


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**REGIONAL AND
POLITICAL ANALYSIS**

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This publication is prepared for regional specialists in the Washington community by the East Asia/Pacific Division, Office of Regional and Political Analysis, with occasional contributions from other offices within the Directorate of Intelligence. Comments and queries are welcome. They should be directed to the authors of the individual articles.

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An Old Story: Teng and the Premiership

Many Chinese officials have assumed that when the Fifth National People's Congress (NPC) meets this fall, senior Vice Premier Teng Hsiao-ping will be named Premier, a post he has actively sought.

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At 73, Teng is not too old by Chinese standards. Chou En-lai served as Premier until his death at 77, and top Chinese leaders often hold key posts well into their 80s. To the Chinese mind, Teng's age and experience make him preferable to a younger man.

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[Redacted] Teng has been Premier in all but name since his return last July. He meets and holds talks with the more important foreign visitors. He is actively involved in all aspects of science, education, and economic modernization policy,

[Redacted] what is at stake is the title (and the power and prestige that go with it), not additional duties.

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Moreover, Teng's personality is such that it is very unlikely he regards himself as too old. Teng is a hard-driving, take-charge type who tends to grab as much power as he possibly can. He has moved quickly to consolidate his influence since his return.

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[Redacted] When he returned, he said he came back to work, not to be an adviser.

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[REDACTED]

A number of Politburo members, including Party Chairman Hua Kuo-feng, who were uneasy about Teng's rehabilitation and sought to delay it, may be opposing his appointment as Premier. Teng is a vindictive man who in the past has not hesitated to punish his opponents. Hua, Party Vice Chairman Wang Tung-hsing, Peking party boss Wu Te, Shenyang Military Region (MR) commander Li Te-sheng, and Peking MR boss Chen Hsi-lien, all of whom have had differences with Teng, may believe themselves threatened if Teng acquires yet another top title. He already is Vice Chairman of the party, Vice Premier, Chief of Staff of the Army, and Vice Chairman of the Military Commission, the party body that oversees the political loyalty of the military.

If not Teng, then who will be Premier? Hua currently holds the title, but he has not been performing most of the duties. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Among the most frequently mentioned candidates for the job other than Teng are Kwangtung party boss Wei Kuo-ching, Vice Premier Li Hsien-nien, and party apparatchik Chi Teng-kuei, but none of them seems entirely satisfactory. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Li is only three years younger than Teng, which would seem to disqualify him if the excuse of age is valid. Chi is young and able, but he is not on the Standing Committee of the Politburo.

The easiest short-term solution may be to allow Hua to keep the title while Teng continues to act as de facto Premier. This may be more acceptable to Teng than appointing a younger man like Chi, who could devote his full energy to the job.

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The premiership may not be the only post at issue.

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[Redacted] Some top military men apparently are being transferred. A few ministries still do not have heads, and there may be some openings in the provinces as well.

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If there are serious disagreements over who will fill these vacancies, the NPC may be delayed. During the summer, Chinese were speculating that it would meet before 1 October, national day, but speculation about this date has stopped. Now Chinese are saying it will meet before 1 January.

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25X1Hsu Hsiang-chien Attacks "Warlordism"

The Hua regime is evidently still having some serious political problems with the military.

In a long and authoritative article on 19 September, Politburo member and Military Commission Vice Chairman Hsu Hsiang-chien scolds unnamed military leaders for trying to parlay their control of forces into unwarranted and independent political influence. This, in Chinese Communist terms, is "Warlordism." Hsu implies that friction between party and military authorities is interfering with the efficient execution of policy decisions.

