



**Foreign  
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# **International Narcotics Biweekly Review**

**12 April 1978**

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INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS BIWEEKLY REVIEW

12 April 1978

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
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This publication is prepared by analysts in the National Foreign Assessment Center for specialists in the Washington community who are interested in international narcotics matters. Comments and queries are welcome.




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25X1 USSR:  Efforts To Combat Drug Abuse

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Soviet officials are concerned about a rapid increase in drug abuse and drug related deaths, although alcohol remains the most widely abused drug in the USSR. Currently, there are an estimated 8,000 hard-drug addicts nationwide, with some 900 in Moscow and 400 in Odessa alone. These figures seem insignificant compared to US statistics (hard-drug addicts number around 450,000, with New York City alone accounting for some 70,000), but Soviet officials perceive their problem as serious and have begun a national program to combat drug abuse.

The most common street drug is a powdered product of the cannabis plant, produced in the Uzbek, Tadzhik, and Turkmen Republics. Cultivation and use of cannabis is an ancient tradition in Soviet Central Asia, but production "for export" is increasing rapidly to meet new demands in other parts of the USSR. Large urban centers in European Russia, especially Moscow and Leningrad, are major markets. (In Moscow, the subway is a common site for drug trafficking.)

In 1975 the Ministry of the Interior established a department concerned with alcohol and drug abuse. This department is responsible for devising preventive measures and punishments, collecting information on Western experience and programs, and compiling a national data base (registries, files of case histories). Also in 1975, a narcotics research center was established within the Serbskiy Institute. A separate institute was planned originally, but its formation was vetoed because Soviet officials wished to conceal the extent of the Soviet drug problem. The 80 to 100 scientists at the center study the actual nature and extent of the problem--the number of addicts, the type and use of drugs in circulation, any connection between drug abuse and mental illness, addiction by medical patients to prescribed drugs, and demographic factors such as the age

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distribution of addicts. In cooperation with the Ministry of Health and the Ministry of the Interior, the center is to develop measures to combat and prevent drug abuse.

Since 1973, stringent antidrug abuse laws have been in effect. Drug addiction is a criminal offense, since it is considered "antisocial." Possession of any amount of an illegal drug is punishable by a minimum of two years in prison or labor camp; habitual users receive sentences of up to 10 years. Drug addicts had been integrated with alcoholics in special "labor clinics" (a type of labor camp designed as a treatment and rehabilitation facility), but a problem of "cross-contamination" (alcoholics turning on to drugs and vice versa) caused the Ministry of the Interior to establish separate drug clinics. By 1976, three of the four planned clinics had been established, in the Ukraine and Moldavia. In contrast, there are some 35 labor clinics for alcoholics, each accommodating 500 to 1,000 inmates.

In 1976 the Ministry of the Interior ordered police investigation of all known or suspected drug addicts. All known addicts were to undergo medical examination, and private citizens were encouraged to help in the identification of new addicts by reporting anyone suspected of drug abuse. A special case officer for alcoholism and drug addiction was appointed in each police precinct. These officers are assisted by "helper squads" established in each city district and staffed by dependable persons who receive three days paid vacation for volunteering. The names of suspected drug addicts are entered into police files; if subsequent investigation confirms the allegation of abuse, the case is turned over to the courts. An examination by a court psychiatrist is required before an addict can be sent to a labor clinic.

In 1976, the Leningrad police established a computerized central registry of drug addicts, a similar national registry for alcoholics having been established there in 1975. After compilation is completed, data from this registry will be made available to republic and oblast capitals.

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USSR: Reluctant To Pressure Afghans on Drug Issue

In a recent conversation with US officials in Washington, a Soviet diplomat provided some insights on Soviet attitudes toward combating the international drug problem and on the drug situation in the USSR. If his comments were at all indicative of the Soviet position, there seems to be little prospect that the USSR will risk its relations with the Third World to cooperate in joint US-USSR programs to stem the flow of illicit drugs.

On 28 March, Soviet Charge Vladillen Vasev and Soviet Embassy First Secretary Y. Ivanov met with US officials to discuss the international narcotics problem. Discussion centered on the increasing flow of drugs out of Afghanistan.

