



**National  
Foreign  
Assessment  
Center**



HR

# **International Narcotics Review**

**16 August 1978**

DOJ review(s) completed.

State Dept. review completed

2000/1

**Secret**

*RP INR 78-002  
16 August 1978*

*Copy 223*

**Page Denied**

Next 1 Page(s) In Document Denied




INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS REVIEW

16 August 1978

CONTENTS

COLOMBIA: Increased Attention on Marijuana Production . . . . . 1

Colombia has long been a principal source of marijuana for the US market. It now appears that the Guajira region, renowned as a center of contraband smuggling, has emerged as the prime source.



PAKISTAN: The Opium Export Business. . . . . 9

Recent information presents a clearer picture of what has become a well-established business.

PAKISTAN: Experimental Abolition of Opium Vending System. . . . . 10

As a narcotics control measure Pakistan has abolished, temporarily at least,

This publication is prepared by analysts in the National Foreign Assessment Center for specialists in the Washington community who are interested in international narcotics matters. Comments and queries are welcome.



SECRET



25X1

licensed vending in two districts. The system has long been exploited for illicit trafficking.

TURKEY: Attempted Illegal Harvest Draws Quick Penalty . . . . . 11

Ankara continues to demonstrate its determination to maintain firm control over opium poppy cultivation. It also appears to be trying to adjust its production to world demand.

YUGOSLAVIA: Tightening Narcotics Controls . . . . . 15

New legislation and a new control center being established in the border area with Bulgaria should help reduce narcotics smuggling from the East.

NOTEWORTHY POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTS



25X1

2. Ecuador . . . . . 18  
3. Honduras . . . . . 20  
4. Malaysia . . . . . 23

BRIEFS . . . . . 26

FOREIGN MEDIA. . . . . 29

SECRET

25X1

25X1

COLOMBIA: Increased Attention on Marijuana Production

According to a report from the Attorney General's office in Bogota, as many as 70,000 hectares (approximately 150,000 acres) of marijuana are under cultivation in the Guajira region of northeast Colombia. This estimate, perhaps the most precise one made thus far, represents a drastic increase over the amount of cannabis previously believed grown in Colombia. The findings also present an increased challenge for drug control by the new Turbay administration.


Colombia has long been a principal source of marijuana for the US market. In the past, most of it has been grown in the rugged Sierra Nevada Mountains in the Departments of Magdalena and Cesar. It now appears that the Guajira region, renowned as a center of contraband smuggling, has emerged as the prime source. US officials believe that 50 to 80 ton shipments of the drug are routine. These marijuana shipments account for perhaps one-half or more of Colombia's estimated \$500 million to \$1 billion annual drug trade.

The majority of the cultivation is done by squatters who encroach on public land. Their average yield is about one ton of marijuana per acre of land. The crop is harvested, baled, and then stored clandestinely on commercial or private vessels that depart from Riohacha, Santa Marta, Barranquilla, Cartagena, or other Caribbean seaport cities. In addition, literally hundreds of secret airports facilitate air smuggling.

In spite of a recent 572-ton marijuana seizure by Colombian authorities, prospects for drug control in the Guajira are not good. The area itself is geographically remote, politically autonomous, and highly volatile. Legislation is presently under consideration that will permit confiscation of land used for growing marijuana, but that is likely to be of little deterrence to the itinerant farmers who grow their illicit crop on government land to begin with. Moreover, the technical problems caused by terrain and weather will make an aerial eradication campaign expensive and difficult to mount.

16 August 1978

### Colombia: Major Marijuana Growing Area



623917 8-78 CIA

SECRET

At the outset of the Lopez administration, narcotics control in Colombia was divided among several uncoordinated and often competing enforcement agencies--an inefficient system that Lopez attempted to improve by assigning primary responsibility for drug control to the Attorney General's office. The Attorney General's drug unit is finally starting to pay dividends.

President Turbay, in his inaugural address last week, pledged that his new government would continue the war on drugs initiated by Lopez. Turbay also implied that the military would play an increased, and perhaps even the lead, role in the antinarcotics program. More than likely Turbay will not lessen the Attorney General's current drug control responsibilities; to do so would be counterproductive at this point. Moreover, it would increase misgivings among many Colombians and others who believe Turbay is associated with traffickers and will afford them official protection.