Hsu focuses on two kinds of problems that evidently are troubling the army-party relationship. First, he attacks certain political misbehavior which has been pervasive for at least the past decade: "one-man rule," factionalism, and creation of "strongholds." He also criticizes leaders who manipulate the party committees within their military units by organizing "small groups" who "discuss things behind the scenes." Second, Hsu focuses on lapses of political discipline that were apparently used by the military to good effect against the "Gang of Four." These include "haggling" or negotiating over orders, selective compliance with orders or willful distortion of instructions, and plain refusal to obey--either through "duplicity" ("saying yes and meaning no") or "sophistry" (disobedience rationalized on the pretext of "resisting erroneous leadership").

The remedy Hsu prescribes is to revive strict party discipline and enforce honesty and candor within the party structure in the armed forces. He also repeats Teng Hsiao-ping's call at last month's 11th Party Congress for strict honesty in party life. Hsu notes that an investigation of the "gang's" activities in the armed forces is still going on and that "the individuals and incidents" connected with the "gang" will be dealt with. He warns that those who persist in the indiscipline of

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the past decade will be admonished, and if they continue to be disobedient, "must be disciplined and must not be tolerated."

Clearly, the Politburo would like to eliminate this vestige of the Cultural Revolution. The techniques that military leaders used to thwart the Leftists' efforts to expand their influence in the armed forces now are available for other purposes. Although Hsu does not even hint at who is using these tactics or for what purpose, there may be some factional maneuvering around the question of who should succeed Defense Minister Yeh Chien-ying or whether any successor should be chosen at this time. It is also easy to imagine how military factionalism could complicate and delay the military modernization program.

It is doubtful that Hua and his aging military "assistants" on the Politburo will be able to force some military men to become less political. Events of the past decade, especially the circumstances that brought Hua to power, have thrust Chinese generals into politics to a degree unprecedented since the founding of the PRC. The Chinese Army is the single most powerful interest group, and the plea to follow party direction by the aging and respected Hsu Hsiang-chien raises the inevitable question of who in the next generation will have sufficient stature in the eyes of the military to hold its political activity in check.

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The Rocky Road Ahead for Chinese Education

Since the arrest of the "Gang of Four" in October 1976, there have been numerous indications pointing toward major educational reforms. It is generally assumed that these reforms, pragmatic steps to depoliticize education and upgrade its academic content, will undo the damage done by the leftist educational policies pursued since the Cultural Revolution. In the long run, this assumption may be correct. But in the short run, over the next five or 10 years, it may be far too optimistic. It can be argued that the problems facing Chinese education are so numerous and so great that they will defy easy and fast solutions.

Among the most nagging of these problems are the small number and poor ability of students. According to the Ministry of Education, there are currently 584,000 students in Chinese universities. Although this figure is probably higher than in any year since the Cultural Revolution, it is far lower than the 820,000 university students before the Cultural Revolution and falls far short of meeting China's needs for trained personnel, especially in the sciences. The shortage, moreover, is even more severe than these figures suggest. Between 1966 and 1970, all universities were closed, no students entered or graduated, and the education of those in the midst of their college careers was stopped. China thus lost at least four years of university graduates.

Those students who have attended universities since 1970 have often had little aptitude for higher education. Since university entrance exams were abolished, students have been chosen on the basis of their political reliability and work records rather than their academic qualifications. In addition, because the quality of education in primary and secondary schools deteriorated after 1966, even capable students often have been poorly trained and poorly prepared for college. Since all students, regardless of ability, are

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required to spend at least two years working in the countryside after graduating from middle school, most require remedial work and refresher courses once they return to school.

A second set of problems involves the inadequate number and quality of teachers. During the Cultural Revolution, many teachers were persecuted as members of the intellectual class. Others were purged and sent to work in the countryside. Still others left their posts to escape the pressures placed on them. After the end of the Cultural Revolution in 1969, many teachers were still required to spend a large part of their time away from the classroom, either working in factories or on communes or attending political reeducation classes. The result has been a shortage of qualified teachers, particularly at the primary and secondary levels. Moreover, since standards at teachers' colleges also deteriorated after 1966, many younger teachers are poorly trained and often ignorant of basic knowledge in their fields. In some areas, junior middle school graduates have been assigned as teachers in middle schools because teachers with higher qualifications were unavailable. The problem has become so severe that Chungshan University in Kwangtung Province was recently obliged to set up a teacher training office to teach young teachers basic theory in their fields.

