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HR

International Narcotics Biweekly Review

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25X1

INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS BIWEEKLY REVIEW

15 February 1978

CONTENTS

INDONESIA: Narcotics Trafficking Increasing..... 1

LAOS: Proposed Site for UNFDAC Crop Substitution
Project..... 3



25X1

DOMINICAN REPUBLIC: Transit Point for Narcotics.... 15



25X1

NOTEWORTHY POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTS

- 1. TURKEY..... 18
- 2. TURKEY..... 21
- 3. IRAN-INDIA-PAKISTAN..... 24
- 4. COLOMBIA..... 25




25X6

BRIEFS..... 30

INTERESTING READING..... 33

This publication is prepared by analysts in the National Foreign Assessment Center for specialists in the Washington community who are interested in international narcotics matters. Comments and queries are welcome.




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15 February 1978

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Narcotics Traffic To Indonesia



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25X1

INDONESIA: Narcotics Traffic Increasing

25X1 The use of Indonesia as a transit route for Golden Triangle - produced narcotics appears to be expanding. [redacted] traf-fickers are currently smuggling narcotics through the Langkawi and Penang Island groups across the Strait of Malacca to the northeast coast of Sumatra. It is believed that the Thai town of Setoi near the Malaysian border is a staging area in the routing of the Sumatra-bound narcotics.

Boats transporting narcotics cross the Strait of Malacca in 24 hours or less to Sumatra with landings taking place at Langsa in Atjeh Province and other points in North Sumatra Province, including Belawan and Riau Province. The hundreds of Malaysian fishing boats normally operating in the area make it difficult to detect those carrying narcotics.

Penang is considered to be the main operating center and is a primary receiving point for the Golden Triangle narcotics smuggled into Malaysia by land and sea. The quantity of narcotics smuggled annually into Sumatra is unknown, and no significant seizures have taken place during the past three years. This is attributed to a lax narcotics control effort by the Indonesians. Most of the narcotics moving into Sumatra are believed to be destined for Jakarta for transshipment to other areas of the world and for local consumption. Narcotics are normally transported to Jakarta by air, although small quantities may move by bus and private vehicles.

Narcotics addiction appears to be growing in Sumatra. There are at least 1,000 opium and heroin addicts in North Sumatra of which some 300 are located in the city of Medan. Whereas in the past this addiction was limited to the children of high-level officials, more middle-class children are now being affected.


15 February 1978

1

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Although the extent of narcotics trafficking through Indonesia cannot be ascertained from these reports, there appears to be little doubt that Sumatra has become a transit point for Golden Triangle narcotics. Sumatra has historically been a pirate's paradise for the smuggling of all types of goods and the many islands along the coast with their remote beaches provide excellent cover for such operations.



25X1

15 February 1978

2

SECRET

SECRET

25X1

LAOS: Proposed Site for UNFDAC Crop Substitution Project

The Lao Government has proposed a site for the UNFDAC crop substitution project designed to reduce opium poppy cultivation by hill tribes. Although the location of the site does not meet requirements agreed upon earlier, UNFDAC officials seem inclined to accept it.

A joint UNFDAC/Lao Agreement signed in November 1977 linked UNFDAC funds for a model crop substitution project and for a drug rehabilitation center. Although Lao officials are enthusiastic about the drug rehabilitation center, they have shown little interest in crop substitution and have dragged their feet in planning for it. When a UN team visited Laos to survey sites and draw up work plans in December 1977, the Lao did not respond to their requests to see the crop substitution site. UNFDAC officials seemed willing to provide funds for addict rehabilitation alone, dropping the requirement that both phases of the program proceed simultaneously, and it was assumed that the Lao intended to renege completely on the crop substitution project.

The original agreement specified that the crop substitution project would be located in a "mountainous region where opium poppy previously has been cultivated." The proposed site, named Oudomsai Mai, is a government-established settlement for hill people located on a lowland plain where opium cannot be grown. Lao authorities plan to eventually relocate as many as 18,000 Hmong and other tribal peoples from their traditional homelands to this village to grow rice. The independent hill tribes have resisted Lao authority and, in some areas, have supported or participated in insurgent activities; Lao officials apparently feel that they can be more easily controlled if they are moved to lowland rice-growing areas.

