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# International Narcotics Biweekly Review

26 April 1978

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**INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS BIWEEKLY REVIEW**

26 April 1978

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
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This publication is prepared by analysts in the National Foreign Assessment Center for specialists in the Washington community who are interested in international narcotics matters. Comments and queries are welcome.



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PAKISTAN-AFGHANISTAN: Increased Opium Production

Opium production is increasing on both sides of the Pakistan-Afghanistan border. Moreover, at least in Pakistan, we appear to have seriously underestimated the amount of opium produced in the past. Total production for the two countries had been thought to be in the neighborhood of 500 tons a year; it may be closer to 1,000 tons this year.

From December to March, the US Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) systematically surveyed the opium-growing areas of Pakistan's North-West Frontier Province. It concluded that almost 100,000 acres of poppies here under cultivation and would produce between 404 and 610 tons of opium this year. Our previous estimates, based largely on Pakistani figures, had put illicit opium production in the neighborhood of 200 tons a year. The DEA survey, which involved cross checking both official and unofficial government figures and on-site surveys, revealed that official statistics are sometimes based on nonexistent records and that deliberate underreporting is common. According to some local officials the provincial government wants the figures kept low to avoid embarrassment.

The increase, however, is not due solely to past underreporting. Illicit opium prices have risen dramatically in the past three years from about \$35 a kilogram to over \$200. DEA believes prices will continue upwards, possibly to \$250 in the next few months. One reason for the greater demand reflected in the higher prices is the establishment of illicit laboratories producing heroin, morphine base and morphine sulphate for both domestic consumption and export.

As a result of higher prices [redacted] acreage has quadrupled in one district in the past two years. Opium, moreover, is now profitable enough to justify the use of commercial fertilizer, increasing the yield from each acre.

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The government has argued that enforcement in this area is almost impossible, and there is considerable validity to their claim as it applies to the more remote parts. Recently, however, poppies have been seen growing within 600 meters of the provincial police headquarters. The government has also claimed that opium is produced largely by marginal farmers who need the additional income to survive. The claim may well have been valid in the past, but the relatively high technology being used in extensive, irrigated fields can hardly be called subsistence farming.

Any statistics on Afghanistan have be be viewed with some skepticism, but the UN estimated the production last year at 293.5 tons; according to DEA it was between 200 and 400 tons. Opium is grown throughout the country, but the border area may account for around two-thirds of the country's total. Should production be doubling there, the country's total would jump, despite strong evidence of a decline in other areas.

Neither Kabul nor Islamabad has ever had much control over the tribes along the border, and tribal hostility to any outside interference led to periodic clashes with police and military of both countries and on occasion to fairly serious tribal uprisings. Understandably, neither government wants to stir up the tribes unnecessarily, and many officials in both countries see

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narcotics as a problem for the industrial nations to solve through elimination of the causes of addiction. They see no reason for the developing countries to risk domestic violence or undergo economic hardship in the effort.

Despite the situation along the border, there are some bright spots in both countries. In Afghanistan's Helmand Valley, where the UN estimated production last year at 51 tons, the government is attempting to plow under this years crop. Kabul has much greater control there and more incentive to act. It risks losing US financing for local development projects if the poppies remain.

Early this month, the recently created Pakistani Customs Drug Enforcement Unit seized 84 kilograms of opium in Karachi and may have broken up a ring that was sending about 80 kilograms a month to Hong Kong. Although increased Pakistani capabilities and interest in combatting smuggling will obviously contribute to narcotics control, most opium leaves the country across the Afghan border, not through Karachi.

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


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
PERU: Prospects for the New Narcotics Law

Peru's military government, which in the past has been indifferent to the problem of narcotics control, has shown increasing concern about the nation's drug situation. A controversial and long-delayed narcotics law\*--intended to strengthen existing controls on the cultivation of coca and gradually eliminate its production altogether--was finally passed last month.

