


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


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


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SOVIET UNION - EASTERN EUROPE

This publication is prepared for regional specialists in the Washington community by the USSR - Eastern Europe Division, Office of Current Intelligence, with occasional contributions from other offices within the Directorate of Intelligence. Comments and queries are welcome. They should be directed to the authors of the individual articles.

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Brezhnev's Speech in Warsaw

Brezhnev's speech at the Polish party congress was short on substance, but, as is his wont in recent months, bearish on the state of relations with the West. As was appropriate to the occasion, Brezhnev spent over half of his 30 minutes talking about the steps taken toward closer economic and political integration between Poland and the USSR, and more generally, the beneficence of the socialist community. In his encomium, Brezhnev referred to the norms of "socialist internationalism"--words that in Yugoslavia and Romania translate as Soviet hegemonism--but he quickly followed with a sentence pertaining to the independence and sovereignty of the states that make up the socialist community.

CSCE was clearly on his mind, perhaps because Warsaw offered an appropriate venue for repeating a few "truths" about the Helsinki agreements. His demand that no one aspect of the agreement be emphasized over another and his criticism of the West for its failure to propagate the text sufficiently have been said before; so, too, has his reference to "ideological penetration" by the West.

Brezhnev made explicit reference to the follow-up CSCE session in Belgrade in 1977 and spoke favorably of the possibility of organizing European congresses on such problems as the environment and energy over the next two years. This clearly was meant as a trial balloon, and more will probably be heard from Moscow.

Brezhnev's speech, as is often the case, is as interesting for what he chose not to say as for what he said. There was no rejoinder, implicit or explicit, to criticism in the US regarding Soviet activities in Angola. He made no mention of


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

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the socialist duty to support "liberation movements," nor did he refer to the immutable continuation of ideological struggle.

Brezhnev repeated the familiar formulation on the need to move ahead with detente despite the efforts of Western critics. He did not, however, say anything explicitly about relations with the US or about SALT.

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Arbatov on US-Soviet Relations

Georgy Arbatov, Moscow's most prominent academic authority on the US, last week offered Ambassador Stoessel his latest views on bilateral relations. He predicted that Soviet detente policy would be reaffirmed at the party congress next February, but said that criticisms were being heard in the USSR and that there have been "discussions" about detente within the Soviet leadership.

Arbatov, director of the USA Institute, implied that Moscow was closely following the increased criticism of detente in the US, especially as that issue showed signs of becoming a center of debate in the US election campaigns. Other Soviet commentators are also speaking more frequently of the effect of the presidential campaign on US policy, particularly policy toward the USSR.


Arbatov acknowledged that there is uncertainty about who would be the leaders in both the US and the USSR a year from now. He was careful to point out, however, that Brezhnev was in "good shape" and would definitely be around for a while yet. He advised that both sides ought to strive for as much bilateral progress as possible under the present leaderships, succession uncertainties notwithstanding.

He singled out SALT as one "central" issue on which he thought both sides could and should show flexibility "before it is too late." He seemed pleased about reports that Secretary Kissinger might soon return to Moscow in an effort to break the stalemate.

Responding to a comment about Soviet involvement in Angola, Arbatov observed blandly that differences between Moscow and Washington would inevitably arise, but argued that these problems should not prevent progress in other areas.


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Arbatov's views, frequently and freely conveyed to Americans, are often plainly self-serving, intended by warning or cajolery to influence US perceptions in ways favorable to Soviet policy. He apparently enjoys Brezhnev's confidence as a substantive expert, however, and is evidently attuned to the mood in Moscow. On occasion, as in his recent article in *Izvestia* against Western critics of Soviet behavior, he seems to serve as a quasi-official conduit for points his patrons want made to the US.


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Yugoslavia-USSR: Official Talks

The Yugoslav ministers of foreign affairs and of foreign trade are in Moscow to sign a long-range economic agreement and to make a first-hand assessment of pre-Congress politics in the Soviet capital.

The conclusion of a five year trade agreement for 1976-80 will probably be the public highlight of the visit.