If Turbay does make changes in the drug control program, it probably will be with regard to increasing military involvement. By ordering the armed forces to step up its participation, the new president can put a personal stamp on his administration's commitment to drug control. Additionally, such a decision would be a sound one in view of the fact that the Attorney General lacks the resources and manpower to operate effectively in the Guajira.

Turbay has to wage his drug war on two very different fronts--cocaine processing and smuggling in the urban centers and marijuana cultivation in remote rural provinces. Attention is currently being focused in Colombia on the latter. It would be a mistake, however, for Turbay to focus enforcement and interdiction efforts solely on the marijuana issue, and to permit the cocaine problem to escalate further.

25X1

16 August 1978


SECRET

**Page Denied**

Next 3 Page(s) In Document Denied



SECRET



SECRET

25X1

PAKISTAN: The Opium Export Business

We have known for some time that a significant amount of Pakistani opium is shipped to Iran through Afghanistan, but information recently reported by DEA sources gives a clearer picture of what apparently is a well-established business. The sources have identified two major opium brokers and five smaller ones, all of whom normally deal in lots of more than a ton. They conduct their business in Landi Kotal, at the entrance to the Khyber Pass, long notorious as a smuggling center.

The brokers usually maintain a stock of about four tons of opium. When supplies run low, they order more opium from middlemen in the growing areas. On 5 August, the two major brokers received shipments of four and six tons. The brokers are responsible for the delivery of the opium to their customers. One minor broker recently sold two tons of opium to Afghans in Jallalabad, but most shipments are made to the Herat area, where the buyers reship the opium to Iran.

Some opium is also sold directly to Iranians. Early this month, the second most important broker sold 1.4 tons to two Iranians and a European for delivery in Iran. Nomads are transporting the opium by mule to a transshipment point in Afghanistan where others will take over for the rest of the journey. The nomads receive 60 cents a kilo, but must pay 20 cents a kilo to the border guards. Because a system has been developed for paying border authorities, shipments usually go by truck not by animal caravan.

25X1

16 August 1978

SECRET




25X1

PAKISTAN: Experimental Abolition of Opium Vending System

Pakistan, as an experiment, has abolished the opium vending system in two districts in Punjab Province. In these districts, addicts will be registered, issued special identification cards, and will buy opium directly from the government. If the program is run at all honestly, it should be an improvement over the present system, whereby licenses to sell opium to addicts are sold by the government to the highest bidder. The vendors buy their opium from the government and resell it to addicts at set prices.

The supposed profit and loss of the vendors in this system can only indicate that they are diverting much of the opium to illicit channels. The opium vendors--by the official bookkeeping--lose about \$2.25 million annually.



25X1

16 August 1978

SECRET

TURKEY: Attempted Illegal Harvest Draws Quick Penalty


For their attempt to gather opium latex, or gum, by lancing the poppy capsules, twenty-seven farmers in southwestern Turkey were arrested recently, and their opium poppy fields destroyed. This method of harvesting for raw opium, which can be easily converted into heroin for illicit trafficking, has been banned in Turkey since 1972. This is the first report since the opium poppy control program went into effect in 1974 of an attempt to harvest raw opium with the probable intent of illegal conversion into heroin. There is no information on how large an area was involved.

The Turkish Public Prosecutor has called for 10-year sentences for those implicated. If imposed, as appears likely, it will further underscore Ankara's continuing commitment to a tough policy against illicit opium production and its firm determination to maintain its strict, and thus far effective, opium control system. There has been no evidence of any breakdown in the control system since it first went into effect; and the Turks show every intention of expanding their control procedures.

In an attempt to come to grips with persistent overproduction and storage problems created by the growing surplus of poppy straw, the Ministry of Agriculture is seeking a government decree that would reduce the size of the planting area authorized to each farmer who is licensed to grow opium poppies. The Turkish Soils Products Office (TMO) has recommended a reduction from five decares--about 1.25 acres--to two decares or about one-half an acre. Under this restriction, the total area authorized should produce about 20,000 tons of poppy capsules per year, an amount that would meet the requirements of the alkaloid factory currently being constructed at Bolvadin in southwestern Turkey. The new plant is expected to be operational sometime next year, probably in time for the 1979 harvest. The proposed decree probably will be promulgated within the next few months.