Afghanistan and neighboring parts of Pakistan constitute one of the three major areas of illicit opium production in the world. In the past, most of this opium has been consumed in the two countries or in Iran, but recently increased amounts of Afghan opium--or Pakistani opium presumably shipped through Afghanistan--has been finding its way to Western Europe. The flow will probably increase as international efforts to cut production in the other two major areas--the Golden Triangle of Southeast Asia and Mexico--succeed.

Some of the Afghan opium crop is reportedly being produced on land associated with Soviet aid projects in Nangarhar Province [redacted]. It is not known whether Moscow had previously been aware of this or not. In any case, the Soviets theoretically are in a good position to influence the Afghans. Since 1956, the Soviets have supplied 95 percent of Afghanistan's military imports, and Moscow is Kabul's largest source of foreign economic aid.

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Not surprisingly, Vasev's remarks indicated that the USSR would be reluctant to pressure the Afghans on the drug issue. Moscow has long pointed to Afghanistan

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as an example of how a small, backward nation could exist on the borders of the USSR without fear of being dominated by its northern and more powerful neighbor. During the 28 March discussion Vasev insisted that narcotics had never been a problem in Soviet-Afghan relations, a statement that could be read as implying that they would not become one in the future either.

Although Vasev admitted that the US and USSR should be able to cooperate on an issue like drug trafficking, he gave little indication that Moscow was ready to take any concrete steps in that direction. While he conceded that the USSR had not entirely avoided the narcotics problem, he argued that it was primarily a social problem indigenous to the more affluent West.

Throughout his discussion with the US officials, Vasev accused the Chinese of being behind much of the world drug problem. Indeed, Vasev exhibited real rancor that the US was even raising the drug issue when it did not criticize the Chinese for their role in the international drug problem. For some time the USSR has echoed unsubstantiated rumors of Chinese backing for the international drug scene. During the trial of three Americans accused of drug trafficking last year in Moscow, Soviet propaganda did its best to implicate the PRC. [REDACTED]

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AFGHANISTAN: Poppy Growing in US-Supported Project

On 29 March, US officials found opium poppies, almost ready for harvest, growing within the boundaries of a US-assisted irrigation project in Konar Province. Afghan officials were informed last August that US financing would be withheld from any projects in which opium poppies were grown.

The Afghans had been informed that the inspection would take place, that US officials had seen opium poppies in the area, and that if they were still there, funds would be withheld. There are several likely reasons for the Afghans' failure to do anything about the poppies.

- The Afghans may have believed the US would not go through with the threat. They tried to avoid the withholding of funds by promising that they would not grow poppies in the project next year, while arguing that it was too late in the season for the farmers to shift to another crop this year.
- Officials both in the province and in Kabul may have felt that the amount of funding at stake, about \$44,000, was not enough to justify the problems--ranging from more hardship for the farmers to possible violent resistance to the police--that eradication could cause.
- Mohammed Maroofi, the official in charge of the Afghan narcotics program, may have had neither the influence nor the time to deal effectively with the problem. When officially informed that the US was withholding funds he implied that he would use the decision to show the Agriculture and Interior Ministers that their failure to cooperate has cost Afghanistan money.

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Maroofi, however, is a second level Foreign Ministry official and his ability to influence cabinet members, especially the Interior Minister, one of President Daoud's confidants, is very limited. Moreover, Maroofi is also in charge of arrangements for the meeting in Kabul next month of the Nonaligned Coordinating Bureau and has presumably been giving this project priority over narcotics.



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
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NOTEWORTHY POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTS



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AFGHANISTAN: Daoud's Revolution

In a recent series of speeches, Afghan President Daoud has given the clearest picture so far of his ultimate goals. Little that he said was new, but he has not previously explained his plans so fully nor come so close to drawing his policies together into a comprehensive program.

Daoud's goal is the transformation of Afghan society, prefeudal in many ways and with an underdeveloped economy, into a modern, prosperous nation state. Daoud is under no illusion that he will transform Afghanistan overnight--he said it would take a generation to complete the next stage of the revolution. Moreover, Daoud's emphasis on the institutions he is creating rather than his own leadership seems to indicate that he does not expect the revolution to be completed in his lifetime. He told his audiences that the presidency is not a personal position and that the Party of National Revolution would be the "most important institution for nurturing a revolutionary generation." He envisions the fledgling party as an organization of the people, apparently more for directing their efforts than for expressing their will.

