


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# STAFF NOTES:

## Chinese Affairs

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158

May 12, 1975  
SC No. 00426/75

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
**CHINESE AFFAIRS**

This publication is prepared for regional specialists in the Washington community by the East Asia - Pacific Division, Office of Current Intelligence, with occasional contributions from other offices within the Directorate of Intelligence and from the Directorate of Science and Technology. Comments and queries are welcome. They should be directed to the authors of the individual articles.

*CONTENTS*

May 12, 1975

25X1D



Leadership Appearances: A Non-Pattern. . . . . 7


May Day and the Military . . . . . 10

May Day in the Provinces . . . . . 13

Chiang Ching: Both a Legalist and a  
Confucianist Be . . . . . 16


China: Tankers . . . . . 19

25X1D



Another Hat for Chen Hsi-lien. . . . . 25

25X1D



**TOP SECRET UMBRA**

25X1D

Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP79T00865A000900240002-6

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Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP79T00865A000900240002-6

Leadership Appearances: A Non-Pattern  
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A series of major events in Peking--the Kim Il-song visit, rallies in support of communist victories in Cambodia and Vietnam and May Day--brought most of China's leaders into public view. Not all leaders appeared at all events, however. Some failed to appear at events they would normally be expected to attend, and others appeared in unusual capacities at other festivities.

Among the more surprising inconsistencies was the non-appearance of Politburo member Chang Chun-chiao at the festivities surrounding Kim's visit and both the Cambodia and Vietnam rallies. Chang has often assumed hosting duties on behalf of visiting foreign communist delegations, but his absence from all functions associated with visiting communists raises questions about whether he has relinquished this role in light of his recent accumulation of other duties. Chang does not appear to be in any political trouble. He did appear on May Day, and his article in last month's issue of *Red Flag* continues to be cited frequently in the provincial propaganda, sometimes without reference to the earlier article by fellow Politburo member Yao Wen-yuan.

Yao emerged in an unusual role during the Kim Il-song visit, as the second-ranking participant in some of the substantive discussions between Kim and Vice Premier Teng Hsiao-ping. While Yao has often hosted visiting journalists on his own, this was the first time he is known to have taken part in substantive talks with a visiting head of state. Yao appeared at all of the recent events in the capital, somewhat overshadowing the nominal third man in the leadership, Wang Hung-wen.

May 12, 1975

~~TOP SECRET UMBRA~~

Wang was not present for Kim Il-song's arrival or departure, and, although he was the highest ranking Chinese leader at both banquets during the Kim visit, the speeches for the Chinese side were given not by Wang but by Teng Hsiao-ping. Wang's protocol ranking in the leadership obviously does not automatically entitle him to an important role in such major events as the visit of Kim Il-song. Moreover, despite his presence at both the Cambodia and Vietnam rallies, it was Defense Minister Yeh Chieng-ying, rather than Wang, who delivered the speeches.


The appearances of Chiang Ching seemed almost arbitrary. She was on hand to greet Kim Il-song but did not see him off. Although she rarely attends state banquets, she was present at the banquet for Kim but did not attend Kim's reciprocal banquet. She attended the Cambodia rally but not the Vietnam rally. Most startling of all she was the only major leader, other than Mao and Chou, to miss May Day. Her absence was made even more glaring by the presentation, given by some ten thousand cultural workers, of songs from the operas produced under her auspices. Radio Peking called the presentation "by far the biggest festival performance in Peking," begging the question of Chiang Ching's absence.

