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International Issues Review

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INTERNATIONAL ISSUES REVIEW

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The LDCs are frustrated over what they regard as a sluggish response by industrial countries to their demand for a greater share of political and economic power. Their frustration could lead to verbal slugging matches at this fall's session, but probably not to a full-scale clash.

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
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Agricultural production in the food-importing poorer countries is still generally not able to keep pace with population growth, and their dependence on imports is growing. Some countries have been able to build substantial reserves, however, and the UN system is better equipped to deal with a future food crisis than it was in 1972-74.

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INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM IN 1978: PRELIMINARY OBSERVATIONS

Most established patterns of international terrorist behavior in 1977 have continued into 1978, including attacks on Western diplomatic and business facilities, an emphasis on simple types of operations, and a preference for striking targets in industrialized democracies.* Significant changes have included attacks involving mass casualties, the spread of international terrorism to Central America, and setbacks to several major European and Palestinian terrorist organizations. The year so far has also seen East European antiterrorist cooperation with the West and the first international antihijacking agreement with potentially effective enforcement measures.

* * *

Techniques and Targets

Despite the publicity given to occasionally sophisticated operations (e.g., the kidnaping of Italy's Aldo Moro, the reciprocal assassination campaign between Fatah and the Iraqis, and the Sandinist takeover of Nicaragua's legislative chambers), most terrorist attacks continue to be simple bombings, arsons, snipings, or threats. Officials and businessmen--especially individuals that are symbols of Western power and wealth--are still the primary targets. Tourists and other private citizens are victimized only incidentally (e.g., as passengers on a hijacked airliner).

One innovation in technique and targeting that caused widespread alarm was the poisoning of Israeli oranges in Western Europe. This operation--believed to be the work of Arab terrorists--showed an unusual willingness to relinquish control over the choice of individual targets. The Abadan, Iran, theater fire in which



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at least 377 died--an equally indiscriminate operation--as well as the downing of a Rhodesian civilian airliner with heat-seeking missiles, may indicate that at least some groups are becoming less worried about harming potential supporters or innocent bystanders. This development has disturbing implications for the debate on whether terrorists would ever resort to atomic, biological, or chemical (ABC) weapons. Up to now, arguments against the likelihood that terrorists would use ABC weapons hinged on their previous unwillingness to inflict mass casualties or to give up the ability to select specific targets.

Regional Patterns

Most attacks still occur in the major industrialized countries. But in Latin America the geographic locus of terrorism shifted. While guerrilla violence has declined in its historic arena--the Southern Cone--it has spread to Central America, most notably Guatemala, El Salvador, and Nicaragua. Kidnapings in San Salvador of Swedish, Japanese, and local business executives have severely diminished corporate confidence in El Salvador. In Nicaragua, the Sandinist National Liberation Front's takeover of the National Palace in August was that group's greatest success. It secured the release of imprisoned comrades, filled the organization's coffers, and directed enormous international attention to its activities and the Nicaraguan political situation. The new round of civil violence that was sparked by the incident has presented the Somoza government with its most serious challenge in years.

Fortunes of Major Groups

The Italian Red Brigades succeeded in generating international publicity by kidnaping Aldo Moro, the nation's leading political figure. Terrorists also carried out less dramatic attacks against judges, newsmen, police officers, employees of large industries, and middle level political figures, including two attacks on Italian executives of American firms, a target that had previously been spared. Despite press speculation, it is still uncertain whether foreign intelligence services or non-Italian terrorist groups were involved in these actions.

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Other major groups have been less successful than the Red Brigades. West German radicals, while embarrassing governmental officials by conducting a daring prison escape, suffered severe setbacks when a number were arrested in Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, Switzerland, France, the Netherlands, and the United States. While still a potential threat, these anarchists have yet to mount a major international attack this year.

Fatah, generally believed to be the most moderate Palestinian guerrilla group, seized the headlines because of its feud with Iraq and the Black June organization, headed by Fatah dissident Abu Nidhal. Both sides have mounted attacks on each other in capital cities on three continents, with no early end in sight to the feud. Although the vendetta's violence has decreased from the daily battles seen in early August, verbal barrages from both sides continue unabated. Fatah denounces the Baghdad regime almost daily, while Abu Nidhal, already under a 1974 Fatah death sentence, has pledged to assassinate PLO leader Yasir Arafat.

The Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine was dealt a setback with the apparent death by natural causes of Wadi Haddad, noted planner and facilitator of transnational terrorist operations. Although individuals claiming PFLP membership mounted bloody attacks at Orly Airport and on a London street, the future of the Haddad faction remains unclear. It is not yet clear who will replace Haddad, and there is no indication that the majority of the PFLP, led by George Habash, has been successful in wooing the Haddad wing back into the fold.

Revolutionaries around the world, including terrorists, mourned the loss of Henri Curiel, leader of a Paris-based support apparatus that funneled money, arms, documents, training, and other services to scores of leftist groups. While his organization will probably continue to function, no successor has emerged with the contacts and charisma Curiel was able to muster.

The Japanese Red Army continues to be relatively quiescent. The JRA recently sent reminders of their exploits to their former hostages, but have not mounted an operation since last fall's Japanese Airlines hijacking, during which it freed imprisoned comrades, obtained a \$6

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million ransom, and embarrassed the Japanese Government. Although authorities feared that the JRA would seize upon local Japanese political issues--such as the Narita Airport controversy--to forge links with domestic radicals, no local operations have occurred.

The whereabouts of Carlos--the infamous Venezuelan terrorist who led the PFLP - West German team in the 1975 OPEC raid--remain a mystery. His German cohort from that mission claims that Carlos has retired.

The Ananda Marg--an India-based religious group that first appeared last year--seems to have been mollified with the release from an Indian prison of its spiritual leader, Prabhat R. Sarkar. During 1977, activist members of this group conducted attacks against Indian nationals on several continents.

Patron State Support

Radical Arab states opposed to a political settlement with Israel have continued to work closely with extremist Palestinian terrorist groups. Iraq's use of such surrogates in battling the moderate Fatah was particularly noteworthy.

After having previously used support for national liberation movements as an excuse for footdragging in antiterrorist efforts, East European governments have shown a new spirit of cooperation in combating terrorism. The Bulgarians, clearly with Soviet approval, allowed a West German team to arrest Red Army Faction member Till Meyer and his anarchist associates. The Yugoslavs also arrested four West German terrorists, but are apparently delaying their extradition until Bonn grants Belgrade's request for the return of several Croatian terrorists. Finally, tourists have noted photos of terrorists being checked against incoming passengers by East European guards at border checkpoints. Despite these favorable signs, it is not clear whether the Soviet and East European governments will expand their concern beyond West German radicals and also help to curb Arab terrorist activities.

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Antiterrorist Countermeasures

The development of antiterrorist paramilitary squads may have deterred terrorists from holding hostages for prolonged periods, a type of incident that has been comparatively rare this year. In the one instance that a rescue team was used, however, it proved a dismal failure. An apparent breakdown in communication between Cyprus and Egypt led Cypriot troops to fire on an Egyptian commando contingent that was storming a hijacked airliner in Larnaca Airport.

