



**National
Foreign
Assessment
Center**

Approved For Release 2005/08/01 : CIA-RDP79T00912A002200010012-2

25X1

East Asia Biweekly Review

31 May 1978

Secret

*RP EABR 78-011
31 May 1978*


Approved For Release 2005/08/01 : CIA-RDP79T00912A002200010012-2

230

25X1

Approved For Release 2005/08/01 : CIA-RDP79T00912A002200010012-2

Approved For Release 2005/08/01 : CIA-RDP79T00912A002200010012-2



EAST ASIA BIWEEKLY REVIEW

31 May 1978

CONTENTS

The Contenders in the Narita Controversy 1


The opening of Japan's new international airport marks an important victory for the government in dealing with a 12-year-old controversy that has incited many bloody conflicts and hundreds of demonstrations.

North Korea: Succession Issue Lurches Forward. . . 4

North Korean President Kim Il-song's behind-the-scenes effort to groom his son, Kim Chong-il, as his successor continues to move by fits and starts.

Papua New Guinea - Indonesia: A Try at Understanding 7

The visit of the Papua New Guinean Foreign Minister to Jakarta has not resolved long-standing differences but may have helped promote fuller mutual understanding.



Approved For Release 2005/08/01 : CIA-RDP79T00912A002200010012-2

25X6

The Contenders in the Narita Controversy

Japan's new international airport at Narita, a town in Chiba Prefecture about 38 miles from Tokyo, finally opened on 20 May after 12 years of controversy. The fight over the airport has pitted the government against a curious coalition of conservative farmers and radical groups. Although the radicals are continuing their harassing tactics, the opening of the airport is an important victory for the government in handling the long-simmering Narita controversy.

The Farmers' View: The site for the new airport was chosen in the early 1960s because of its topography, its proximity to Tokyo, and its advantages in providing new facilities for Japan's air traffic network. From the outset, however, the government's effort to speed construction of Narita ran afoul of the farmers who owned the land designated for the airport site. As a consequence, Tokyo invoked the right of eminent domain to force reluctant owners to sell their property for the main section of the airport--a tactic that deviated from the government's past practice and the normal Japanese style of reaching a consensus on the problem. Furthermore, the government's failure to obtain support from nearby residents who opposed the airport because of the noise, increased traffic congestion, and potential safety hazards it would create, widened the controversy over the new facility.

Many of the farmers who owned lands slated to become second and third runways of the airport held off selling their property and protested the actions of the government along with those who had been forced to sell their farms. The plight of the farmers, publicized by a sympathetic press, attracted many supporters, including labor, environmentalists, leftist opposition parties, and radical student groups. As a result, the government postponed opening the airport when it was completed in 1972.

31 May 1978

1

SECRET

The Radicals' View: The Narita issue was viewed from a different perspective by the radical student groups. In particular, it offered a new rallying point after the end of the Vietnam War and a means for the radicals to align themselves with the "workers and peasants" in a new antigovernment cause.

Although several radical organizations backed the farmers' cause, the Japan Chapter of the Fourth International, a pro-Communist student group, took the lead in trying to prevent the opening of the airport this spring. The organization, which claimed responsibility for the destructive raid on the airport in March, saw its campaign as a means to gain entry into the core group striving for unification of the Japanese radical leftist movement.

Overall, an estimated 5,000 to 6,000 members of radical groups provided farmers with the necessary manpower and funds to continue their campaign against the airport. Even so, the violent tactics used by the radicals undercut much of the public sympathy that the farmers had enjoyed.

25X1

25X1



25X6

The Government's View: [redacted] the government has been negotiating with the Narita farmers and residents to win over most of the local opposition. Ironically, that effort was aided by the radicals' March attack on the airport. With the successful opening of the airport, many of the farmers owning land needed for additional runways are now planning to sell to the government.

25X6

In dealing with the radicals, Tokyo has been careful not to create an image of government suppression or police brutality, which could shift public support back to the anti-Narita forces. While Prime Minister Fukuda admitted the government had been too lenient with the

31 May 1978

radicals throughout the postwar period, he clearly carefully measured his response. Moreover, Fukuda stressed the distinction between the farmers and the radicals by focusing only on the radicals as a "grave challenge" to a democratic system of law and order.