Taken together, the recent events in Peking and the leadership appearances associated with them may give some clues as to the relative importance of certain officials. Chiang Ching's political standing, as usual, remains hazy. Teng Hsiao-ping is clearly important, perhaps far more so than his sixth-ranking position in the leadership would suggest. By contrast, young Wang Hung-wen's performance to date does not seem to equal his standing as third in the leadership. The other members of the "second generation," particularly Chi Teng-kuei, who himself was tied up with the visiting Belgian prime minister

May 12, 1975

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but managed to appear at all the other events, are taking on greater responsibilities. Although this pattern has been discernible since the National People's Congress in January, the most surprising development is the role of Yao Wen-yuan during the visit of Kim Il-song. Yao has not seemed to figure greatly in the growing role of the second generation, but his future activities may merit close watching. (CONFIDENTIAL)



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May 12, 1975

May Day and the Military  
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Leadership appearances on May Day suggest that while party-army relations remain strained, civilian leaders in Peking and regional commanders have reached a certain accommodation. The campaign to strengthen the proletarian dictatorship, which has so far emphasized social order and production goals and has not been used as a means to attack the military, almost certainly appeals to the vast majority of military men on both counts. While provincial turnouts are incomplete, and some missing leaders are soldiers who hold party posts, most top ranking military men have been accounted for. One previously absent leader who had been heavily criticized, former Canton Military Region political commissar Jen Ssu-chung, has apparently been given a high ranking military post in the Tsinan Military Region. The effort to ease military men out of party and government posts continues, and with some success, but Peking's tactics are quite different than they were during the campaign to criticize Lin and Confucius. At that time, regional commanders were the targets of severe criticism, and seven of them were stripped of their provincial party posts in one bold stroke.

The current standing of the military is typified by the appearances of two military region commanders who are also politburo members. Shenyang commander Li Te-sheng led the turnout in Liaoning. Li, who lost his post as head of the PLA's General Political Department last year and was dropped from the politburo standing committee this year after running into serious trouble during the anti-Lin, anti-Confucius campaign, had been conspicuously absent from large turnouts in Liaoning in April to greet Kim Il-song on his arrival and departure from China. Li's political standing remains shaky, but he apparently remains Shenyang Military Region commander.

May 12, 1975



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Canton Military Region commander Hsu Shih-yu, who was reported to be visiting a "grassroots unit" on May Day, was the only one of the provincial-based politburo members who did not head a turnout in his provincial capital. The peculiar treatment accorded Hsu seems a sign of political weakness and serves to emphasize his separation from the locus of political power in the region. However, the party first secretary of Kwangtung was also absent from Canton, which tends to cloud the meaning of the turnout.

Other recent indicators are consistent with Peking's carrot-and-stick approach toward the military. Two provincial military figures who were heavily criticized last year and seemed likely purge candidates continue to appear in Peking. Han Hsien-chu, who was rotated from Fukien to Kansu, and Hsieh Chen-hua, who headed Shansi until a play produced there was branded a "poisonous weed," were listed among members of the party central committee appearing in the capital. Neither leader has appeared in his province in some time, but they have not yet been replaced, either.


Several military men were publicly rehabilitated or given active posts for the first time on May 1. Fu Chung-pi, who was Peking Garrison commander until his fall in the 1968 purge of acting chief of staff Yang Cheng-wu, is now listed with ranking officers of the Peking Military Region. A continuing relationship with Yang, who is now a deputy chief of staff, cannot be established, but Fu certainly has no strong ties to his superior, Peking Military Region commander Chen Hsi-lien. The appointment appears to be another example of the civilian leadership using checks and balances to control a politically sensitive military command. Another professional soldier who fell early in the Cultural Revolution, former artillery commander Wu Kuo-hua, has also returned to active

May 12, 1975

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ranks, while Tan Cheng, who was the head of the General Political Department and a vice-minister of defense in the 1950s, was listed as "attending" the festivities.