The most notable development in international cooperation to combat terrorism was a surprise antihijacking proposal by Japan at the Bonn economic summit conference in July. The seven participants agreed to cut off air commerce with nations refusing to extradite or prosecute hijackers and/or to return hijacked planes. This is the first antihijacking agreement that includes an enforcement mechanism. Although many technical and legal questions regarding implementation remain to be answered, the international response has been generally favorable.



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The LOT Airlines Hijacking: Sorting Out the
Jurisdictional Issues

On 30 August, a Polish Airlines (LOT) flight to East Berlin was hijacked by East German citizens and forced to land at Tempelhof Airport in West Berlin. Extradition of the offenders to East Germany has been all but ruled out. Nonetheless, the case raises legal issues--centering around who should try the case--that are complicated by political considerations of East-West relations, Allied supervision of Berlin, and the effectiveness of the Bonn antihijacking agreement.* Pending resolution of these issues, the hijackers remain in the custody of US military police.

* * *

East European Perspectives: The Extradition Issue

On 31 August, the Poles requested that the US Commandant in Berlin extradite the hijackers to Poland. In similar cases of East European hijackings to the West, extradition has been rejected by Western governments, who have preferred to prosecute. American failure to extradite in the present case has offered the East Germans a new opportunity to charge that the US and West Germany are not adhering to the Bonn antihijacking agreement. This attack is off the mark: the Bonn agreement calls for extradition or prosecution of hijackers.

The East German regime is also upset because several East German passengers decided to stay in West Germany. It has demanded their return, but the West Berlin Senat replied that the matter was up to the three Allied powers (UK, France, US). The East German passengers do not need to apply formally for political asylum because under

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West German law they have an automatic right to West German residence. The issue of their return has been quietly dropped by East German officials, who are mainly concerned about the fate of the hijackers.

The Soviets also seized on the LOT case and have issued statements supporting the East German position.

Debate Among the Allied Powers: Who Should Try the Case?

The American preference for a West German trial of the hijackers has been met with strong objections by the French, British, and West Germans.

The French believe that hijacking in Berlin is an Allied matter, since it affects security and air traffic, both areas of reserved rights. They argue that the US, rather than the Germans, should try the hijackers and point to a 1969 precedent in which a specially established French court tried two East Germans who hijacked a LOT plane to Berlin. In addition, the French suggest that a West German court trying the present case would find it difficult to obtain statements and other evidence from the plane's East German passengers.*

The British believe that although the plane landed in the American sector, the interests of all the Allies in Berlin are involved. While they are willing to consider extradition to Poland, they also prefer an American trial. London believes that a West German court might be more lenient than a US court and that an American trial would be perceived by the East as being a better deterrent to potential hijackers. The British--in contrast to the French--believe, however, that conditions have changed since 1969 and note that the Hague and Montreal antihijacking conventions, which have now been signed and extended to Berlin, give the West Germans the legal authority to try the hijackers.

*It is not clear how a non-German court would be able to overcome this particular difficulty.

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The View from Bonn: Domestic Pressures

The LOT hijacking puts West Germany in a politically uncomfortable position. The US wants a West German trial, but several countervailing domestic and international political concerns lead Bonn to prefer that the US assume jurisdiction.

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The West Germans are also concerned about Eastern claims that a West German trial would be an impermissible Allied delegation--if not abrogation--of reserved rights in Berlin, particularly in civil aviation. Bonn fears that such a trial could trigger a Soviet - East German campaign to reduce Allied control over the air corridors to Berlin, a subject to which West Germans are highly sensitive.

Hoping to avoid these difficulties, West Germany has argued that a US court should try the case. Bonn contends that assumption of jurisdiction by West Germany would be counterproductive to Allied interests in several areas:

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- A lenient West German verdict would damage efforts to gain international acceptance for the Bonn antihijacking declaration.
- A West German court might find that the constitutional right of free movement would take precedence over the crime of hijacking. The Bonn administration would not be able to direct the court to rule otherwise and hence would not be able to ensure a severe sentence. This, the West Germans contend, would impair their negotiations with East Germany, which is not sympathetic to problems caused by the independence of the West German judiciary. The inter-German talks, however, include issues more important to East Germany than a hijacker's trial.
- The Soviets and East Germans would object to a Berlin court trial as being an unacceptable exercise of West German sovereignty over West Berlin. The US believes, however, that to agree to an American trial would be tantamount to accepting the validity of Soviet protests against the extension to Berlin of West German ratifications of the Hague and Montreal antihijacking conventions.

While a West German trial might be unpalatable to both West and East Germany, existing legislation provides sufficient authority for the West Germans to prosecute. The principal hijacker has confessed to acts punishable under criminal law in force in West Berlin. An Allied trial would be required only if members of Allied forces or Allied interests were involved. Moreover, the West Germans have quietly admitted that they would probably insist on their right to prosecute under the Hague and Montreal conventions if the hijackers were non-German. The West German representative in the Bonn Group has

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stated that West German authorities will cooperate--reluctantly--if the US directs that the hijacker be turned over to them.*

Conclusion

The effects of the LOT case on the Bonn antihijacking declaration have been minimal. According to the Canadians, West Germany seems to be losing some of its initial enthusiasm for the Bonn declaration, which the West Germans fear may violate international law with its ambiguous and vague phrasing. Despite these second thoughts and the Allies' jurisdictional debate, there have been no perceptible signs of serious erosion in Allied support for the Bonn declaration. The Allied agreement to prosecute, in whatever forum, tends to support this conclusion. No nation outside the Eastern bloc has raised the LOT case in diplomatic channels with any of the seven participants in the Bonn summit. Indeed, the seven nations have been successful in their efforts to increase the number of adherents to the antihijacking declaration.

As expected, the East has reacted adversely to the Western decision not to extradite, claiming that non-extradition of hijackers indicates Western sympathy and aid to "terrorists." This attitude stems from the legacy of incidents in the late 1940s and 1950s, when East European dissidents seized airliners to escape to the West. Lenient Western court sentences for the perpetrators have been a source of irritation to the Soviet and East European regimes ever since. This fundamental disagreement with the Western treatment of Soviet and East European hijackers, has, in turn, affected the possibilities for East-West cooperation against other forms of political terrorism.

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*The Bonn Group is a four-power consultative working-level group composed of representatives from the West German Foreign Office and the three Western Allies, attended, on occasion, by an observer from the West Berlin delegation to Bonn. Formed in the late 1950s, the Bonn Group has played an increasingly important role in coordinating negotiations on all-German matters and the special status of Berlin.

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UNESCO: PROSPECTS FOR THE 20TH GENERAL CONFERENCE

At its 20th General Conference in Paris next month, the UN Educational, Social, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) may be facing its most divisive meeting since 1974 when the membership barred Israeli participation in the European regional group. That act led to a decision by the US Congress temporarily to suspend payment of US dues, amounting to 25 percent of the overall budget. The US has since resumed paying its dues. In introducing or supporting a number of highly contentious issues for consideration by the conference, the UNESCO leadership and some of the less developed countries may be underestimating the impact that adoption of these proposals would have on the industrialized countries in general and on US public and Congressional opinion in particular.

One of the most contentious issues at the General Conference will be approval of the final draft of the declaration on mass media, a document that establishes the principle of state responsibility for all media that enter into or circulate within a country. Director General M'Bow will submit the final draft, and UNESCO will probably adopt a version of it.