15 February 1978

3

SECRET

SECRET

The UNFDAC director in Laos and a UNFDAC representative from Geneva seem inclined to accept the proposed site. They argue that since it provides assistance for former opium producers who have stopped cultivating it, the project still falls within the UNFDAC mandate. They also fear that any pressure on the Lao to propose a new site which meets the specific terms of the agreement might cause them to close down the UNFDAC office there.

As pointed out by the American Embassy in Vientiane, however, the site chosen by the Lao authorities could not serve as a laboratory for testing and developing crop substitutes for opium or as a demonstration project. More importantly, UNFDAC support for Lao programs to resettle hill tribes could have negative human rights implications.

25X1

15 February 1978

4

SECRET

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25X1

DOMINICAN REPUBLIC: Transit Point for Narcotics Smuggling

There are indications that the Dominican Republic is playing an increasing role as a transit point for South American cocaine being smuggled into the US. In the past year, for example, there have been major increases in the amount of cocaine seized and the number of foreign traffickers arrested.

The statistics could merely reflect increased efficiency and stricter enforcement of the country's narcotics laws by the National Police and the Department of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs. It is more likely, however, that the figures represent a jump in drug smuggling through the island.

As enforcement and interdiction programs in some Latin American mainland countries become more effective, it is inevitable that the resilient drug networks will alter their routes and change their methodologies. The Dominican Republic is an attractive site for such a shift. Located astride important shipping lanes that connect the Caribbean Sea, Gulf of Mexico, and the Panama Canal, the island also has numerous hidden inlets which enhance the opportunities for smuggling.

Colombia is the main source of the drugs, the majority of which enter the Dominican Republic on cargo ships. Tourist boats and commercial pleasure yachts that call at northern ports of the island may also be transporting drugs between the Dominican Republic and Puerto Rico.

Even though national attention is focused on the May presidential elections, drug arrests continue to be widely publicized in the local media. Although the Dominican Republic does not suffer from a major drug abuse problem, officials seem aware of the potential consequences which could result for their island society as a result of increasingly available drugs.

15 February 1978

15

SECRET

SECRET

The National Police readily cooperate with INTERPOL
and the US Drug Enforcement Administration.

25X1

[REDACTED] the Dominican
Republic will remain at least one of the stops in the
"island hopping" path South American cocaine takes en
route to the US. [REDACTED]

25X1

15 February 1978

16

SECRET

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NOTEWORTHY ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS

(Editor's Note: These items, produced for another CIA publication, do not deal specifically with the international narcotics situation. They are included here, however, because they concern developing economic or political situations that could impact on the international narcotics control effort.)



25X1

TURKEY: The Balance-of-Payments Crisis

Prime Minister Ecevit's month-old government probably will impose controversial austerity measures within the next few weeks in an attempt to remedy a critical balance-of-payments situation. Foreign exchange reserves are at their lowest level in six years, and short-term debt has reached an alarming \$4 billion.

Former Prime Minister Demirel's coalition, which fell in late December, foundered in part because it could not agree on policies that would satisfy the International Monetary Fund and private foreign bankers, potential sources of much-needed loans. Ecevit must convince politicians and the public alike that stiff austerity measures are essential and do not represent knuckling under to outside pressure.

Turkey has been involved in a foreign exchange juggling act for at least a year as officials try desperately to maintain essential imports. Central Bank overdrafts and arrears carried over from last year amount to between \$1.5 billion and \$2 billion. Shortages of imported goods have caused industrial production to be cut and development projects to be delayed.

Iraq and Libya, Turkey's main sources of oil, have stopped supplies for short periods in recent months when their bills were not paid. Foreign exchange reserves now

15 February 1978

18

SECRET

SECRET

are below \$500 million, the equivalent of about five weeks' worth of imports. Expectations of a substantial devaluation of the Turkish lira are slowing both payment for the country's exports and remittances from Turks working abroad.

