


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**REGIONAL AND
POLITICAL ANALYSIS**

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
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Composition of the New Politburo

The new Politburo, elected on 19 August, is a veteran group dominated by aged party bureaucrats and professional military men. As a group it favors moderate, pragmatic solutions to China's problems. The leftist ideologues of the 9th and 10th Politburos have been purged; this Politburo does not appear to have an ideology. Although the new Poliburo is more united than either the 9th or 10th, there is tension between those members who supported Teng Hsiao-ping's rehabilitation and those who opposed it, and potential tension between civilians and military men.

The accompanying chart gives the approximate age, top posts, and backgrounds of each member of the 11th Politburo. New members are indicated by an asterisk.



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THE NEW POLITBURO

The Standing Committee (rank order)

Hua Kuo-feng	56	Chairman of Party; Premier; Chairman Military Commission; Minister of Public Security	Chairman of the Party by chance. Rose to top after Chou En-lai died and Politburo too divided to agree on anyone else. Has no real power base, but is attempting to build one. Reportedly uneasy about Teng's rehabilitation. Hua is an excellent administrator. Probably will surrender Premier and Public Security posts at 5th National People's Congress (NPC) this fall.
Yeh Chien-ying	79	Vice Chairman of Party; Minister of Defense; Vice Chairman of Military Commission	China's senior military man and one of its most respected leaders; strong backer of Teng but also giving considerable support to Hua. Seems to be holding potential rivalries on Politburo in check. In frail health.
Teng Hsiao-ping	73	Vice Chairman of Party; Vice Premier; Chief of Staff of Army	Twice purged: once during Cultural Revolution and once after Chou En-lai died. Teng was heir apparent to Chou, but Hua reaped the benefits after Teng's fall. Tough, vindictive, hard to get along with, but excellent administrator. Very popular with masses and veteran party, government, and military cadres. Some Politburo members opposed Teng's rehabilitation fearing he would eventually monopolize all power. May be named Premier at 5th NPC.
Li Hsien-nien	70	Vice Chairman of Party; Vice Premier	Economic expert. Former close associate of late Chou En-lai. Supported Teng when Teng ousted in 1976.
Wang Tung-hsing	61	Vice Chairman of Party; Head of Party's General Office; Commander of Security Forces	Long time Mao bodyguard. Big gainer at Congress, perhaps because he played large role in purging leftists. Was suspected of leftist sympathies in past. Reportedly opposed Teng's return. Has become more visible since purge of leftists.

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Full Members (stroke order)

Wei Kuo-ching	63	Kwangtung Party boss	Strong supporter of Teng. Rarely ventures to Peking, but rumors of transfer to Peking occasionally surface in Canton.
Ulanfu*	71	Head of Party's United Front Work Department	Purged during Cultural Revolution. Returned at 10th Party Congress in 1973. Was alternate member of 8th Politburo. May have ties to Teng, but very independent man before his purge during Cultural Revolution.
Fang I*	68	Vice President, Chinese Academy of Sciences (CAS)	Was Minister of Economic Relations with Foreign Countries before transfer to CAS after purge of leftists. Fang running CAS and weeding out leftist backers there.
Liu Po-cheng	85	Vice Chairman, National People's Congress	Ill, inactive, seldom appears. A symbol. One of top military leaders during Chinese civil war.
Hsu Shih-yu	71	Canton Military Region Commander	A very strong supporter of Teng. Hsu may be transferred to Peking to take over Ministry of Defense from Yeh or Peking Military Region from Chen Hsi-lien.
Chi Teng-kuei	47	Vice Premier	May oversee party's organization department. His youth makes him a man to watch. Speculation before the congress was he may be promoted to Standing Committee. Has functioned as troubleshooter for party.
Su Chen-hua	68	Political Commissar of Navy	Promoted from alternate to full member of Politburo at Congress. After leftists fell, sent to Shanghai to clean house.
Li Te-sheng	65	Shenyang Military Region Commander	May be under a cloud; close associate purged as leftist in Anhwei, Li's old base. Li suspected of ties to left, and reportedly has opposed Teng's return.