A third problem is the weak and highly politicized curriculum. For the most part, it is too short and pays too little attention to academics to produce first-rate graduates. After the universities reopened in 1970, courses of study were cut from 4 to 3 years in the humanities and social sciences, from 5 to 4 years in the sciences, and from 7 to 3 years in medicine. Graduate programs were completely abolished. In undergraduate courses, political courses were favored over academic ones. Many important aspects of education--in particular, training in basic theory in the sciences--were neglected in favor of subjects which had "practical" value. In addition, students were required to spend large portions of their academic careers working in communes or factories. Exams were abolished, and students were passed routinely from one level to the next regardless of their performance or ability. All this produced a graduate ill-suited to the country's needs:

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one who often lacked ability, was unable to reason, and was ignorant of basic theory and often even basic knowledge in his field.

There are also severe problems with discipline and morale. Since the Cultural Revolution began, students have been encouraged to stand up to and even rebel against their teachers. Teachers and intellectuals in general have been intimidated, not only by the conduct of their students but by government persecution. Some like the late Minister of Education, Chou Jung-hsin, have even been driven to illness and death by the tremendous pressures placed on them. As a result, many intellectuals and educators have become timid and apathetic, unwilling to take risks for fear that they might be attacked or criticized. With such attitudes, they are unlikely to move forcefully to carry out proposed educational reforms.

The demoralization extends to students as well. Middle school students wanting to attend college are faced with the prospect of spending at least two years, and sometimes a lifetime, working in the countryside. Because selection for university education has been based heavily on political and work records rather than academic qualifications, few have any incentive to work hard in school. The problem is compounded by the shortage of prestigious jobs for middle school and university graduates. Although China needs more highly trained scientists, it also needs a large number of low-level technicians to work in rural areas. Such jobs--the majority of the positions available--are far less attractive to young people than jobs in the cities.

Although problems with poor students, teachers, and educational facilities are nationwide, they are especially acute outside the major cities. The best universities in China--Peking University, Tsinghua University, and Fudan University--are located in Peking and Shanghai. So are the best research institutions, to which students are often attached for training and research experience. In order to upgrade education, it will be necessary to develop first-rate research and educational facilities in other parts of the country as well.

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In order to solve all of these problems--to improve the quality of students, teachers, and educational facilities--the Chinese Government will have to tackle at least two more problems. One is economic: the shortage of funds. China's modernization program demands huge outlays of money for a number of purposes--modernizing the military, modernizing and mechanizing agriculture, raising industrial production and modernizing industry, and upgrading science and technology. Because there will be so much competition for China's scarce resources, education may well receive less support than it needs to adequately carry out all of the reforms essential to its improvement. The second problem is political. It is likely that there is still some leftist influence in universities and in educational circles, both long bastions of the "Gang of Four." Until people with leftist views are removed or purged, they are likely to resist any moves to depoliticize the educational system and to stress study rather than work and politics.

The problems afflicting Chinese education have had a disastrous effect on an area closely connected with education: science and technology. Because of the poor quality of Chinese education, too few scientists have been trained to meet the needs of scientific research. During the Cultural Revolution, many older scientists were persecuted, harassed, or purged. Others left their jobs to escape the pressures placed on them. Since graduate programs were abolished, few young people were trained to take their places, and those who were often lacked solid grounding in scientific theory. Chang Wen-yu, Director of the Institute of High Energy Physics of the Chinese Academy of Science, recently stated that over half of his staff were poorly trained, were unable to understand the principles of quantum mechanics, and hence were unable to do research. Outside of the main research centers, the situation is even more abysmal. The Chengtu Geology College in Szechuan Province, for instance, recently reported that of 234 research projects it completed since 1973, only six have reached international standards, and only 10 have reached progressive national standards.