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We continue to agree with the US Embassy's belief that the highest levels of the Peruvian Government realize



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that narcotics trafficking is not solely a problem for the US to solve. The amount of time devoted to preparing the narcotics reform law indicates that Peruvian officials are aware of the domestic implications drug trafficking could have if left unchecked. These same officials appear to be sincere in their concern over the increasingly widespread drug abuse among Peruvian youth and the corrupting influence of narcotics trafficking on security forces and other national institutions.

In spite of both the high level recognition the drug problem has received and the passage of the new narcotics law, a number of constraints will continue to work against effective drug control in Peru. The country's current economic problems--a \$5 billion foreign debt, an annual inflation rate of 30 to 40 percent, and unemployment or underemployment of 50 percent of the work force--will limit resources available to control narcotics.

The government's economic dilemma, coupled with a continuation of labor restiveness, comes amid heightened expectations for a return to civilian rule in 1980. The possibility of a failing political will on the part of the current regime, as its time in power comes to an end, could also jeopardize short-range drug control plans.

In the interim, the coca growers themselves may exert pressure on the government. For example, two groups of coca growers claiming to represent more than 32,000 families who cultivate the crop have already met with President Morales in an attempt to get the government to alter regulations for the production of coca. Members of the delegation raised the possibility that, if the law were not altered in favor of the farmers for whom coca is a major source of income, they might call a strike or attempt to get support from radical political groups.

Obviously, passage of the narcotics law--while an important step for drug control in Peru--is only a first step. The real test lies in the military government's willingness to overcome the obstacles and pay the social and economic costs involved in actually eliminating a crop which is deeply rooted in the history and culture

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of the large Indian segment of the country's population. Unless the Peruvians significantly reduce coca production, however, enforcement efforts in neighboring countries which figure as part of the overall cocaine trafficking pipeline in South America will continue to be little more than expensive stopgap measures. [REDACTED]

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NOTEWORTHY POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTS

*(Editor's Note: These items, produced for another CIA publication, do not deal specifically with the international narcotics situation. They are included here, however, because they concern developing political or economic situations that could impact on the international narcotics control effort.)*

IRAN: Government Reaction to Recent Violence

The policy of tolerating dissent that the Shah has followed for many months may be coming to an end.

In response to foreign interest in the human rights situation in Iran, the Shah has over a period of more than a year instituted judicial and prison reforms and tolerated a larger amount of publicly expressed dissent than has been the case for 15 years. In the last three months, however, violence has broken out in all the large cities and many of the smaller ones throughout Iran. The police, who have the main responsibility for controlling demonstrations, have been indecisive, apparently unsure how far they can go in view of the Shah's policies.

The government appears to be starting to react. A large public demonstration in Tabriz organized by the government-sponsored Rastakhiz Party pledged support for the Shah-People Revolution and condemned "every plot, every design instigated by colonialists and their hired agents." Other progovernment demonstrations will probably be organized in the weeks to come.

The Civil Resistance Corps, a sort of paramilitary home guard, has announced that it is ready to "stop the violence and sabotage perpetrated by groups of masked hooligans," foreshadowing the possibility of a repetition of clashes between pro and antigovernment mobs which have been so common throughout Iranian history.

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In addition, bombs have exploded at the homes of three moderate opposition leaders, and a fourth man has been beaten up. This ostensibly is the work of a pseudonymous "Underground Organization for Vengeance." The US Embassy reports that there are two stories making the rounds: that the bombings are the work of progovernment elements and are intended as warnings that public violence has gone as far as is tolerable, and that the bombings are the work of more extreme dissidents opposed to the line followed by the moderates. The Embassy gives greater credence to the first explanation.

If the bombings are the work of government supporters, they may be striking at the wrong target. The recent violence appears to have been primarily protests by a relatively conservative, unorganized group of religious fundamentalists expressing their unhappiness with the Westernization and modernization of Iran, which they believe threatens the very existence of Islam. Counter-violence by street mobs might disperse these Islamicists, but attempts to intimidate the moderate opposition leaders would not.

In spite of the evident government concern, the security situation is not out of control, and the moderate opposition nationalist coalition does not at this time appear to be seeking a showdown with the government.