On the political side, Foreign Minister Minic's talks--possibly the final ones at this level before the CPSU congress meets in February--promise to be less rewarding. Belgrade clearly is not satisfied with recent Soviet denials of involvement with Cominformist subversives. The two countries are also deadlocked over conflicting goals in the long-postponed meeting of European Communist parties.

Belgrade and Moscow both support the MPLA in Angola, but their stands on the last Sinai accords are in conflict and could cause trouble. Similarly, Minic could face Soviet displeasure over the Yugoslav premier's precedent-setting visit to China this fall.

Yugoslav media are playing several tunes on the Minic visit. For the benefit of the West, the press is insisting that relations with the Soviets are more or less normal--and thus not susceptible to third party manipulation. A commentary broadcast to Moscow last week, however, reasserted Belgrade's nonaligned principles, including its continuing struggle against "hegemony" by either bloc.

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Bulgaria Protests Yugoslav Allegations
on Macedonian Issue

Sofia has reportedly made a formal protest to Belgrade about Yugoslav propaganda claims that Bulgaria has used terrorism to suppress its Macedonians. Despite the protest, Yugoslav media are again stepping up the pace of anti-Bulgarian commentary.

According to press reports, the Yugoslav ambassador in Sofia was summoned to the Foreign Ministry last month to receive the protest. The Bulgarians reportedly decried allegations that Sofia had arrested numerous Macedonians and had deported them to camps in the north (*Staff Notes*, November 17). Neither side has publicly referred to the protest.

The Yugoslav media have nevertheless continued to repeat and even embellish these same allegations in the wake of the Bulgarian census last week. The latest commentary flatly states there was no category for Macedonians, and notes the survey only served Sofia's political purposes by proclaiming that Macedonians are ethnic Bulgarians.

The latest developments in the long-standing dispute shatter the climate of uneasy calm that lasted barely two weeks after Bulgarian Foreign Minister Mladenov visited Belgrade last month. Mladenov and his Yugoslav counterpart, Milos Minic, reportedly discussed the issue of Belgrade's inflammatory polemics, but were unable to agree on muzzling Belgrade's outspoken nationalists.

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Romania and the Arabs

Romania's pursuit of a balanced policy in the Middle East--maintaining relations with both Israel and the principal Arab antagonists--continues to cause problems between Bucharest and some of the more militant Arab states. The US embassy in Romania has provided a wrap-up of the current difficulties Bucharest faces.

The Arabs are annoyed with the large volume of business the Romanian national airline (TAROM) does with Israel. Romania's repeated refusal to answer Arab queries about its air service to Tel Aviv or about how many Jews it is allowing to emigrate apparently led to the current Arab boycott of TAROM. More recently, Romania was absent when the UN voted on the anti-Zionism resolution, and Libya reacted by refusing landing rights to a TAROM plane. An Egyptian official in Bucharest labeled this action particularly "dirty" because Tripoli had "bullied" Romania into setting up the air route in the first place. The Egyptian did suggest, however, that if Romania made some concession, such as discontinuing TAROM's passenger pooling arrangement with El Al, the situation might improve.

Romania's relations with Israel have blocked Bucharest's attempts to improve relations with Kuwait and the Persian Gulf states. Earlier, Kuwait had floated a signed prospectus for a \$100-million loan to Romania on condition that the Kuwaiti parliament ratify the Romanian-Kuwait trade protocol. Ceausescu was apparently anxious for the loan to go through in order to demonstrate that he is getting something in return for recent Romanian aid credits and the display by Bucharest of some sympathy for the Arab cause. Failure of the trade protocol to pass the Kuwaiti parliament not only killed the loan, but also caused Ceausescu to scrub his late November visit to Kuwait.

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Bucharest has also had its problems with Algiers, which has been unsympathetic to Romanian attempts to gain observer status in the nonaligned movement. Deputy Prime Minister Oancea's visit to Algiers from November 26 to 28 was, in part, designed to gain Algerian support for Bucharest's overtures for admission to the nonaligned summit in Colombo next summer.

Deputy Foreign Minister Pacoste reportedly will set off soon on a tour of several Arab countries in search of "oil and money." Pacoste's itinerary has not been announced, but the cancellation of Ceausescu's Kuwait trip probably means Pacoste will have little chance of gaining either oil or money from those Middle East states in the best position to meet Romanian needs.