The greatest dilemma facing Chinese education, however, is not any single problem, but the combination of a large number of problems. The Chinese Government has

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to tackle many jobs at once--increasing the number of students, recruiting good teachers, improving educational facilities, writing good textbooks, raising morale, rooting out leftist influence, and finding enough money. All of these, moreover, are interconnected. The solution of one demands the solution of another. The task of solving the problems facing Chinese education will therefore demand both time and effort. It is highly unlikely that it can be accomplished by the end of the century, when Peking wants to have developed China into a "powerful socialist state." And until substantial educational reform and improvement is carried out, the modernization of agriculture, industry, national defense, and science and technology is not likely to be fully achieved.

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25X1Problems in Agricultural Mechanization

A recent broadcast from Kwangsi Province in South China and an editorial published recently in the *People's Daily* illustrate the important practical problems China is having mechanizing its agricultural production. Increased mechanization of agriculture has been a long-standing goal of Chinese economic policy, but has been especially stressed since 1975 when then Vice Premier Hua Kuo-feng announced China's intention to basically complete the process by 1980. China's mechanized farm implement industry, however, has been more successful in producing the machinery than the Chinese peasant has been in assimilating it.

Kwangsi, according to the provincial broadcast, had increased by 12 times the number of tractors in the province since 1970, but had only trebled the number of trained tractor operators during the same period. One county, for example, had added 300-400 new machines per year since 1974 but only 200 operators per year during the same period. As a consequence, the county is now 1,000 operators short, and machines remain idle.

In addition to being in short supply, many supposedly trained workers are not adequately prepared to either operate or maintain the machinery. The broadcast cites the following examples:

- A production brigade youth sent to the county seat to learn to operate and bring back a new hand-guided tractor was to return to a triumphant and noisy hero's welcome. The youth failed to arrive at the appointed hour because he and his tractor had fallen into a ditch on the way back to his village.
- A production team had painstakingly carried a tractor into a mountainous region of the province only to have the machine fail after a few days'

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use. Unable to diagnose the problem, the team disassembled the tractor and carried it down the mountain to the county seat for inspection. The problem: the machine had run out of fuel.

Having pressed tractor production since 1975, Peking is now paying more attention to getting the best use out of the machines. Peking plans a conference on agriculture mechanization in late October and has established a high-level State Council office to oversee the program. Overcoming the training problems, however, will be the provinces' responsibility, according to the *People's Daily* which calls for training programs to be established in all provinces and at all levels of authority from the production brigade up.

The editorial and Kwangsi broadcast both suggest another and perhaps more fundamental weakness in the mechanization program: tractors are often not being used for farming. Both professional tractor drivers and peasants have apparently found that using tractors to haul goods on roadways is more profitable than using them to pull plows in the fields where traditional labor intensive methods still prevail.

The editorial, in particular, reflects concern that the growing class of professional "agricultural workers" is becoming divorced from the peasants it is trained to serve. The editorial criticizes the practice of "small production," presumably rental of machines and services to the highest bidder, and directs that machine operators remain skilled at farming and be paid according to the same standards as the peasants. To correct the "capitalist tendency," the editorial urges stepped-up political training.

Neither political nor technical training, however, is likely to promote substantially wider use of the equipment in agricultural production until the machines represent a clear advantage in economic terms over the traditional methods or become less profitable when used for other purposes.

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FOR THE RECORD

Nepal: The appointment of new Nepalese Prime Minister Bista on 12 September undoubtedly cheered Peking. The Chinese have assiduously courted Bista's favor and will now expect him to strengthen relations between the two countries.

China had been suspicious of former Prime Minister Giri's links to India, fearing that he might cause the Himalayan kingdom to lean too far toward New Delhi and away from Peking. The Chinese fear was heightened by the memory of India's annexation of Sikkim, which removed an important buffer from the border with India.