The deepening foreign exchange crisis stems from several years of rapid economic growth and high military expenditures at a time of skyrocketing oil prices, world recession, and a shutoff of US military grant aid. In addition, the government has been supporting agricultural prices well above world levels, making key exports salable only on a subsidized basis. The result of these and other policies has been a ballooning of the current account deficit from \$720 million in 1974 to \$3.2 billion in 1977.

To finance the deficit, Turkey has borrowed abroad and encouraged foreign banks--mainly US--to maintain deposits of foreign currency in Turkish banks. These so-called "convertible lira" deposits plus Central Bank arrears and overdrafts make up Turkey's short-term debt of \$4 billion. Long-term debt, primarily owed to the US and international organizations, amounts to \$5 billion.

Earlier Remedies

The Demirel government began taking steps to reduce the current account deficit following initial discussions with the IMF last September. Ankara devalued the lira by 9 percent against the dollar and trimmed the annual increase in agricultural support prices. It raised domestic petroleum prices for the first time since 1973 and announced substantial increases in the prices of some state enterprises' products to reduce the budget deficit. The Demirel government balked, however, at further measures needed to meet IMF loan conditions and restore the confidence of foreign bankers.

International bankers, after considering loans to tide Turkey over until a settlement could be reached with the IMF, decided in December to make new assistance conditional on an IMF standby credit. The \$65 million to \$110 million potentially available from the IMF for 1978 is small change compared with total financing needs, but Turkish acceptance of IMF policy conditions would

15 February 1978

SECRET

SECRET

open the door to medium-term private credits that could total \$1 billion or more. Under the circumstances, Turkey has little choice other than to accept the IMF policy recommendations.

The new Ecevit government is believed to recognize the need for austerity and is likely to seek an early agreement with the IMF. Ankara may delay the next round of IMF talks at least until next month, however, to allow time for approval of the 1978 budget and enactment of other economic measures. The government proposals will be difficult enough to defend without their appearing to be imposed from outside.

IMF proposals discussed with the Demirel government included a further 20-percent devaluation of the lira, a cut in 1978 government spending in real terms, limits on money supply expansion, and a sharp cut in imports. The Turks apparently calculated that these conditions would result in real GNP growth of 4.5 percent in 1978, well below the average 7- to 8-percent rate of the past few years. The projected slowdown in growth proved to be a key stumbling block for members of the Demirel government, particularly Deputy Prime Minister Erbakan.

With Erbakan out of the government and preliminary figures showing GNP growth down to 5 percent or less in 1977, the IMF proposals appear to be gaining greater acceptance among Turkish officials. The new government already has accepted the \$4.85 billion IMF limit on imports, and Ecevit probably will agree to the proposed devaluation. He may try to raise slightly the government budget ceiling agreed to last fall by Demirel, and he is likely to postpone restrictions on domestic credit as long as possible.

In the absence of a standby agreement with the IMF, external financing constraints would almost certainly result in a severe decline in real GNP this year, with shortages of oil and other imports causing widespread plant closings and power outages. Road transportation would be crippled, and the cities--where over 40 percent of the population lives--would be hit hardest.

With IMF support, much of Turkey's short-term debt could be rescheduled, and exports and worker remittances

15 February 1978

SECRET

would probably recover. Some real growth might be realized, although probably less than the Demirel government expected. High inflation and unemployment will persist, however, and real incomes may fall even if Ankara enacts the measures demanded by the IMF.

Tight control over imports and government spending probably will have to be maintained through 1980. US ratification of the long-pending four-year Defense Cooperation Agreement, which calls for \$250 million a year in loans and grants to Turkey in return for the use of military bases, would make available foreign exchange that could be used to support domestic investment projects.