- It is likely that the provisions in the declaration will be less stringent than those tabled in previous drafts.
- Significant opposition to the current draft still exists among industrialized nations, and this opposition will diminish only if Director General M'Bow modifies part of the current draft.
- Most of the key LDCs support the draft and are not likely to vote against it. Some of them may be willing to act as a moderating force in behind-the-scenes negotiations.

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-- The Soviet Union and its allies will strongly support the draft and will probably attempt to include more stringent provisions.

Other divisive topics that will be discussed at the UNESCO General Conference this year are not new; they have been the source of tension at previous conferences, and several of them are rooted in the conflict between the Arabs and Israelis. Although no UNESCO body has condemned Israel since 1976, there will be a concerted effort to include anti-Israel proposals in some of the resolutions. Support for this Arab effort will depend to some extent on perceptions of the outcome of the Camp David summit.

* * *

Draft Declaration on Mass Media Principles

A draft declaration on mass media principles has been a contentious issue in UNESCO since it was first suggested by the Soviets at the 1972 UNESCO General Conference. The declaration became a subject of dispute during the next two conferences, and in 1976 a vote on it was postponed. Industrialized nations objected strenuously to the draft introduced at the meeting in 1976, and the Director General was charged with holding "further broad consultations with experts with a view to preparing a final draft which could meet the largest possible measure of agreement." The text that the Director General issued on 21 August is his most recent attempt to present an acceptable draft.

The preamble of the most recent draft emphasizes limitations on freedom of expression. It also includes an implicit reference equating Zionism with racism. The provisions of the draft lay the groundwork for state control of domestic media, state responsibility for its news media overseas, and regulation of local correspondents of foreign news media.

LDC Perspectives: Increased awareness of what the LDCs perceive as an "information imbalance" will hamper possible attempts by the industrialized nations to defer a vote on this issue next month. LDC interest in the declaration has grown in the past few years as they have

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attempted to organize their own news pools and promote exchanges with international news agencies. The non-aligned foreign ministers endorsed these efforts at their meeting in Belgrade last July. The coordinating council of the nonaligned news agencies' pool resolved last April that the UNESCO Director General should submit a mass media declaration to the 20th General Conference for a vote. The council also asked that the principles of the declaration be expanded to include a reference equating Zionism with racism.

Most LDCs probably view the language in the most recent mass media declaration as much milder than in previous drafts. Consequently, they will probably have difficulty comprehending the industrialized countries' objections to it.

The overwhelming majority of LDCs advocate adoption of the draft, but their reasons for doing so vary. Even among the group of LDCs whose long-term involvement in mass media questions precludes any doubt that they will strongly support the text, there are different reasons for supporting the draft.* Some, such as Cuba, Libya, and North Korea, that are active in the coordinating council of the nonaligned news agencies' pool may propose language in the declaration that would further restrict the role of the media and will probably instigate a call for a vote even if the Director General does not introduce the declaration. Others in the group like Mexico and Venezuela are more concerned with correcting the information imbalance through more practical and less rhetorical means and will probably not be active leaders in organizing LDC support for the declaration.

A second group of LDCs will support the draft mainly to ensure their status within the nonaligned movement. Countries such as Nigeria and Tanzania will probably vote for the declaration even though they might not actively

*This group--composed of such countries as Cuba, Algeria, Libya, Vietnam, North Korea, Mexico, and Venezuela--has long espoused the need for a broad series of changes in international communications that are informally termed the New World Information Order. Many of these countries have played a major role in nonaligned or regional news agencies' pools.

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participate in the debate or in the working group negotiations. These LDCs will be the target of persuasion by the activists in the nonaligned news agencies' pool and may be influenced--for extraneous tradeoffs--to push hard for the declaration.

A number of LDCs in the nonaligned movement could work as a moderating force in behind-the-scenes maneuvering on the declaration or in a procedural vote. These countries--which include Yugoslavia, Jordan, and the ASEAN nations--would be unlikely to take a public stand against the declaration, however, for fear of compromising their influence among the nonaligned.

To some LDCs, such as Saudi Arabia, the mass media declaration is a low-priority item. Any attempt to determine the degree of support they will give to the declaration is complicated by the prospect that their policies are likely to be affected by extraneous concerns.

A small but vocal group of LDCs will probably join the Western nations in opposing the draft. Countries like Ivory Coast, Togo, Liberia, Haiti, and Costa Rica have supported Western initiatives in previous conferences and are expected to do so in October. These nations support the ideal of a free press despite, in some cases, government-imposed restrictions on their own press organizations.

Soviet and East European Views: The Soviet Union and the East European countries strongly support the declaration on mass media principles, but their motives differ from those of the LDCs. The Soviets were the first to request UNESCO action on a declaration, and they have a special interest in its adoption. They have also organized several joint projects between the Soviet-sponsored International Organization of Journalists (IOJ) and UNESCO.

The Eastern countries perceive information as essentially a tool of state policy, and they hope to obtain international acknowledgement that all governments have the right to control communications. The Soviets and their allies fear technological changes that open up new means of communication. This concern is reflected in their position in the UN Committee on Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, where they advocate permitting receiving

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nations to place restrictions on the content of broadcasts transmitted from satellites. These countries also believe that the mass media issue gives them a common ground even with those LDCs that are heavily influenced by the West. The Soviets and their allies will probably join the more radical LDCs in proposing more restrictive language on media freedom.

Industrialized Nations' Attitudes: The industrialized nations--the EC Nine, the Scandinavian countries, Switzerland, Australia, Canada, and Japan--were instrumental in deferring a vote on the declaration during the last two general conferences. They have issued no official statements on the draft of 21 August, although several have indicated that they view it as an improvement over previous drafts. The EC Nine will meet in Bonn on 2 October to discuss the draft, and members of the European media community will join them.

Western media representatives criticized the draft at a meeting on 5 September in London, and they will probably reiterate their objections to their governments. Media representatives object to the draft because it endorses state control of the media and provides no specific measures to protect journalists. The vagueness of the requirement in the declaration to respect the rights of all nations bothers them as does the requirement to denounce the evils of racism, apartheid, colonialism, and neocolonialism.

Industrialized nations will probably find unacceptable the implicit reference in the mass media declaration equating Zionism with racism. They may also oppose the lack of explicit recognition of the need for a free flow of information. They differ, however, on what defines a free flow of information and what constitutes restrictions on it. The major question is whether the industrialized nations will attempt to amend the draft or decide to oppose it completely.

Some of the industrialized countries, such as Switzerland and the UK, oppose a draft in any form. They question the propriety of UNESCO's role in mass media issues, and they perceive the declaration as a harmful diversion from the practical assistance that they would prefer to give to the Third World.

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Other developed nations, like Sweden and Norway, probably oppose the current draft but might be persuaded to vote for an amended version. If the Zionism-racism equation were removed and if the draft gave more weight to the free flow of information, the declaration might be acceptable to them. Amendments such as these, which would largely reverse the direction of the declaration, are unlikely, however, and the chances are good that the industrialized nations will once again form the core of the opposition to the declaration.