16 August 1978

### Turkey: Legally Grown Opium Poppies



623918 8-78 CIA

25X1

SECRET

In a further step intended to reduce poppy straw production and, at the same time, to promote higher quality, the TMO has announced its intention to discontinue the practice of buying all poppies, regardless of quality, at prices near the top of the pricing scale. On 10 August, the official Turkish Gazette published the prices to be paid for the 1978 crop. Poppies that were planted last fall will be purchased at \$1.00 per kilogram; those that were planted in the spring to replace crops that were damaged by the winter weather will be bought at the rate of \$.72 per kilogram. Despite an inflation factor exceeding 40 percent, the two-level pricing system will enable the government to pay approximately the same total amount for poppy capsules this year as it paid in 1977. Although the purchase price this year represents a net decline for the farmers and there probably will be some protest from those provinces where poppies are grown, the prices are still not unattractive, and the byproducts of seed, oil, and fodder are of considerable value to the farmers.


The steps being taken by the Turkish Government reflect Ankara's concern over its poppy straw surpluses in recent years, largely as the result of growing surpluses on world markets. They also reflect Ankara's determination to keep Turkey's annual yield of poppy straw in balance with the capacity of the new poppy straw processing plant. The reduction being contemplated could result in as much as a 50 to 60 percent reduction in the total area actually under poppy cultivation.

The poppy straw harvest, which got under way in early July and will continue for another few weeks, probably will yield between 30,000 and 35,000 tons of capsules, or about the same as last year. This is a preliminary estimate, however, and is subject to change. Because most of the available storage areas are already filled with the carryover from previous crops, most of the new crop will have to be kept in open storage, although it will be partially protected by canvas and polyethylene covering. Some weather damage could result from this type of storage; the previous year's experience suggests that any loss should not be serious.

25X1

16 August 1978

SECRET



628920 8-78

25X1

YUGOSLAVIA: Tightening Narcotics Controls

Belgrade is planning to introduce tougher legal restrictions on the production and use of narcotics later this year. It will also strengthen its enforcement ability along a major smuggling route.

The new law--to be passed at the end of the year--requires greater care in the storage of narcotics, monitoring of narcotic substances in production, and official permits for personal possession of such drugs. Stiff fines--in the Yugoslav context at least--of \$3,000 to \$6,000 and light imprisonment, only up to 60 days, are the teeth in the new legislation.

In a related move, Yugoslav narcotic control experts recently told US officials that a modern drug investigation unit will be opened in southern Serbia in January of next year. The investigation center in Nis will concentrate on checking the flow of smuggled narcotics from the Gradina crossing point from Bulgaria. Already this year, the authorities confiscated 870 kilos of illegal drugs at Gradina, and existing enforcement facilities are hard put to keep up with the problem.

The Gradina border crossing is probably the most significant control point for the interdiction of narcotics couriers in Europe, according to American observers in the area. Last year about 2,500 kilograms of illicit drugs were seized at this point from 115 smugglers, including Turks, Iranians, and Germans. Forty-four of the 46 smugglers arrested at the Gradina crossing so far this year have been Turkish nationals. The new Narcotics Investigation Center at Nis will have a capability of eliciting information from narcotics couriers concerning the point of origin and the destination of drug shipments and will be able to forward that information quickly to police enforcement units in the countries concerned.

25X1

16 August 1978



**Page Denied**

Next 1 Page(s) In Document Denied

Noteworthy Political and  
Economic Developments



25X1

ECUADOR: Presidential Election Quandary


Ecuador's armed forces still appear divided over what to do about Jaime Roldos--winner of the first round of the presidential election on 16 July and protege of the military's archfoe, Assad Bucaram. Opposition to Roldos is said to be growing among general officers, but there is also mounting international and domestic pressure on the government to proceed with the second round--which Roldos should win handily. Battle lines are now being more tightly drawn;

25X1

[redacted] the populist leader is threatening to take his cause to the streets.

Roldos unofficially polled a surprising 31-percent plurality in the first round


25X1




25X1

[redacted] an inordinate delay in the tribunal's tabulation of the returns, have prompted an outcry from civilian political leaders and the press. They have also caused foreign observers to discount the Ecuadoran leaders' commitment to return to constitutional rule. President Poveda, however, has assured US emissaries that the election will proceed without hindrance.