Once the immediate foreign exchange situation is brought under control, Turkish leaders probably will have to address structural economic problems. For the past decade, Ankara has channeled a large portion of investment into high-cost showpiece plants or into consumer-oriented industries that depend heavily on imported materials and are not competitive in export markets. A reevaluation of development policy would be politically difficult, but creditors may force the government's hand.

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TURKEY: Prospects for the Ecevit Government

Influential Turkish political and military circles are cautiously optimistic that Prime Minister Ecevit is prepared to move forward on a broad range of domestic and foreign policy issues. He has an image of decisiveness and independence and is courting groups outside the government, particularly labor.

The components of the governing coalition headed by Turkish Prime Minister Bulent Ecevit--his own left-of-center Republican People's Party plus two tiny rightist

15 February 1978

SECRET

SECRET

parties and at least 11 independents--have displayed in their first weeks in office a considerable degree of cooperation, and the new government is enjoying a political honeymoon of sorts. The Prime Minister is working hard--within his own party, the coalition, the parliamentary opposition, and important groups outside the government--to gain support for an activist program that will improve Turkey's economy and international standing.

Opposition to Ecevit, led by former Prime Minister Demirel, has been strident and even vicious. Demirel reportedly is trying to win back some of the 11 defectors who resigned from his Justice Party and are now aligned as independents with Ecevit. However, it is hard to see what Demirel could offer them; Ecevit has put nine of them in the cabinet.

Ecevit's award of 13 ministerial posts to his coalition partners comes close to guaranteeing his government a 226-vote majority in the National Assembly. Perhaps more important is the realization within the coalition that there is no clear alternative to the present government:

Within his own party, Ecevit has tried with some success to placate his critics, particularly those on the left. He has reshuffled the party executive committee and given the Energy Ministry to Deniz Baykal, the party's principal leftist dissident. Baykal does not appear completely satisfied, and may continue his crusade for greater social and economic activism, but he is not anxious to split the party or to jeopardize his new job.

Ecevit has attempted to minimize parliamentary opposition by neutralizing Necmettin Erbakan, leader of the Islamic-fundamentalist National Salvation Party. Shortly after Demirel's government fell, Turkey's chief prosecutor accused Erbakan of having violated Turkey's secularist laws by pursuing an aggressively Islamic line in his speeches. Erbakan faces expulsion from his party if convicted.

25X1

Military Approval

Turkish military officers, particularly those in the middle grades, seem pleased with Ecevit's government.

15 February 1978

22

SECRET

SECRET

Although some senior officers may be chary of Ecevit's occasional socialistic statements, they still remember him as the man who ordered the invasion of Cyprus in 1974. They believe that Demirel's coalition was ineffective and that Ecevit is probably the only leader who can achieve a Cyprus settlement.

Solving that problem, the officers believe, would reopen the path to cooperation with the US, which to many of them is of primary importance. A \$1 billion Defense Cooperation Agreement has long been stalled in the US Congress. The military is also concerned by the present magnitude of domestic violence and hopes that the Ecevit administration can do something about it.

Labor and Business Views

Ecevit's meeting last week with Turkey's two major labor leaders signaled that he is attuned to the problems of labor, particularly important during the period of economic austerity that lies ahead.

The head of the leftist labor federation has expressed reservations about increased austerity measures. The more conservative union is prepared to make sacrifices, but only if collective bargaining arrangements are preserved. Neither organization is particularly well disciplined, and a large number of Turkish workers are not union members. Nonetheless, organized labor seems likely to give Ecevit the benefit of the doubt, at least for the present, if only because it considers him preferable to Demirel.

Businessmen have been cautious in discussing the new government, but they seem relieved that Demirel is no longer in power. In August and September, various employers' associations offered proposals for more realistic economic policies, but received little response from Demirel.

Ecevit has not yet announced the details of his economic program, but it is generally understood to call for belt-tightening, a move most businessmen would welcome. Rather than call back the International Monetary Fund negotiating team to finish talks on a \$130 million loan, Ecevit may decide to implement austerity measures independently and attempt to negotiate new bilateral

15 February 1978

SECRET

loans. This move would be politically popular over the short term because it would enhance Turkey's image of independence; there is virtually no chance, however, that Ecevit could obtain adequate outside support if no IMF loan is negotiated.