Government security officials were concerned, however, about their ability to cope with the airport protests. Both prefectural and national police officials came under heavy criticism for the failure to blunt the 26 March attack. The officials claimed, in turn, that the public security laws did not give the police sufficient authority to control the situation. The use of Molotov cocktails in the attack and the subsequent discovery of lethal weapons in one of the radical camps reinforced the call for more stringent security measures. As a consequence, the government was able to pass new legislation to permit police to enter private property within a two-mile radius of the airport to remove structures used by the radicals for their operations.

Nevertheless, government officials have proceeded gingerly. Although the government was legally empowered to remove all 33 such structures and concrete "fortresses" built around the airport, the Ministry of Transportation only banned use of two of the buildings for one year. The fact that the Ministry did not include the most famous of the opposition shelters--the "Number One Fort," which anti-Narita protest leaders plan to turn into a museum to commemorate their struggle--is a significant concession that Tokyo clearly hopes will dampen further protest. In a related move, the government released on bail two of the three anti-Narita protest leaders who were arrested during the March raid.

In future negotiations with the farmers, the government will most likely meet their demands for new farmland outside of the airport area as well as substantial financial compensation. Although settlement of these grievances will improve the political atmosphere, the police are concerned about possible reprisals from small underground radical groups whose activities are difficult to control. Extremely tight security at the airport will therefore be maintained for some time to come.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

31 May 1978

25X1

25X1



25X1A

North Korea: Succession Issue Lurches Forward

The long term effort by North Korean President Kim Il-song to groom his son, Kim Chong-il, as his successor continues to move by fits and starts. The son's candidacy received a shot in the arm in mid-January when the Pyongyang-based clandestine radio that broadcasts to South Korea openly raised the succession issue. Without actually naming the son, it argued that Kim Chong-il--the "party center"--was the best qualified to take over the reins from the elder Kim.

In late January the North Korean Communist Party issued a letter urging the use of "speed battle" tactics to carry out the new seven-year economic plan. The speed battle concept is linked directly to Kim Chong-il. It is modeled on a labor-intensive production campaign instituted by Kim Il-song in the late 1950s known as the "chollima" or winged horse movement. It emphasizes the total mobilization of available manpower resources to achieve a selected goal in a short period of time.

In early February Pyongyang revealed that the founding date for the North Korean armed forces would be pushed back from 1948 to the beginning of the anti-Japanese guerrilla war period. That change has the effect of boosting the revolutionary credentials of the elder Kim, who is credited with organizing and leading partisan forces against the Japanese in the early 1930s. The change also advances the cause of Kim Chong-il, who is portrayed as "inheriting" the "revolutionary tradition" of Kim Il-song. It complements the son's efforts at exhorting the North Korean populace to accept sacrifices and display the zeal that is said to have characterized the anti-Japanese guerrillas.

Over the past several years there have been subtle hints in the North Korean press that not everyone is enthusiastic about the aspirations to leadership by the President's 37-year-old son, and these nuances continue

31 May 1978

4

SECRET

SECRET

to manifest themselves. For example, an editorial in the party daily on 18 May criticized those who viewed the implementation of the January letter as a "temporary" task rather than a long-range one. An editorial in February took the unusual step of chastizing party workers who were overly concerned about wages. These admonitions may reflect resentment from the rank-and-file caused by excessive reliance on speed battle techniques that call for long hours of overtime work under arduous conditions and without adequate compensation.

Differences over the utility of speed battle tactics also are evident from time to time in the various formulations used in the media to describe party policy. The January letter put the concept on a par with the elder Kim's chollima movement. An editorial in the party newspaper on 12 May seemed to minimize the younger Kim's movement somewhat by calling for workers to implement economic tasks in the chollima spirit "supplemented with" the speed battle spirit.

There also seems to be some disenchantment with Kim Chong-il's efforts to instill among the populace at large the work ethic of the anti-Japanese guerrillas. A feature on Pyongyang radio on 14 May on one of the slogans minted by Kim Chong-il carried an introductory endorsement by Kim Il-song. The endorsement had a highly polemical ring to it not unlike those observed during the Chinese Cultural Revolution when Mao's authority was used to muffle opposition to highly egalitarian schemes put forward by Mao's extremist adherents.


