


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STAFF NOTES:

Soviet Union Eastern Europe

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SOVIET UNION - EASTERN EUROPE

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Moscow Pessimistic On Cairo Ties

The Soviet ambassador in Cairo who returned to his post in mid-October after an extended period of consultations in Moscow recently said that Soviet-Egyptian relations had reached their lowest point since the 1952 Egyptian revolution.

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it seems plausible and there is solid evidence that Ambassador Polyakov and Fahmi had a heated two-hour discussion on October 18.

Polyakov said he had returned from Moscow with instructions to be civil with the Egyptians, but that his session with Fahmi had convinced him that Cairo was not interested in improving bilateral relations. Indeed, Polyakov apparently got the impression from Fahmi that the Egyptians might soon move to abrogate the Soviet-Egyptian friendship treaty.

Moscow has demonstrated continuing nervousness over the future of the treaty. *Pravda*, for example, in its scathing denunciation of Egyptian policies and Sinai II on the eve of President Sadat's arrival in the US this week, went to great lengths to point out that it was Sadat himself who had called for the 1971 accord.

Polyakov indicated that, for the time being at least, Moscow planned to respond to Sadat's public expressions of hostility in a low-key manner and play for time. He said a Soviet reassessment of Middle Eastern policy--particularly with respect to Egypt--was currently under way in the Kremlin and that Moscow intended to stall the Egyptians on matters of economic cooperation and debt rescheduling until the review was completed.

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By employing these delaying tactics, the Soviet ambassador said Moscow hoped to convince Cairo that the USSR is too important to the Egyptian economy to permit a further deterioration in relations. He predicted that future Soviet economic policy toward Egypt would be much tougher, with specific political concessions demanded in exchange for each increment of foreign aid.

The ambassador's comments, among other things, suggest that considerable disillusionment exists in Moscow over the failure of its substantial investment in Egypt to pay more dividends.

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Hanoi Gets Aid From Moscow; Backs Detente

The communique issued yesterday at the end of North Vietnamese party chief Le Duan's official visit to Moscow indicates that Hanoi has received some of the economic aid it was seeking and that Moscow did obtain a North Vietnamese endorsement of some of the USSR's major foreign policy themes.

Le Duan, for example, proved willing to endorse Soviet detente policies more explicitly than Hanoi has before. The Soviets find this especially welcome in light of Peking's efforts, during Le Duan's visit to China last month, to persuade him of the dangers of detente.

Hanoi praised the results of the European security conference and expressed support for the Kremlin's line toward the Middle East, Portugal, and Chile.

In the declaration, Hanoi and Moscow adopted a relatively non-committal position toward Phnom Penh, where Chinese influence is predominant. This stance contrasted sharply with pledges of aid and support for the pro-Hanoi regime in Laos.

Like the Chinese, the Soviets will provide credit on easy terms, indicating that the days of grant aid for Hanoi are over. Moscow went a step further than Peking, however, by promising to discuss support for North Vietnam's second five-year plan.

In another gesture Moscow will find to its liking, Hanoi agreed to develop economic ties "within the framework of the multilateral cooperation of socialist countries." Although this may foreshadow a closer North Vietnamese relationship with CEMA, the vague formulation employed allows for considerable flexibility.



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Yugoslavs Believe More Work Needed on Final Document for European Communist Conference

In a speech on Thursday, Aleksandr Grlickov, the top Yugoslav negotiator at the meeting of delegates from 27 European parties in East Berlin earlier this month, described the preliminary draft now under consideration as a "possible and acceptable basis for further work" that "could evolve" into an agreed text for a final document. Grlickov added, however, that almost all participants offered verbal and written proposals that must be considered in the next stage of the drafting effort. He hinted that the revisions differed widely and said that "new joint efforts by all parties are needed" in order to produce the final document.

Grlickov then listed demands that presumably represent Belgrade's own position on the existing draft. He said the conference document must create the broadest possible opportunities for Communists to cooperate with the other democratic and progressive movements in Europe. It should cover only what the Communist and workers parties have in common, and not artificially strive to reconcile differences.

Grlickov added--in an apparent reference to the Soviets' pretensions to leadership in the movement--that the conference offers Communist and workers parties the opportunity "to rid themselves of the past with regard to their mutual relations." He also said that each party must be free to draw its own conclusions from the variety of opinions the European party leaders will offer in their speeches. Grlickov stressed that the leaders of each party must approve the draft of the final document before the conference is held and that alterations must not be made at the conference itself.

The Yugoslavs have avoided taking the lead in countering Eastern propaganda praising the progress

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achieved at the last drafting session. This is Belgrade's first official commentary on the preparatory meeting, which adjourned on October 10. It closely parallels a recent press statement from the independent Italian Communists. The day before Grlickov's revelations, *Tanjug* broadcast the news that the British Communist Party had also issued similar conditions for the European Communist Conference.

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Romanian Youth: The State of the Union

Ceausescu's opening speech to the congress of the Union of Communist Youth next Monday will almost certainly reaffirm his unswerving commitment to internal orthodoxy and to a strongly national Communist path in foreign affairs.

This is the first youth congress since Ceausescu's scathing criticism of the youth organization for its "intellectualism," "bureaucratism," and "neglect of working youth" in July 1971. At that time, Ceausescu stressed a campaign calling for ideological orthodoxy in an effort to reassure Moscow of Bucharest's loyalty. His visit to Peking had led the Soviets and their loyalist allies to charge that an anti-Soviet, pro-Peking axis existed in the Balkans.

Ion Stefanescu, who became first secretary of the youth organization in 1972, responded to Ceausescu's 1971 criticism by emphasizing the increased emphasis the organization was placing on ideology and party policy. Members of the union now participate in regular annual "study courses" and have been pressed into service to combat the spread of "mysticism" (religion). Stefanescu has also championed Ceausescu's hard-driving economic development program by organizing "volunteer" patriotic work programs in agriculture and construction, to which students say they have contributed almost one million work-days since 1972. Despite Stefanescu's efforts, the leadership is apparently still dissatisfied with the extent of political mobilization, and Stefanescu has recently called for "radical improvement."

On balance, the regime has little reason to consider youth a threat to Romania's internal stability and seems satisfied with Stefanescu's stewardship. His ambitious program has, however, sparked rumblings

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of dissatisfaction from within the organization. Last year, university students reportedly circulated a petition calling for less "centralism" and more "democracy" in the group's activities.

Ceausescu will nevertheless probably call for increased discipline and commitment, thus using the occasion to demonstrate once again to Moscow his commitment to a rigid internal orthodoxy. No major personnel shifts are expected, but it is rumored that Ceausescu's son, Nicu, may be shifted to the youth group's Secretariat to replace Vasile Nicolciou, who has handled international relations for some 10 years.

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Soviet Fumigation Policy
May Delay Grain Imports

Soviet refusal to accept US fumigation practices at US ports may cause serious delays in the delivery of US grain to Soviet consumers. The Soviets have refused to allow the US to apply one of the two chemicals it uses to fumigate grain, and, as a result, serious weevil infestation is likely to occur during shipment.

During the 1972-73 grain lift, weevil infestation was an important factor in delays at Soviet ports, prolonging ship turnaround time by as much as 30 days. At the height of the deliveries in the summer of 1973, almost every vessel arriving in port had some weevil infestation, and the Soviets were forced to undertake expensive and time-consuming fumigation.

When fumigated at a Soviet port, a vessel is removed from its berth, isolated in the harbor, and the crew is removed. All costs, including crew quartering and demurrage, are absorbed by the Soviets. Cargo certification may not be given for at least 7 days; more frequently it requires 30 days.

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