Outlook

As his foreign and domestic policies become clear-- and memory of Demirel's ineffective government fades-- Ecevit will surely be subject to more criticism. The strength of such pressure, probably more topical than general, will be dampened for a time by the general belief that a Turkish government is, at long last, addressing major problems. But Ecevit must soon produce results in order to sustain his current popularity.

By continuing to project himself as a highly independent yet realistic leader, Ecevit can probably generate the popular confidence that will enable him to make difficult decisions, particularly in foreign policy. Unlike his predecessor, Ecevit will be able to operate without the encumbrance of parliamentary allies who are often opposed to his policies or preoccupied with their own ambitions.

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IRAN-INDIA-PAKISTAN: Shah's Visits

The Shah of Iran was impressed by Indian Prime Minister Desai during their meeting in New Delhi last weekend. From all indications, the relationship of the leaders of the two major powers in the region got off to a good start. The Shah told the US Ambassador to Iran that he had found the political situation in India much improved, reflecting his generally favorable reaction to the performance of the Desai government during its first year in power.

With respect to specific issues, the Shah found ready Indian acceptance of the concept of an Asian Com-


15 February 1978

SECRET

SECRET

mon Market. The scheme is intended to strengthen regional economic cooperation, a familiar theme in Iranian foreign policy but one on which little headway has been made. The Indians favor greater regional economic cooperation in principle, but they view the Shah's proposal as ill-defined and premature.

The Shah was less satisfied with his brief stopover in Pakistan, where he was unable to dispel what he sees as Chief Martial Law Administrator Zia's obsession with possible Indian-Iranian collusion against Pakistani interests. Pakistanis are not fully aware of the Shah's reaction and appear pleased by what they regard as avoiding a confrontation as well as by the Shah's agreement to defer repayments on a \$580 million loan.



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COLOMBIA: Congressional Elections Set

President Lopez' measures to counter kidnappings and lawlessness have assuaged the Colombian military's concern over a serious crime problem, and national attention has now shifted to election year political activities. Congressional elections, which will also serve as a primary for the ruling Liberal Party, are scheduled for 26 February, and will be followed by presidential elections in June.

This month's "primary" is significant because it takes the place of a nominating convention for the badly

15 February 1978

SECRET

SECRET

splintered Liberal Party. Presidential and congressional elections were originally planned to be held together in the spring. Liberal Party officials have been concerned, however, that the numerous factions would not be able to unite behind one of the two leading Liberal pre-candidates--Julio Cesar Turbay and former President (1966-70) Carlos Lleras Restrepo.

A divided Liberal Party at election time, or even one led by a compromise candidate, would enhance the prospects of victory for Belisario Betancur, the Conservative Party standardbearer. To head off that possibility, a Liberal caucus last December succeeded in passing controversial legislation which separates the upcoming elections. This maneuver bought the Liberals additional time to patch up political differences.

In a further attempt to strengthen the Liberal Party against the attractive Betancur, Lopez engineered the San Carlos consensus--an agreement calling for the Liberal Party nomination to go to the contender whose supporters win the most votes in the congressional elections.

This approach favors Turbay, a facile politician who controls much of his party's political machinery. Lleras, however, is an experienced statesman noted for economic reforms and strong fiscal policies--persuasive credentials in the eyes of a populace economically fatigued by inflation. Over the past several months Lleras has narrowed Turbay's lead.

Turbay's loss of momentum is due in part to his indecisive campaign platform, ponderous oratorical style, and public concern over rumors of corruption and narcotics trafficking surrounding him and his supporters. Nevertheless, he is projected to win.

A poor turnout at the polls, which is expected due to low voter registration, probably will not hurt Turbay's grass-roots machine, but it will be a serious blow to Lleras, who is banking on a last minute upsurge of support from undecided voters.