Pressure on the military nevertheless continues. Wu Hsiu-chuan, a former head of the party's International Liaison Department, is either a deputy chief of staff or, more likely, a deputy director of the General Political Department. In either case, Wu seems to continue the trend of placing putative civilians in high military posts. Moreover, domestic propaganda seems to be telling PLA men that they will no longer receive preferential treatment in the form of urban employment upon demobilization. Numerous articles also continue to emphasize that local military leaders are to support their party and government counterparts at all times. (SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM/NO DISSEM ABROAD/BACKGROUND USE ONLY/CONTROLLED DISSEM)



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May 12, 1975

May Day in the Provinces  
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May Day turnouts in the provinces were considerably larger than a year ago when the anti-Confucius campaign was raging, but less impressive than those for National Day (October 1st) when a major effort was made to project an image of stability and unity. Accounts of this year's festivities are notable principally for their blandness.

There were no major surprises this year. No new first secretaries were named, nor were any purges revealed. Five provinces--Anhui, Heilungkiang, Hupeh, Liaoning, and Shansi--still do not have a publicly identified first secretary, and civilians continue to head 16 of the 29 provincial-level units. Military men lead the other eight.

Anhui, Chekiang, Fukien, and Kiangsu--four of the more troubled provinces--failed to publish detailed accounts of their local celebrations, indicating that the situation remains unsettled there. Heilungkiang, whose first secretary apparently was purged recently, also failed to provide a name list of those in attendance. Yunnan, on the other hand, turned out in force despite its continuing factional struggles.

A few provincial leaders appeared in Peking. Most notable were Jen Jung and Lu Jui-lin, the bosses of Tibet and Kweichow, respectively. Jen may be discussing Tibet's long-standing economic and supply problems with officials at the center. Lu may be in Peking to discuss Kweichow's persistent factionalism, although rumors of poor health necessitating trips to the capital for medical treatment continue to surface.

The strangest turnout was in Kwangtung where Chao Tzu-yang, the party boss, Hsu Shih-yu, Canton

May 12, 1975

MAY DAY TURNOUTS IN THE PROVINCES


<u>Province</u>	<u>Size of Turnout</u>	<u>Turnout Led By</u>	<u>Comment</u>
Anhwei	No information		
Chekiang	No details reported	"responsible persons"	
Fukien	No information		
Heilunjiang	No details reported	"responsible persons"	
Honan	Large	Liu Chien-hsun, 1st secretary	
Hopen	Large	Liu Tzu-hou, 1st secretary	
Hunan	No details reported	"responsible persons"	
Hupen	No details reported	"responsible persons"	
Inner Mongolia	No details reported	Teng Tsun-lun, party secretary	Yu Tai-chung, 1st secretary, did not appear. Ranking secretary Wu Tao turns out in Peking.
Kansu	Large	Hsien Heng-han, 1st secretary	Much criticized Lanchow MR commander Han Hsien-chu appears in Peking.
Kiangsi	No information		
Kiangsu	No details reported	"responsible persons"	
Kirin	Large	Wang Huai-hsiang, 1st secretary	Three of the province's four party secretaries miss the turnout.
Kwangsi	Large	Wei Kuo-ching, 1st secretary	
Kwangtung	Large	Kung Shih-chuan, political commissar Canton MR	Chao Tzu-yang, 1st secretary, and Chiao Lin-i, Canton mayor, do not attend local celebrations. Hsu Shih-yu, Canton MR commander, spends May Day with a "grassroots unit."
Kweichow	Large	Li Pao-hua, 2nd secretary	Lu Jui-lin, 1st secretary, attends the Peking celebrations.
Liaoning	Large	Li Te-sheng, Shenyang MR commander	
Ningsia	No coverage by FBIS		
Shanghai	No details reported	"responsible persons"	
Shansi	No coverage by FBIS		Former 1st secretary Hsieh Chen-hua attends the Peking festivities.
Shantung	Large	Pai Ju-ping, 1st secretary	A Jen Ssu-chung, who may be the ex- Canton MR political commissar who disappeared during the anti-Con- fucius campaign, attends the Shantung rally.
Shensi	No details reported	"responsible persons"	
Sinkiang	Large	Saifudin, 1st secretary	
Szechwan	No coverage by FBIS		
Taiwan	No information		
Tibet	Large	Chen Ming-i, MD commander and ranking party secretary	Jen Jung, 1st secretary, appears in Peking.
Tientsin	No coverage by FBIS		
Tsinghai	Large	Sung Chang-keng, party secretary	Chang Chiang-lin, 2nd secretary and top party figure in Tsinghai, does not appear.
Yunnan	Large	Chou Hsing, 1st secretary	