According to Daoud, the first phase of the revolution--the "consolidation" phase--is over, and the more difficult economic development phase has begun. Daoud's speeches were given in three provinces along the Pakistani border, and he apologized for spending almost all his time in

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Kabul. Daoud has, in fact, been consolidating his position in Kabul and working to establish institutions for governing the country, and it was not especially important for the people--particularly in the provinces--either to understand or approve his decisions. Daoud, however, apparently believes that popular support and participation is necessary for the success of the next stage and so has taken the highly unusual step--for an Afghan ruler--of taking his case to the people.

Daoud repeatedly stressed that the revolution is for all the people, and all must think of themselves as Afghans. Few now see themselves as Afghans--except when using the term as a synonym for the Pathans, the country's dominant ethnic group--and most of the people do not think of themselves even in terms of tribe, ethnic group, or region. Loyalties tend to go no further than the extended family or village or valley.

The fragmentation of Afghan society has hindered the development of national political institutions and limited Kabul's ability to plan and execute social and economic reforms. In some parts of the country, Kabul has little control. For Daoud, who believes that progress is likely only at the prodding of the small, modern sector of the society concentrated largely in Kabul, fragmentation and a lack of central control may seem an especially important problem. Moreover, Daoud, unlike most of his countrymen, is a strong nationalist and sees a united population with a common loyalty to the nation as a desirable end in itself. Daoud's concern was emphasized by his taking his case first to what may be his least receptive audience, the Pathans themselves. As the dominant group, they stand to lose the most by any rule not based on ethnic groups and show some resentment when Tajiks, Hazaras, or Uzbeks have the temerity to call themselves Afghans.

Daoud highlighted the provisions of his government's economic plans and pointed out that "temporary" foreign help can be useful, but economic progress depends on the Afghans themselves. Currently Afghanistan is dependent on foreigners for almost all development projects, and it will be years before the country will be in a position, either financially or technologically, to forgo outside assistance. Daoud's insistence on the Afghans progressing through their own efforts reflects his deep dedication

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to Afghan independence, not only political but economic, but this seems more of a distant goal than a near-term achievement. Daoud obviously realizes that his country needs foreign help, and it is unlikely that he intends to dispense with it.

The goals Daoud has set for his revolution may be unattainable even with his strong and skillful leadership. Much of the task will fall to his successors, and it seems unlikely that they will have the ability, even if they have the inclination, to carry on.

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Noteworthy Political and  
Economic Developments

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IRAN: The Natives Are Restless

The riots, demonstrations, and sabotage in many cities and towns in recent weeks are no threat to government stability. The incidents reflect, however, widespread dissatisfaction with the government on the part of conservative religious groups and add a new element of religious fanaticism aimed at non-Muslims. The new line of tolerance of dissent adopted by the Shah presents the security forces with the problem of how to control public disorder without resort to the harsh measures of suppression that have been common--and effective--for the last 15 years.

As many as 43 towns and villages have experienced disturbances of some kind in recent weeks. These have ranged from acts by a single person--such as the fire-bombing of a car or building--to demonstrations of 50 or more persons. These do not appear to be part of a unified and coordinated attack on the government. They are separate incidents growing out of a common unhappiness on the part of conservative religious elements with government actions and with the modernization of Iranian society, which is equated with Westernization and anti-Islamism. Some of the incidents have taken on a tone of religious bigotry. A chain of banks owned by a Bahai\* businessman has been a particular target of

*\*Bahaiism is a 19th century offshoot of one of the more esoteric sects of Shiah Islam. Its doctrines, however, put it beyond the pale, and it is considered by the orthodox Shiah to be a heresy, and--at least in the more old-fashioned view--its adherents can be killed on sight. The last murderous attacks on the Bahai were in 1954--although there were some incidents in the 1960s.*

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attack. He has now put his banks up for sale. In addition, threats have been made against the Community Church, which is attended by Americans, and against the native Assyrian and Armenian Christian communities.

Although the bulk of the incidents reflect religious dissatisfaction, a few may have been carried out by one of the two identified terrorist groups. There is no indication, however, that the terrorists have actually controlled or directed the demonstrations.