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Hungary: Conversation with Kadar

Hungarian party leader Kadar told Ambassador McAuliffe last week that Budapest is prepared to fulfill the "freer movement" provisions of the Helsinki accord and that it hopes to expand trade with the US.

Kadar characteristically hedged his statement on European security. After some general observations on the utility of increased travel in correcting illusions, he concluded that implementation of the "freer movement" provisions has an "inevitability" about it. He said this was so despite the fact that "some" still entertain many reservations about Basket Three and that the Communist countries may not move as quickly and forthrightly as others might wish.

Kadar's statements on increased trade with the US was more than the usual call for most-favored-nation status. Apparently to dispel any Western notion that Hungary's economic problems would cause it to reduce economic ties with the West, Kadar said that Hungary needs access to Western technology, markets, and raw materials. He added that although CEMA integration is important for resource-poor Hungary, he disagrees with "theoreticians" who argue for more economic integration solely for integration's sake and that he likewise disputes others who argue that Hungary should shift more commerce to trade with other Communist countries.

Kadar, the consummate politician, could have been tailoring his words for Western ears, calculating that hints of Hungarian dissent could yield important political and economic benefits. On the other hand, some of his private words are in line with his public admission last June that Hungary

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conducts one third of its trade with the West "of necessity," not choice. His comments also jibe with recent Hungarian foreign trade projections, which show that Hungarian trade with the West during the next five years is expected to increase at a faster rate than total trade.

In a low-keyed manner, Kadar for the first time personally raised the issue of getting back the Crown of St. Stephen from the US. Last July, Premier Lazar officially requested return of the crown, a traditional symbol of political legitimacy for the Hungarians.

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Czechoslovakia: Shades of Masaryk

The Husak regime has in recent weeks been paying lip-service to the concept of continuity of Czechoslovak history.

The effort seems designed to reinforce the acceptance of the regime by its own population and to promote its image in the diplomatic arena. The new stress on links with the past may also be intended to counter Prague's well-deserved reputation for subservience to Moscow.

According to a Foreign Ministry official, party chief and president Husak had the historical linkage in mind when he recently invited foreign ambassadors and chiefs of mission to the first presidential hunt in almost 30 years. This traditional event of the old republic was abandoned after the Communists took power in 1948.

Foreign Minister Chnoupek is also promoting historical continuity. In his address to the federal assembly last month, he harked back to the founding of the republic in 1918 and several times referred to Czechoslovak diplomatic "firsts." He also dredged up the appeal of medieval Bohemian King George of Poděbrady for an integrated Europe.

In addition, Premier Strougal, during his current trip to Yugoslavia, lauded the support of the Yugoslavs for their Czechoslovak brethren during the 1938 Munich Diktat period.

To avoid possible charges that this kind of stress on pre-Communist Czechoslovak history encourages nationalism, the Husak regime has been careful to pay proper obeisance to the Soviets and to continue to be one of the most vociferous proponents of internationalism and bloc integration.

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Cadres Abroad Central Committee Post Filled

Diplomatic sources have confirmed earlier reports that former deputy foreign minister Nikolay Pegov, 70, has been appointed chief of the CPSU Central Committee Department for Cadres Abroad. In addition, *Izvestia* on December 4 identified Pegov as "ambassador," not as deputy minister of foreign affairs. The Cadres Abroad Department is rarely referred to by name in the Soviet press.

The department oversees--for the party--the activities of Soviet foreign service personnel serving abroad. Pegov as a deputy foreign minister, was responsible for personnel matters in the MFA.

Leaders of the department in the past have, like Pegov, had diplomatic experience. Petr Abrasimov, 63, who apparently headed the department for a time between 1973 and March of this year, served previously as ambassador to France, East Germany, and Poland, and is currently reassigned to East Germany. His predecessor, the late Aleksandr Panyushkin, had been ambassador to the US and China, and Panyushkin's first deputy chief, Andrey Ledovsky, held diplomatic assignments in the Far East for many years.

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