All of this "toing" and "froing" in the media is a reliable sign that the status of Kim Chong-il's campaign is essentially unchanged. Kim Il-song is moving slowly on the issue in order to build up the son's political acceptance and legitimacy and to avoid a lame duck status for himself. During this testing period the son is being kept out of the public eye. His name is not used in the media, he does not appear at leadership turnouts, he has never met with foreigners, and in the past two years even photographs of the younger Kim have been withdrawn from general circulation.

31 May 1978

SECRET

SECRET

This approach, however, is creating some problems. The regime is having increasing difficulty coping with foreign press speculation about the son's status.



25X1

25X1

25X1C

31 May 1978


25X1A

Papua New Guinea - Indonesia: A Try at Understanding

Papua New Guinean Foreign Minister Olewale's visit to Indonesia on 14-21 May may have helped set the stage for a more productive relationship. Bilateral relations have been marred by Indonesia's patronizing attitude toward Papua New Guinea and by its suspicion of Papua New Guinean complicity with dissidents from the adjacent Indonesian province of West Irian. Papua New Guinea views its relations with its populous neighbor as second in importance only to its special relationship with Australia. Although it tries to convince itself that Indonesian absorption of Portuguese Timor was not the forerunner of a similar military adventure against Papua New Guinea, it is still somewhat doubtful of Indonesian intentions.

The problem of West Irianese dissidence has kept bilateral relations uneasy and probably dominated the talks in Jakarta. Although West Irianese armed rebels may number as few as 50 and are only a nuisance to Indonesia, they have at least the sympathy of the some 2,000 West Irianese believed to be living in Papua New Guinea. Jakarta believes that this sympathy, plus the sanctuary afforded by Papua New Guinea, could foster the rebel organization's growth. Although Papua New Guineans feel some concern for fellow Melanesians in West Irian under insensitive Indonesian rule, Jakarta tends to exaggerate this kinship. Port Moresby is absorbed with building a sense of nationhood among its many and often mutually hostile clans and has no extra energies for championing the West Irianese cause.

25X1

 Port Moresby's policy is to jail illegal border crossers and to emphasize to West Irianese exiles that it will not tolerate plotting against Indonesia on Papua New Guinean territory. Nevertheless, Port Moresby finds it hard to enforce its strictures along the mountainous, overgrown 500-mile border. A recent rebel announcement of a cabinet list--including several West Irianese who had adopted

31 May 1978

SECRET

Papua New Guinean citizenship--prompted intemperate criticism from an Indonesian Embassy officer in Port Moresby. The Papua New Guinean Government was miffed to the extent of considering a request for his recall.

Against this background, the decision to go ahead with Olewale's visit reflects a mutual desire to put a good face on present relations. The Indonesian reception for Olewale seemed more sincere than that accorded Papua New Guinean Prime Minister Somare in January 1977, and the length of the visit--eight days--suggested the importance the Indonesians attach to good relations.

Concrete results were few. It was agreed to continue an arrangement for visits to Indonesia by Papua New Guinean agricultural trainees, and both sides expressed interest in exchanges of newsmen. Olewale reiterated Port Moresby's resistance to a longstanding Indonesian request for the return of all illegal West Irianese border crossers on grounds that Papua New Guinea was not sure that those who are political activists would be treated humanely.

Despite this rebuff, there seemed to be some change in Indonesian attitudes. One Indonesian foreign affairs official said Olewale's explanations helped the Indonesians appreciate the difficulties Papua New Guinea faces in curbing the West Irianese dissidents. Relations will probably continue to fluctuate over the rebel issue, but there may be a greater disposition to discuss problems than to indulge in propaganda.

25X1

31 May 1978

8

SECRET

25X6

Approved For Release 2005/08/01 : CIA-RDP79T00912A002200010012-2

Next 14 Page(s) In Document Exempt

Approved For Release 2005/08/01 : CIA-RDP79T00912A002200010012-2

Secret

Approved For Release 2005/08/01 : CIA-RDP79T00912A002200010012-2

Secret

Approved For Release 2005/08/01 : CIA-RDP79T00912A002200010012-2