The government has charged publicly that "foreign elements"--the USSR is not mentioned by name--are responsible, and some officials may actually believe this, but there is no evidence that this is the case. Two well-publicized cases of Soviet espionage in recent months help, however, to strengthen the impression the government is trying to give.

The government's major problem is how to handle these demonstrations. In response to foreign criticism of Iran's treatment of dissidence, the Shah seems to have instituted an unprecedented soft line, leaving the security forces uncertain as to how far they can go in containing the demonstrations. He may expect that public opinion will eventually harden against such disruptions and demand that the government take strong action. Until this can be done, the chances are good that violence will continue--perhaps with lulls--and that foreigners of all kinds, especially Americans, will become a more specific target.

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Noteworthy Political and  
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BRAZIL: Economic Prospects

Last year, austerity measures and expanded exports sharply reduced Brazil's current account deficit for the first time since the oil price hikes of 1973 and 1974, and trimmed inflation without unduly cutting output and jobs. Politicking for the congressional election this fall is likely to induce the military regime to allow some slippage in monetary and fiscal targets this year. Even so, economic growth may reach 5 to 6 percent without jeopardizing recent gains on the current account and inflation fronts.

Because of Brazil's heavy dependence on foreign energy, its balance-of-payments position was hard hit by the quadrupling of oil prices in 1973 and 1974. The government began to implement serious austerity measures in 1976 to slow inflation and reduce the current account deficit, but they did not begin to take hold until 1977.

Inflation in 1977 was held to 39 percent, compared with 46 percent in 1976. The reduction would have been greater if Brazil had been able to stick to its monetary goals. This was not possible because of the need to finance rising coffee stocks after the cessation of coffee exports in July; the stronger than expected performance of agriculture, which required additional credit to finance stockpiling under the price support program; and the large sale of bonds by state-owned enterprises in September. The government tightened monetary restrictions in September.

Although austerity caused a marked slowing of economic activity, real gross domestic product still grew by 4.7 percent in 1977. This was not enough, however,

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to absorb fully the increase in the labor force. Agriculture was the star performer; farm production grew 9.6 percent because of a good growing season and the recovery of coffee production. Industrial output rose 3.9 percent, but manufacturing registered only 2.3 percent.

Increased exports were largely responsible for the substantial improvement in Brazil's current account in 1977. Coffee and soybean exports were up 10 percent and 23 percent for the year. Manufactures--benefiting from devaluations totaling 30 percent, export incentives, weak domestic demand, and market diversification--registered the largest gain, increasing by almost 40 percent.

Weakened demand and direct controls continued to limit imports. The trade balance was turned around, from a \$2.1 billion deficit in 1976 to a surplus of \$123 million. The strong trade performance cut the current account deficit from \$6.1 billion in 1976 to \$3.8 billion in 1977. Capital inflows more than offset the deficit, and official reserves increased by \$700 million, to \$7.2 billion. Total foreign debt increased from \$26 billion at the end of 1976 to \$31 billion in December 1977. Servicing the foreign debt equaled 46 percent of merchandise exports in 1977.

Despite progress in 1977 in curbing inflation and improving the balance of payments, major problems remain. The continuing need to control the current account deficit and preserve Brazil's international credit rating conflicts with the political pressure to maintain real wages and ensure sufficient growth to keep unemployment from rising.

President Geisel and Minister of Finance Simonsen have indicated that they intend to continue to emphasize reducing inflation and cutting the current account deficit. Even so, election year politics and the administration's desire to complete major import substitution projects before leaving office next March will probably force it to let monetary and fiscal targets slip a bit. Geisel knows that his efforts to liberalize the Brazilian political scene gradually could backfire if the domestic economy becomes a focal point for opposition criticism.

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The conflict between austerity and the politics of transition will almost certainly preclude attainment of the target of less than 30-percent inflation this year. Real spending in the public sector is budgeted at almost last year's level but probably will be considerably higher as a result of overspending by government-owned companies. The government will have to control monetary expansion much more effectively than it has in the past if it is to hold inflation under 35 percent.