With Bista's appointment, the Chinese will want to collect on their investment last year in his political future. Bista visited Peking in May 1976 for what he expected to be a private visit with relatives serving in the embassy there. The Chinese surprised him by according him high-level treatment, including a meeting with Hua Kuo-feng and a banquet given by the Chinese Foreign Minister. In return for this well-publicized support, Peking may well be looking for a payoff in Nepal's foreign policy. [redacted]

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Chronology

- 9 September Huang Ming-ta, new Chinese Ambassador to Afghanistan, leaves Peking for his post. [redacted] 25X1
- Ting Hao, new Chinese Ambassador to Kuwait, leaves Peking for his post. [redacted] 25X1
- 10 Secretary of State Vance receives Taiwan Ambassador James Shen for the first time in three years. [redacted] 25X1
- Chinese media republish 1958 Mao speech on imperialism as paper tiger. [redacted] 25X1
- Joint editorial warns against using selected use of Mao quotations and implies Mao's thought contains contradictions. [redacted] 25X1
- Vice Premier Teng Hsiao-ping meets with a delegation of the Japanese Dietmen's League for Japan-China Friendship. He severely criticizes US policy toward China, saying that the US is playing with "two cards" (China and Taiwan). [redacted] 25X1
- 11 A delegation of the National People's Congress of China leaves Peking for a visit to Australia and New Zealand. The delegation leader is Ulanfu, vice chairman of the NPC Standing Committee. [redacted] 25X1
- 12 A Chinese military delegation led by Yang Cheng-wu, deputy chief of General Staff of the PLA, leaves

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12 September

Peking for a visit to France and Romania. [redacted]

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Japanese good will mission of the New Liberal Club headed by its chairman, Yohei Kono, arrives in Peking. The delegation is greeted at the airport by Liao Cheng-chih and other members of the China-Japan Friendship Association. [redacted]

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A delegation of the Chinese People's Association for Friendship with Foreign Countries led by its president, Wang Ping-nan arrives in Somalia for a friendly visit. [redacted]

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Miao Chiu-jui, new Chinese Ambassador to the Republic of Chad, leaves Peking for his post. [redacted]

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The delegation of the *QUOTIDIEN DU PEUPLE*, central organ of the Marxist-Leninist Revolutionary Communist Party of France, led by Robert Emery and Gabriel Ferreol, ends its visit to China. [redacted]

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Sun Sheng-wei, new Chinese Ambassador to Sri Lanka, leaves Peking for his post. [redacted]

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Yueh Liang, new Chinese Ambassador of Rwanda, leaves Peking for his post. [redacted]

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Vice Premier Teng Hsiao-ping meets with the delegation of the New Liberal Club of Japan. Teng indicates to the Japanese that China would give Japan favorable treatment if China declared a 200-mile fishing zone. During these discussions Teng states that the premiership is a job for a younger man. [redacted]

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14 September Vice Premier Li Hsien-nien meets with Louis Alexandrenne, Minister of Industrial Development and Environment of Senegal. [redacted] 25X1

Vice Premier Li Hsien-nien meets with American columnist Carl T. Rowan and his party in Peking. [redacted] 25X1

15 Tan Chen-lin, vice chairman of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress, meets with a delegation of the National Conference of State Legislatures of the United States led by Tom Jensen. [redacted] 25X1

Ho Ying, vice minister of foreign affairs, meets with a Palestinian "Fatah" visiting group led by M. H. Salih. [redacted] 25X1

Chairman Hua Kuo-feng meets with Marcelino dos Santos, Minister of Development and Economic Planning of Mozambique, and the delegation accompanying him. [redacted] 25X1

16-20 U Ne Win, President of Burma, in China for a visit. Welcoming him at the airport are Chairman Hua Kuo-feng and Vice Premier Teng Hsiao-ping. [redacted] 25X1