16 August 1978

25X1, Although the Ecuadoran public has remained relatively quiet during the past six years of military rule, an obvious attempt to steal the election from Roldos could trigger widespread popular unrest. 



16 August 1978

SECRET

Noteworthy Political and  
Economic Developments

25X1

HONDURAS: A New Leadership Takes Over

The bloodless ouster of Honduran Chief of State Melgar by the Superior Defense Council--the group of lieutenant colonels who help set national policy--resulted from a mix of motives centering on the struggle over the delineation of authority between the Council and the Chief of State. The new three-man junta--led by armed forces chief General Policarpo Paz--is probably sincere at the moment in its commitment to hold elections in 1980 as scheduled. No civilian opposition to the change in leadership is likely.

The division of responsibility between Melgar and the Council was never resolved after they assumed power in 1975. While the lieutenant colonels at first tried to run everything, they soon discovered that affairs of state detracted from military duties. As a result, Melgar and his cabinet were delegated more authority to implement government policy while the Council provided only overall guidance. Differences also arose between progressive and conservative members of the Council over the pace of reform. These were eventually resolved in favor of the conservatives, and by last year, most of the more liberal members of the Council had been retired or sent abroad.

New disagreements cropped up among the leadership early this year, however, when the government decided to schedule elections for 1980 and open up the political system. Moreover, the relatively free Honduran media embarked on a continuing campaign of allegations of military involvement in narcotics trafficking, which prompted hard-line officers to institute a coverup.

Melgar--the odds-on favorite to win the 1980 presidential election--opposed retaliatory measures against the press. This, together with his increased reliance

16 August 1978

SECRET

SECRET

on civilian advisers, raised questions about his institutional loyalty to the military and appears to have exacerbated personality differences between himself and General Paz.

The Council began bidding to regain a larger role in setting and carrying out policy, ostensibly to halt alleged inefficiency and graft in Honduras' autonomous institutions. The actual motivations among the nearly three dozen members of the Council, however, probably ranged from a real desire for reform to a simple effort to siphon off more funds for themselves. The Council and General Paz, increasingly determined to expand their authority, demanded late last month that Melgar remove several officials and institute other changes in his administration. Although the Council had initially been disposed to reach a compromise, Melgar's effort to garner civilian support for his position evidently triggered his ouster.

Any resistance on the Council to Melgar's removal-- apparently only a small minority of members--seems to have dissipated quietly. Several of the officers whose support for the ouster was once considered questionable played leading roles in the move--most notably Air Force Chief Alvarez, who is now part of the three-man governing junta.

The two leading civilian political parties are probably not displeased with the shift. Although Melgar would probably have been the National Party's candidate, the Nationals may now be able to run a civilian. The Liberals, for their part, believe that they have a better chance of winning with Melgar out of the race.

25X1

Melgar's most prominent civilian advisers and those military officers in his cabinet who are viewed--like Melgar--as having become too politicized will be removed. This is not likely to result in any

16 August 1978

SECRET

SECRET

basic shifts of policy. The new leadership is clearly less inclined to suffer public attacks on the military, but its considerable sensitivity to US concerns--evidenced by the decision to inform the US Embassy of Melgar's removal before making any public announcement--seems likely to keep its human rights record a relatively good one.

[REDACTED]

25X1

16 August 1978

SECRET

Noteworthy Political and  
Economic Developments

25X1



MALAYSIA: What the Election Means

The results of the recent parliamentary and state elections suggest that:

- The position of Prime Minister Hussein has been strengthened both within the ruling 10-party National Front coalition and within his own party, the United Malays National Organization (UMNO).
- The gains made by UMNO, although aided by the ban on rallies during the campaign, reflect the majority Malay community's continued support of a secular Malay party as the country's dominant governing body.
- The modest gains made by the opposition Chinese-dominated Democratic Action Party (DAP) reflect increasing disenchantment on the part of the minority Chinese population with the National Front's two Chinese parties, the Malaysian Chinese Association (MCA) and Gerakan.
- The losses absorbed by the opposition conservative Malay Islamic Party (PAS) stem from its inability to shake off its corrupt image and to articulate credible policy alternatives.