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Wu Te	67	Mayor of Peking; Vice Chairman of National People's Congress	Also may be under a cloud; Peking posters have criticized Wu periodically; reportedly opposed Teng's return.
Yu Chiu-li*	55	Minister of State Planning Commission	Top economic planner. Associate of Li Hsien- nien. Fell out of sight after Teng's ouster.
Chang Ting-fa*	65	Air Force Commander	Professional military officer who assumed com- mand of air force after leftist commander purged. Purged during Cultural Revolution, but returned in 1975 as political commissar of air force.
Chen Yung-kuei	53	Vice Premier	A former model peasant who has assumed other functions in recent years, including travel abroad. Reportedly backed Teng's return to power.
Chen Hsi-lien	64	Vice Premier; Commander Peking Military Region	May be under a cloud. Career military man who has flirted with leftists when it served his interests. Often rumored to be transferred. Was only Politburo member to miss Army Day turnout in Peking, having been sent to Inner Mongolia to attend minor celebration on behalf of Politburo.
Keng Piao*	68	Head of Party's International Liaison Depart- ment	Apparently given job of cleaning house in party's propaganda network which had long been dominated by the leftists. Continues to oversee China's relations with foreign Communist Parties.
Nieh Jung-chien*	78	Vice Chairman National People's Congress; Vice Chairman Military Commission	Inactive. A symbol. Was on 9th Politburo. Famous Military Commander during civil war.
Ni Chih-fu	44	Second Secretary Peking Party Committee; Second Secretary Shanghai Party Committee	Promoted from alternate to full member. A model worker originally but has greatly ex- panded his role. Sent to Shanghai after fall of leftists to help clean house. May be com- mander of Peking worker-militia.

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Hsu Hsiang-chien*	75	Vice Chairman National People's Congress; Vice Chairman Military Commission	Inactive. A symbol. Was member of 9th Politburo. Famous Military commander during civil war.
Peng Chung	64	Third Secretary Shanghai Party Committee	Has day to day charge of Shanghai as Su and Ni often in Peking. Sent to city from Kiangsu after leftists fell to help put Shanghai in order. Was purged during Cultural Revolution. Criticized by left in 1976 as a Teng supporter.

Alternate Members (stroke order)

Chen Mu-hua*	55	Minister Economic Relations with Foreign Countries	A woman. Long-time Vice Minister of Economic Relations with Foreign Countries. Promoted to minister when Fang I went to CAS.
Chao Tzu-yang*	70	Szechwan Party boss	Former boss of Kwangtung but purged during Cultural Revolution. Returned to Kwangtung in 1973 and restored order. Transferred to Szechwan in 1975 to do the same there. Reputed to be Teng supporter.
Saifudin	62	Sinkiang Party boss	A member of Uigher minority. A symbol.

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Eleventh Party Congress: Loose Ends

Unlike its two predecessors, the 11th Party Congress was not a stop along the way to further domestic political turmoil, but seemed genuinely to mark a new stage in China's development. The congress was pervaded with a sense of general agreement on overall economic goals and a desire to put a more orderly and predictable face on political behavior. Nevertheless, Hua Kuo-feng's effort to explain events of the recent past--especially his own elevation and Mao's relationship with the "gang of four"--left some questions unanswered and even raised new ones. The personnel decisions of the congress, moreover, probably caused some consternation among middle-aged and young officials who found the door to upward mobility slammed firmly in their faces.

In an apparent effort to disassociate Mao from Teng Hsiao-ping's former political difficulties, Hua Kuo-feng addressed himself to each quotation from Mao that the leftists had used last year against Teng. He attempted to put these statements in a larger political perspective that left the clear impression that the statements were not directed at Teng. This served the dual purpose of trying to restore Mao's good name to Teng's supporters--a move vital to Hua who owes his position to Mao's good judgment in choosing him--and of clearing away, for the public record at least, any lingering suspicions that the case against Teng was legitimate.