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Noteworthy Political and  
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NEPAL-INDIA: Economic Relations

Nepal and India finally signed new agreements on trade and transit in mid-March, after two and a half years of occasionally bitter negotiations. The two treaties and an agreement on smuggling reflect the Desai government's willingness to make minor concessions to its weak neighbors, but they also underline Nepal's obvious vulnerability. The specific provisions offer slightly increased scope for Nepalese exports, but mostly serve to limit the ways in which the two countries can hurt each other. The economic package is an important symbol of improved relations. Its practical significance will depend on how it is implemented, and that in turn will depend on economic conditions in each country and the state of their political relations.

Transit Issues

The main Indian concession--agreement to a separate treaty for transit issues--was partly the result of Indian administrative confusion. Prime Minister Desai personally agreed to separate treaties shortly after he came into office, apparently thinking this request was of major symbolic importance to Nepal but of negligible practical importance. In fact, the Nepalese had earlier withdrawn this request in order to press their greater interest in language establishing a "right" to transit through India rather than just a "freedom" subject to negotiation. The final language does not concede this "right," although it does refer to Nepal's landlocked status and its "need" for access to the sea. The format of separate treaties is intended to give the illusion of more concessions than were granted.

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In the past, Nepal has accused India of using its control of transit goods to punish Nepal for its political statements, to force it to buy more from India, and in general to ensure its dependent status. There is some truth to these accusations, but most impediments to transit have been the result of Indian inefficiency. On the other hand, Nepal has sometimes claimed that a transit "right" would entitle it, for example, to the use of scarce freight cars in preference to the requirements of Indian users. Whatever the niceties of language, transit will inevitably remain subject to negotiations.

Nepal obtained some concessions on specific transit issues--simplification of paper work, additional routes, the right to lease more warehouse space in Calcutta, and additional free days there before demurrage is levied.

As soon as details can be worked out, Nepalese goods will be allowed to transit India to and beyond Bangladesh. Special arrangements were made in the past for Nepalese rice shipments to Bangladesh, but the Indians did not want to bother establishing permanent facilities. The present economic value of this route seems minimal, but Nepal feels more comfortable having access to a port other than Calcutta.

### Illegal Trade

Throughout the negotiations, India was primarily interested in control of smuggling. The new agreement commits each country to "take all necessary measures" to prevent unauthorized trade from hurting the other. India tightened its border control several months ago and now cites this provision as justification. In addition, the new treaties give the Indians greater control of smuggling of goods in transit. As before, unauthorized trade is defined to include not only conventional smuggling, but also the export of Nepalese goods made largely from Indian products.

Two weeks after the agreements with India were signed, Nepal announced substantial changes in its trade and currency regulations. An export incentive scheme, which India viewed as an incentive to smuggling of third country goods into India, was abolished. Many Nepalese

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now resentfully view the policy reforms as part of the bargain with India. This is only partly true; the changes were also recommended by the International Monetary Fund.

In economic terms, smuggling is scarcely worth all the trouble. Neither country is short of convertible currency at the moment, and it is Nepal that loses when its imports are diverted. Illegal trade patterns that could harm India more--such as export of Indian jute or routing of Indian internal trade through Nepal--were once important but are now minor as a result of changed economic conditions. The long border between the two countries makes tight control of smuggling almost impossible.

#### Legal Trade

India will now permit duty-free entry of Nepalese-manufactured goods with a 20-percent foreign content in place of the previous 10 percent. This Indian concession does affect some products and therefore has real, if limited, value. As before, a 50-percent duty will be levied on goods with a higher (but less than 50 percent) foreign component. This gives Nepal preference over other countries, but probably does not make many of its products competitive in Indian markets.

Nepal did not receive guaranteed access to all the Indian products it may want to buy. New Delhi did pledge improved administrative arrangements and "best efforts" to supply goods such as cement, coal, steel, aluminum, and hardware. India often restricts exports of these goods and rations supplies among its own consumers. Nepal needs special permission in order to buy. The permitted annual "quota" of purchases has been held down when India has been particularly short, when the request was judged in excess of Nepalese needs, or when--in the Nepalese view--political relations were sour. Nepal's development could be handicapped when it has to turn to third country suppliers, since such imports are more expensive, require convertible currency, and must in any case transit India.