Arab-Israeli Issues

Race and Racial Prejudice: Item 20 on the provisional agenda for the conference is the Draft Declaration on Race and Racial Prejudice. The declaration was adopted at the UNESCO Conference on Race and Racial Prejudice last March and is up for approval by all UNESCO members. While it currently includes no reference equating Zionism with racism, the Arab states will probably try to add one, as they did at the meeting in March. Their success, however, may be impeded by Director General M'Bow's influence over the African nations, whose stance against an anti-Israel proposal in March prevented the adoption of the Zionism-racism clause.

Jerusalem: The second area in which the Arab-Israeli conflict will appear is Item 21, the Director General's report on Jerusalem. This resolution, which originated at the 1974 General Conference, not only condemns Israel for altering the character of Jerusalem by constructing high rise buildings and carrying out archeological excavations but also withholds UNESCO financial aid. At the 1976 conference, the resolution on Jerusalem was reaffirmed despite strong Western objections.

This year the Director General will again report on the situation in Jerusalem, and because new plans for excavations were announced during July in the Jerusalem Post, his report will probably trigger an effort by the Arabs to reaffirm the 1974 resolution against the Israelis. Furthermore, an effort to include harsher sanctions and more radical anti-Israel language may occur. The views of the Africans will again determine the success of an Arab move to include a Zionism-racism clause in the resolution on Jerusalem.

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Occupied Territories: In a resolution passed at the 1974 UNESCO General Conference, the Director General was instructed to take full responsibility for the educational and cultural institutions of the inhabitants of the Israeli-occupied Arab territories, a task that requires Israeli cooperation. At the 1976 conference, M'Bow was reminded of his responsibility by the reaffirmation of the 1974 resolution, and he will report on the status of Arab education and culture in the occupied territories next month. M'Bow has received approval from the UNESCO executive board for a plan including several proposals that could be implemented only by Israel. The Israelis will probably object to M'Bow's ideas, among which is the recommendation to place a high-level UNESCO official in the territories. M'Bow's determination to fulfill his responsibility despite Israeli objections will probably introduce a third area of conflict where Arab attacks on Israel--perhaps even an effort to exclude it from UNESCO--may develop.

Other Influences on the Proceedings

Impact of Multilateral Meetings: The results of other recent multilateral meetings could also affect anti-Israel activities at the General Conference. In late July, the nonaligned foreign ministers included several references equating Zionism with racism in the final document of their meeting in Belgrade, and the World Conference to Combat Racism and Racial Discrimination closed late last month by approving a final document that includes several references to Israel that are highly objectionable to the Western nations. The US did not take part in the meeting, and the LDCs were unable to negotiate an acceptable text with the Western countries. The EC Nine, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand left the meeting. Any attempts by the LDCs to include a reference to the final document from the August meeting on racism in the UNESCO Declaration on Race and Racial Prejudice will trigger a strong reaction from the Western countries at the General Conference.

The atmosphere of the UN General Assembly and the discussion there of topics such as the New International Economic Order (NIEO) may also affect the UNESCO meeting. General LDC interest in the NIEO and the influence of

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various high-level UNESCO officials such as M'Bow and delegates such as former Mexican President Echeverria suggest that discussion of the NIEO may occupy a significant part of the debate on general policy issues.

Internal Factors: Several internal factors will probably influence activities at the General Conference. The election of a president of the conference presented no problems a few months ago when the Canadians proposed the only candidate. Since then, however, the Arabs have advanced a contender, and his selection could aggravate the already tense situation concerning possible anti-Israel resolutions.

The order of the agenda could also affect how various delegates will vote. For example, if tempers are aroused over the Declaration on Race and Racial Prejudice, this might influence the vote on the mass media declaration.

On some issues the composition of the delegations will have a significant impact. For example, the Tunisian Foreign Minister fully supported the Yugoslav draft on mass media at the nonaligned foreign ministers' meeting in Belgrade, a document that only mildly criticizes the Western nations. If he attends the General Conference, he might exert a moderating influence at the working group level on the mass media question. Should Tunisian Secretary of State for Information Masmoudi attend, his primary goal would be to amend the draft declaration to include more strident language.

Pressures on M'Bow: There are many pressures on M'Bow. To have a productive meeting, he must not only stop the Africans from voting with the Arabs on anti-Israeli proposals--as he did at the conference last March--but he must also try to secure continued support from the Western nations, whose financial assistance is essential for many specific UNESCO activities. He is also caught between conflicting demands on the mass media issue. If he introduces a draft that is objectionable to the industrialized nations, he risks splitting the meeting; if he fails to introduce a draft, he may lose the support of his largest constituency, the LDCs.

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Outlook

The UNESCO conference is likely to be one of the most difficult international meetings for the US in some time. The substance of the issues under consideration, the likelihood of sharp rhetorical confrontation over sensitive Arab-Israeli problems, and the limits on US influence over the proceedings will make it difficult for the US to attain even its current limited objectives.

The debate over the mass media declaration strikes at the heart of a deeply held US value--the free flow of information--leaving little room for negotiating flexibility. At the same time, most Third World countries favor a concept of balanced information flows, and even some of our OECD partners view the question of the free flow of information in terms that are not as all encompassing as those of the US.

A sober debate on these issues would be difficult under the best of circumstances. At UNESCO, the debate will become embroiled in a host of tangentially related issues, the most contentious of which will highlight the same Arab-Israeli tensions that once before led to US action inimical to the organization and limited the ability of the US to project its influence in it.

At the conference, trade-offs through concessions on some other issues may be important if the US is to secure its objectives on the mass media declaration. The US has little to offer on the declaration itself that most LDCs will find acceptable. Many LDCs may believe that the draft has already been significantly weakened and that further modifications would result in a resolution reaffirming a status quo they find increasingly difficult to tolerate. Possible concessions on economic issues at the conference, such as promises of increased communications aid, would probably only have limited impact. Little has been done so far to carry out US offers at the 1976 UNESCO General Conference to increase communications aid, and the generally slow pace of other North-South negotiations could also tend to limit US credibility.

A final factor that could affect attitudes toward reaching an accommodation with the US and other industrialized countries on contentious issues is a possible insensitivity to US domestic politics. Notwithstanding

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the experience of 1974 when Congress suspended the payment of US dues to UNESCO, some LDCs may underestimate the extent of a possible backlash of US public and Congressional opinion in the event the conference adopts positions sharply in conflict with US goals and interests. Moreover, most LDCs will perceive that the previous withholding of US dues from UNESCO did not seriously disrupt the organization. The LDCs will also be aware that the US withdrawal from the International Labor Organization has not crippled that body. Thus, US leverage at the 20th General Conference will be limited because even the extreme prospect of US withdrawal may be perceived by most members as more damaging to US interests than to those of UNESCO.

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The Developing Nations at the UN General Assembly--
Foundering Cooperation?

The UN General Assembly opened its 33rd annual session on 19 September in an atmosphere of apparent cordiality, but underlying tension. In the eyes of some developing countries, only glacial advances have been made toward solving some of their outstanding problems. Although they are questioning the utility of moderation in their dealings with industrial states, their frustration is unlikely to lead to the full-scale clash that occurred in 1974. The developing states recognize that the General Assembly is a forum that can discuss--but not necessarily resolve--major problems. The outcome of the session will depend largely on how issues develop outside the UN forum. The delegates' attention will probably be dominated by the perennial questions of the Middle East, southern Africa, disarmament, and economic concerns. A host of apparently secondary matters, such as the status of Puerto Rico and the mass media declaration at the UNESCO General Conference in October, could transcend their objective importance if they become issues in the Assembly.