The problem--one that is likely to dog Hua for the duration of Teng's political life--is to explain the apparent contradiction between Mao's selection of Teng in 1975 to head the day-to-day work of the party and his selection of Hua for the same job the following year. If Mao in fact was at odds with the "gang of four" and disagreed with their efforts to unseat Teng, why did he choose Hua as first vice chairman of the party in 1976 rather than Teng? Hua cannot explain this and made no effort to. Instead, he slid over the events of early 1976, indicating Mao's choice of someone to take over

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the work of the party in January 1976 without actually naming himself. The January date remains troublesome because Hua was not named first vice chairman of the party until April. In January, leaving Teng out of the equation, Hua was outranked in the party by such officials as Yeh Chien-ying, Li Hsien-nien, and Chi Teng-kuei, all of whom seemed at least as likely as Hua to assume that role. Nevertheless, even Yeh Chien-ying in his speech to the congress claimed that Mao picked Hua in January, an interesting point for Yeh to make since he had already left Peking by that time in a rage over Teng's failure to be named premier.

The current leaders may have glanced knowingly at one another when Hua announced that the Cultural Revolution was over after 11 years, but this will raise problems for future generations. The 11-year period includes two purges of Teng Hsiao-ping and two rehabilitations of him; it encompasses the rise of Lin Piao and his fall and the rise of the gang and their fall. It was not, as the Chinese seek to portray it, a straight line leading progressively toward current policies, but a circle that has left China essentially back where it was before the Cultural Revolution started. The current leadership, of Mao's generation and having lived through the Cultural Revolution, needs to maintain a fiction about that period so as not to discredit Mao or ignore the past entirely. Future generations that did not live through that period and will not have experienced Mao's leadership may not feel the same need to put a gloss on the Cultural Revolution and, in any case, will have difficulty reconciling the earlier stages of the Cultural Revolution with the later stages that overturned it. Consequently, it seems almost inevitable that a more realistic assessment of the Cultural Revolution and Mao's role in it will emerge in the future. That reassessment in turn will reflect poorly on the pronouncements of the 11th Party Congress and on Hua Kuo-feng himself, who perpetrated the fictionalized version of the Cultural Revolution in the first place.

Another reason for future generations to look back on this congress with some dismay is its treatment of young and middle-aged officials. After years of dominating the leadership, much of the old guard has at last died off, a process that in theory should have created some head-room for the younger officials who have been waiting

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so long in the wings. Instead, what is left of the old guard got the empty seats on the Politburo and were named to the party central committee. The only allowance the congress made for grooming the next crop of leaders was a rather brief statement by Hua Kuo-feng on the need for younger officials to learn from the veterans and for the veterans to help younger officials to correct their mistakes. Implicit in this statement was the view that veterans do not make mistakes, but that younger officials inevitably do.

This position, as distasteful as it may be for younger officials, is probably a wise tactical move by Hua. As a middle-aged official himself and one without a strong independent base of support, Hua needs to keep the veteran officials in his camp and seems to have gone out of his way to pay homage to them.

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Hua and Teng: Getting By With a Little Help From Their Friend

The 11th Party Congress, which dwelt at length on the need for greater party unity, discussed not only the factionalism that split the party from 1966 to 1976, but also tried to assuage fears that Party Chairman Hua Kuo-feng and Vice Chairman Teng Hsiao-ping, the dominant figures on the new Politburo, have become rivals.