There is still a question, however, whether Lleras will honor the San Carlos accord and support Turbay, a long-time bitter enemy. Lleras probably will not run

15 February 1978

SECRET

for the presidency on a maverick ticket because he realizes that would virtually ensure the election of Betancur. For the Conservatives, the February election will be a struggle between the Gomez and Pastrana-Ospina factions to determine which group will be the party's majority bloc in Congress.

After this month's election the political pace will accelerate even more. The candidates also will have to abandon their political platitudes and begin seriously to address campaign issues such as government corruption, kidnappings, rampant crime, and guerrilla activity.

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15 February 1978

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CUBA: In conjunction with the war against common crime which President Fidel Castro declared late last year, Cuba just imposed stiffer penalties for drug trafficking and other criminal activities. The tougher penalties are the result of growing concern in Cuba over increasing crime and delinquency. According to the new decree, production, cultivation, or transportation of illicit drugs will be punishable by three to eight years imprisonment, with increases up to 15 or 20 years for major violators. The new laws may have a direct effect on foreigners and American citizens periodically detained by the Cubans while smuggling marijuana north by air and sea from Colombia and Central America. [REDACTED]

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YUGOSLAVIA: Poppy Crop Damage--The low temperatures in the area around Kochani have damaged the opium poppy crop. According to the director of the Mosha Pijade cooperative farm in the area, the opium poppies planted on 40 hectares were "completely destroyed." In addition, about 150 hectares of poppies planted on farms in neighboring communities have also been destroyed. In another section, 80 percent of the crop was destroyed in a 1000 hectare area. The greatest damage was caused by the drought accompanied by dry winds and frost. [REDACTED]

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SWEDEN: The resources for the care and rehabilitation of drug addicts in Sweden will be doubled if a government proposal--to be submitted to the Swedish parliament within the next few weeks--is adopted. The proposed government-supported program will cost the equivalent of about \$7 million. According to the draft legislation, the country will be divided into regions, and each community will have access to a special treatment center. The proposal calls for an interlocking program which will include intensive medical care, institutional treatment, and postrelease assistance. The proposed legislation particularly emphasizes the importance of providing jobs for rehabilitated drug addicts. A special project group will also be created to study the use of "foster families" in the rehabilitation program.

15 February 1978

SECRET

The bill also provides for research on treatment methods and calls for greater cooperation both among the Nordic countries and with the US in research on drug addict rehabilitation. The bill provides further that over \$500,000 in Swedish foreign aid funds will be spent to support crop substitution efforts in certain developing countries especially those in Southeast Asia. [REDACTED]

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CZECHOSLOVAKIA: The 2 February issue of *Rude Pravo* carried a brief roundup of recent smuggling attempts including an item on a "West Berlin Citizen" who recently tried to smuggle a small amount of hashish into the country in his car. The newspaper speculated that it was perhaps an attempt to find a suitable smuggling route for drugs. An initial attempt by the Embassy's narcotics coordinator in Prague to get more information on the case from Czech customs authorities was unproductive, but he is pursuing the matter further. [REDACTED]

25X1

AFGHANISTAN: The Afghan Ministry of Commerce is offering 25 tons of confiscated opium for sale, and interested pharmaceutical firms have been invited to submit bids. The Embassy in Kabul notes that this is the same confiscated opium that had been offered for sale last December. The Afghan Government chose not to accept the bids received at that time and has reopened the bidding. Because of the general oversupply of opiates on the world market, the bidding this time probably will be even more unsatisfactory to the Afghan Government. [REDACTED]

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BURMA: The nationwide antidrug abuse campaign, which was launched late last year, is continuing unabated, according to the American Embassy in Rangoon. The campaign is aimed primarily at school-age children and features large exhibitions of student-made posters depicting some of the perils of drug abuse. The continuing campaign also includes mass rallies and song, poem, and essay contests. Recently in Mandalay, Burma's second largest city and a center of drug addiction, some 32,000 students marched through the city carrying posters and chanting antidrug slogans. Student attendance at such rallies is said to be compulsory. The embassy in Rangoon points out, however,