#### Prospects for 1978

Brazil should be able to obtain a politically acceptable real economic growth of 5 to 6 percent. A severe drought and weakening prices for cocoa and coffee have hurt agricultural prospects for 1978, but manufacturing is likely to grow faster than it did last year as government and private investment programs are stepped up and as major projects come into operation. Steel and petrochemical production should continue to post good gains on the basis of expanded capacity. Consumer industries, especially automotive firms, probably will rebound in 1978.

Because of slower growth of exports and increasing imports, Brazil's trade balance probably will show no improvement this year. Exports are likely to increase between 6 and 7 percent in value. Exports of manufactured and semimanufactured goods will again lead the way, increasing by around 25 percent if--as expected--the currency continues to be devalued in line with inflation. Agricultural exports probably will decline from the record level last year because of falling prices and drought damage to soybeans, corn, and rice.

Import volume will have to increase this year to support economic expansion and to help dampen inflationary pressures. Several large steel, chemical, and fertilizer projects, whose output is to substitute for imports, are not yet completed. Even allowing for substantial substitution, imports probably will reach \$13 billion, compared with \$12 billion last year.

Brazil's current account is likely to deteriorate slightly this year. Rough equilibrium in the trade

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balance will not offset a deterioration in the services account, as interest payments on foreign debt increase by approximately \$500 million.

Brazil should have little trouble handling its anticipated \$4 billion current account deficit, barring further major deterioration in agriculture. Direct foreign investment inflows should continue to cover \$1 billion of the deficit, and a \$3 billion increase in Brazil's foreign debt to cover the remainder should be readily arranged. The international banking community might balk at providing funds much in excess of this figure, given its already large exposure in Brazil. Brazilian borrowing rates are now averaging 2 percentage points above the London interbank rate.

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BRIEFS

LAOS: UN NARCOTICS OFFICIAL MAY BE EXPELLED FROM LAOS.  
The Laotian Government has indicated that it is considering the expulsion of Alexander Arnaud, director of the UN-sponsored antinarcotics program in Laos. The specific reason for the pending expulsion has not been divulged/

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Laotian officials may have concluded that Arnaud has not been effective enough in promoting the proposed UN-sponsored crop substitution program in Laos. Any delays regarding this project, however, have resulted primarily from the failure of the Laotian Government to come up with an acceptable site proposal for the project. Vientiane wants the project to be located in the plains area of Vientiane Province; the UN agreement calls for it to be located in the mountainous opium-producing area of Laos. Nonetheless, Laotian officials may view the expulsion of Arnaud as a signal to the UN that patience is running thin and that the project will be located in the plains or not at all. If a warning is intended, it has not been lost on the UN officials who favor accepting the government's proposal rather than endanger the tenuous relationship between UNFDAC and the Laos Government. Although Arnaud himself has been somewhat controversial in his approach to the Laotian problem and his statements have, at times been unreliable, he has been firm in his belief that Vientiane, at the policymaking level remains committed to both the Single Convention and to the UNFDAC program in Laos. He has acknowledged, however, that some "middle level types" might still look upon opium sales as a means of generating badly needed revenue.

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BURMA-THAILAND: THAI PRIME MINISTER TO VISIT RANGOON SOON. The Burmese Government has proposed that Prime Minister Kriangsak of Thailand pay an official visit to Burma during the period 5-9 May. This is in response to an overture made by Kriangsak last month that he would like to visit Rangoon. Unfortunately the Thais had not allowed sufficient time to coordinate the proposed visit which came at a time when Burmese attention was taken up with a new upsurge of fighting against Burmese Communist forces. Thai officials continue to stress the sincerity of the Thai Government's desire to improve relations with Burma. The Thai Ambassador in Rangoon, apparently expecting the visit to take place soon, has affirmed his belief that Kriangsak's visit to Burma will mark an important step toward improved relations between the two countries. The Burmese, although still waiting for some concrete move on Bangkok's part that would demonstrate a willingness to cut off aid to insurgent organizations in Burma, appear to be in a mood to be receptive for any sincere Thai overture for improved relations, according to the Embassy in Rangoon. [REDACTED]

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SYRIA: NARCOTICS TRAFFICKER ARRESTED WITH OPIUM FROM TURKEY. Syrian authorities in Aleppo on 4 April arrested a Syrian national with 12 kilograms of raw opium in his possession. [REDACTED]