17 Hua and Teng meet separately with U Ne Win. [redacted] 25X1

Tan Chen-lin meets with Lord Killanin, chairman of the International Olympic Committee, in Peking. [redacted] 25X1

Fang I, member of the Politburo and vice president of the Chinese Academy of Sciences, meets with Chinese-American physicists

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- 17 September Dr. Chien-shiung Wu and Dr. Chia-liu Yuan. [] 25X1
- Chen Chih-fang, new Chinese Ambassador to Vietnam, leaves for his post. [] 25X1
- The Chinese Government agriculture delegation, led by Sha Feng, minister of agriculture and forestry, leaves Belgrade after an eight-day visit to Yugoslavia. [] 25X1
- 18 Central Committee circular announced plans to hold science conference next spring. [] 25X1
- Hua Kuo-feng and Li Hsien-nien greet Lieutenant-Colonel Seyni Kountche, President of the Supreme Military Council and head of state of the Republic of Niger on his arrival in Peking. [] 25X1
- 19 The Chinese Government delegation led by Vice Foreign Minister Ma Wen-po returns to Peking from Romania after attending the inauguration of the new Chinese embassy building there. [] 25X1
- 20 Chairman Hua Kuo-feng and Vice Premier Li Hsien-nien meet Macias Bojogo Nogue Ndong, President of Equatorial Guinea on his arrival in Peking. [] 25X1
- 21 Meeting with Li Hsien-nien. [] 25X1
- The government-industry delegation from Senegal ends its visit to China. [] 25X1
- Chairman Hua Kuo-feng meets with Lieutenant-Colonel Seyni Kountche and his party. [] 25X1

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23 September

Huang Hua, chairman of the Chinese delegation to the 32d session of the General Assembly of the UN, leaves Peking for New York. [redacted]

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Politburo member Wei Kuo-ching is publicly identified for the first time as Director of the PLA's General Political Department. [redacted]

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ANNEX

Authoritative CPSU Journal Spells Out Moscow's Case
Against Peking

The full text of the extensive anti-Chinese polemic in the August issue of the CPSU Central Committee's theoretical journal Kommunist is now available. It is a forceful, sharply-focused indictment of Peking's sins as Moscow sees them, and clearly reflects Soviet exasperation at the unwillingness of the post-Mao leadership to moderate Mao's strident anti-Soviet policies. Many of the charges made in the Kommunist article have been made elsewhere in Soviet propaganda and in private statements by Soviet officials. Nevertheless, as the most extensive and authoritative official Soviet pronouncement on China since Mao's death, it contributes greatly to an understanding of Soviet charges, fears, and resentment of Chinese policies. The article, which went to press during the Chinese Communist Party's 11th Party Congress, assumed, correctly, that the decisions taken at the CCP plenum in July were an authoritative statement of Chinese policy programs under the new leadership and would be reflected in the results of the party congress. Kommunist was clearly at pains to vilify these policies in the strongest possible language.

The New Leaders Are As Bad--Or Worse--Than Mao

The *Kommunist* article clearly articulates Moscow's distress over the fact that Mao Tse-tung's successors have failed to change the direction of Mao's hostile policies toward the USSR. It hammers away at the theme that the essentials of Maoism are being faithfully followed by the new Chinese leaders both internally and externally. In fact, in their negative policies toward the USSR and world socialism, they are being intensified. Moscow's negative assessment of the July plenum's results and of the new Chinese leaders is pointed and harsh. The following, and all the excerpts cited later, are direct quotes:

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- So far no positive changes have become apparent in the policy of the Chinese leadership compared with the course pursued by Peking during Mao's life. It is rather the opposite that has happened--a line of further intensification of anti-Soviet attacks, militarization of the country, and closeness with the most reactionary imperialist forces has been charted.
- Implementing the Maoist foreign political course as a whole without corrections, the Peking leaders go beyond it, rejecting the former revolutionary camouflage, displaying an even greater desire to come closer to the imperialists.
- The leaders of the CCP, as is clear, do not intend to reject the Maoist ways, critically assess faulty concepts, and put the country back on the track of socialist building. The events of September-October 1976 did not go beyond a type of leadership coup which was limited to the removal of one of the rival groups without, however, bringing about radical political changes.
- Maoist concepts are the essential foundations of the domestic political program of the new Chinese leadership headed by Hua Kuo-feng.