Military Region commander, and Chiao Lin-i, Canton's mayor, all failed to attend the provincial rally. Hsu was reportedly with a "grassroots unit" somewhere, but no effort was made to account for Chao's and Chiao's absence. There is no evidence to suggest that either man is in political trouble. In their absence, Kung Shih-chuan, the second ranking military man stationed in the province, led the turnout. Kung's role is mildly surprising because he was apparently stripped of his provincial party titles as a result of the anti-Confucius campaign, although he retained his military posts. It was apparently in that capacity--as well as a member of the Central Committee--that he led the turnout in Kwangtung.

The top party figures in Inner Mongolia and Tsinghai also missed local celebrations. As was the case in Kwangtung, no explanation was offered for their absence, and neither man seems to be in political difficulty. Inner Mongolia's number two man did attend the festivities in Peking as a member of the Central Committee.

May Day turnouts indicate that the campaign to study the proletarian dictatorship has had little, if any, effect on provincial leaderships so far. Both national and local leaders have successfully managed to keep the campaign focused on impersonal behavior patterns and away from the specific actions of individuals, including their own. Recent reporting, however, suggests that this phase of the campaign may be coming to an end, and that criticism of individuals--which could lead to changes in some of the less stable provinces--will begin shortly.  
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Chiang Ching: Both a Legalist  
and a Confucianist Be  
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Although the anti-Confucius campaign has faded into the background, some discussion of the historical struggle between legalists and Confucianists continues to surface in the propaganda. Two such articles recently received in Washington seem to take opposing views of Chiang Ching.

Last year, Chiang Ching's supporters appeared to make a case for her to be chosen as Mao's successor by painting a favorable picture of Empress Wu, generally regarded as a terrible ruler. The spruced-up image of the empress, suddenly called a "legalist," was countered by wall posters that attacked Empress Wu and linked her directly to Madame Mao.

Chiang Ching's supporters evidently tried again in early January with another article on the virtues of the "legalist" empress. The timing of the article, just after the party central committee had completed a new slate of government officers that omitted Chiang Ching, may be significant. The article smacks of some vengeance over the obstacles Empress Wu/Chiang Ching had to overcome to win positions of power.

In addition to repeating the earlier theme that Empress Wu ruled China well for many years after her husband's death, the article made some specific claims that seem to resemble more recent events. Striking what appeared to be a rather vindictive note, the article lashed out against the court elders who objected to the emperor's marriage to Wu and who vigorously defended the emperor's current wife as one who "should not be divorced lightly." The passage seems to refer to the controversy surrounding Mao's marriage to Chiang Ching, which many party officials opposed, and their support for his highly respected wife, Ho

May 12, 1975

Tzu-chen, who had made the Long March. In its defense of Wu, the article noted the emperor was attracted to her because, among other things, she was "well versed in literature," apparently an allusion to Madame Mao's cultural aspirations.

The article also complained that those in power, including the court "secretary-general" and some who held important government positions, constantly conspired against her. Upon assuming the throne, the article noted that Empress Wu removed 36 such officials, including the prime minister. These actions were portrayed in the article as praiseworthy, legalist policies.

By contrast, an article in March on the struggle between Confucianism and legalism complained bitterly that the Confucianists used opera to attack the legalists, distort historical facts, and advance their own cause. Although the article was cast in historical terms and the operas attacked are ancient ones, the complaints could easily apply to the model operas created under Chiang Ching's guidance.