Preferential treatment of trade in primary products will be provided on a reciprocal basis. The new provision covering Indian goods will probably not guarantee Nepal access to scarce commodities, such as pulses.

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Nepalese products were covered under the old agreement, but Indian central government intervention was frequently necessary to force the Indian states to allow the promised movement of Nepalese rice and oilseeds. Implementation will probably continue to be a problem.

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Noteworthy Political and  
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BRAZIL: The Views of President-Designate Figueiredo

President-designate Figueiredo has expressed strikingly contrasting views on a number of issues closely related to the eventual liberalization of the political system. Because of his ambivalence, many Brazilians must now be wondering what Figueiredo's true opinions on this all-important subject really are and how deep, in fact, is his expressed commitment to a political "opening."

Figueiredo's first formal political speech, delivered on 9 April on the occasion of his "nomination" as the government's presidential choice, was a notably conciliatory statement. In his remarks, Figueiredo discussed fundamental questions indicating an intention to follow President Geisel's lead in working toward a gradual opening of the tightly controlled political system. In his speech, Figueiredo waxed considerably more liberal, however, than he did during the preceding week when, in a series of lengthy media interviews, he hewed to a fundamentally authoritarian line with only a sprinkling of democratic notions.

In his remarks to the progovernment ARENA politicians who had just "nominated" him for the presidency, Figueiredo stressed political and social issues, rather than the strickly economic and security themes that have generally preoccupied the military over the years. Very early in the statement, Figueiredo alluded to the long-standing domination of the government by the executive branch and suggested that some change in tone could be expected. He said that the "structure" he envisions as appropriate for the achievement of national aspirations is based on an "active congress representing the many currents of thought among the electorate" and a "dynamic

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judiciary respected in all instances." The reference to "various currents of thought" is widely taken to mean that Figueiredo is giving serious consideration to the creation of more political parties.

The president-designate also spoke of the need to manage the economy to meet the needs of the people. Specifically, he stressed the importance of holding down inflation, which "erodes the purchasing power of salaries" while still maintaining a growth rate that allows for some expansion of the job market. He also said he recognizes a need to carry out "with ever greater determination" the task of reducing social disparities. To this end, Figueiredo promised a major effort to promote job training, eradicate malnutrition, and, in general, better meet the health needs of Brazilians.

Figueiredo formally associated himself with the concept of a gradual opening of the political system that the military has put in place. He declared that as president, he will "have to ensure the continuity of a program of political, economic, and social consolidation that is being unfolded in stages without being afraid to revise some established concepts in the process." The statement was almost universally taken to mean that Figueiredo intends to retain and add to whatever liberalizing measures Geisel puts in place by the end of his term next March. Figueiredo cautioned, however, that "tolerance must not be confused with permissiveness" and added that politicians must act "responsibly." He capped the substantive portion of his speech by saying that "the times call for reconciliation and understanding, but with neither patronizing accommodation nor intransigence."

While Figueiredo in his formal speech was conciliatory, he was contentious in wide-ranging, impromptu remarks to the press during the preceding week, greatly unsettling public opinion. Indeed, a number of opposition congressmen and the nation's leading newspapers expressed serious concern over the views he proffered in several extensive interviews.

Figueiredo gave vent to opinions that echo the familiar rhetoric that has long been used to justify the military's dismantling of the civilian political system

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and its retention of sweeping controls over national life. Figueiredo stressed, for example, the need for the state to continue to have the "instruments to protect society," an obvious reference to the all-encompassing national security laws the officers decreed and still enforce. The General frequently fell back on the well-worn argument that Brazil "is in the midst of a revolution" (by the military), as when he defended President Geisel's temporary closure of congress last year when it balked at certain authoritarian laws the regime wanted enacted.