Most striking is the blanket condemnation of the entire leadership group and the admission that Moscow sees no succor from any member of the reconstituted Chinese leadership. Specifically, the article claims that "a struggle is taking place within the Chinese leadership less about a 'line,' as its participants claim, than among individuals who support the same Maoist platform and are different only in terms of shades and emphasis." In short, *Kommunist* writes off any significance to the elevation or demotion of any leaders, including Teng Hsiao-ping or the "Gang of Four."

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Peking Is Beyond The Role Of Marxism-Leninism

One purpose of the article is to depict Chinese policies as being completely beyond the pale of Marxism-Leninism or having any "progressive" content whatever. Specifically, the journal alleges that:

- Under the new Peking leadership Maoism remains a variety of anti-Communism.
- The Peking leadership is in the ranks of the enemies of peace and socialism.
- The policy of the Peking leadership is openly directed against the majority of socialist countries.
- It openly approaches the position of the most extreme reaction and is not only alien to the principles and ideals of socialism but, essentially, has become an important reserve of imperialism.
- The Maoist stipulations on the most important social and economic problems are of an anti-Marxist and subjective nature.

Peking As A Military Threat And Source of War

The article pays close attention throughout to China's military potential and sounds an alarmist note about Peking's alleged preparations for war. It clearly reflects Moscow's growing concern that the West and Japan will contribute to China's military buildup and therefore vilifies Peking's military investment policies as being a source of severe deprivation to the Chinese people and a threat to world peace. These charges, in addition to their obvious propaganda intent and their attempt to discourage Western military-related assistance to Peking, also convey a note of genuine concern about the long range threat to the USSR of a populous, hostile China with a growing nuclear capability. The following points are made:

- The Chinese leaders are actively pursuing the course set by Mao Tse-tung of preparations for war, ignoring the fact

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that this is harming the development of the country's national economy, exhausting its already limited resources, and creating a serious threat both to the immediate neighbors of the PRC as well as to the cause of peace throughout the world (emphasis added).

- The course of preparations for war was entered in the PRC Constitution adopted in January 1975, and in the documents of the Ninth and Tenth CCP Congresses.
- China's military potential is growing at an accelerated pace. Basic attention is being paid to improving nuclear missile weapons. In the first months following Mao's death China had three nuclear blasts. Last year a total of four nuclear tests were conducted.
- In 1976 direct military outlays accounted for over 40 percent of state budget expenditure, about 50 percent of them being in nuclear missile weapons.
- Lately the Chinese leadership has been adamantly asking the West for military aid in terms of procurement of modern armaments and combat materiel as well as assistance in the development of military industry sectors.
- In this connection the trips which Japanese military leaders and specialists have made to the PRC, at Peking's invitation, deserve serious attention. As the Japanese themselves state they had to listen to the "complaints" of the Chinese military concerning the limited combat possibilities of their army.