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
[REDACTED] Syrian authorities claim the raw opium is of recent origin but did not specify how recent or that it was of Turkish origin. They accept the trafficker's claim that the opium came "from Turkey." This is not the harvest season for opium poppies in Turkey, but use of the term "recent origin" does not necessarily mean "fresh" or just harvested opium. Use of the term here probably merely means that it was not from a stock that had been cached several years ago and just brought out for sale. When it was legal to harvest raw opium, even though under

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strict government controls, it was a common practice for a poppy grower to package raw opium and hide it away as an eventual dowry. Many Turkish nationals currently living and working in West Germany have been apprehended in recent months for smuggling illicit opiates into Western Europe. There is still no evidence, however, that the raw opium involved actually came from poppies grown in Turkey

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Press Excerpts

LEBANON--*Hashish Production, Some Principal Growers and Dealers*--TNDD,\* No. L/7682, 28 March 1978, pp. 85-92. "Growing and smuggling hashish means big business for rich clans in Lebanon who own the hemp fields in the Bekaa Valley: foreigners who deal with the hashish suppliers pay sums which run into millions. This year the hashish harvest is expected to be a record one. The top men of the biggest drug syndicates in North America and Europe come to Baalbek, the center of the hemp area, to buy large quantities of hashish. Operations are being planned in Lebanon which would make the French Connection look like a five finger exercise. Baalbek is the very center of activity. Hash is sold openly on the street corners. It is an open city ruled by the sharpest shooters and the richest planters who always remain invisible to outsiders. Baalbek, a small free and easy town deep in the mountains about 90 kilometers east of Beirut and once a friendly little mountain town, was overrun by mountain dwellers who had hemp fields in the Bekaa Valley between 1950 and 1970. Before then, thousands of tourists had come there to see plays and operas performed in the setting of the centuries-old Roman temple ruins. But now that is all over. Guests who do come take flight after one night, sometimes shaking with fright. The hash dealers do not give them a moment's peace. The whole area is in the hands of 20 families. The most powerful is undoubtedly the Jaafar clan, which is more than 3,000 strong. This family possesses dozens of fields and its own factories and boats to ship the drug to Europe and North America. The clan has its own tanks, M-16 machineguns, and anti-aircraft guns to protect its fields. The police are no problem. They have them in their pocket in Baalbek. They belong to the hemp field owning

*\*US Joint Publications Research Service (JPRS) Translations on Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs. Published by JPRS, 1000 Glebe Road, Arlington, Va. 22201.*

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families of the Bekaa Valley." This detailed account of the hashish trade from field to market was written by a team of reporters who spent a week in the Middle East, disguised as dealers, on the trail of hashish. The account goes into considerable detail concerning the routes that the illicit drug take on its way from Lebanon to Europe either by sea to Rotterdam or by land through Syria, Turkey, Bulgaria, Yugoslavia, Switzerland, and the Netherlands. According to the reporters, "nothing has changed despite international intervention. While the demand for hashish continues to grow, greedy dealers will go to desperate lengths to satisfy the demand. The cycle remains unbroken."

COSTA RICA--*Country's Role as Drug Channel Denounced*--TNDD, No. L/7682, pp. 64-68. The continental drug traffic uses Costa Rica as an intermediate stopover from which drugs are reshipped to the large markets in North America. For geographic and other reasons Costa Rica seems to have become a good place to bring in appreciable quantities of drugs, particularly cocaine, and ship them to their final destinations. Costa Rica is an involuntary instrument exploited by international traffickers without local contacts involved in most cases, although the involvement of Costa Ricans cannot be entirely discounted. Foreign drug traffickers find out how to enlist them as liaisons and intermediaries. Our people are well aware of this problem and are ready to cooperate to eradicate it.

The Mafia that controls international drug traffic has made this small Central American nation one of the principal links in its chain of illegal trade. In this involuntary position, Costa Rica channels the major percentage of the drug that reaches the United States and Canada from productive sources in South America. Major political changes that occurred in Panama in recent years favored the slow but continual transfer of the headquarters of Latin American drug traffic to Costa Rica.