The Congress and the meetings preceding it took every opportunity to portray Hua and Teng as partners and to dispel any notion that they may be at odds. In his widely circulated speech to the third Plenum of the 10th Party Congress in July, Teng praised Hua at length and promised to serve as his "good assistant." Teng also said that he, the late Premier Chou En-lai, and Party Vice Chairman Yeh Chien-ying first tapped Hua for the succession in 1975--as if to imply that Hua's rise to the top was accomplished with Teng's blessing and not at his expense. In his speech to the 11th Party Congress, Hua cast Teng and himself as allies in the fight against the leftists. Completing the picture of unity, Teng made the official announcement at the congress that Hua had been elected chairman of the party--a nice touch because, but for an odd series of events, Teng himself might have been elected chairman. Hua's speech went to great lengths to repudiate leftist claims that veteran officials like Teng were "capitalist roaders." Although Hua undoubtedly was referring to the many veterans who have been newly elected to the Central Committee and Politburo, his constant refutation of the capitalist roader charge in particular seemed aimed at clearing Teng, since only a year ago he was called the biggest unrepentant capitalist roader in the party.

The Teng and Hua accounts of their earlier relationship are creatively rewritten versions of the actual situation. Hua reached the top only because Teng fell, and it is doubtful that Teng ever seriously promoted Hua's career.

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[redacted] Articles appeared in the Peking press 25X1
that seemed to oppose Teng's return, while others suggested
Hua was being pressured by Teng's supporters.

Hua and Teng see eye to eye on most issues, but apparently differ on how to proceed against the remaining supporters of the purged leftists. Teng, [redacted] 25X6
[redacted] apparently favors a much tougher approach 25X6
than Hua. In his speech to the Third Plenum, Teng called for vigorous prosecution of the campaign, and intimated that the basic reason for his fall in 1976 was that he was too soft on his leftist opponents. In his speech to the congress, Hua called for a quick end to the campaign, set strict limits on permissible targets, and counseled leniency. Hua's position was endorsed by the new Central Committee.

Teng's conception of his proper role in the leadership is more likely to cause friction between the two men than policy differences. Teng clearly sees himself as playing a very large role, and Hua may feel threatened. Teng has already deeply involved himself in the economy and foreign policy [redacted]

[redacted] 25X1
[redacted] and it seems unlikely that a man of Teng's assertive nature and long experience would readily accept a role secondary to the younger Hua. [redacted] 25X1
[redacted]

Yeh Chien-ying, who is 79 and frail, seems to be the key to holding the potential rivalries on the Politburo in check. The 11th Party Congress was made possible largely through Yeh's efforts. Yeh, who has been one of Teng's most ardent backers, reportedly put together a compromise that allowed Teng to return and assured the anti-Teng people that they would not suffer at the congress for their earlier opposition. Yeh, who has consistently lent his prestige to Hua of late, appears to be seeing to it that all parties abide by the agreement. As long as Yeh is around to rein in Teng and bolster Hua's prestige, the chance of a serious falling out between the two men is greatly reduced. [redacted] 25X1

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25X1The Eleventh Party Congress and Provincial Leadership

The recent 11th Party Congress apparently marks the beginning of the reconstruction of the provincial party organizations and the end of the purges and major reshuffling at that level which have characterized the period since the ouster of the "gang of four" last October. The election of all 29 provincial party first secretaries to full membership in the Central Committee reinforces the status of the 13 newly appointed leaders and confirms the political health of the 16 holdovers.

The ouster of "gang" supporters from the provincial committees over the last 10 months has left many provincial party units understaffed, but the integrity of this remaining core group is attested to by the high percentage of remaining officials chosen for Central Committee membership. Provincial broadcasts and, most recently, Chairman Hua's opening address at the Party Congress have made it clear that much investigation, education, and rebuilding remain to be done at the local levels. The composition of the new Central Committee indicates that the slate has been wiped clean and the leaders have been selected to begin this work of recreating a stable, correct, and responsive party organization in the provinces.

The election of all 29 first secretaries to full membership in the new Central Committee suggests both the organizational importance of that group to party affairs and, on a personal level, the resolution of a number of outstanding cases. Individuals such as Tseng Shao-shan from Liaoning and Wu Te from Peking, whose involvement in the anti - Teng Hsiao-ping campaign in 1976 had left their political fortunes in doubt, apparently have made satisfactory amends. The same seems to be true of their corresponding Military Region Commanders, Li Te-sheng and Chen Hsi-lien. It appears that for now the central authorities value a consolidated leadership in the provinces over a potentially troublesome, if somewhat more thorough, continuation of the housecleaning of provincial leaders.