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Peking Muddies The Waters Of Soviet-US Relations And
Sabotages Detente

Clearly most rankling to the Soviet Union is Peking's courting and encouragement of any country or organization which maintains an essentially adversary relationship with Moscow. Particularly, Peking's tilt toward the US, its contacts with West Germany, and its encouragement of NATO draw the strongest fire in the *Kommunist* article. All are cited as evidence of Peking's casting its lot with imperialism (that is, anyone anti-Soviet). The statement draws particular attention to China's attacks against the basis of the present Soviet leadership's foreign policy--detente and productive relations with the US. Particularly, it claims that:

- Peking's foreign policy is entering a new stage which is even more hostile and dangerous to the forces of peace, democracy, and socialism.
- A trend toward further rapprochement and expanding the area of "common" or "parallel" international interests of Peking and Washington remains.
- The position of the Chinese leadership is reduced to inducing the United States to fight the Soviet Union "edge to edge" on the basis of "common interests" and doing everything possible to provoke a worsening of relations between the United States and the USSR.
- In the scale of priorities of Peking's foreign policy, relations with the West have taken the foreground.
- Li Hsien-nien noted that he had "much in common" with [British Conservative leader Thatcher] on a number of important international problems and the joint desire to counter the policy of detente, "of which there could be no question."

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- Using the advance of the enemies of peace in the West and giving them all-round support, the Maoists are trying to turn back the process of detente.
- Peking is adamantly resisting any measure in the field of disarmament. It has still not assumed any obligations banning or limiting the development and use of weapons of mass destruction.
- Acting under the false banner of "struggle against superpower hegemony," Peking is trying to counter the general course followed by the socialist states toward detente and disarmament.

And Worst Of All--Tampering In Eastern Europe

The polemic includes an uncommon expression of concern about alleged Chinese efforts to tamper with Moscow's sensitive relationship with Eastern Europe. The degree of sensitivity on this issue seems surprising, but it is stated in forceful terms:

- The Chinese leadership is continuing its devisive policy of "differentiated approach" to the socialist states, acting in this case in an even more subtle manner than in the past.
- Peking sees as its task the breaking of the unity of the fraternal countries and undermining their coordinated course. It is trying to convince individual socialist countries of an alleged "real possibility to develop all-round cooperation" to continue a hostile course toward the socialist community as a whole and the USSR in particular.
- The escalation of Peking's subversive efforts against the members of the socialist community represents a real

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threat both to their unity and to the national interests of each of the fraternal states (emphasis added).

Finally, the *Kommunist* article provides a clear warning to its allies:

-- Maoist ideology and politics are directed against the very essence of socialism and against the foundations of the international communist movement. Any conciliation with them could turn into a form of opportunism. With this in mind we cannot fail to see the topicality of the struggle against Maoist attempts to assist in the manifestation and proliferation of all types of nationalist distortions (emphasis added).

Conclusion

A lengthy portion of the 7,000-word statement attacks in detail Peking's domestic political and economic policies, particularly singling out the Taching and Tachai production models. A few optimistic lines are scattered throughout the piece to the effect that the policies of the new Maoists will fail and China will some day take the path of scientific socialism. The final, five-line paragraph also provides a proforma statement of the Soviet desire for normalized relations between the two countries. The true spirit of the article, however, is best reflected in the concluding paragraph of the penultimate section which states that:

"The words and actions of the Chinese leadership that replaced Mao Tse-tung confirmed the correctness and topical nature of the principled assessments of the theory and practice of Maoism made at fraternal party congresses. Peking's feverish attempts to wreck detente, prevent disarmament, implant mistrust and hostility among countries, and its aspirations to provoke a world war and warm its hands on the flames of this conflagration represent a great danger to all peace-loving nations. Peking's provocative policy is profoundly contradictory to the interests of all nations and must be rebuffed."

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A striking aspect of the article is the pessimistic conclusion, which closes off the possibility that some members of the present Chinese Politburo might desire an amelioration of Peking's hostility toward the USSR. In contrast to Soviet media articles in the early 1970s, there is no reference to "healthy forces" (that is, pro-Soviet leaders) in the Chinese Party or Army who might be willing at some future date to try to improve Sino-Soviet relations. On the contrary, the article becomes polemical in denying that conditions in China could be conducive to the development of such forces, inasmuch as Mao's death, "neither did, nor could, automatically bring about the surmounting of Maoism."

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