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
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This publication is prepared for regional specialists in the Washington community by the East Asia/Pacific Division, Office of Regional and Political Analysis, with occasional contributions from other offices within the National Foreign Assessment Center. Comments and queries are welcome. They should be directed to the authors of the individual articles.

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Indonesia: Present State of Dissidence

President Suharto's New Year's address reflected the significant degree of attention his government has given to domestic dissent. Suharto referred to recent student demonstrations on Java as a threat to national stability, although persistent guerrilla movements outside of Java undoubtedly concern him also. The President stated that last month's release of 10,000 political detainees would not threaten the nation's security, however, and pledged to continue the scheduled release or trial of the remaining detainees who now number approximately 21,000. Suharto's generally moderate tone toward opposition to his regime and the emphasis on the government's commitment to equitable distribution of development benefits are probably designed to quiet his critics pending his expected reelection this March.

Suharto and his family have been the subject of much criticism. The most recent accusation which surfaced in the highly publicized Sawito political trial alleged that Mrs. Suharto was involved in smuggling activities. Suharto's response to these and other attacks has been relatively restrained, despite the advice of some military officials that he adopt tougher measures. His government has neither closed to the public nor inhibited the press from reporting on the Sawito trial; it has arrested students, but released them quickly; and although it has harassed notable critics such as retired General Nasution and former Vice President Hatta, it has never detained them. This moderation probably stems from Suharto's belief that harsh measures would only stiffen opposition at home and diminish the government's recent gains in its human rights record abroad, both of which Suharto wants to prevent as he prepares for his reelection.

The President nonetheless professed concern in his speech that the student protests in Jakarta, Bandung, and Jogjakarta could damage Indonesia's continued political and social development. Suharto said that the military's warning of 15 December, in which it promised to take firm

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action against elements undermining the authority of national leadership, was issued to prevent heightened tension in the future. This warning, and a later admonition to students to refrain from taking to the streets, appears to have met with at least temporary success. Students have lately confined their activities to quiet discussions of issues on campus and reasonably polite meetings with government officials. However, the recent detention of a well-known university professor for criticism of the government could spark fresh outbreaks of student demonstrations.

Suharto has had a more difficult time subduing dissidence outside of Java. In East Timor, the Revolutionary Movement for an Independent East Timor (FRETILIN) continues to mount effective resistance against the better equipped and more numerous Indonesians. In a very candid statement to the US Ambassador, the General responsible for the Timor operations conceded that the Army lacks adequate manpower, supplies, and expertise to root out a guerrilla force now estimated at about 600. Nonetheless, Suharto's extension of amnesty to those who will side with the government--an appeal aimed more at villagers probably aiding FRETILIN than the guerrillas themselves--and increased food and clothing supplies to the villagers will probably hamper operations of FRETILIN.

In North Sumatra, members of the fanatic Muslim National Liberation Front for Aceh (NLFA) shot two Americans at the US-owned Mobil gas site last November and has promised to continue attacking foreigners employed by overseas corporations. The NLFA's actions are ultimately aimed at the Javanese, who are resented for exploiting Sumatra's wealth in natural resources for Java's benefit. By frightening off foreign investment, the NLFA hopes to deprive the Suharto government of important development funds. Although Jakarta has increased security forces there, while being careful not to send too many Javanese soldiers, the still limited forces and the forested terrain work against complete suppression of NLFA terrorism.

In Irian Jaya, the Organization for Papuan Independence (OPM) continues to harass Indonesian soldiers and cultivate latent anti-Indonesian sentiment among villagers. The OPM successfully sabotaged the US-owned Freeport

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Minerals copper mine last summer, and has threatened kidnappings and hijackings. Suharto's success in neutralizing the OPM will depend on the government's ability to gain the support of village tribes and maintain friendly relations with Papua New Guinea in order to limit the OPM's use of that country as a sanctuary.

Suharto's assertion that the overall security situation is under control and his apparently genuine desire to ease the detainee problem suggests that the schedule for future releases might be accelerated. He undoubtedly hopes that such a move would dampen criticism at home and enhance Indonesia's human rights record abroad, although skepticism exists among many Indonesian officials disappointed over the lack of praise the Western press has accorded the government for the December release. If security worsens, and this is possible given the volatility of the students and the militancy of devout Muslims angered over the government's attempt to recognize mysticism as an official religion, then Suharto could delay further releases.

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North Korea: Domestic Political, Economic Concerns
Dominate Legislative Assembly

At its mid-December meeting, North Korea's newly elected legislative assembly formally approved changes in the central government and the scaled down goals for the new seven-year economic plan. The delegates also heard North Korean President Kim Il-song launch a hard-hitting attack on the evils of bureaucratism. The speech may be the opening shot of a new long-term political campaign aimed at middle-level managers and party cadre. In keeping with its basic domestic orientation, the three-day gathering provided no new insights into Pyongyang's policy toward reunification or general trends in North Korea's foreign policy.

New Government Appointments

According to the state constitution, elections for the Supreme People's Assembly (SPA) are supposed to be held every four years. Pyongyang is relatively relaxed about meeting such requirements; the last elections were held five years apart--1967 and 1972. The first meeting of the new SPA usually is an occasion for unveiling new government appointments and the first session of the sixth SPA, held 15-17 December, was no exception.

Three of the top seven officials in the Administrative Council (North Korea's cabinet) are newly appointed, and about half of the 28 central government ministries and committees have new leaders. The new premier, Yi Chong-ok, is a veteran economic specialist who has a background in heavy industry. Named as a vice premier in late 1976, Yi's promotion to premier is the clearest sign yet of the regime's desire to reinvigorate the country's lagging economy. Yi replaces Pak Song-chol, who is more of an administrator and a foreign policy specialist.

The two new vice premiers are Kang Song-san, a party specialist in transportation, and Kim Tu-yong, who has served in the Ministry of Public Security. Kang, in his

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speech to the SPA on 17 December, seemed to put special stress on matters affecting the "people's livelihood." There has been no recognized spokesman in the cabinet for consumer affairs since the death in March 1976 of Vice Premier Nam Il.

The list of cabinet appointments revealed some structural changes as well. Three ministries (Commerce, Higher Education, and Common Education) and one committee (Heavy Industry) were evidently abolished, and one new committee (the State Scientific and Technological Committee) was established. A new emphasis on technology was evident in President Kim Il-song's keynote address on the opening day of the SPA. He called for a three-point policy of "making the national economy chuche-oriented (self-reliant), modernized, and scientific at an accelerated pace." Despite the emphasis on self-help, Pyongyang will have to continue to look for outside assistance in scientific and technological fields. An editorial in the party daily on 20 December explicitly endorsed the use of foreign technology.

New Economic Plan

As usual at these affairs, the speechmaking provided a lot of general statements about the goals of the seven-year plan (1978-84), but few concrete details on how North Korea hopes to achieve the goals. Originally scheduled to begin in 1977, the plan was postponed to make economic "adjustments," probably needed because of the delay in meeting the targets of the previous plan.

North Korea first outlined its "10 prospective goals" in 1974, but several important industrial targets have been substantially reduced (see table). Although the plan calls for more than doubling the present manufacturing output by 1984, it still indicates a significant lower annual growth rate than in the past. Even allowing for some exaggeration, Pyongyang's own published growth rate figures reveal its lowered expectations; the rate for industrial production for the 1971-76 period is given as 16.3 percent while that for the new seven-year plan is forecast as 12.1 percent.

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North Korea: Seven-Year Plan Goals

<u>Sector</u>	<u>February 1974</u>	<u>December 1977</u>
(Goals stated in million tons unless otherwise specified)		
Coal	100	70-80
Steel	12	7.4-8
Cement	20	12-13
Non-ferrous metals	1	1
Machinery	5	5
Fertilizers	5	5
Fish products	5	3.5
Grain	10	10
Electric power	50	56-60
(billion KWH)	100,000	100,000
Tideland reclamation (Chongbo--approx. 2.5 acres)		

Despite the lowered goals, some of North Korea's targets still appear to be out of reach. Imports of machinery and equipment necessary to meet the electric power, steel, cement, and fertilizer goals would require an outlay from \$3 billion to \$4 billion. Considering Pyongyang's poor trade and payment record in recent years, it is doubtful that goods of this magnitude could be imported from any source. In what is apparently an exercise in wishful thinking, North Korea is saying that it is going to meet the 12.1 percent growth goal largely on its own efforts. In his speech, Kim coined a new slogan--"Let us display the revolutionary spirit of self-reliance more fully"--and he called for the slogan to be the regime's guide "throughout" the seven-year plan. He asserted that the plan targets could be achieved "without large investments" if North Korea makes effective use of "the existing economic foundation."

Kye Ung-tae, North Korea's longtime Foreign Trade Minister and now the ranking Vice Premier, echoed Kim's emphasis on self-reliance in a speech to the SPA on 17 December. He called for greater domestic production of machinery "which we have been importing from other countries." Nevertheless, the promotion of Kye Ung-tae, who has also moved up recently in party status, suggests

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that Pyongyang intends to continue to pursue active trading with the West and the Third World.

On the question of consumer welfare, the seven-year plan calls for raising the people's material well-being "a step further." There was no mention, however, of a general wage increase such as occurred in 1970 just before the beginning of North Korea's last long-term plan. The new plan indicates that improvements in living standards will come primarily from lower prices on state goods and increased state funding for housing, medical care, cultural facilities, and the like.

Antibureaucracy Campaign

Although the seven-year plan was the centerpiece of the SPA session, Kim's speech was directed primarily toward "strengthening the people's government." In the speech, Kim sharply criticized the tendency of some cadre to act in a bureaucratic manner and to abuse their power. Kim charged that such practices paralyze the creativity of the masses, dampen their enthusiasm, and alienate them from the system.

Attacks against the evils of bureaucratism in North Korea are not new by any means. Indeed, as a partial remedy Kim once again urged the cadre to go out among the masses, study local conditions, and solicit the opinion of the masses. What is new, however, is the heavy emphasis on legal measures to correct such abuses. Kim called for a tightening of regulations and an increase in the role of what he termed the "socialist law-abiding life guidance committee."

The organizational affiliation of this so-called life guidance committee is unclear. It could be a purely party organ, but more likely it is a subordinate arm of the Central People's Committee, an organization unique to North Korea and perhaps best described as an inner cabinet. According to Kim, the duty of the committee is to heighten the cadres' awareness of legal norms and to combat violations by applying appropriate sanctions.

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The functions of the guidance committee are somewhat analogous to those of another secretive North Korean organization, the "State Control Commission," which appeared briefly in 1975. At that time Yang Hyong-sop, a member of the party's elite Political Committee, was identified as its chairman. Yang dropped from public view in early August 1977, and his failure to be mentioned as taking part in the recent SPA proceedings indicates that he probably has fallen into disfavor.

Whatever the precise functions of the socialist law-abiding life guidance committee are, it would appear that the antibureaucracy movement will be slow to unfold. Most of the speakers at the SPA and at follow-up rallies in the provinces on 19 December gave it only perfunctory treatment, perhaps because they had no detailed guidance. An editorial in the party daily on 17 December characterized this portion of Kim's speech as the "struggle platform" for 1978 and urged party members to study the speech carefully, "not hurriedly," and to make an orderly plan for carrying it out.

Kim also stressed the need to maintain rigid discipline and strict political controls in North Korea. In part Kim was seeking to refute Western criticism of human rights violations by declaring that strict controls are necessary to protect the interest of the masses. The stridency of his remarks suggests, however, that some in the party hierarchy are advocating a relaxation of political controls in order to enhance worker incentive and hence improve the country's economic performance. This seemed to be the message behind one particularly striking passage in the speech on 16 December by the public security minister, who is rarely seen in public in North Korea. He criticized unnamed proponents of "opportunist" theories who would "dull the blade of dictatorship" by calling for "so-called democracy for citizens."

Because of the lack of hard information on conditions in North Korea, there is no easy way to determine if there is any substance to these charges. Nevertheless, the themes of bureaucratism and opportunism are sufficiently vague and all-encompassing to cause widespread apprehension and mistrust within the party and government apparatus and make nearly everyone fearful of losing their jobs.

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No Word on Succession, Party Congress

Contrary to speculation within the diplomatic community in Peking--some forty ambassadors accredited to North Korea but residing in the Chinese capital got an expense free trip to Pyongyang--the SPA did not address the succession issue. Kim Il-song is grooming his son, Kim Chong-il, as successor, but the regime has kept the 37-year-old son out of the public limelight even though he has been given increasing responsibility in party and state affairs in recent years. Frequent favorable references by the speakers at the SPA to political and economic campaigns associated with Kim Chong-il and the repeated emphasis on adhering to Kim Il-song's policies "from generation to generation" indicate that the son almost certainly played an important behind-the-scenes role in orchestrating the proceedings.

Long-term economic plans are usually given the stamp of approval at a party congress. The last plan (1971-76) was unveiled at the Fifth Congress of the Korean Worker's Party (KWP) in November 1970. For the current plan, the sixth SPA in effect served as a substitute party congress. Newly appointed Premier Yi Chong-ok in his speech on 16 December spelled out the authority behind the plan. He said the plan was drawn up in accordance with Kim Il-song's suggestions (in North Korea, Kim's suggestions carry the weight of law), discussed at the KWP plenary session (the 15th plenum held on 13 December), and legally adopted at the SPA.

The KWP sixth party congress is now two years overdue, but nothing at the SPA or in Kim Il-song's New Year's address suggests that a congress is coming soon. Although the regime will celebrate its 30th anniversary in September 1978, it will be 1980 before the party marks another prominent anniversary--the 35th. It is possible that Kim will convene a party conference, which could serve as a forum for important policy initiatives without formally designating a new Central Committee. In its relatively short history, the KWP has held two party conferences: in March 1958 to mark the victory by Kim over the last of his domestic challengers, and in October 1966 to signal the shift to more militant tactics against the US and South Korea.

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