MAURITIUS--*Increase in Use of Drugs Reported*--TNDD, No. L/7682, pp. 93-97. Drugs have already devastated

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our society. Young people are turning away from marijuana, whose price has increased considerably, and have adapted themselves to cocaine, until now unknown in Mauritius, and introduced to our country by foreigners in November 1977. Or else they discover the hallucinogenic properties of certain varieties of local mushrooms. About 40,000 marijuana plants were uprooted last year. Because of the scarcity of this product, people are "shooting" opium. It is foremost on the drug scene in Mauritius today. Another important development is the introduction of cocaine. Some people sip their "mushroom soup" a soup spiced with several varieties of poisonous mushrooms which cause severe hallucinations. There is no doubt that there has always been a drug problem in Mauritius. What is new is the fact that all levels of the population, particularly idle youth, are touched by it, and drug use has had a great deal to do with the crime wave which is spreading throughout the country.

CYPRUS--*Cyprus Examined as Transit Point for Drugs*--TNDD, No. L/7682, p. 98. The proximity of Cyprus to several Middle East countries and Turkey has generated concern over the possible use of the island as a transit point for illicit drug trafficking. Domestic use of drugs in Cyprus is said to be negligible. Many smugglers attempt to use the coastline as a means of transporting drugs. If people are in transit or on board a ship, it is not normal routine to check unless there is special information, according to a police official. The author of the article appearing in the *Cyprus Mail* also commented that "local authorities" have evidence that some trafficking is going on in the areas of Cyprus controlled by the Turkish Cypriots, but this allegation has never been substantiated.

MALAYSIA--*Drug Abuse Increasing Daily*--TNDD, No. L/7682, p. 15. This can be seen from the figures on arrests and seizures recorded by the various bodies connected with eradicating drug abuse in the country. Arrests in 1975 were 3,202. Last year it was 5,000.

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BRAZIL--*Psychiatrist Cites Need For Awareness of Drug Danger*--TNDD, No. L/7698, pp. 96-97. Psychiatrist Oswald Moraes Andrade, who headed the commission to draft the new anti-drug law, believes that one of the causes of drug consumption among young people is big-city idleness. The article goes on to draw a comparison of the new law regarding drugs and the previous law.

COLOMBIA--*An Overflight of the 'Drug Province' of Guajira*--TNDD, No. L/7698, pp. 109-114. "The light plane, which had been following the coast in a northerly direction, finished its turn to the east and began flying parallel to the five enchanting

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coves of Praque Tayrona, one of them a colony of hippies and drugs . . . . Where is the airport around here? . . . . Everywhere! There are 50 or 100 . . . . The maritime, air, and port organization of the region is excellent. Its 'statesmen' have succeeded in designing a system of commerce which is extremely simple, efficient, and extra quick. There are no delays, congestion, or disputes. Or better said, there are, but they are on a small scale, and they are settled in minutes by the codes of Madsen, Magnum, or Smith and Weston, without further ado. The essential thing is that the merchandise move and arrive quickly and promptly at its destination. But what would happen if suddenly the marijuana cultivation and traffic and smuggling in general were stopped in La Guajira? Who then would solve the social problem of a poor people who suddenly discovered a way to quadruple their incomes without more effort?"

INDIA--*Seminar in Delhi on Narcotics*--TNDD, No. L/7698, p. 65. Production of opium in India which is confined to Madhya Pradesh, Rajasthan, and Uttar Pradesh amounted to 1,164 tons in 1976-1977 and the area under opium cultivation is 57,018 hectares. The major portion of the raw opium is exported for medicinal and scientific purposes while a part of it was used within the country for the manufacture of alkaloids and medicinal opium.

New Delhi was selected as the venue for the seminar on narcotics for law enforcement officers from the area because of the experience India gained over a long period of time as the largest producer and exporter of licit opium.

MALAYSIA--*Malaysian Paper Concerned Over Worsening Drug Situation*--TNDD, No. L/7698, p. 69. Malaysia's anti-drug laws are already harsh: The move to introduce mandatory death sentences for trafficking will make them even more punitive. But punitive laws have not in themselves been able to control drug abuse. In 1977 the number of traffickers arrested more than doubled over 1965, as did the amount of drugs confiscated. Customs and police

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officials cannot cope with the multiple demands on their understaffed departments. It is no wonder that, despite the law, enough traffickers get away to earn Malaysia an international reputation as the transshipment center for hard drugs from the "Golden Triangle."

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