On the subject of selecting presidents, Figueiredo said he favors indirect elections which, he said, are as "legal and democratic" as direct elections. Indeed, he indicated his conviction that Brazilian voters are simply not yet capable of voting "intelligently" enough to justify direct balloting.

Still, Figueiredo insisted he does favor a political opening that involves some greater degree of civilian participation in the government and the easing of some political controls. He defended, for example, the right of students to demonstrate so long as they restrict themselves to campuses. He hinted that he might favor rescinding a recent measure that established indirect election of one-third of the national senators. Figueiredo added that he favors direct election of state governors, currently chosen by state assemblies.

During the week of the media "blitz" a noteworthy clash occurred between the president-designate and a leading senator of the nominal opposition party. Figueiredo, in an interview, called the senator, an advocate of greatly liberalized rule, a "false democrat" who had arrogantly abused his authority years ago as a state official. The senator categorically rejected the charges and went on to say that if Figueiredo, as the nation's top intelligence official, believed such unsubstantiated information, the nation's intelligence apparatus must be woefully inept.

Other opposition legislators reacted strongly to Figueiredo's views. The president of the party, for example, said he was more convinced than ever that

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Brazil's problems could not be solved merely by rotating the presidency among the officers. "The system is wrong," he declared, and its "arbitrariness must be discarded without delay." An opposition congressman said that Figueiredo's remarks proved the General was "not prepared" for the presidency, while another regarded as "offensive" the candidate's negative comments on the capacity of Brazilians to vote intelligently.

Two of Brazil's leading dailies, *O Estado de Sao Paulo* and *Jornal do Brazil*, were no less disturbed. *O Estado* termed some of his ideas "incoherent" and others "inconsistent," noting the "crudeness of his attitude toward reality." The paper said that, judging by Figueiredo's remarks, one must conclude that his idea of consensus consists of "bowing to the will of the prince." This, said *O Estado*, hardly seems like a way to approach liberalization. *Jornal do Brazil* acknowledged Figueiredo's frankness and his courage in undertaking the dialogue but said his opinions raised "worrisome questions." The same paper went on to say that the General's statements reveal "questionable understanding" of what democracy should be and equally questionable understanding of Brazil's current situation.

At this point, Brazilians are uncertain whether the views expressed to ARENA or those splashed in the media represent the true intentions of the president-designate. Figueiredo, himself, appears uncomfortable with the aftermath of his free-swinging encounters with the media. He clearly intended the sessions as a means of making himself better known nationally and of enhancing his--and the military's--image by being readily accessible to the reporters and forthcoming on pertinent issues. Figueiredo has since, in effect, acknowledged that his "shoot from the hip" style was, if anything, counterproductive. He has now let it be known that at least for a while he will limit his press exposure and may even resort to insisting that questions be submitted in advance.

Indeed, since the nomination acceptance speech, Figueiredo has been publicly silent. But his withdrawal from the limelight may not have been his decision alone. President Geisel [redacted]

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[redacted] may have prevailed on his successor to keep a much lower profile.

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Figueiredo's inconclusive but disquieting performance has undoubtedly left some Brazilians more skeptical than before as to the sincerity of Geisel's promise to institutionalize an "opening" by the end of his tenure. At the same time the populace is more anxious than ever to see what, if anything, the administration will do or say to prove the "opening" is still in the works. Geisel and Figueiredo both know they have a difficult task before them if they are to win greater popular acceptance, as each has said he hopes to do. If the administration perceives that popular dissatisfaction has grown appreciably as a result of Figueiredo's foray, it may feel obliged to try to regain lost ground by advancing the timetable of its proposed reforms. [redacted]

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
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BRIEFS



