretary General
Communist Party of Israel (Rakah)	Secretary General
Italian Communist Party	PPS
Japan Communist Party	Central Committee
Jordanian Communist Party	Politburo
Lebanese Communist Party	Secretary General
Communist Party of Luxembourg	Central Committee
Communist Party of Malta	Central Committee
Mexican Communist Party	Executive Commission of Central Committee
Party of Progress and Socialism (Morocco)	Central Committee
Communist Party of the Netherlands	(Unknown)
Communist Party of Norway	Chairman
People's Party of Panama	Central Committee
Paraguayan Communist Party	First Secretary
Peruvian Communist Party	Secretary General
Philippines Communist Party	PPS
Portuguese Communist Party	Secretary General
South African Communist Party	Politburo, Secretariat
Communist Party of Spain	Below Central Committee Level
Sri Lanka Communist Party	Politburo
Sudanese Communist Party	Politburo
Left Party Communists (Sweden)	(Unknown)
Swiss Party of Labor	Politburo, Secretariat
Syrian Communist Party	Politburo
Communist Party of Turkey	Secretary General
Communist Party, USA	Secretary General
Communist Party of Uruguay	First Secretary
Communist Party of Venezuela	Politburo, Secretariat
Socialist Unity Party of West Berlin	Chairman
Socialist Party of Yemen	Central Committee

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NONPARTICIPANTS AT THE SOFIA IDEOLOGICAL CONFERENCE
(UNCLASSIFIED)

12 - 15 December 1978

Ruling Parties (6)

Albanian Party of Labor
Communist Party of Kampuchea (Cambodia)
Chinese Communist Party
Korean Workers' Party
Laos People's Revolutionary Party
League of Communists of Yugoslavia

Non-Ruling Parties (21)

People's Democratic Party (Afghanistan)
Socialist Party of Australia
Burma Communist Party (White Flag)
Faroe Islands Communist Party
Guadeloupe Communist Party
Jamaican Communist Party
Communist Party of Lesotho
Communist Party of Malaya
Martinique Communist Party
Communist Party of Nepal
New Zealand Socialist Unity Party
Socialist Party of Nicaragua
"Nigerian Marxist-Leninists"
Communist Party of Pakistan
Puerto Rican Communist Party
Reunion Communist Party
Communist Party of San Marino
Saudi Arabian Communist Party
African Independence Party of Senegal
Communist Party of Thailand
Tunisian Communist Party

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Secret

Secret