The article claimed that the operas glorified certain Confucianist figures, whose names were widely used in the anti-Confucius propaganda last year to represent Lin Piao, and eulogized historical generals who advocated policies of "national betrayal." Chiang Ching's operas, in fact, glorify some military men who undoubtedly were originally intended to represent Lin Piao, and several of her operas glorify the military in general. Last year's anti-Confucius propaganda, inter alia, accused not only Lin but some regional military commanders of harboring traitorous ideas.

The article noted that none of the old operas praised the major legalist figures and that one, "The Stubborn Prime Minister," even attacked a


May 12, 1975

TOP SECRET UMBRA

respected legalist. One of Chiang Ching's operas is open to similar charges. Perhaps somewhat akin to "The Stubborn Prime Minister," it not only does not praise Premier Chou En-lai but actually appears to denigrate him and portrays him as "stubborn."

Lest there be any doubt that the discussion of ancient operas has current relevance, the article accuses "Lin Piao and company" of using the Confucian practice of producing operas as "monuments" to themselves. Any operas created after Lin gained power in 1966 in fact were done so under Chiang Ching's tutelage. Consequently, the article's criticism of operas created by Lin "and company" can only refer to Chiang Ching's model operas.

Although the article lauds the "revolution in Peking opera," it attributes this not to Chiang Ching but to "the proletariat." It concludes with ritualistic praise for the model operas but calls for "continued effort" to root out Lin Piao's influence, particularly the distortion of history, in the cultural sphere. (CONFIDENTIAL)




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May 12, 1975

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
China: Tankers



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Peking is making a major effort to expand its international tanker fleet. The fledgling fleet--600,000 dead weight tons acquired since mid-1974 for more than \$150 million--could reach 1 million tons by the end of the year. Tankers account for about 80 percent of the international merchant fleet total tonnage purchased during the first four months in 1975. By world standards, it is a small fleet.

The newly acquired tanker fleet will carry an increasing share of China's growing petroleum exports. Crude oil deliveries totaling nearly 9 million tons are scheduled for this year--8 million tons of it to Japan--of which the Chinese may carry as much as one third. The fleet has already carried one million tons of crude to Japan since July. Chinese tankers will also participate in deliveries of 650,000 tons to the Philippines, with chartered tankers carrying the initial consignments. (SECRET)



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May 12, 1975

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### Another Hat for Chen Hsi-lien

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Peking regional military commander Chen Hsi-lien has added another job to his growing list of responsibilities. The only military man among the newly appointed vice premiers of the government, Chen was identified on May 11 as a member of the Military Commission, the organization through which the party maintains its control over the military. Radio Peking coyly refrained from specifying whether Chen is a "leading member" of the Military Commission or "the" leading member. The distinction is important because he could either be one of several vice chairmen of the commission or the ranking vice chairman, a job generally thought to belong to Defense Minister Yeh Chien-ying.

Despite Yeh's presence at the military sports meet at which Chen's new job was publicly revealed, it was Chen rather than Yeh who gave the opening address. Chen welcomed the participants "on behalf of the Chinese PLA," the only military leader other than Yeh Chien-ying to use those words since the fall of Lin Piao. Chen's speech dwelt on military training and preparedness and made no reference to a political role for the PLA.

Chen seemed to clash with moderate leaders in Peking when he led an attack during the summer of 1973 on the use of university entrance examinations. He was also attacked by historical analogy during last year's anti-Confucius campaign. Since that time, however, he has performed well in his capacity as vice premier and has shown no recent signs of opposition to current moderate policies. His apparently docile behavior in recent months can perhaps best be explained by the number of new jobs he has been given. He was transferred to Peking in the rotation of military commanders at the end of 1973, thereby bringing

May 12, 1975


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him to the center of political power, allowing him to participate in the national government, and giving him an opportunity--possibly limited when he was stationed in Liaoning--to be present at all Politburo meetings. The range of Chen's current jobs suggests that he is one of the most important members of the regime. (CONFIDENTIAL)

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May 12, 1975

-26-

TOP SECRET UMBRA

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