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From another angle, the importance of the provincial leaders can be seen in the inclusion of five first secretaries, as well as Shanghai's second and third secretaries, on the Politburo. It should be noted, however, that a number of these men serve primarily in Peking. In the case of Shanghai, Su Chen-hua and Ni Chih-fu appear to have left the day-to-day management of the city to Peng Chung, also a Politburo member. Sinkiang's Saifudin has appeared only sporadically in his home province since the central work conference in March. This, coupled with the recent appointment of new second and third secretaries in Sinkiang, suggests that Saifudin may leave many of his secretarial duties to others in order to free himself for other work in Peking.

The representation of provincial party committees in the Central Committee makes it clear that Peking has paid a great deal of attention not only to the first secretaries, but to the provincial party organization as a whole. More than 43 percent of the full Central Committee members and 25 percent of the alternates hold a position on a provincial party committee, for a total membership of over 36 percent. More important, however, is the fact that of the total number of persons of deputy secretary rank or higher known to be active in provincial party committees, more than 57 percent are members of the new Central Committee. That is to say, every second person of secretary rank in the provinces belongs to the Central Committee. The net effect is the existence of a newly endorsed core group of political leaders at the helm in the various provinces as restaffing at the lower levels begins.

The Party Congress paid a great deal of attention to the problems of maintaining a stable and responsive provincial apparatus. The interference of the "gang of four" in the provinces, most importantly in operating outside the party's chain of command, may still concern the central leadership. Hua's call for further education and work style rectification of cadres in the provinces is only the most recent example of central concern. A number of provinces have already announced plans for widespread investigations and rectification during the last half of this year. This same concern is also expressed in new provisions of the party constitution which call for the establishment of

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investigative units within each party organization. These units may function in a way similar to the control commissions set up in the party following the Kao-Jao affair in the mid-1950s, thus providing Peking with a theoretically independent check on the lower levels.

In summary, Peking has cleaned house in the provincial leadership, given its seal of approval to a nucleus of trusted officials, set up further controls on the functioning of lower level party organizations, and called for a thorough reeducation and change in work style throughout the country.

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25X1The Military and the Eleventh Party Congress

A preliminary accounting of the number of military men elected to Chinese Communist Party leadership bodies suggests that the percentage of career military men on the Politburo has risen to about 39 percent (10 of 26 members), while the military proportion of the Central Committee has dropped from 32 percent at the 10th Congress to about 29 percent at the 11th.

While such figures are useful in terms of assessing the overall position of the PLA vis-a-vis the party, there are certain qualifications which must be taken into account. The most troublesome is the problem of dual responsibilities. Nearly all the provincial first party secretaries (mostly civilians) have concurrent military responsibilities as first political commissars of the relevant military regions or districts. These are not simply honorary positions, particularly given the increasing emphasis within the PLA itself on decision-making by the entire party committee, not just the commander. Thus, these individuals hold very important positions within the military chain of command. For example, An Ping-sheng, first secretary of Yunnan Province, is ordinarily considered a civilian, even though he holds the positions of first political commissar, Kunming Military Region (MR), first political commissar, Yunnan Military District (MD), and most importantly, first secretary of the MR party committee. He is clearly one of the key military officials in the area.

The reverse, that is when an individual who has primarily held military responsibilities is given a civilian position, is also important. Yu Tai-chung, for example, is the commander of the Inner Mongolian Military District. He is also first secretary of the Inner Mongolian Autonomous Region party committee and makes the vast majority of his public appearances in that capacity. Yet he is usually considered a military representative on the new Central Committee.

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There is a certain artificiality in making fine distinctions about the new Central Committee on the basis of military affiliations. If all those who hold military positions of any kind are included in the military category the proportion of the PLA on the Politburo becomes 69 percent and 45 percent for full members of the Central Committee.