IRAN-AFGHANISTAN: SHAH TO VISIT KABUL NEXT MONTH; MAY MOVE TO REDUCE NARCOTICS TRAFFICKING ACROSS BORDER. Although the subject of narcotics may not be on the agenda for the bilateral talks, decisions that are made there may improve border control thus making narcotics smuggling more difficult, at least over established routes. The visit, to begin on 26 May, is expected to involve among other things a discussion of Iranian development assistance to Afghanistan and control of the migration of Afghan workers to Iran. Iran regards Afghan migratory workers as potential "security risks" and is trying to bring the migratory worker traffic under better control. The Afghans have not as yet responded to Iranian overtures on this matter; the Shah may take the opportunity of his visit to press the issue. Iran has already begun strengthening its own security forces along the border with Afghanistan. The Embassy in Tehran notes that it has long recommended such tightening of controls along the border with Afghanistan for the purpose of interdicting opium trafficking. Any measures that may be agreed upon

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to mutually strengthen border controls could discourage narcotics traffickers, although any likely controls would fall far short of actually stopping the substantial cross-border narcotics trafficking in this area.

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TURKEY: DOMESTIC POPPY PRODUCTION CONTROLS POSSIBLE; ANOTHER BUMPER CROP EXPECTED THIS YEAR. According to the American Embassy in Ankara, some high level Turkish officials are currently reviewing the world opium supply and demand data and may be seriously considering the imposition of production controls by the next crop year. Such controls are possible either by limiting authorized hectarage or by requiring crop rotation, either of which apparently would be possible without further legislation of government decree. The Embassy notes further that there has not been a single case of illicit collection of raw opium, as opposed to authorized poppy straw, in the licensed areas since the government authorized limited and controlled cultivation of opium poppies for the production of poppy straw. It has noted further that, during the years since the opium ban was rescinded in 1974, the Turkish Government has never refused to purchase the entire poppy straw crop from authorized producers. Illegal crops are destroyed and those involved prosecuted.

All factors considered, the poppy straw crop in Turkey this year probably will be approximately the same as last year's crop of approximately 37,000 tons rather than the 50,000 to 80,000 tons that would theoretically be possible under ideal growing and harvesting conditions. Although a larger total area has been authorized for opium poppy cultivation, weather and other factors indicate that the actual producing area may be even slightly less than last year. Total production will depend on the weather conditions between now and the harvest period in late summer and early fall. There have been no indications that government controls in the poppy-growing areas will be any less rigidly enforced than in previous years or that there will be any greater possibility of illicit harvesting of

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gum opium or of any practical diversion of authorized production into illicit channels. A nonindustrial process to convert poppy straw into illicit opium or morphine apparently has yet to be developed, rendering such diversion improbable. [REDACTED]

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INDONESIA: HEROIN TRANSITING INDONESIA GOING PRIMARILY TO AUSTRALIA AND EUROPE. According to the latest semiannual assessment from the Embassy in Jakarta, domestic drug use still appears to be increasing within Indonesia, and larger amounts of both raw opium and heroin are being channeled through the country. Reports received by the Embassy indicate that heroin transiting Indonesia is being routed primarily to Australia and Western Europe. According to current intelligence estimates, Indonesia probably will play an increasing role both as an opium producing country and as a transit country for opium and heroin. Although the Indonesian government has plans to strengthen its law enforcement capabilities, the lack of expertise, funds, and equipment limit Indonesia's potential for mounting an effective narcotics control effort. [REDACTED]

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BURMA: MORE ILLICIT BURMESE OPIUM MAY BE SHIPPED BY SEA. Burmese authorities recently seized over 100 kilograms of illicit opium on board a schooner about to sail from Rangoon Harbor to a port on the southern coast of Burma, according to an item in the Rangoon press. The Embassy notes that narcotics smuggling from Burmese ports represents one alternative to the traditional land routes which carry the bulk of Burmese narcotics entering world markets. The Embassy notes further that, although the seized opium may have been intended for domestic markets, the shipment could have been destined for delivery to Malaysia or Thailand. [REDACTED]

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
THE NETHERLANDS: DUTCH OFFICIALS TO VISIT SOUTHEAST ASIA TO REVIEW NARCOTICS SITUATION. Justice Minister de Ruiter, the secretary general-designate of the Justice Ministry, and Jan van Straten, head of the Dutch National Narcotics Unit plan to visit Southeast Asia in early May to discuss narcotics matters. Van Straten is slated to become chief of the Central Criminal Information Service of the


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Justice Ministry. 