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This year the General Assembly welcomes the United Nations' 150th member, the Solomon Islands. Later in the session, Dominica may join. The overwhelming majority of members are so-called developing countries. Since the 1960s, their steadily increasing numbers and influence have meant that their interests and ambitions have become the predominant themes of Assembly sessions and of UN diplomacy generally.

The atmosphere of this session is difficult to predict. On the one hand, the developing states believe that the industrial states--and especially the US--lack the political will to create what they see as a more equitable international political and economic system.

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Their consequent state of frustration suggests a rocky road ahead. On the other hand, concessions gained from the industrial states at the recent UN Special Session on Disarmament may help to smooth out some of the bumps. In any case, the sheer volume of items to be debated will limit the time that can be devoted to any one issue and may in fact force the delegates to seek ways to avoid lengthy debate on contentious issues.

Middle East

If the language on the Middle East and Palestine endorsed at the recent Belgrade nonaligned foreign ministers' meeting is any indication, the debates on these issues are likely to be very harsh and polemical. The presence of a new Israeli chief delegate, Yehuda Blum, who is more doctrinaire than his predecessor, may contribute to sharper debates than in the past. Even the successful conclusion of the Camp David summit might not help since it will anger the intransigent Arabs. Last year the rejectionist Arab states succeeded in preventing any mention of Egyptian President Sadat's peace initiative in Assembly resolutions. They could treat the results of Camp David the same way or use it to condemn Egypt as well as Israel.

Among the issues the rejectionist states are likely to attempt to place on the agenda are the convocation of a special session of the General Assembly to discuss the Palestinian situation, the equation of Zionism with racism, and condemnations of Israel's economic and military links with South Africa--issues that virtually assure black African support for the Arab cause.

An Iraqi resolution regarding military and nuclear cooperation with Israel is expected to be raised in committee and could adversely affect the atmosphere of the entire session. The resolution, introduced but then withdrawn at the Special Session on Disarmament, called for a mandatory arms embargo against Israel.

Southern Africa

Moderate black Africans appear to be effectively resisting radical pressures, as witnessed by the outcome of the recent OAU summit. This bodes well for a balanced

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approach at the UN on issues of direct concern to the Africans. Nevertheless, apparent South African rejection of the Namibian settlement proposal will fuel their mounting frustrations over their inability to control events in the region.

As the General Assembly opened, a Security Council solution to the Namibian independence issue seemed close to realization. South Africa's rejection of aspects of the Secretary General's recommendations concerning the settlement proposal, however, portends more hard bargaining ahead in the UN. Pretoria's announcement of a plan to hold elections in late November without UN participation will certainly rile the General Assembly and renew pressures for economic sanctions against South Africa.

The question of funding the UN force in Namibia is likely to be hotly debated. The Soviets, who see the force as a Western initiative, have indicated they will not agree to financing it either through the regular budget or by special assessment. There are also a number of Third World countries who on principle oppose funding special endeavors from the regular budget. Ultimately, the financial burden will probably fall on the Western states.

South Africa's apartheid policy will continue to be the object of black African wrath. The US is also likely to draw heat because it refused to participate in the African-initiated World Racism Conference, which equated Zionism with racism. The Africans' disappointment over the walkout by the European Community from the meeting is certain to be expressed in harsh rhetoric.

The July nonaligned foreign ministers' meeting condemned Western nations--including the US--for continuing military, economic, and nuclear cooperation with South Africa. Their declaration calling for the UN to apply mandatory economic sanctions and an arms and petroleum embargo against South Africa under Chapter VII of the UN Charter may come up in the Assembly. South African intention regarding development of nuclear weapons, an issue that has been bubbling beneath the surface for some time, may also be raised.

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Disarmament

Progress in arms control negotiations--particularly on strategic arms limitation and a comprehensive test ban--will affect the atmosphere in the First Committee, which will consider only disarmament and security matters. The debates could be complicated by several thorny topics, such as Iraq's resolution to cut off arms to Israel, India's proposal for a complete ban on nuclear testing, France's proposal for a satellite verification agency, and the Soviet Union's recent draft convention on strengthening security guarantees to nonnuclear states. The first three initiatives were introduced at the Special Session, but were withdrawn to allow adoption of a single document by consensus. The Soviet proposal is an obvious response to the demands of the nonaligned countries for assurances against the use of nuclear weapons.

Discussion of so-called zones of peace--particularly the Indian Ocean--may be controversial. The Soviets may use the occasion to blame the US for lack of progress in the Indian Ocean talks. Malta is pursuing the creation of a zone of peace in the Mediterranean, a proposal that was rejected by the West at the Special Session on Disarmament.

The First Committee will also consider the creation of a preparatory committee for the second Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) review conference to be held in 1980. There is some concern that states not party to the NPT may use the opportunity to seek ways to amend it. Many states argue that certain countries' export controls on sensitive nuclear technologies undermine a key portion of the treaty that guarantees access to nuclear materials for peaceful purposes under international safeguards. If the UN debate cannot be kept within moderate bounds, prospects for an acrimonious and possibly counterproductive NPT review conference will be significantly increased.

Economic Issues

The recent suspension of meetings of the UN Committee of the Whole created to oversee and monitor the North-South dialogue could lead to a confrontational attitude in the economic debates. Since its inception last year, the committee has been beset by differences

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over whether it should have a negotiating role. If some elements of the Group of 77--the developing states caucus--succeed in pushing their view that the failure of the meeting is another indication of the loss of momentum in the dialogue, the discussion of North-South issues could return to the General Assembly, thus complicating negotiations elsewhere.

In addition to deciding the mandate for the overview committee, the main economic items presently on the agenda are a recommendation to convene a UN conference on new and renewable sources of energy (excluding oil), establishment of machinery to draft a new International Development Strategy for the 1980s, and consideration of the annual report of the UN Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD). With the sour taste left from suspension of the meetings of the economic overview committee, discussion of UNCTAD-related items could provide the Group of 77 with a pretext for the introduction of resolutions that are critical of the West for the slow progress on such issues as the common fund and debt relief.

Because of its size and the limitations of its charter, the Assembly is not an effective forum for reaching economic agreements. The developing states may defer discussions on specific economic issues to the November common fund negotiations and to the fifth session of UNCTAD in 1979.

Other Issues

This year, the 30th anniversary of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights may provide a good opportunity for assessing the UN's human rights record. The apparent new interest in human rights among the nonaligned, as expressed in their foreign ministers' declaration and the new UNESCO human rights procedures, indicates a willingness among UN members to be more involved in human rights activities. Nevertheless, the West could come under fire on the human rights issue if last year's General Assembly resolution, giving priority to economic, social, and cultural rights over civil and political rights, becomes the basis for a Third World--or Soviet--human rights offensive. Furthermore, the Soviets have already made demarches against a proposed US resolution to reinforce the Secretary General's role in human rights

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and improve coordination of the various UN human rights programs. The Soviets' chief concern probably is the authority the proposal gives the Secretary General. The Costa Rican proposal for creating a high commissioner for human rights--which has surfaced periodically for several years--still lacks sufficient support and is likely to be defeated by procedural moves.