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that the "intensity and duration" of the overall drug abuse campaign is further evidence of the seriousness with which the Burmese Government views the local addiction problem. [REDACTED]

25X1

BURMA: The UNFDAC Burma Project, a \$6.6 million, five-year program launched in mid-1976, got off to a slow start, but the problems which marked its beginning have now been largely overcome, and rapid progress is likely in 1978, according to the Embassy in Rangoon. The project provides equipment and supplies to support Burmese Government programs in crop substitution, antidrug education, addict treatment and rehabilitation, and law enforcement. [REDACTED]

25X1

25X6

15 February 1978

32

SECRET

SECRET

INTERESTING READING

Singapore: Ferret Digs In (SINGAPORE)--TNDD, No. L/7584, 31 January 1978, pp. 17-18. "Nine months after its inception, there are signs that the Singapore Government's antidrug Operation Ferret is putting the heat on the island republic's burgeoning narcotics underworld. Since Ferret began, some 7,000 heroin takers--the most numerous among the abuser group--have been rounded up out of an estimated addict population of 200,000." (Phase two of "Operation Ferret" officially began on 1 January 1978.)*

Experts Discuss Drug Addiction, Prevention (ARGENTINA)--TNDD, No. L/7584, pp. 24-26. "A recent police campaign made it possible to uncover some secrets of the Argentine drug-smuggling route. Meanwhile, authorities responsible for the area have succeeded in checkmating traffickers, closing off the routes that they travel."

Drug Agents To Be Assigned to Overseas Embassies (BRAZIL)--TNDD, No. L/7584, pp. 30-34. "Brazilian embassies will have police attaches for drug-related matters beginning in 1978, starting with Peru, Bolivia, and Venezuela. This is one of the new measures announced by the interministerial commission that is formulating a new strategy for the Justice Ministry for suppressing drug trafficking and restricting drug use."

Five Thousand Kilos of Narcotics Confiscated Last Year (IRAN)--TNDD, No. L/7584, p. 80. "According to the Iranian National Gendarmerie, in all probability, the smugglers had prepared 50 percent of these items for export to the West. (Items listed included both opium and heroin)."

**US Joint Publications Research Service (JPRS) Translations on Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs. Published by JPRS, 1000 Glebe Road, Arlington, Va. 22201.*

25X1

15 February 1978

SECRET

SECRET

Customs Officials' Crackdown Fails To Stem Drug Traffic
(DENMARK)TNDD, No. L/7584, 92-94. "Drug-related crimes increased explosively in Denmark in 1977. Narcotics valued at about \$10,000,000 were found on Danish soil, while other drugs worth about \$6,540,000 were in transit in the country. These figures provide only a partial picture of the real drug crimes."

25X6

Minister Seeks Isolation From World Drug Scene (NEW ZEALAND)--TNDD, No. L/7598, pp. 38-39. "The Minister

15 February 1978

34

SECRET

SECRET

of Customs has embarked on a campaign to seal New Zealand off from the world's drug traffickers . . . the amount heroin seized by New Zealand Customs officers alone has jumped from nil in 1972 to 1,448 grammes in March 1977."

Intensive Anti-Drugs Campaign Announced (COLOMBIA)--TNDD, No. L/7598, pp. 80-81. "Within the radical changes to take place in the methods of preliminary penal investigation, under the absolute responsibility of the national attorney general's office, there will be a new operative front which will take a unified stand against drug traffickers. Preliminary investigation (methods) during the last six years have contributed to the wave of insecurity."

Police Official: 90 Percent of Juvenile Theft Tied to Drug Abuse (NORWAY)--TNDD, No. L/7598, pp. 136-140. "There are between 6,000 and 7,000 narcotic addicts in and around Oslo. The money to support their addiction is gotten by thefts. In 1977, eight youths died in Norway from overdoses."

15 February 1978

35

SECRET

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