Hussein, who came to power in January 1976 upon the death of his predecessor, has emerged with a mandate to continue pursuing the New Economic Policy-- aimed at increasing wealth among Malays through sustained economic growth--while minimizing communal tension. The National Front, which he leads, won 131 of 154 parliamentary seats, gaining once again the strength to make constitutional changes; his own party took 70 of those seats, an overall increase of nine.

16 August 1978

The victory will probably set the stage for a harmonious UMNO General Assembly, which Hussein had canceled to hold the election. The convention, at which party officers are elected, is now scheduled for 14-16 September. In the wake of UMNO's strong electoral showing, it is unlikely that Hussein and Deputy Prime Minister Mahathir--who was returned to Parliament with a surprisingly large majority--will face even token challenges for the UMNO presidency and vice-presidency.

The Front's victories in all state assemblies have also led to the appointment of several new Chief Ministers. Their reputations for honesty and administrative competence combined with their close ties to Hussein may work in favor of settling some federal-state conflicts over land use--a constitutional prerogative of the states that has impeded national planning and has been a traditional source of corruption at the state level.

Discrimination in land matters--for example, the difficulty encountered by the Chinese in obtaining licenses to run their tin operations--is one of several reasons why more Chinese Malaysians voted for the DAP; favoritism of Malays in economic and educational issues are two others. The DAP's increase in Parliament from nine to 16 seats and the MCA and Gerakan's combined decrease from 26 to 21 may also reflect an increasing perception among ethnic Chinese that their Front parties are too subservient to UMNO. The fact that two of the DAP victors are detainees who could not campaign illustrates the level of frustration harbored by the Chinese community.

Although it is unlikely that the government will change its educational policy--favoring the admittance of Malays to universities and the use of Malay in the classroom--Hussein will probably be more flexible in economic matters. He may seek to lessen restrictions on the amount of Malay equity needed for approval of new investment, which might assuage at least some segments of the Chinese business community and lead to an increase in what has been lagging domestic investment. The Prime Minister's creation and assumption of a new Ministry of Federal Territory--with control over land matters in an area including Kuala Lumpur, where the majority of the population is Chinese--may be another

16 August 1978



way to win Chinese support. The Front won only two of five seats in Kuala Lumpur, and one of those was gained on a plurality; the DAP took the other three.

Hussein and other UMNO leaders have worked hard at winning over the rural Malay constituency of PAS with timely allocations of federal funds and promises of future economic development. This strategy, combined with land profiteering scandals involving PAS leaders, has led to the party's lowest point since its birth over 20 years ago. As a result of recent elections, its parliamentary representation fell from 13 to 4; and its state strength declined to 11, including considerable setbacks in Kedah and, earlier this year, in Kelantan. Nevertheless, the margin of some UMNO victories over PAS, especially in traditional PAS strongholds in the north, were slim. A faltering economy combined with heightened racial tension could lead to a PAS resurgence, particularly under a new party leadership.

25X1

16 August 1978

~~SECRET~~BRIEFS

EAST/WEST GERMANY: WEST GERMAN OVERTURE TO GDR COULD HELP PAVE THE WAY FOR COOPERATION IN THE INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS CONTROL EFFORT. The West Berlin police recently received information that a Turkish narcotics courier from Istanbul would soon be attempting to smuggle an undisclosed amount of heroin into West Germany after first landing at East Germany's Schoenefeld Airfield. The report named the alleged Turkish courier, gave his date of birth, and cited a long record of dealing in illicit drugs. After gaining permission, the West Berlin police promptly passed the information via Telex to the East German authorities and suggested that, since they had given the GDR information which could lead to a major narcotics arrest, probably the East Germans "would want to inform" the West Berlin police of any results. Although there, as yet, has been no response from the East German authorities, this direct contact between representatives of the two German elements in Berlin is viewed by some American observers as a positive development. The US Mission in Berlin notes that it is unaware of any previous instance where narcotics intelligence has been passed directly between the West German police and the GDR. The Mission feels the incident may encourage cooperation on the narcotics issue and at least will help to keep pressure on the GDR to try to stop narcotics smuggling through the East German airport. The GDR, like other East European countries, admits to no domestic narcotics abuse problem. They have, however, recently indicated more awareness of the international narcotics problem by press references to West Berlin as the "drug capital" of Europe and by commenting on the drug abuse problem in Portugal. Schoenefeld Airfield has been widely viewed as a favored transit point used by Turkish "guest workers" who have been smuggling narcotics into Germany. Recent intelligence from the US Mission in Berlin notes, however, that heroin