The West German proposal for a convention containing measures against taking hostages will probably again fail to win approval, but the mandate for the ad hoc committee to consider such a convention is likely to be renewed. The antihijacking declaration by the seven nations at the Bonn summit may receive endorsement by several countries in their opening remarks.

The developing states are concerned that the US may pass legislation authorizing deep seabed mining. As a result, they are considering adding to the agenda an item to deal with potential unilateral violation of a 1969 UN resolution on law of the sea that established a moratorium on seabed exploration.

The issue of Puerto Rico's status could be inscribed on the agenda, following the Decolonization Committee's recent approval of a revised Cuban resolution. The resolution, although considerably tamer than previous ones introduced by Cuba, calls for independence for Puerto Rico before it decides whether to opt for some form of association with the US. Most countries would probably rather not have to deal with the issue at the Assembly, but if pressed to a vote most of them would probably be unable to oppose a measure billed as an attack on colonialism.

The revelation of "sanctions-busting" in Rhodesia by international oil companies could damage the climate of trust essential to Anglo-American efforts to seek a Rhodesian settlement. The revelation came when a report commissioned by the British Foreign Office apparently was leaked to the press. The Africans could decide to use the report as another example of lack of integrity among developed countries in their efforts to curb the activities of their multinational companies.

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Outlook

The developing countries' spirit of cooperation in negotiating with industrial states appears to be flagging, but they realize they have made some advances during the past year toward resolving issues of concern to them. The General Assembly is a forum in which developing states can air--but not solve--their problems, and it seems unlikely they would risk alienating the West by being wholly intractable. Nevertheless, emotions will run high and grievances will be harshly expressed in resolutions that will often conflict with US positions. More important than the public posturing, however, will be backstage activity in a setting more conducive to compromise.



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THE CONVENTIONAL ARMS TRANSFER ISSUE AT THE SSOD

The final document of the recent UN Special Session on Disarmament (SSOD) includes the first endorsement by a global forum of the concept of limiting conventional arms transfers (CAT). Although several reservations about CAT restraints were expressed during the debates, they did not prevent the General Assembly from determining that limiting arms transfers should be a goal in its own right, not merely a means to implement other arms control objectives. Disagreement on the issue persists, but its treatment at the SSOD will help to legitimate bilateral and regional efforts to implement specific CAT restrictions.

* * *

The Declaration on Disarmament adopted at the SSOD calls for "negotiations on the limitation of international transfer of conventional weapons." The accompanying Program of Action also mentions CAT limitation and recommends consultation on the subject among major arms suppliers and recipient countries. These references to CAT restraint represent a significant concession by the majority of nonaligned states. In its draft documents submitted to the SSOD preparatory committee, the nonaligned contact group had made no mention of arms transfers. Its proposed paragraph on conventional arms focused instead on limiting the development of new types of weapons and on the reduction of armaments in Europe. During negotiations in the preparatory committee, the nonaligned delegations accepted references to CAT restraint, but tried to link them to limitations on production of weapons, a linkage they finally abandoned during the SSOD itself.

Many of the nonaligned and other less developed countries view CAT restraints with suspicion as an infringement on their ability to provide for their defense and an effort by the developed states to divert attention from their own arsenals. Nevertheless, the nonaligned states considered CAT less important than several

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other issues at the SSOD. They were thus willing to accept the principle of CAT limitation in return for concessions on other points, including a separate paragraph in the Program of Action that assigns "special responsibility" for reducing conventional armaments to states with the largest military arsenals. In addition, the endorsement of CAT restraint is qualified by the statement that the security needs of all states and the right to self-determination and independence of peoples under colonial or foreign domination should be "taken into account." At US insistence, however, these rights are mentioned only "in accordance with" the UN Charter and the Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation Among States; this avoids any implication that the SSOD document goes beyond earlier documents in approving arms transfers to insurgent movements.

Debate over the issue of CAT restraint at the SSOD took place largely between the Western and nonaligned groups, with the Soviets and Chinese remaining relatively passive. Nevertheless, there were significant differences within each group.

Western Views

Japan, which had sponsored an unsuccessful resolution on the issue at the 31st General Assembly in 1976, was the most aggressive supporter of CAT restraint at the session. The Japanese held out longer than the rest of the Western group for inclusion of arms transfers in the portion of the Program of Action that calls for "resolute pursuit" of agreements on other measures aimed at limiting conventional weapons. This would have meant an endorsement of CAT restraints stronger than the reference to "consultations" that is in the final version of the document. Japan's strong interest in the issue continues, and Tokyo intends to introduce another CAT resolution at the 33rd General Assembly.

Most West European states spoke in favor of CAT restraint, with some of them explicitly welcoming the US-USSR talks on the subject, but were more cautious than Japan. They also emphasized that restraint by a few suppliers is not enough and that regional consultations are more apt to lead to effective limitations on

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arms transfers. Some of the West Europeans envisioned consultations that would include both recipients and extraregional suppliers; others preferred that recipients take the lead, with the suppliers then committing themselves to observe whatever agreements the recipients could reach.

LDC Views

Differences on this issue among the nonaligned nations, and among less developed countries generally, were more pronounced. Their views were conditioned primarily by the roles they play, or expect to play, in local armed conflicts. The smaller and more lightly armed states (e.g., Sri Lanka) were most sympathetic to broad-based CAT restraint. Countries with a more direct interest in a continuing conflict tended either not to mention CAT restraint at all or to criticize arms transfers to their enemies. For example, Chad attacked the shipment of arms to rebels in northern Chad, Israel criticized the supply of arms to Arab states, the Arabs attacked military support for Israel, and several African states criticized arms shipments to South Africa.

Such remarks do not indicate a lessening of LDC concerns about CAT limitations. Some of the same states that made them also expressed support for keeping certain arms transfers free of restrictions. In particular, the African states stressed their interest in ensuring the supply of arms to resistance movements in southern Africa. One of these states, Ghana, led the push to include the references to the right of self-determination and independence of "peoples under colonial or foreign domination" as justifications for continuing to receive arms.

LDC attitudes on the CAT issue also vary because some of the larger LDCs are producers as well as purchasers of arms. The desire of Argentina and Brazil to nurture their arms industries--and the exports on which these industries depend--helps to account for their failure to mention CAT restraint in the general debate. Despite its generally negative attitude toward CAT restraint, India's role as the only significant arms producer on the Asian subcontinent led it to join with the West in opposing a link between CAT limitations and limits on production. India's regional rival Pakistan

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spoke ostensibly in favor of CAT limitation, but included a lecture on the needs of states that do not produce their own arms and on the dangers of instability if such needs are not taken into account.

The views expressed at the special session indicate greater differences among the LDCs on CAT restraint than on many other disarmament issues. They also suggest some reasons why these views, and the patterns of support for CAT restraint in the less developed world, might change. Alterations in local military balances, the resolution of longstanding conflicts like that in the Middle East, or the development or decline of budding arms industries would affect the future responsiveness of individual governments to proposals for curbing arms transfers.