A more useful categorization would be to separate those individuals holding concurrent military and civilian responsibilities from those holding purely military posts. As a result of the 11th Party Congress, these "double-dippers" constitute roughly 45 percent of the Politburo and 17 percent of the Central Committee. Those who have only military titles, on the other hand, represent 23 percent of the Politburo and 21 percent of the Central Committee.

Perhaps a more important characteristic of the PLA representation on the party's ruling body is the increased equation between Central Committee membership and command influence. Whereas the 10th Central Committee contained a number of model soldiers or politically active (leftist) cadres at the military district level, the 11th Central Committee military contingent constitutes the most senior level of the PLA high command.

For example, there are now 11 members of the General Staff Department who hold positions on the new Central Committee, as opposed to only six on the previous committee. There were a total of 38 members of the central military hierarchy elected to the new committee, a gain of 11. (Thirteen members of the 10th Central Committee who held central military positions were dropped and 24 new central military officeholders were added.)

At the MR level, the total number of Central Committee members remained roughly the same, 51 on the 11th Central Committee and 49 on the 10th. All 11 MR commanders (including Yang Yung, who has not yet formally received a new appointment) are full members, as are 25 of 27 of the known MR political commissars.

Military district representation on the new Central Committee, however, was cut back somewhat. Only six MD or major municipal garrison commanders made the new committee, while all of the MD and garrison first political commissars, most of whom are civilian provincial

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first secretaries, were elected full members. Those PLA officers who hold secretary positions in the provinces were largely slighted, compared to their civilian counterparts, in gaining Central Committee membership. Thus, the slight loss in total PLA representation on the 11th Central Committee was largely absorbed at the MD level and below.

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The Eleventh Party Congress and Educational, Cultural,
and Scientific Policy

There were no surprises in the statements made about science and technology, education, and culture at the 11th Party Congress. As expected, the Congress reaffirmed recent policies designed to upgrade science and technology, improve the quality of education, and relax some of the constraints on cultural life.

The most visible sign of the party's commitment to these policies was the appointment of Fang I, vice president and acting head of the Chinese Academy of Sciences, to the Politburo. Fang, who was appointed to his post at the Academy of Sciences in January, has many years of experience in managing economic, scientific, and technological programs. Since taking charge of the Academy, he appears to have spearheaded efforts to reorganize the Academy, to upgrade its research programs, and to permit more freedom of debate in the sciences. His presence on the Politburo is certain to strengthen his hand, and indeed documents from the Congress made repeated calls for more open discussion of scientific issues.

In his political report to the Congress, Party Chairman Hua Kuo-feng committed himself--and the party--to the new policies. He called for efforts to upgrade basic research, to draw up long-range research plans, and to reward scientists who make significant contributions. He noted that a national conference on science and technology would be held "at an appropriate time," presumably in early 1978, to expedite these efforts.

In his comments on education, Hua noted that students should be not only politically reliable, but also professionally competent. To this end, educational facilities should be expanded at all levels and the quality of the education they offer upgraded. He called for more diversity in cultural life and more freedom of thought--"letting a hundred flowers bloom"--in literature and the arts, but he stressed that it was still imperative for the party to retain strict control and maintain discipline.

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Hua condemned the gang of four for attacking intellectuals as "the stinking ninth category." Although he conceded that many intellectuals lacked complete commitment to Maoist ideology, he pointed out that China needed their talents and ability. Rather than attacking them, he said, the party should put their knowledge to use while trying to reeducate them.

Hua implied that there might be a review of one of the most unpopular policies related to intellectuals--the policy of sending large numbers of middle school graduates to the countryside to work. He asserted that this policy was necessary and should continue, but added that problems caused by the practice must be dealt with effectively.