THE NETHERLANDS ANTILLES: NARCOTICS PROBLEM BECOMING MORE SERIOUS. Drugs are a major and growing problem in the Netherlands Antilles, according to a recent report from the Embassy in Curacao. The legislature, by unanimous vote, recently increased the penalties for trafficking in drugs, including marijuana, from four to 10 years. The Embassy regards the government there as sincere in its effort to move against the domestic drug problem, and believes that cooperation in any bilateral narcotics control effort will be according to the government's own perceptions of the nature and seriousness of the drug problem. 

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PRESS EXCERPTS



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INDIA--*Drug Abuse Increasing Among Upper Class--TNDD, No. L/7735, pp. 8-9. A survey by the All-India Institute of Medical Sciences has estimated that 3 percent of Delhi University students are hard-core drug addicts, and nearly one-third of the students are drug abusers. Another survey by the Indian Medical Council of Medical Research covering Calcutta University students suggests that 11.4 percent abuse amphetamines. A study conducted in Bombay University claims that 19.7 percent of the students are drug addicts. Concerned over the rising trend in drug abuse among young people, the Indian Government has announced its decision to push through a law to fight the use of drugs, including psychotropic drugs. There is also a proposal to treat and rehabilitate addicts. Contrary to popular belief in India, alcohol appears to be the most common drug being abused in India. According to one survey, alcohol abuse involves 74 percent of all adults over the age of 15. Many Indian experts feel that the international agreements on drug control are too Western-oriented and take little account of the peculiarities of Asian countries.*

*US Joint Publications Research Service (JPRS) Translations on Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs. Published by JPRS, 1000 Glebe Road, Arlington, Va. 22201.*



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THAILAND--*Foreigners Held on Drug Charges in Asian Jails*--  
TNDD, No. L/7735, pp. 17-18. The life term for an Australian in Malaysia and the sentencing of a British nurse to a 20-year jail sentence in Thailand have highlighted the dilemma of foreigners falling afoul of Asia's tough antidrug laws. Many Asian governments in recent years have made the death penalty or long prison terms mandatory for trafficking in drugs. About 50 foreigners are currently serving jail terms in Thai prisons on drugs charges or are awaiting trial according to the local press. Traffickers face possible summary execution in Thailand though no Westerners have yet received this sentence. In the Crown Colony of Hong Kong, where there is fairly strong antidrug enforcement, 34 foreigners have been serving jail terms for drug offenses. Malaysia has become increasingly concerned about the drugs coming into the country and has amended its laws to provide tougher penalties. Antidrug laws are also tough in Singapore, where nine people have so far been sentenced to death for drug trafficking. Drug pushers in Indonesia can be sentenced to death. Over 200 foreigners were arrested in Japan last year on drug charges.

THAILAND--*Pattern of Constant Change in Illicit Drug Trade*--TNDD, No. L/7735, pp. 19-20. Despite more vigilant police action and tougher sentencing, drug addiction reportedly is increasing in Southeast Asia where the pattern of the narcotics business is constantly changing. Several years ago trawlers used to run illicit opium from the Golden Triangle to Hong Kong to be refined into heroin. Then the traffickers decided it was more efficient to take the chemists to the growing areas and refine the opium there. Two or three years ago, most of the couriers carrying illicit narcotics were Asians; now the smugglers are using mostly non-Asians. Trafficking routes have also changed. Alternate routes are being used, including Malaysia, with the resort island of Penang as a principal transshipment port. Malaysia, facing a growing influx of drugs from Thailand, has become a pipeline and distribution center for opiates from the Golden Triangle.

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RHODESIA--*More Help Needed to Fight Drug Abuse*--TNDD,  
No. L/7735, p. 146. The medical officer of the  
Drug Dependence Council of Rhodesia has appealed  
for more of his medical colleagues to help in the  
treatment of drug abuse. Doctors working in the  
system are also hampered by limited facilities.  
Those appealing for government funds to carry on  
the drug abuse treatment program in Rhodesia have  
met the reaction that there is no drug problem in  
Rhodesia as it is not the Rhodesian way of life.