Regional Restraint

The SSOD has encouraged, in two ways, efforts to control conventional arms and arms transfers on a regional basis. First, the session helped to stimulate the attempt by President Perez of Venezuela to revive the 1974 Declaration of Ayacucho as a basis for arms control in Latin America. It also stimulated indirectly a competing regional initiative by Mexico. Second, the Program of Action mentions regional "consultations and conferences" as a means of considering conventional disarmament and cites Ayacucho as an example.

The negotiation of this portion of the Program of Action was complicated by the USSR's attempt to insert a reference to the Warsaw Pact's 1976 Declaration of Bucharest. Although this declaration makes approving references to conventional arms control, it is not comparable to the Ayacucho document because it embodies no commitment by the signatories to work among themselves to restrict conventional arms in their own region. The Soviets made clear that the reference to Bucharest was a bargaining chip they would gladly give up if mention of Ayacucho was also omitted. They eventually dropped it anyway, but their effort suggested a dislike on their part for the Ayacucho initiative, perhaps because it is sponsored by a pro-Western state and the USSR has had no role in it.

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Impact on Future Efforts at Restraint

The SSOD document does not provide a clear blueprint for specific CAT restraint measures. Nor does it resolve significant differences of opinion on the issue. It will, however, assist future attempts at restraint by serving as a visible endorsement of CAT limitation that the General Assembly adopted by consensus. Like other multilateral endorsements, it can be invoked by a government wishing to demonstrate that its participation in a negotiation is neither inconsistent with its past diplomacy nor contrary to the global climate of opinion. The Soviet Union has already referred approvingly to the SSOD document in justifying its negotiation of CAT limitations with the US. The endorsement of CAT restraint at the SSOD also makes it more likely that the issue will be on the agenda of future multilateral discussions of disarmament, as in the UN Disarmament Commission or the General Assembly itself.

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Meeting Global Food Needs: Modest Progress,
Continuing Problems

Hunger and malnutrition continue to be a problem in almost all developing areas of the world, even though world grain harvests have generally been good in recent years. The World Food Conference of 1974 urged national governments and international agencies to assign greater political priority to solving food problems within the context of domestic development and international economic cooperation. This ambitious shift in priorities has not yet taken place. In countries of particular concern to the Conference--those food deficit countries that lack foreign exchange to finance import needs--progress in stimulating food production has been slow, and population growth rates continue to exceed agricultural production growth rates.

The World Food Conference was convened by the United Nations in response to the harmful effect of the world grain shortage of 1973-74 on cereal-deficit countries. This article reviews the status of the institutions set up as a result of the Conference and finds that limited progress is being made toward Conference goals. The World Food Council functions as a forum for the international dialogue on food and agriculture, although it is generally recognized that the Council's limited authority is incommensurate with its responsibility for overseeing food policy and the implementation of international food programs. Negotiations continue on a new International Wheat Agreement, though at a slower pace than the developing countries would like. The OPEC- and OECD-funded International Fund for Agricultural Development went into operation in December 1977, but it is expected to disburse only a relatively insignificant amount of money in its first year.

The key finding of this study is one of modest progress amid continuing problems in international efforts to cope with global food needs. Even if the

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general tone of North-South relations becomes more strained during the coming year, as now seems likely, a joint effort to meet global food needs will probably be one of the few instances of productive cooperation between LDCs and the OECD states. This record of perceptible progress will be an incentive to keep the North-South dialogue going.

* * *

The World Food Council

The World Food Council, the food policy oversight and evaluation body for all agencies affiliated with the UN, was established in 1975 on the recommendation of the World Food Conference. After a slow start, in which ministerial sessions became mired in bloc politicking, the Council issued a comprehensive food policy statement in 1977. Both the developing and the industrialized countries consider this document, the Manila Communique, to be a good compromise on food production, security, aid, and trade.

The Manila Communique recommends a commitment by the developed countries to provide \$8.3 billion annually. This is the amount of external assistance that the Council Secretariat estimates is needed to achieve a 4 percent rate of growth in food production in developing countries. Traditional and potential new food aid donors are requested to increase their food aid commitment to ensure that a minimum annual level of 10 million tons in cereals is available for delivery in 1977-79. The communique recommends establishing an international system of nationally held grain reserves. It calls on all countries, particularly those that are developed, to stabilize, liberalize, and expand the world food trade, and urges national governments and international agencies to give higher priority to nutrition and rural development in development plans. It also recommends that governments and international agencies support the basic human needs approach to foreign aid.*

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The generally constructive pattern of the 1977 meeting in Manila, the tone and substance of the Manila Communique, and the election of a potentially strong Council president from a developing country (Arturo Tanco of the Philippines) raised hopes that the organization would be able to function as the world food security agency that the World Food Conference had envisaged. Basic structural problems became especially evident at the June 1978 meeting, however, and now inhibit the agency from performing a command function. In particular, the Council was not given direct authority on food policy matters over other UN entities or members, as the Conference had recommended. Although a number of UN agencies are requested to make periodic reports to it, many comply only minimally.

The fourth ministerial session of the Council was held in Mexico City from 12 to 15 June of this year. The meeting was devoted almost entirely to the line-by-line drafting of "the Mexico Declaration," to the intense dissatisfaction of some high-level participants.* In informal discussions in Mexico City, the ministerial and plenipotentiary-level delegates demanded fuller participation in substantive preparations for the Council's Ministerial meetings by governments of developing countries and by regional bodies, as well as the World Bank, the UN Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), and the UN Development Program. They emphasized the need to develop information on internal resource commitments to increased food and agriculture production and on plans to reduce food losses due to inadequate storage facilities. They suggested that future meetings of the Council would be more productive if they concentrated on recording varying country viewpoints rather than producing a fully agreed text. If these recommendations are not implemented, it is likely that a drop in the level of representation at Council meetings will occur, thus reducing its usefulness.

*The Mexico Declaration is a long, innocuous document that reproduces most of the substance of the Manila Communique, but with increased emphasis on the difficulties of increasing food production in developing countries and in formulating national food plans.

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Multilateral Aid for Agricultural Development

The 1974 World Food Conference heavily emphasized the need to intensify cooperative international efforts directed toward the goal of food self-sufficiency for developing countries. Primary responsibility for rapid rural development and population control was declared to rest with the developing countries, with sustained technical and financial support from the developed countries. The outlook for this Conference goal is not encouraging. In 1977-78, cereal imports for all developing countries are expected by the FAO to achieve record levels in excess of 65 million tons. More important, however, dependence on imports among the countries the UN considers to be "most seriously affected" by recent adverse economic conditions is projected to increase to 17.4 million tons in 1977-78, or some 7 percent above the previous year's levels.* According to the World Food Council, the growth of food production in these countries fell from 2.5 percent annually during the 1960s to 2 percent during 1970-77. While a 2 percent agricultural growth rate is historically acceptable, production has not kept pace with population growth. Per capita production growth in these countries has thus continued to decline in this decade.