16 August 1978

SECRET

SECRET

appears to be reaching Berlin via a "great variety" of ways and that there is no major point of entry. It noted that motor vehicles may well be the preferred way for transporting illicit drugs into Berlin. [REDACTED]

25X1

EAST GERMANY: DRUGS COULD FOLLOW THE ALCOHOL ROUTE. Large amounts of alcoholic beverages are being smuggled into West Germany from the east, and the same modus operandi may also be used by narcotics traffickers. According to an item appearing recently in Der Spiegel, truckers traveling between the two German sectors frequently carry contraband alcohol hidden in their cargo. The press item further claims that East German officials are involved in the smuggling operation. According to the item, West German Customs officials have recently learned, allegedly from one of those involved in the smuggling operation, that East Germany has, for years, been building its foreign exchange reserves by serving as an accomplice to the illegal trade if not actually the managing agency in the activity. The contraband cargo is loaded on "sealed" trucks that are detoured briefly while en route to the control point; shipping documents are also altered to cover any delay made necessary by the unscheduled stop. The source claimed that the system only works smoothly because GDR officials are personally involved. West German officials are also partially at fault, however, because they apparently often pass trucks through the control points with little or no inspection, other than a brief look at the shipping documents. Often there is little more than a wave of the hand. The Der Spiegel article refers only to alcohol and cigarettes as contraband items, but the same smuggling routes and methods of operation apparently are well established and could just as easily be used for smuggling narcotics into West Germany from the east for further distribution throughout Western Europe and even to the Western Hemisphere. The routes and the vehicles apparently are virtually uncontrolled, except for a check of the bill-of-lading and a wave of the hand. The

16 August 1978

SECRET

volume of traffic passing through the control points rules out any thorough search of the large trucks traveling from east to west unless there is intelligence indicating that contraband cargo may be on board. Only freight from non-EC countries is subject to strict control.

25X1

16 August 1978

FOREIGN MEDIA

BELIZE--Drugs-By-Air Smuggling Hottest Racket in Town--  
TNDD,\* No. L/7947, 9 August 1978, p. 46. The police in Belize City, acting on a tip-off, seized a Cessna Air Commander aircraft carrying more than 1,000 pounds of marijuana. According to the press item, there is little question that the marijuana, packed in 30 large plastic bags, was grown in Belize. From time to time, the police in Belize reportedly have come across large caches of marijuana, but this is the first time that the marijuana trafficking has been definitely linked to air transportation. According to the press, the lack of previous arrests and prosecution of carriers tends to confirm the suspicion that the drug trade in Belize has the protection of persons of power and influence.

25X6

COLOMBIA--French View of Aborted Bombing Plan--TNDD, No. L/7933, 2 August 1978, pp. 75-77. (Based on an article appearing in the French magazine Le Point.) As in the James Bond movies, an electronically controlled garden camouflaged the airfield which was equipped with the latest innovations in navigational gear, radio beams, and landing lights for night flights. This clandestine airfield was used by drug traffickers. The Colombian police, after receiving an anonymous tip, put an end to the most modern cocaine laboratory yet found. Colombia has become

\*US Joint Publications Research Service (JPRS) Translations on Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs. Published by JPRS, 1000 Glebe Road, Arlington, Va. 22201.

25X1

16 August 1978

the base of drug traffickers in Latin America; small airplanes reportedly land daily on the northern and southern coasts of the country to pick up or drop off drugs. "What is to be done against organizations which have resources greater than those of the state?" a Colombian official sighs. The Colombian Air Force continues to investigate every possible clandestine landing strip which will be bombed, according to the Colombian official. More than 300 such strips in Colombia reportedly have already been destroyed according to the press report.