Although Hua reaffirmed the general tone of recent policies, he failed to spell out how they would be implemented. Perhaps this is because of some resistance to the new ideas. Particularly vulnerable to criticism are plans to modify the policy of sending young people to work in the countryside by allowing a few to go directly to universities without first doing an obligatory stint of labor. Recent reports suggests that there is some debate about certain other educational reforms as well. A number of schools, for example, have been unable to agree on the proper way to reintroduce exams--whether to have traditional written examinations or group discussion examinations and practical tests of knowledge. While some of this uncertainty may be a result of the traditional reluctance of educators to respond to policy shifts for fear that they are not permanent, there is some evidence that leftist influence in the universities has not been totally eradicated.

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Reforming the Chinese Academy of Sciences

One of the focal points of China's efforts to upgrade its science and technology has been the Chinese Academy of Sciences, the country's leading center for scientific research. Since the Cultural Revolution, the work of the Academy has been hamstrung by leftist policies in science and education. In order to revitalize the Academy, the Chinese Government appointed a new acting head, Fang I, in January 1977 and apparently gave him a mandate to overhaul the Academy and step up its research programs.

[redacted] Fang I's efforts have begun to bear fruit. Research programs have been restored, and in a number of the Academy's institutes, theoretical research programs, neglected since the Cultural Revolution, have been introduced. Under a new policy, five days of the week must be spent exclusively on scientific research, something unthinkable in the heyday of leftist influence, when political meetings or practical work were considered of great importance. In addition, a number of scientists dismissed during the Cultural Revolution have been reinstated to their jobs. Libraries have been reopened, new journals and publications have been issued, and academic seminars have been held regularly.

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The Academy is also trying to meet its need for young, well-trained scientists. To this end, it has emphasized the importance of upgrading the China Scientific and Technical University, once the main center for training physicists and engineers. The university was once located in Peking, where its students could work at the Academy of Sciences, but was moved to Anhwei Province during the Cultural Revolution. There it became a provincial technical university.

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[redacted] The Academy decided that the university should offer new, more specialized courses, institute new enrollment procedures for students, and

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
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stress academic performance as well as political reliability. In addition, it declared that the university should become primarily a center for scientific research and that its main job should be the training of research scientists.

Many of these reforms are badly needed. Since the Cultural Revolution, the Academy of Sciences and the China Scientific and Technical University have been fraught with problems. Research programs have been disrupted and, in some cases, halted. Some of the Academy's institutes were disbanded, and others were moved to the provinces or subordinated to other agencies. Many of its scientists were dismissed or sent to work in factories or communes. In one of the research offices of the Peking Astronomical Observatory, for instance, 33 out of 38 scientists and technicians were forced to leave their jobs. New scientists recruited by the academy were often poorly trained and incapable of doing sophisticated research.



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The recent reforms, although helpful, solve only a few of the problems facing Chinese science and technology and often skirt the most basic difficulties. Unless, for instance, the China Scientific and Technical University is returned to Peking where its students will have access to the facilities and resources of the Academy of Sciences, many of the reforms there are likely to be short-lived. The dilemma facing the Academy of Sciences and China's science and technology in general is that a large number of intractable problems have to be solved before the situation can be substantially improved. Not only do research programs have to be restored, but incompetent people hired since the Cultural Revolution need to be weeded out, competent scientists need to be trained, communications between scientists throughout the country need to be improved, and blurred lines of authority in the scientific establishment need to be clarified. Because of the neglect that education and science and technology have suffered over the past decade, solution of these problems is likely to require a number of years.



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Party Constitution: Promoting Discipline and Stability

The constitution adopted by the 11th Chinese Party Congress contains specific measures that seem calculated to promote discipline and stability in the party. Most of the measures restore procedures that were part of the constitution adopted during the eighth Party Congress, the last one before the Cultural Revolution. That constitution did not prevent the excesses of the Cultural Revolution, and the factionalism that followed, largely because the constitution was ignored. The reintroduction of some of the provisions of the earlier constitution indicates that the current leadership is committed to restoring some aspects of pre - Cultural Revolution political norms. The principal changes in the constitution involve procedures by which new party members are recruited and some adjustments to party organization.