External financial assistance for increasing food production is still substantially below the recommended target of \$8.3 billion, but international efforts to stimulate and divert funds to food production continue. The World Food Council's most important contribution has been its role in the creation of the International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD), with a \$1 billion commitment from the OPEC and OECD countries. The Fund will provide grants and low interest loans to stimulate food production in low income, food deficit countries. The Fund's contribution to agricultural investment, while not impressive in terms of the amounts already being spent, is expected to act as a catalyst, spurring other financial flows. Another objective of the Fund is to help the poor and landless by fostering the use of appropriate technologies and generating employment. So far, however,

*This group of countries includes India, Bangladesh, Burma, Ethiopia, and Egypt.

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the Fund's executive board has approved only two projects, and it is expected that less than \$100 million will be disbursed in the first year of operation. IFAD commitments are expected to average less than \$350 million a year, at least during the first three years.

World Bank loans for agriculture and rural development increased from \$956 million in 1974 to an estimated \$3.3 billion in 1978. This occurred as part of a World Bank rural development strategy, established in 1973, which is aimed at sustaining increases in per capita output and incomes, expanding productive employment, and achieving greater equity in the distribution of the benefits of growth. For example, about 25 percent of the Mexican rural development program during 1977-79 is being financed by World Bank and Inter-American Development Bank loans. Most of this foreign money will go into directly productive infrastructure, such as irrigation, livestock, and development credit.

Another international activity to stimulate food production is the FAO's International Fertilizer Supply Scheme to expand fertilizer and pesticide production in developing countries. In addition, a number of countries have informed the World Food Council that they are willing to provide a wide range of technical agricultural assistance such as irrigation, to countries with serious food shortages.

Grain Reserve Negotiations

The most important food-related issue to developing countries probably is the attempt to establish a multilateral system of grain reserves intended to stabilize prices and assure adequate supplies even during bad crop years. Such reserves were first proposed in the 1940s, and the FAO revived the idea in 1973 when North American grain stocks became depleted and the United States declared its intention not to build up government stockpiles again. The 1974 World Food Conference recommended the establishment of food security stocks, and subsequent meetings of the World Food Council have emphasized the importance of establishing such a system of reserves.

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Extensive discussions--intended to reach a new accord to replace the International Wheat Agreement (IWA) of 1971--have taken place in the International Wheat Council in London, to some extent in the Multilateral Trade Negotiations in Geneva, and most recently in a United Nations Negotiating Conference held in February and March 1978. The proposed agreement represents a substantial departure in concept from earlier ones, which had no provisions for price stabilization or buffer stocks. The emphasis in the current discussion is on specific obligations regarding reserve stocks or other measures to influence supply and demand on international markets, such as production adjustments and assurance that export markets remain open. Such measures are intended to meet the primary objectives of price stabilization and food security.

So far, about the only concurrence of views in these discussions has been on a target for food aid of 10 million tons of wheat and other grains annually and on the desirability of a wheat buffer stock. The Interim Committee of the Negotiating Conference, which met in June in London and in July in Geneva, has been trying to redraft the substantive economic provisions of the wheat trade convention and coarse grain trade convention; no substantive work on the food aid convention has been undertaken since the Negotiating Conference. Some progress has been made with the wheat trade convention on "trigger" price mechanisms by which decisions to release from, or add to, reserves are made, but no further progress has been made on target size and appropriate allocation of reserve stocks. The Interim Committee will reconvene on 16 October, and a full Negotiating Conference is planned for November in London, unless the Interim Committee decides otherwise.

Food Aid

Food aid is a vital but relatively small element in the global food situation. Large-scale dependence on food aid is considered an inhibition to agricultural development, although there are cases, as in Bangladesh and some Sahelian countries, where food aid is necessary regardless of its effect on development. The logistics of emergency food aid are complicated by the location of cereal stocks (which are concentrated mainly in a few

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grain-exporting countries), by donor delay in responding to requests for food aid, by weak delivery and distribution infrastructures in poor countries, and by a tendency on the part of governments to delay official announcement of emergency situations.

The UN World Food Program seeks to stimulate economic and social development through aid in the form of food that may, for example, be used as a partial substitute for cash wages paid to workers in development projects. It also tries to meet emergency food needs. Allocations to the international emergency food reserve scheme, operated through the World Food Program, increased substantially in the last year, reaching a level of 421,000 tons of cereals, just under the 500,000-ton target. There was general agreement at the 1978 ministerial session of the World Food Council on the need to establish a more permanent reserve, with yearly replenishment and commitments by governments for more than one year in advance.

The Manila Communique recommended that a Food Aid Convention of the International Wheat Agreement be established to contribute to the attainment of the 10 million ton target, and that negotiations provide for an increase in the amount of food aid moved through the World Food Program. In the IWA negotiations the US has endorsed the 10 million ton target, and has proposed that a new "Special Provision for Emergency Needs" be negotiated as part of the Food Aid Convention, providing for an increase in the flow of food aid of up to 20 percent above the minimum level in times of critical or exceptional food needs in developing nations. If the Convention with this special provision is negotiated and ratified, the US would be obligated by treaty to provide at least 4.47 million tons of grains for food aid annually, and perhaps as much as 5.4 million tons under extreme circumstances. To cover this possible obligation, the Carter administration has proposed legislation that would authorize the Secretary of Agriculture to buy and hold an International Emergency Wheat Reserve of up to 6 million metric tons of wheat.

The IWA negotiations are complex and have been going on since 1975. The Group of 77, the UN caucus of the developing countries, has expressed concern at the

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slow pace of the talks. The group suggested at the 1978 World Food Council ministerial session that, in the event a new IWA cannot be concluded by the end this year, a food aid convention should be negotiated independently of the new trade convention, and that it be incorporated in the trade convention when that is concluded.

A major component of the world food security system is the FAO's Global Information and Early Warning System on Food and Agriculture. This system, which operates to alert food donors to emerging critical food shortages, worked well during the recent food crisis in Ethiopia. Ethiopia has been on the FAO's list of food-shortage countries for the last two years. In March the FAO, using data from monitoring stations it had set up in Ethiopia late last year, alerted foreign donors to the probability of a major food emergency, even though the Ethiopian Government was still issuing optimistic reports. When foreign donors responded too slowly to this appeal to be of immediate help--mostly because they feared that the food they sent would rot on ships waiting to be unloaded in Ethiopia's clogged port--the FAO quickly supplied an emergency 10,000 tons of cereal in early June.

Outlook

Several years of good crops and the accumulation of substantial reserves in several countries have lessened the pressure on both developed and developing countries to make the necessary changes in national and multi-national policies to solve food distribution problems. Nonetheless, the world is somewhat better equipped to deal with another food crisis--in terms of food aid--than it was in 1972-74: a food policy oversight mechanism is now operating, and talks on reserves are under way. Food production in the food-importing poorer countries is growing, and some countries, such as India, have been able to build substantial reserves. Food production, however, is still generally not able to keep pace with population growth in these countries. The aid commitment by developed countries to agricultural development has increased, but a larger commitment is needed to adequately support developing country efforts toward food self-sufficiency. International financial institutions have increased their efforts in rural development, but the increase in funding recommended by the Manila

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Communique has not materialized. Most important, however, channels for international cooperation, negotiation, and discussion, laboriously set up since 1974, are now open. Progress in the coming year will be measured by developments within the IWA negotiations in London and by the World Food Council's attempts to gain the active cooperation of governments and agencies for its programs.

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