FRANCE--Authorities Seize 40 Kilos of Cocaine--TNDD, No. L/7947, p. 94. Forty kilograms of cocaine, worth about \$7 million, were seized recently at a French airport by the French Customs Service, according to an item in Le Figaro. The seizure was one of the largest ever made in France. The drug was found in four suitcases in the possession of four members of a Chilean family who had just arrived from La Paz and were passing through Paris on their way to Rome. This single seizure equaled the total amount of cocaine seized in France during six months of the year.

FRANCE--How Marseilles Seagoing Customs Officers Fight Drugs--TNDD, No. L/7947, pp. 91-93. The supervision of territorial waters and of the coastline is an age-old concern of maritime countries. Its novelty today lies in the acceleration of technical progress in every area, but this works both ways, for the big traffickers very quickly adapt to the new circumstances. By degrees, international cooperation has been broadly achieved; in the Mediterranean, for example, there are constant exchanges with the Italian and Spanish customs officers. International agreements even make it possible to intervene on the high seas under certain circumstances. Supervision of territorial waters and sea reconnaissance of suspected vessels, is possible only with fast boats and effective fire-power. French scout-type coast guard vessels, armed with 12.7-mm machineguns, patrol the high seas and carry out considerable maritime checking and, where necessary, escort suspected

16 August 1978

ships to port. Aircraft and helicopters are also used to maintain this surveillance. Detection missions are becoming more difficult, according to those involved, shipments are split up into smaller lots and get through on some of the countless small pleasure sailboats. The French Customs officials admit that large amounts of drugs escape seizure. The problem is that the trafficker always has the initiative both as to time and method, and he is quick to exploit gaps and weaknesses. The majority of the long weekends apparently are the peak periods for narcotics smuggling.

INDONESIA--Malaysia Agrees To Join Effort Against Drug Trafficking--TNDD, No. L/7947, p. 10. Indonesia and Malaysia have agreed to cooperate more closely in combating drug trafficking between the two countries.

INDONESIA--Review of Drug Scene in Indonesia--TNDD, No. L/7933, pp. 27-29. An International Narcotics Bureau and European Interpol intelligence report received by the Indonesian police last spring claimed that a large Thai narcotics syndicate planned to establish a clandestine narcotics laboratory on the mainland area of Indonesia. Another intelligence report, according to the Indonesian press, stated that Indonesia was to become a major transit area for illicit drugs destined for the US and Europe. A narcotics police official in Jakarta has stressed that the illicit narcotics problem constitutes a "strategic threat" which must be faced. According to the press item, 27 domestic syndicates and five international syndicates operating in Indonesia have been smashed, but much remains to be done. According to the police, narcotics abuse in Indonesia reached alarming proportions as early as 1968 when some 10,000 youths were known to be drug addicts.

LIBERIA--Marijuana Seizure at Liberian Airport--TNDD, No. L/7933, p. 90. More than half a million dollars worth of marijuana reportedly was seized recently by Customs and Security officials at the international airport. Three large suitcases, believed to have come from a West African country, were said to

16 August 1978

SECRET

contain large quantities of marijuana. According to a Liberian Customs official, the government is mobilizing its forces to prevent the importation of dangerous drugs into the country.

NORWAY--Prison Director Announces Steps To Keep Drugs Out--TNDD, No. L/7933, pp. 91-92. Because of the serious increase in the use of drugs in Norway's prisons, the government has authorized prison officials to carry out body searches on prisoners including where necessary the use of laxatives such as oil and enemas. According to a Cabinet minister, the abuse of narcotics in Norwegian prisons has become a big problem, and the harsh search measures are required as security measures for the employees at the prisons. The examination must be carried out by health personnel and only after the decision of a physician, and will only be considered where there is definite suspicion that drugs are involved.

THAILAND--Why Does Heroin Spread With Every Passing Day--TNDD, No. L/7947, pp. 20-22. According to figures cited by the clandestine "Voice of the People of Thailand" there are 600,000 drug addicts in Thailand, including over 300,000 in Bangkok and 4,000 Buddhist monks. Some 60 to 70 percent are said to be children. The clandestine radio station goes into considerable detail as to what it alleges to be the drug trafficking networks in Thailand.

25X6

16 August 1978

SECRET



**Secret**

Approved For Release 2008/12/03 : CIA-RDP79T00912A001900010017-0

---

**Secret**

Approved For Release 2008/12/03 : CIA-RDP79T00912A001900010017-0