


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# STAFF NOTES:

## Middle East Africa South Asia

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**MIDDLE EAST – AFRICA – SOUTH ASIA**

This publication is prepared for regional specialists in the Washington community by the Middle East - Africa Division, Office of Current Intelligence, with occasional contributions from other offices within the Directorate of Intelligence. Comments and queries are welcome. They should be directed to the authors of the individual articles.

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South Yemen

*Results of the National Front Congress*

4+11  
11  
2

Decisions taken at the sixth congress of the ruling National Front, held in Aden in late March, will not lead to dramatic departures in South Yemen's domestic or foreign policies. Secretary General Abd al-Fattah Ismail, leader of the extremist wing of the National Front, and other important party leaders retained their posts. Differences between Ismail and his reputedly more flexible rival, President Salim Rubayi Ali, were papered-over.

1+6+7+8

In the domestic arena, the congress reaffirmed the Front's commitment to "scientific socialism" as the basis for economic development. Prior to the congress, President Ali had advocated a modification of socialist measures to give some encouragement to the country's dwindling entrepreneurial and land-owning groups. Ali's less doctrinaire position may have been based, in part, on his belief that it would generate aid from more conservative Arab governments.

11  
3+9

The party's published foreign policy resolutions were generally restrained. This was in line with efforts during the past year by President Ali to take a more flexible approach--perhaps as a result of Egyptian overtures. South Yemen will continue its efforts to establish relations with the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, and Qatar. Aden hopes to secure additional sources of economic aid, neutralize Arab support for Omani Sultan Qabus, and diminish Western and Iranian influence in the Gulf.

1+8

Predictably, the National Front adopted a strong resolution supporting the Popular Front for the Liberation of Oman.

3+9

The Front went on record again in support of the peaceful unification of North and South Yemen.

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(Continued)

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1


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The Adenis avoided direct criticism of Saudi Arabia. In what may have been an opening to the Saudis, Secretary General Ismail noted that South Yemen is ready to establish diplomatic ties with governments having different social systems on the basis of mutual respect for sovereignty and non-intervention. Cairo has been attempting to get Aden and Riyadh talking, and to reduce the Soviet role in South Yemen. President Ali has been the advocate of this position in the National Front.

Moscow appears to have made at least one move to buttress the position of Ismail, who is generally identified as the leader of the pro-Soviet wing of the Front. A Soviet cruiser docked in Aden on the eve of the congress and remained--with several other Soviet ships--for the duration of the session.  
(SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM/NO DISSEM ABROAD/CONTROLLED DISSEM)

25X1A



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Nigeria

*The Ibos Since the Civil War*

1+2  
Five years after their defeat in the civil war, Nigeria's Ibo tribesmen have accepted the fact that "Biafra" is dead and are quietly rebuilding for their economic and political future. The best educated and most industrious of Nigeria's tribes, the Ibos are among the strongest backers of General Gowon and continued military rule. This attitude is a direct result of Gowon's policies of reconciliation and reconstruction, which were primarily responsible for putting the tribe back on its feet after the war.

1  
Ibo political activity is confined largely to East Central state, where the bulk of the tribe lives. Ibos maintain a low political profile and avoid involvement in controversial national issues, as they are still viewed with suspicion throughout much of Nigeria. Despite this consideration, however, they are seeking to restore links with other tribal groups, undoubtedly with an eye to building future political alliances.

1+2  
The Ibos are particularly eager to reestablish ties with the Hausa-Fulani of northern Nigeria. The Hausa-Fulani dominated Nigerian politics from independence until the military took power in 1966. More than 50,000 Ibos have returned to the north; many more had fled from the region during the anti-Ibo riots of 1966. Northerners apparently have been receptive to their presence.

The Ibos have rejected involvement with the sizable Yoruba tribe of western Nigeria. As a result of the war, Ibo domination of Nigerian commerce and the civil service passed largely to the Yoruba, whom the Ibos--and the northerners--now view with intense distrust.

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
3

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The Ibos have had little success in reestablishing their ties with the country's minor tribes. In Rivers and Southeastern states, small tribes were freed of Ibo domination by the war and are determined to keep them from returning. The Ibos have been unable to regain their considerable valuable property in Port Harcourt, a predominantly Ibo city before the war.

There are few identifiable Ibo leaders today. Although several thousand former Biafran enlisted men and civil servants have been readmitted into the military and the federal government, fewer than 50 Ibo officers have been taken back into the army. None have been placed in key commands. The civilian administrator of East Central state, Ukpabi Asika, is an Ibo, but has no following among his fellow tribesmen and owes his position solely to his wartime loyalty to General Gowon. Colonel Ojukwu, the former secessionist leader, remains in exile in the Ivory Coast. (CONFIDENTIAL)



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Kenya

*More Hurdles for Kenyatta*

3  
1  
4  
The parliamentary committee investigating the death of J. M. