



**National
Foreign
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Center**

Secret



International Narcotics Review

30 August 1978

DOJ Review Completed.

State Dept. review completed

Secret

*RP INR 78-003
30 August 1978*

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INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS REVIEW

30 August 1978

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East Germany, if only to project a more responsible image, is showing some willingness to cooperate in the narcotics control effort in East and West Berlin. Practical and political obstacles remain for any effective comprehensive controls involving both East and West Germany.


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The articles in this publication are prepared by analysts in the National Foreign Assessment Center primarily for specialists in the Washington community who are interested in international narcotics matters. Comments and queries are welcome.





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WEST BERLIN: Narcotics Black Market Favored by
Obstacles to Customs Controls

Practical and political obstacles to effective customs controls serve to protect the West Berlin market for narcotics that some claim has caused that city to eclipse Amsterdam as the "drug capital of Europe." These obstacles are rooted in the special status of Berlin, most firmly in the West German and Western Allied refusal to treat the boundaries of West Berlin as international borders. There is currently no prospect that an effective and comprehensive control system over the smuggling of narcotics into the city will be developed.

The East Germans have in the past treated the Berlin drug problem as purely Western, and the laxity of their controls over foreigners, especially the Turkish "guest workers" who enter West Berlin via the East German airport near the city, is advantageous to smugglers. Recently the East Germans have hinted at a willingness to cooperate more in the control of international narcotics movements. The practical results of this, however, are not predictable. Furthermore, the portion of the narcotics supply for the illicit West Berlin market that comes through Schoenefeld airport is estimated at only 20 percent.

More public focus on Berlin's narcotics problem, especially as it affects the US forces there, can be anticipated this fall, when a Congressional committee looking into drug abuse among US military personnel plans to hold public hearings in West Berlin.

Berlin as Narcotics Center

Recognition that West Berlin's rate of drug abuse is serious and rising dates from October 1977, when the West Berlin Government declared the narcotics "epidemic" to be the greatest danger to the city, surpassing even terrorism in its consequences. One month earlier, West

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Germany's Minister of Health had proclaimed West Berlin the center of West Germany's drug problem and stated that Turkish workers were supplying the addicts.

The number of deaths from drug overdoses in West Berlin reached 87 in 1977, up from 54 in the previous year. The 1977 figure is much higher than the total of such deaths in the West German cities of Hamburg (16), Munich (16), Hannover (8) and Stuttgart (5). The West Berlin figure of 87 is said to represent a mortality of about 20 per thousand addicts. There has been a steady increase of drug abuse and deaths from overdoses in West Berlin since 1970.

The US Embassy in Bonn reported in November 1977 that West Berlin was becoming a major trafficking point for illicit drugs. Although West German officials then believed that West Berlin had not yet begun to supply West Germany with substantial quantities of heroin, they feared such a development, because the street price in West Berlin was lower and heroin was more easily, and more safely, obtainable. In the first quarter of 1978, the West Berlin police and Customs seized more than five times as much heroin and arrested over three times as many persons on drug charges as during the same period last year. There was a decline, however, in the number of deaths from drug overdoses to 25 in the first five months of 1978.

Special Status of Berlin

The special status of Berlin impedes West German efforts to come to grips with the city's narcotics problem. Coordination of drug law enforcement in West Germany is done by the Permanent Working Group on Narcotics, on which West Berlin is not even represented. Although there is cooperation with Berlin police on criminal cases, West German officials are well aware that no federal law enforcement agency has jurisdiction in West Berlin. The special status of the city, furthermore, prevents its government from erecting customs barriers against narcotics smuggling activity at the many entry points to West Berlin.

The reasons for this are both political and practical. West Berlin is an island dependent on its links

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to the outside world. It is interested in facilitating access to the city to minimizing controls through which visitors must pass. Any new obstacle to passage is seen as deepening the division of Germany and strengthening the East German claim to separateness.

The Western Allies insist, along with the West German and West Berlin Governments, that the boundaries of West Berlin are not an international border. This political and legal view is fundamental to their position and applies with special force to the sector-sector boundary running through the middle of the city. Thus political objections to additional customs controls are formidable as well as the practical problems such controls would face because there are many holes in the Wall where experienced travelers can enter West Berlin without undergoing more than routine identification. By passing through East German controls--which are cursory, especially for exiting foreigners--in the main East Berlin railroad station on Friedrichstrasse, travelers can board one of several subway or rapid transit lines and step off at any one of hundreds of stations in West Berlin without facing further controls. Major resources would be required to apply a customs barrier in the area under Western jurisdiction.

The problems of customs control on the western periphery of the city are equally staggering. The main entry points are highways not only carrying international vehicular traffic, but also a very large amount of transit traffic between West Berlin and West Germany. After years of negotiation, the delays at these important entry points have been reduced to an acceptable minimum. To apply anything more than occasional customs inspections on the West Berlin side would entail delays and arouse political reactions. As many as a thousand trucks a day supply West Berlin with over half of its goods and materials; a thorough inspection of a trailer truck takes four or five hours.

Allied and Soviet Reservations

The French and the British share some of the US concern over the problem of drug abuse in West Berlin and have expressed a desire to be helpful, so long as damage is not done to important Western political

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interests. They are especially determined to maintain the position that the sector-sector line through Berlin is not an international border. The French and British recently joined the US in approving a request of the West Berlin Senator for Interior for increased authority in a search for drug smugglers to control, persons using the rapid transit lines run by East Germany in West Berlin. This action has so far resulted only in reopening a dormant dispute between the Western allies and the Soviets, who usually feel compelled to back the East German claim to sovereignty over the Reichsbahn property it owns in West Berlin. The Western Allies must insist that East German property in West Berlin is subject to their jurisdiction and control.

The Soviets have challenged, therefore, the Western Allied authorization for the West Berlin police to control passengers on the rapid transit lines and the Allies have responded by reaffirming their authority. The political sensitivity of this issue assures that the additional authority granted the West Berlin police will be limited. Controls are to be occasional. They are not to be carried out on a large scale or close to the sector-sector line unless Western Allied permission is obtained beforehand. The purpose of this recent authorization is worthy: the prospect that it will measurably decrease supplies to the West Berlin illicit narcotics market is small.

Turkish Connection

The assertion of Bonn's Minister of Health that Turkish workers supply the addicts and that West Berlin is the center of the drug problem, while perhaps oversimplified reflected German understanding of the developments since 1976. In that year, a joint German-Dutch crackdown on traffic in "brown" heroin from Southeast Asia through Amsterdam effectively ended that product's dominance of the West German illicit drug market. The void has been filled by "white" heroin from the Middle East, also the source of hashish and cannabis for Germany. During 1977, according to German police

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information, 75 percent of the heroin used in West Germany's illicit market was of Middle East origin and the majority of traffickers were Turkish.*

The traffickers, hidden in the large Turkish guest worker communities of West Germany and West Berlin, are in a relatively strong position, and West German authorities expect the predominance of Middle East heroin on the market to continue. West Germany has over a million Turkish guest workers, thousands of whom vacation in Turkey each year and hundreds of whom then return bearing small (1 to 3 kilograms) stashes of heroin for sale in Germany. This pattern also appears in West Berlin.

In addition to the colony of Turkish guest workers in West Berlin which numbers about 75,000, there are also an estimated 5,000 Turkish illegal residents.** The sources of heroin for the West Berlin market are, typically, individual Turks selling small kilogram quantities. They travel to and from Turkey mainly by air or by vehicle. Of the latter, many, if not most, drive vehicles with West Berlin or West German tags, so that determination of who comes from Turkey in the heavy transit traffic to West Berlin requires time for a thorough passport examination. Air travelers can choose between the western route that passes through West Germany or the eastern route that uses the East German airport at Schoenefeld.

According to West Berlin authorities, much of the heroin reaching the city from Turkey and the Middle East seems to pass through West Germany en route and the couriers are indistinguishable from legitimate travelers. It is estimated that about 80 percent reaches West Berlin via the western route, especially in trucks, while only about 20 percent comes through Schoenefeld.

*Although the so-called "Middle East" heroin is being smuggled by Turkish nationals there is no evidence that the heroin was made from opium grown in Turkey.

**The opium involved may actually come from the sizable amounts available in Afghanistan and Pakistan and may be processed in clandestine laboratories in Iran or Turkey.

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East Germany's Role

The East German regime tends to identify crime with capitalism and has strong political views about jurisdictional proprieties in the Berlin area. Both impede the regime's readiness to act against traffic in illicit drugs entering West Berlin. When a Bonn Health Ministry official raised the West Berlin narcotics problem with his East German colleague, in late 1977, the latter expressed "astonishment" that a West German would presume to speak officially on a "purely Berlin matter." At about the same time, the Governing Mayor of West Berlin sent the East German Government a letter proposing cooperation in combating drug abuse, to which no answer has so far been reported.

A more practical effort in this direction was made only recently. The West Berlin police sent East German authorities the identity and details of the modus operandi of a Turkish courier expected to bring heroin through Schoenefeld airport to West Berlin between 4 and 7 August. Cooperation in making a "major narcotics arrest" was requested. Nothing has been heard in response to this message, although the suspect subsequently turned up in West Berlin, evidently unscathed.

Nonetheless, it is too early to write off the possibility that East Germany will be more forthcoming on the drug abuse problem. On 24 August, a Foreign Ministry official in East Berlin told the US Embassy that his government would like to receive the names of suspected couriers of narcotics. The offer of such information had been made six months earlier. Furthermore, there are factors which should argue for more East German cooperation. They include evident concern of the regime about the number of foreigners, especially Turks from West Berlin, who have been coming to East Berlin in search of an evening's entertainment. Inevitably they encounter the disenchanting youth of East Germany and at least the potential for an expansion of the drug market is there.

Perhaps a more promising lever is the desperate East German need for hard currency, which could be somewhat alleviated by pay for services in an agreed East-West program to control drug abuse. Should the East

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Germans display an inclination to cooperate, West Berlin interest would presumably focus on the desirability of more stringent controls at Schoenefeld airport, or at the Friedrichstrasse railroad station and the southern crossing point on Waltersdorfer Chaussee used by the buses from Schoenefeld to West Berlin. These two places are the logical chokepoints for control of travelers from the airport. Effective controls there could have a perceptible impact on the illicit narcotics supply but only on the estimated 20 percent that comes via the eastern route.

Outlook

There are signs, according to the US Mission in West Berlin and the US Embassy in East Berlin, that East Germany may gradually seek to project a more responsible image by displaying interest in international cooperation against narcotics traffickers. This is conceivable, but it is unlikely that cooperation would come about before the question of hard currency payment arises. In weighing the benefits of such cooperation, the East Germans will be influenced by their assessment of what it would mean to the drug situation in East Berlin. Their ideological refusal to admit having any domestic drug problem, however, means there is almost no information on which to base an estimate of the significance of this factor.

The West Berlin market in illicit drugs seems more dependent on Middle Eastern, notably Turkish, supply than that of West Germany, where recent heroin seizures indicate that the Southeast Asian suppliers are getting back in business. A control program focused on the Turkish community of West Berlin, however, would be politically unacceptable.

Partial measures that could reduce the narcotics supply are possible: for example, new controls at Waltersdorfer Chaussee, which handles limited traffic largely of foreigners, would not greatly disturb Berlin political sensitivities. Such measure, however, would offer only limited improvements. Special controls on passengers from Schoenefeld at Waltersdorfer Chaussee and Freidrichstrasse railroad station would, in time, drive smugglers to make use of other crossing points along the Wall, notably Checkpoint Charlie. This would pose new political problems.

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Any new control program comprehensive enough to bring about a major and lasting reduction of the traffic in narcotics to West Berlin risks blocking traffic in a manner that would irritate the Berliners. It also could not be brought into force without extensive inter-Allied coordination.

West Berlin's drug abuse problem will be highlighted by Congressional committee hearings now planned there in November. Although focused on the problem of US Forces, the hearings will arouse public concern about the drug abuse situation in West Berlin. Whatever resolve to deal with the problem might be stimulated there by, it will not be forceful enough to override the local and international political considerations that militate against a comprehensive drug control program. The French and British have insisted that there is no noticeable drug impact on their military forces in West Berlin. And the Berliners are, by history and experience, conditioned to resent all forms of control.

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PAKISTAN: New Narcotics Law

A comprehensive narcotics law, which should significantly improve the government's ability to control illicit opium production and trafficking, was expected to be promulgated in Pakistan early this week. The law was to take effect immediately, although it will not become a permanent law until approved by parliament after military rule ends.

The new law appears to be similar to the law drafted five and a half years ago with UN assistance, but never enacted because of political pressures, bureaucratic infighting, and the low priority government leaders give narcotics control. The basic legislation on narcotics has been contained in three laws--enacted in 1847, 1878, and 1930--which treat narcotics primarily as a revenue problem.

The major change in the new law will be the strengthening of the role of the federal government. Although political constraints will still hinder enforcement, the pressures will be less effective than when provincial governments had the main responsibility for narcotics control. Opium is grown in only one Pakistani province, the northwest frontier, where it is an important business. The provincial government traditionally has been far more concerned with avoiding trouble with the poppy growers than it has about doing anything to control the illicit opium traffic.

Under the new law, the federal government will have control of the production of drugs manufactured from opium, operations at the frontiers, and any foreign dealings in narcotics. Provincial governments, however, will still control the transport, sale, and possession of opium domestically. With enforcement responsibilities divided, jurisdictional disputes and gaps in enforcement seem likely, but the situation should nevertheless be improved.

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The role of the Pakistan Narcotics Control Board has been strengthened. The PNCB has been in overall charge of narcotics control, but its authority over both provincial officials and other federal agencies has been limited and far from clear. Under the new law, the PNCB is the primary control agency, will coordinate and supervise an interagency committee, and will have the power to make arrests. The effectiveness of the PNCB in its new role will depend, however, on both the budgetary support it receives and the willingness of senior officials to protect it from political pressures.

Penalties for narcotics offenses have been increased. The maximum penalty under the old laws was two years' imprisonment. The new law provides for up to seven years for the manufacture, production, or possession for sale of narcotics; 10 years for the import or export of narcotics; and up to 14 years for repeat offenders. The government will be able to define psychotropic drugs as manufactured drugs, greatly enhancing its ability to deal with the hashish traffic.

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COLOMBIA: Drug Control Effort May Lead to Border Tension

The Colombian Government has requested US logistic support to carry out its drug control operations in the Guajira region of northeastern Colombia. In a recent meeting with US Ambassador Asencio, Defense Minister General Camacho reiterated the intention of the new administration to act forcefully against drug trafficking. He repeated President Turbay's proposal to Secretary Blumenthal for a dramatic show of force by interdicting or destroying aircraft illegally entering the Guajira Peninsula. He added that a battalion of troops was available to carry out the operations in the region but that the government needed fuel, spare parts, and sophisticated communications and radar equipment. Camacho assigned the armed forces commander, General Sarmiento, to work with US personnel in drawing up a program of action and a budget.


The Colombians are obviously intent on demonstrating their commitment to curb drug trafficking in an area that has become a major center for marijuana cultivation and cocaine export. They do not appear to be taking into consideration, however, the reaction of neighboring Venezuela to what, in effect, would be the militarization of an area that figures prominently in a longstanding and emotional border dispute between the two nations. The Guajira Peninsula and adjacent offshore territories have been the subject of conflicting claims since the late 1880s and the ill-defined border area has frequently been the scene of minor skirmishes.

The Venezuelan military have traditionally viewed their Colombian counterparts with suspicion. Many Venezuelans accept as an article of faith that Colombia harbors aggressive intentions on oil-rich western Venezuela. They will regard any abnormal increase in military strength along the border as potentially hostile.

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Colombia: Major Marijuana Growing Area



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
Moreover, Venezuela is now in the throes of a closely fought general election campaign that could provide a forum for a renewal of anti-Colombian feelings, particularly if one of the major parties senses that political capital could be made.

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Narcotics Growing Areas in Afghanistan and Pakistan



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NOTEWORTHY POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTS

(Editor's Note: These items, produced for other CIA publications, do not deal specifically with the international narcotics situation. They are included here because they concern developing situations that could impact on the international narcotics control effort.)

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AFGHANISTAN: The Pathan Tribes as a Military Force

This year Afghanistan is expected to produce between 300 and 400 tons of illicit opium, about two-thirds of which will be grown by Pathan tribesmen. In neighboring Pakistan--where production could run as high as 600 tons--almost all opium is grown by Pathans, and much of it is exported through the Pathan areas of Afghanistan. Thus the degree to which the Afghan Government can control the Pathan tribes is an important factor in determining the success of narcotics control efforts in both countries. The following article is addressed primarily to the question of whether the tribes can overthrow the government, but it also indicates the weakness of central government authority in tribal areas.

The Pathan tribes have been a major problem for all Afghan governments. A proud and independent people, the Pathans have long resisted outside control--even from other Pathans in Kabul. At least two of the many tribes have rebelled against the Taraki government, and it is likely that others will do so. There are widely varying estimates of Pathan military capabilities, partly because of the lack of good information, but also because of the many variables that affect tribal military strength.

No census has ever been taken in Afghanistan, but there are probably about 8 million Afghan Pathans--about half the population. Some--such as President Taraki, presumably from the Taraki tribe--have lost any real identification with their tribal origins. Others do not speak Pushtu, usually the test of who is a Pathan. Some groups of Pathans have moved either voluntarily or under compulsion out of the traditional tribal areas. Most Pathans, however, consider themselves members of specific tribes, live in southern and eastern Afghanistan (or in

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northwest Pakistan), and speak one of the many Pushtu dialects.

The Command and Control System

A coordinated military campaign by the Pathans seems almost impossible. There are three main tribal groupings: the Durrani in southern Afghanistan, the Ghilzai in eastern Afghanistan and extending into Pakistan, and the Yusufzai mainly in Pakistan. Each of these groups contains about a half dozen tribes. The exact count depends on what is considered a tribe and what a subtribe. In addition, there are more than a dozen tribes that do not belong to any of the larger groups.

The Durrani are the most cohesive of these groups. Members of Durrani tribes tend to have a highly developed group identity, and fighting among the tribes is relatively rare. The Ghilzai, on the other hand, frequently fight among themselves, and some observers believe Ghilzai is a concept invented by outsiders with no real basis in the loyalties of the tribesmen.

Even within a particular tribe there is likely to be little unity. The Mangals--one of the tribes now rebelling against the government--have generally been disunited, and in most of their frequent conflicts with central authority some tribesmen have remained neutral and others have sided with Kabul. On the other hand, the Mohmands, the other rebel tribe, are exceptional for their unity, and tribal leaders exercise a good deal of authority over the tribesmen.

Barring the emergence of an extremely strong leader--such as Nader Shah, who in 1929 led the Mangals and others in a rebellion that put Nader on the throne--any large-scale tribal rebellion is likely to be an uncoordinated affair. Authority would be fairly firm only at the lowest level--the village, the extended family, or an ad hoc raiding party. Few of the tribes would act as a single unit, and coordinated action by one of the larger groups--even the Durrani--is highly unlikely. Each tribe--or faction of a tribe--would decide for itself when to fight, when to advance, when to retreat, when to drop out of the war, and when to change sides.

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Personnel Strength

In a maximum effort, according to different estimates, the Pathan tribes can put between 50,000 and 2 million men into the field. The wide variation is due in part to sketchy information--the Mangals, for example are estimated to have anywhere from 5,000 to 20,000 fighting men. There are, however, other factors that make realistic estimates difficult.

The 2 million man force is probably an accurate estimate if all Pathans of fighting age decided to fight against the government at the same time. It would, however, include Pakistanis. The Afridis, perhaps the best known of the tribes because of their many encounters with the British Indian Army, might be able to put 50,000 men in the field. They live in Pakistan, however, and their contribution to an Afghan rebellion is more likely to be a handful of men hoping for loot and excitement. The 10,000 or so Waziri fighting men in Afghanistan would have a better chance of receiving help from Pakistani Wazirs, but probably much less than the 50,000 the Pakistani Wazirs might be able to raise. The half of the Mohmand tribe living in Pakistan, however, might well give strong support to the Afghan Mohmands, raising their strength to the neighborhood of 20,000 men.

Despite the popular picture of the Pathan as a gallant nomad eager to fight for his honor, his religion, or profit, some of the tribes are not particularly warlike and probably would make little contribution even in a widespread rebellion. Tribes such as the Ishakzai and Popolzai (both Durrani) and the Ghilzai Hotaki are settled farmers and generally regarded as peaceful. Other tribes, such as the Ghilzai Nazir, are impoverished and would have difficulty equipping or sparing men for a rebellion.

Even among the warlike tribes, many men would have to remain home to protect the sheep, women, and other property from neighboring tribes. Others inevitably will have no interest in a campaign against the government. Fighting within or among the tribes will also reduce tribal strength, although there has been a tendency to ignore local differences during fights with outsiders. The Mangals may have been joined in the present rebellion

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by two smaller tribes despite longstanding disputes, and the Mohmands have often had the backing of their traditional enemies, the Shinwaris, when they were fighting the government.

Equipment and Logistics

In the more warlike tribes probably every adult male is armed, usually with a firearm. The weapons vary, however, from the most modern automatic weapons to rifles and muskets more valuable as antiques than as weapons. Some of the weapons are locally manufactured copies, sometimes down to the serial number. These copies work fairly well, although because of inferior metal, they have a tendency to blow up. Ammunition may be stolen government issue, commercially purchased, or homemade. A Pathan fighting man might be better armed than an Afghan soldier, but he is more likely to have far inferior equipment.

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In past fighting against the government, the tribes have appeared to have no defense against aircraft. Should Pakistan or Iran decide to supply the tribes with weapons, the tribesmen could probably use modern rifles with little or no training, but would have little capability to operate or maintain more sophisticated arms.

There is no logistics system. A tribal army would expect to live off the country, which would seriously limit its size and its ability to move outside the tribal areas.

A Pathan tribal rebellion--even if it involved most of the tribes--would appear to present little direct threat to the government. The tribesmen--as they have for generations--might successfully resist government forces through guerrilla war, making an attempt to impose control in the tribal areas both costly and futile. They would, however, have little capability to take any major cities or fight the Afghan Army outside the tribal areas.

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A major tribal rebellion would, nevertheless, pose a significant indirect threat to the Afghan Government. Almost all military officers and many of the enlisted men are Pathans and are already unhappy at the limited fighting under way against tribesmen. If ordered to suppress a widespread tribal rebellion, they might well move against the government instead.

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Noteworthy Political and
Economic Developments



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IRAN: Formation of New Government

The formation of a new government in Iran just before Chinese Premier Hua Kuo-feng's visit on 29 August is an indication of the seriousness with which the Shah views the continuing political unrest that has beset the country since January. The appointment to the prime minister's post of former Senate President Jafar Sharif-Emami, 68, a traditionalist who is well regarded in the religious community, was intended as a gesture of conciliation to Muslim leaders who have been in the forefront of opposition to the Shah's rule. The Shah's removal in early June of General Nematollah Nasiri, who had been identified with a hardline approach in dealing with dissidents, as head of the National Intelligence and Security Organization (SAVAK), was an earlier attempt to placate religious leaders.

Sharif-Emami, in his first public statement in office, said that his first order of business will be to damp down Iran's volatile political environment by building bridges to alienated Muslim fundamentalists. During his brief tenure as a transition Prime Minister in 1960-1961, he acquired the reputation of acting independently of the Shah. He has for years, however, remained a member of the Shah's inner circle of advisers and would be a likely choice to serve as the Shah's intermediary with major Muslim leaders. Outgoing Prime Minister Amuzegar's one-year tenure was a mixed success. He curbed inflation and reduced the cost of housing, but he lacked the skills in political brokerage needed to cope with an increasingly active religious and political opposition. It has been the Court, not the government, that has begun a tentative dialogue with religious leaders.

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It remains to be seen whether religious leaders are now ready to accept the compromises necessary for a political settlement with the Shah. The Shah's appointment of a new cabinet could be interpreted by some Muslim clergymen as a capitulation to their demands. This could encourage Muslim leaders to push for further political concessions, such as the right of the Muslim clergy to veto parliamentary legislation--something the Shah is certain to reject.

New appointees hold about two-thirds of the ministerial posts in the government. One is Foreign Minister Amir Khosrow Afshar-Qasemlu, a veteran career diplomat with wide experience in a number of foreign posts. The appointment of a military officer, General Abbas Karim-Qarabaqi, as Minister of Interior breaks precedent with the civilian hold on the post and was probably intended by the Shah as a message that he will continue to deal firmly with opponents who go beyond accepted limits of political dissent.


The Shah will continue to formulate the broad outlines of Iran's domestic and foreign policies. The formation of the new government presages no sharp departure in policy toward the United States or in Iran's relations with other major powers and its neighbors.

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Noteworthy Political and
Economic Developments

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SRI LANKA: Moderation of Tamil Separatist Demands

After a spate of terrorist activity earlier this year, the momentum of the Tamil separatist movement has slowed considerably. Whatever the expectations of the militant youth behind the terrorism, broad-based support within their own community for an independent Tamil homeland has not materialized. The use of politically motivated assassination and terror, as espoused by the educated and unemployed younger generation, has not been accepted by their more conservative elders as the desired means to achieve minority rights. Although continuing to pay lipservice to the possibility of an independent state, Tamil moderates are actively backing efforts at compromise through institutional changes to improve and protect their status in an overwhelmingly Sinhalese-Buddhist society.*

With tensions on both sides still strong in the aftermath of communal riots in August and September 1977, the murder of five police officers investigating the separatist activities of the youthful Tamil Liberation Tigers (TLT) in April and May of this year could have easily led to another round of communal violence. President J. R. Jayawardene's adroit handling of the problem, however, prevented a new outbreak of Tamil-Sinhalese clashes. The Jayawardene government, in contrast to the heavyhanded repression employed by previous regimes (including sweeping emergency powers accompanied by intensive

*The Sinhalese, about 80 percent of the population, are the dominant group in Sri Lanka. The Tamil community, predominantly Hindu, is divided into two distinct groups which together make up 20 percent of the population. The Sri Lankan Tamils trace their origins back more than a thousand years to Tamil kingdoms centered around Jaffna in the north. The other group, the Indian Tamils, came in the mid-19th century to work on plantations in the Central Highlands. Indian Tamils are only peripherally involved in Tamil politics.

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use of the Army and the police) merely passed a bill that proscribes the TLT and any other group advocating violence to achieve its ends. Limited to one year, the bill also permits press censorship of material dealing with banned organizations--another effective method for controlling volatile Sinhalese-Tamil relations. Use of the military and police forces in the predominantly Tamil northern and eastern provinces has been limited to a modest complement of 600 men.

Since June, activist Tamil youth have remained quiescent with the exception of the assassination of a retired Tamil police officer in Jaffna, an act that received scant press coverage. This period of relative calm is attributable in part to the extensive manhunt conducted after the May murders as well as the arrest of more than 30 young Tamil militants--most of whom have since been released. Communal peace is also sought by many Tamils living in predominantly Sinhalese areas who see themselves as hostages to threats of Tamil militants in the north.

Risking censure from the Sinhalese majority, Jayawardene's ruling United National Party (UNP), has instituted linguistic, administrative, and economic reforms designed to placate moderate elements within the Tamil community. Sinhala, under the new constitution promulgated on 16 August, will be the official language, but both Tamil and Sinhala will be recognized as "national" languages. The exclusive use of Sinhala in the civil service has been modified. Civil administration as well as the courts in the Tamil north and east will be conducted in the Tamil language. The setting of quotas for university admission according to the percentage of each community in the population has been scrapped--presumably to the advantage of the Tamils. Aspirations for more regional autonomy, while falling short of a federal relationship or a separate state as called for by the Tamils, have received indirect attention in the new constitution which provides for District Ministers who will promote the interests of each locality. Since the program will be instituted islandwide, it is not seen by the Sinhalese as a dangerous concession to the Tamils.

The drawing back of the Tamil community from serious confrontation with the majority community in recent months

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was further emphasized during the second annual meeting on 29-30 July of the Tamil United Liberation Front (TULF)-- a coalition of several Tamil parties and the primary opposition organization in parliament. A resolution submitted at the conference calling for continued struggle to establish a separate state, while following traditional rhetoric on the issue, was moderate in tone and vague regarding a timetable for independence. Tamil political leaders must tread a narrow line between their own militant youth and Tamil moderates in order to maintain their hold within their community.

In urging restraint at this time the Tamil leadership has signaled the UNP that they are willing to wait to see if the promises of reform will be implemented. The Tamils are also watching UNP efforts to revive the economy and decrease the exceptionally high unemployment rate among the educated younger generation of both communities. Lack of economic opportunity has been viewed by the Tamils as a deliberate attempt by the Sinhalese to suppress the minority community. Years of neglect of economic development within the Tamil region have been somewhat rectified by the beginning of construction, in May 1978, of a flour mill that will eventually be one of the largest in the world.

As part of the recent trend toward mutual accommodation, the Secretary General of the TULF, A. Amirthalingam, in discussions with the US Embassy in Colombo acknowledged meeting with Jayawardene to discuss Tamil concerns and possible compromises. Amirthalingam and the TULF are apprehensive about the manner of choosing District Ministers. It is not clear from the wording of the constitution whether these posts will be given to Tamil members sitting in parliament or will become political plums awarded to UNP loyalists. If the latter occurs, Tamil hostility would negate the purpose of the program--a development Jayawardene wishes to avoid at all costs.

There are too many longstanding grievances between the two communities to yield sudden results from compromises--a situation that both Jayawardene and Amirthalingam appreciate. New problems continually arise. For instance, the Tamils believe the government's present resettlement program, which provides vacant farmland in an area long

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considered an integral part of the Tamil heartland to the Sinhalese settlers, to be particularly threatening, and the TULF has asked that the program be ended. In this case, however, the President has taken the stand that the island is one country with equal rights for all citizens, and any resettlement scheme cannot favor one group over another.

Despite the pitfalls and problems facing reconciliation between the Tamils and Sinhalese, mutual accommodation and compromise have a good chance of continuing to govern communal relations for the foreseeable future. The moderates among the Tamils appear satisfied with the stated intent of the UNP government to rectify inequities and seem willing to wait and see if the proposals can be successfully implemented.

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Noteworthy Political and
Economic Developments

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CENTRAL AND SOUTH AMERICA: Sources of Illegal Migration*

Illegal migration to the United States from Central and South America is growing more rapidly than from any other area. Such migration--almost nonexistent two decades ago--is now estimated at 90,000 persons annually, and the region may soon overtake the Caribbean area as the second, to Mexico, most important source of illegal aliens in this country. At any one time, roughly 15 percent of the 3 million to 5 million illegal migrants residing in the United States are of Central or South American origin.

Most of the illegal flow comes from a few countries in Central America and on the west coast of South America. The five most important source nations--El Salvador (25,000 illegals per year), Guatemala (15,000), Colombia (14,000), Ecuador (9,000), and Peru (6,000)--account for three-fourths of the flow with only one-fourth of the region's population. If Honduras (4,000) and Chile (4,000) are added to the list, we find that seven countries with 30 percent of the area's population supply 85 percent of the illegal migrants.

In a typical year, the six countries of Central America are the source of more than one-half of the illegal flow. The average Central American illegal resembles his Mexican counterpart in many important respects.

- He is likely to have a rural background.
- He probably entered the United States by land, without use of real or forged documents.

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**Central and South America:
Main Sources of Illegal Migration to the United States**



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- He often sees migration to the United States as an alternative to migration to a large city in his own country.
- Although relatively uneducated by the standards of his country, he is not from among the poorest of his society.
- He has friends or relatives who have already migrated to the United States legally or illegally.
- He has been recently employed and is more likely to be seeking greater economic opportunity than fleeing unemployment.

In other respects, however, he differs from his Mexican counterpart. Most importantly, he plans on staying in this country for an extended period, whereas the Mexican illegal typically works only a few months before returning to Mexico. Some Central Americans, nonetheless, work only long enough to save the money needed to start a small business in their home country. Given the more usual goal of making good in this country--however making good may be defined--the Central American illegal is less willing than the Mexican migrant to take disagreeable, dead-end jobs. He is also much less likely to seek rural or agricultural work.

The South American illegal differs markedly from the typical Central American. The South American tends to be a relatively well educated skilled worker or semiprofessional. He may speak fair to excellent English, comes from an urban area, and definitely considers himself a part of the middle class. Indeed, his annual earnings before migration, while very low by US standards, probably place him among the upper 20 percent of wage earners in his country of origin. The South American illegal usually enters the United States by air. Given his education and financial position, he has little trouble obtaining a non-resident visa, which he subsequently abuses. Even more than the Central American or Caribbean migrant, the South American illegal has come to this country to stay.

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There are some exceptions to the above description. A fairly large minority of Ecuadorean illegals, for example, follow the Central rather than the South American pattern--they are relatively uneducated, have rural backgrounds, and probably make almost all of their trip to the US border by land. A smaller minority of Colombian migrants also fall into this category. In the case of Colombia, a few cocaine-smuggling "mules"--individuals hired by narcotics traffickers to bodily carry a kilo or two of cocaine into this country in return for air fare and a small fee--apparently cash in their return tickets and remain here as illegals.

It is difficult to say why some countries are major sources of illegal migration and others are not. Almost all South American illegals come from the Andean nations of the west coast: Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, and Chile, with 25 percent of the continent's population, provide more than 80 percent of South American illegals. The relatively rigid social structure of the Andean countries--with its sharp division between the middle and upper classes--appears to be a major factor. The ambitious and educated member of the middle class in these countries has less "headroom" than his counterpart in the more fluid societies of the east coast. Headroom is further increased in those countries such as Brazil, Venezuela, and Argentina where there is rapid economic growth and/or already high per capita incomes. Population densities also tend to be lower in the east coast countries. Distance, small populations, and poverty sharply limit the source potential of Bolivia and Paraguay.

The case is simpler in Central America. Here illegal migration is roughly proportional to population, once distance is factored in. El Salvador is the only exception to this rule: with 20 percent of Central American population, it supplies 50 percent of the area's illegal flow. Explanatory factors, aside from distance, include population density (more than six times the average in other Central American countries) and per capita income (80 percent of the average elsewhere in Central America). Relatively slow economic growth and a more rigid social structure than in most Central American nations act as added incentives for migration.

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On balance, we believe that illegal migration from Central and South America will continue to grow over the next two decades. The pool of potential migrants is large and expanding. Many in the under-20 population bulge that emerged in the early 1970s are now entering the migration-prone 20- to 30-year age group. Of equal importance, the demonstration effect of past successful illegal migration will be increasingly felt. In both Mexico and the Caribbean a tradition of illegal migration and the existence of friends or relatives in the United States are major factors in an individual's decision to migrate. In 1960 these factors were almost nonexistent as far as Central and South America were concerned; now they are strong.

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BRIEFS

PAKISTAN: INTERIOR MINISTER PESSIMISTIC ON OPIUM POPPY ERADICATION IN NEAR FUTURE. In the US Ambassador's initial call on Mahmud Haroon, who was appointed Pakistani Interior Minister in early July, the Minister was surprisingly well informed on the opium problem. He said he would do what he could to eliminate both production and trafficking, but most of his comments seemed to indicate that he sees little that can be done. In addition to familiar arguments against enforcement such as low incomes in the producing areas and the special status of tribal areas where much of the opium is grown, the Interior Minister also raised Pakistan's problems with the new Afghan Government. He argued that the extreme sensitivity of relations with Kabul militates against any actions likely to antagonize the opium-growing tribes along the border. [REDACTED]

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PAKISTAN: ILLICIT OPIUM DEALERS OPERATE OPENLY. Additional information from DEA sources makes it even clearer that Pakistani illicit opium dealers in Landi Kotal, near the Khyber Pass, operate as if they were in a legitimate business with no pressure or threats from enforcement officials. The sources, who posed as buyers, talked with 16 major opium dealers, a higher number than had been previously reported. The dealers keep a total of about 38 tons of opium on hand, and some have a turnover of two to five tons a week. Most opium is purchased by Afghans and Iranians for shipment to Iran, but some is shipped through the port of Karachi. Delivery reportedly is ensured by set payments to government officials. The Landi Kotal dealers see themselves as professional businessmen dealing in an everyday commodity. [REDACTED]


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BURMA: OPIUM [REDACTED]

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Despite Burma's persistence in pursuing narcotics traffickers, the main effect has been to force structural changes in the opium trade, including a decline in the use of large caravans. There as yet has been little lasting effect on total opium production and no significant reduction in the flow of opium out of the Golden Triangle area into illicit world markets.

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THAILAND: OPIUM ADDICTION RATE HIGH. An estimated 6 to 8 percent of the population of Bangkok are addicted to hard drugs, according to Dr. Khachit Chupanya, head of the city's Drug Prevention and Rehabilitation Section. He told the press recently that, based on the number of persons seeking treatment for drug-related ailments, he estimates that between 300,000 and 400,000 of Bangkok's population of 5 million are addicted. Most of them reportedly are addicted to heroin No. 4, the purest grade available on the street. Dr. Khachit has published a report which claims there are about 500,000 drug addicts in all of Thailand; Bangkok press sources regard this figure as probably conservative.

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PERSIAN GULF: THIS AREA HAS THE POTENTIAL TO BECOME A MAJOR NARCOTICS TRANSIT ROUTE. The Persian Gulf states face a real threat of becoming a major transit area for narcotics trafficking from Asia to Europe and the United States, according to American observers in Tehran. This threat will be increased when the 24-mile causeway connecting the island of Bahrain with the Saudi mainland is completed, probably sometime in 1980. This new road link will give Bahrain road access to Europe by way of the Middle East and Turkey.

Meanwhile, the Persian Gulf states of Qatar, Bahrain, Kuwait, and the United Arab Emirates are

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experiencing an increase in drug abuse, but, according to the Embassy in Tehran, it remains a relatively minor problem confined, thus far at least, primarily to foreign workers, especially Iranians, Pakistanis, and Indians. The hashish and opium being smuggled into the area, primarily for local consumption, are of Pakistani and Iranian origin. [REDACTED]

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SRI LANKA: POSSIBLE TRANSIT CENTER FOR NARCOTICS OPERATIONS IN THE EAST. Narcotics traffickers from Nepal, Afghanistan, and the Golden Triangle are operating via Sri Lanka to avoid detection in the West, according to a spokesman for the Police Narcotics Bureau. He claims that because suspected narcotics couriers flying directly from Malaysia, Bangkok, Singapore, and Hong Kong are thoroughly checked for drugs at western airports, more and more traffickers are beginning to fly by way of Colombo. Sri Lankan police officials are concerned that international narcotics traffickers in the east may be planning to move their center of operations to Sri Lanka. At least one Sri Lankan national living abroad is suspected of being involved in international narcotics trafficking operations through that country. [REDACTED]

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FOREIGN MEDIA

AUSTRALIA--Drug Smuggling Operation Allegedly Financially Backed by Two Parliamentarians--TNDD,* No. L/7962, 16 August 1978, pp. 10-11. The new South Wales Commission investigating drug trafficking in that part of Australia was told by one witness that two parliamentarians had financed the smuggling of a large quantity of heroin into Australia. It was further alleged that a diplomatic courier had brought the heroin into Brisbane. The witness who gave the testimony, identified only as "Mr. AC," admitted that he received the unconfirmed information from his partner in the heroin operation. The names of the others allegedly involved in the scheme were not disclosed.

AUSTRALIA--Substitute for Marijuana--TNDD, No. L/7972, 23 August 1978, p. 10. A marijuana substitute has appeared on a local drug market in Australia. The substance has been given the name "stash," and, because it is a mixture of herbs that are legally sold, it is not classified as illegal. The new drug reportedly produces a sensation similar to low-grade stinky marijuana. The herbs and ingredients listed on the packet are lobelia, wild lettuce, hyssop, kava-kava, skullcap, and damiana.

BELGIUM--Turks Arrested With 6.8 kilos of Heroin in Antwerp--TNDD, No. L/7962, pp. 73-75. Within 15 days of the discovery in Antwerp of a cocaine trafficking network between Colombia and Antwerp, at which some 2 kilograms of cocaine were seized and nine persons arrested, investigators seized 6.8 kilos of high-grade heroin and arrested a Turkish national as an international narcotics trafficker. The Turk had been under surveillance for some time and when arrested was involved in an exchange of parcels with another Turk who was accompanied by his Dutch wife and their four children. According to the article in the Belgian newspaper, it is

*US Joint Publications Research Service (JPRS) Translations on Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs. Published by JPRS, 1000 Glebe Road, Arlington, Va., 22201.

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believed that the heroin was destined for the US. The Turk had been under suspicion since last November; the arrest occurred in June.

BRAZIL--Deputy Claims 1 in 10 are Drug Addicts--TNDD, No. L/7972, p. 62. The Brazilian official claimed that cocaine and heroin were brought into Brazil from Bolivia, and much of the marijuana is smuggled in from Paraguay. He affirmed that the causes of drug addiction are complex and warned that only a national mobilization, including teachers, legislators, and civilian and religious leaders, could "erect a barrier."

COLOMBIA--Militarization of La Guajira To Be Discussed--TNDD, No. L/7962, p. 48. The Governor of Guajira Province, speaking in Bogota recently, said she disagrees with the proposal to militarize La Guajira as a solution to the rampant marijuana trafficking problem. The proposal has been under discussion by top government officials, however, and the outgoing president announced in early August that military surveillance in the region will be reinforced as part of an overall plan to fight illicit marijuana trafficking in that part of the country.

DENMARK--Would-be Drugs Manufacturer Bought Ephedrine Openly in West Germany--TNDD, No. L/7962, pp. 77-78. The discovery of a narcotics laboratory in an apartment in Amagar was a source of great concern for the police; a spark, even from the doorbell, could have caused a catastrophic explosion. A 23-year old chemical engineering student was charged with the violation under the strict narcotics code as well as with placing lives in danger. The student was producing a stimulant drug in his apartment; and the police estimated there were enough chemicals to produce about \$700,000 worth of illicit drugs. When the police entered the suspect's apartment, they found distilling apparatus bubbling and simmering in the kitchen and living room and 5 liter cans of ether standing around the rooms. During the investigation, it was determined that the student was also very interested in experimenting with explosives.

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DENMARK--Arrests in Pakistan Morphine Case--TNDD, No. L/7962, p. 86. Pakistani morphine tablets, worth between \$4-500,000, have been sold from rooms in four large hotels in Copenhagen during recent months, according to an item appearing in the Copenhagen press. The police found 1,341 morphine tablets in the hotel room where they arrested the narcotics pusher, who admitted to receiving between 1,000 and 1,500 tablets twice each week which he sold to intermediate dealers in other hotels. He claimed that he had sold a total of between 20,000 and 30,000 of the morphine tablets. According to the press item, the 21-year-old pusher was jailed "for 14 days."

INDONESIA--Hard Drug Abuse, Change in Smuggling Route Reported--TNDD, No. L/7962, pp. 23-25. Prescription drugs are being substituted for morphine by drug abusers not only in the cities but also in the villages. The press item noted that the narcotics syndicate continually alters the route of its opium-smuggling to prevent interception by the authorities. The route of entry to Indonesia was, at the time, from Riau and West Borneo. According to an Indonesian police official, international traffickers in Southeast Asia look upon Indonesia both as a market for narcotics and as a way-station in black market drug traffic to other areas. Indonesia was being viewed as a thoroughfare for narcotics being smuggled from Thailand to Australia.

ITALY--Drug Arrests in Rome, Apulia, Florence--TNDD, No. L/7962, pp. 94-96. An organization, operating in tandem with "kidnapings anonymous," was investing the ransom money obtained in the acquisition of business and apartments, but principally in large consignments of narcotics. The investigation of 31 persons arrested last spring uncovered a vast business network which included several Sicilian and Calabrian Mafia groups. The acquisition of large quantities of narcotics is one of the preferred investments for those involved in the "kidnaping industry" because this type of operation facilitates the rapid multiplication of funds while entrusting the laundering of "dirty money" to the underworld.

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JAPAN--Japan and Hong Kong Police to Cooperate on Drug Affairs--TNDD, No. L/7962, pp. 28-30. Last month the Japanese National Police Agency solidified a policy to establish a full-fledged international investigative cooperation structure with the Hong Kong police, aimed at the "annihilation" of international narcotics smuggling organizations. According to the agency, the inflow of drugs from overseas is a little over 2 tons per year. Of this amount, 1 ton is from Korea and 1 ton is of West German manufacture and comes in by way of Hong Kong, the Philippines, Taiwan, and Macao.

NEW ZEALAND--Heroin Remains Big Drug Abuse Problem--TNDD, No. L/7972, p. 42. According to a recent report given in Parliament, heroin offenses increased last year from 127 to 235, and a total of 835.75 grams of heroin was seized. The report notes that there has been a reduction in the amount of imported cannabis sticks as heroin is more profitable and less bulky to handle. The report states that drug offenses in New Zealand increased 15.3 percent during 1977.

SOUTH AFRICA--Millions Worth of Marijuana Confiscated--TNDD, No. L/7962, pp. 70-72. Over one million dollars worth of marijuana was confiscated in a 3-day period according to a Johannesburg newspaper. The marijuana, the quality of which was described as "the best ever to come into the country," reportedly came from Lesotho, and was contained in 205 bags. According to a police spokesman, it appeared that those involved were connected with an organized syndicate.

SWEDEN--Interpol Warns Police of Drugs Smuggled in Condoms--TNDD, No. L/7962, pp. 97-98. According to a Stockholm newspaper, this method of smuggling low volume narcotics, such as heroin and cocaine, is becoming more and more common since it is difficult to detect. Narcotics are placed in condoms which are then swallowed by the smuggler before crossing the border. According to the article, the record of those detected is 55 condoms or 1.5 kilograms in one stomach. The intensified battle against narcotics smuggling in Sweden and abroad has forced the smugglers to use a variety of methods. There

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has also been a marked increase in the volume of cannabis drugs entering Sweden. According to Interpol, a total of 70,000 kilograms of cannabis, including cannabis oil, were seized in Europe last year--an increase of more than 100 percent over the previous year.

TURKEY--Heroin Seized--TNDD, No. L/7972, p. 118. Police forces in Bursa, about 60 air-miles southeast of Istanbul, recently seized 5 kilograms of heroin worth about \$240,000. Security officials claimed that the heroin had been smuggled into Turkey across the Turkish-Iranian border. The seized heroin had been found hidden in two specially prepared compartments during a search of a car parked on the street in Bursa. Two persons have been taken into custody and another is being sought in connection with the incident.

UNITED KINGDOM--British Police Seize Large Quantity of Heroin--TNDD, No. L/7972, p. 119. British Customs officials and Scotland Yard drug squad officers recently seized 3.5 pounds of heroin in a raid on a house in London. The seizure is regarded by British authorities as a "major breakthrough" in the attack on the smuggling of Southeast Asian heroin to Britain. A Malaysian and two Chinese are under investigation in connection with the case.

WEST GERMANY--Heroin Addiction, Deaths Increase in Frankfurt--TNDD, No. L/7962, pp. 101-103. Twenty-three heroin addicts already have died of drug overdoses in the Frankfurt area this year; this is more than the total of 18 for all of last year. Frankfurt drug authorities regard the rising death toll as an "inevitable development" as more and more users move from the experimental stage to hard core addiction. There has been a 50 percent increase in the number of drug addicts in the Frankfurt area in the last two years.

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