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Those who have surveyed the situation, however, claim that there is indeed a problem with many tragic situations.

DENMARK--*Parliament Denies Police Request for Central Registering of Drug Violators*--TNDD, No. L/7735, pp. 149-150. A large majority in Parliament rejects the proposal for central registration of narcotics addicts because of fear that many would refuse treatment because of possible association with narcotics crimes. A radical proposal about setting up a permanent committee on alcohol problems has also had a mixed reception in Parliament.

DENMARK--*Police Break Up International Smuggling Ring*--TNDD, No. L/7735, pp. 151-153. Three criminal experts from the national police travel department, after several months' investigation, have broken up an international narcotics smuggling organization having strong Danish connections. Several hundred narcotics traffickers are said to be involved in the operation. The case reportedly involves large sums of money, coded telephone conversations, and considerable amounts of cocaine being smuggled from South America. Money transfers have also been used involving large sums being circulated between Swiss bank accounts.

PORTUGAL--*Journalist Tries Updating 1976 Official Report on Drug Problem*--TNDD, No. L/7735, pp. 155-160. The report in question, the first official report on the drug problem in Portugal, begins by estimating the number of drug addicts in Portugal at 300,000. The drug problem in Portugal was taken up on an international scale for the first time in 1976 when, during a UN session, an extensive report was presented on the subject. This report was the first attempt at a systematic official coverage of the subject. The author of the press article claims that the situation in Portugal has grown worse, and that there has been a major increase in the use of injected drugs.

TURKEY-EGYPT--*Turkey and Egypt Sign Protocol on Narcotics Smuggling*--TNDD, No. L/7735, p. 168. A protocol on counteracting narcotics smuggling has been signed

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in Cairo between Turkey and the Arab Republic of Egypt. According to the protocol, the two countries will cooperate on the prevention of smuggling, and a joint committee composed of experts will be established to make proposals to government members on measures to be adopted on the subject.

YUGOSLAVIA--*More Strict Drug Laws To Be Introduced--*  
TNDD, No. L/7716, 18 April 78, p. 56. The first discussions held in connection with the adoption of a new law on drugs indicate clearly that more strict measures regarding the production and trafficking in drugs will be taken. It is proposed that the growing of the coca plant, the production of opium by cutting poppy capsules, and the production of preparations having a psychoactive effect should be banned. The opium poppy will still be grown in Yugoslavia, in specified areas, to meet the needs of domestic consumption--for pharmaceuticals--and for export. The draft bill provides for maintaining extensive records and for the imposing of heavy fines for violations of the new law.

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SRI LANKA--*Smugglers Shift Base to Sri Lanka--*TNDD, No. L/7710, 11 April 1978, pp. 38-39. In the shadow of the Golden Triangle there is a similar triangle comprising Sri Lanka, India, and the Maldives which is fast growing to notoriety as a center of international smuggling and traffic in opium. Sri Lanka official circles estimate that 5 tons of opium flow into the country from India each year and that the bulk of this supply is eventually siphoned off to Europe, England, Australia, and the US. According to the article, opium was brought in from India

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concealed in fast boats or towed underwater in polythene bags by innocent-looking fishing craft. The deploying of the Sri Lanka Navy to support the police has led to frequent arrests and seizures. Although seizures have decreased in number and quantities, the article claims that smuggling of contraband and traffic in drugs have by no means ceased but that big operators have merely scaled down the size of their individual operations. The article describes some of the new methods of operation being used by the Sri Lanka traffickers.

SOUTH AFRICA--*South African Connection to International Drug Ring Suspected*--TNDD, No. L/7710, pp. 50-51. Profits from the greatest LSD racket in history may be hidden in South Africa, which may have been the gang's international banking house. This article refers to the major LSD operation that was disrupted in Britain last month. After 14 months of surveillance, 122 people were arrested by a "phantom" British police team of 800 policemen throughout Britain.

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