Membership

The new constitution reintroduces:

- A one-year probationary period for candidate party members, during which they cannot vote or hold party office.
- An interview with candidate members by a representative of a party committee an echelon above the one that recruited him.
- A requirement that high-level party officials review and approve disciplinary actions taken against party members.

The reintroduction of the probationary period and the interview seems intended to prevent the easy packing of the party with members of a particular political persuasion, a tactic the purged leftists are accused of having used in 1976. The leftists recruited many who normally might not have survived a screening by higher authorities.

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While the new constitution makes admission to the party more difficult, it also makes it more difficult to discipline party members. The requirement to obtain the approval of higher authorities to discipline party members appears to be inconsistent with efforts to tighten party discipline. It should, in fact, improve party stability by preventing wholesale traumatic leadership changes at local levels that have followed political shifts in Peking in the past. The disciplinary provision may have some bearing on the forthcoming rectification campaign, which Peking hopes to keep tightly controlled in order to prevent major disruptions in production and social order. In particular, the measure may reassure cadre who fear indiscriminate retaliation because of unavoidable past association with leftists.

Organization

The chief organizational measure introduced by the new constitution to improve party discipline at all levels is the creation of inspection commissions. The commissions will be responsible for "strengthening party members' education or discipline, checking on discipline, and struggling against all breaches of discipline." The new commissions may be similar to the control commissions that existed prior to the Cultural Revolution. At that time, the control commissions had the authority to receive and investigate complaints against party cadre, a function which the new inspection commissions may also assume.

The new constitution also calls for the formation of "leading party groups" within state and mass organizations. Although the function of the groups is not defined in the constitution, they may serve as party committees in organizations where such committees do not currently exist. The groups may be roughly analogous to the commissar system in the military, which is intended to temper the independent authority of military commanders by giving the party another direct line of control over military units.

Formation of the "leading party groups" may also presage the re-creation of Central Committee departments with functional responsibilities for some government and mass organization affairs. Central Committee departments

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for agriculture and forestry, industry and communication, and finance and trade were disbanded during the Cultural Revolution and have never been formally reestablished.

The Other side of the Coin: Combating Commandism and Bureaucratism

While the speeches at the Congress and the revisions in the constitution clearly emphasize discipline, the constitution nevertheless reaffirms Maoist concerns over bureaucratic work styles, dictatorial leadership practices, and abuse of power at the lower levels. The constitution, like all those before it, affirms the principle of collective leadership in which all members of party committees participate in decisions. It also retains the right of party members to criticize and bypass superiors, although it requires that cadre obey orders even though they may disagree with party committee decisions. The inspection commissions and "leading party groups" attached to government organs, while serving as checks from above, should provide disaffected party members with additional outlets for their points of view.

Neither the constitution nor the rhetoric of the party congress will change the Chinese or their politics. The stresses of modernization are likely to rekindle the kind of tension that helped fuel the Cultural Revolution 11 years ago. The way in which that tension is controlled or relieved will depend largely on the character of the leadership in Peking. The new constitution seems to provide channels through which grievances can be expressed, and the new leadership is likely to adhere to the provisions of the constitution.


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Sino-Soviet Trade

Million US\$



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
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Sino-Soviet Trade: No Big Deals



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Overall, the value of Sino-Soviet trade increased about 50 percent from 1975 to 1976. With Chinese imports totaling \$238 million against exports of \$178 million, the balance shifted sharply to Moscow's favor.

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[redacted] higher prices were largely responsible for the increase. The real value of trade, that is, the volume of goods exchanged measured in constant 1970 US dollars, increased only an estimated 15 percent over 1975--a recovery from the 30-percent decline in 1975, but still below the levels of 1972-74 (see figure 1). Average prices for selected commodities ran about 90 percent

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higher in 1976 than in 1974, both for Chinese imports and exports. The entire increase in trade volume last year, therefore, was probably due to increased Soviet deliveries. The volume of Chinese exports may have declined because the Tangshan earthquake tied up transportation in northeast China in the last half of the year.



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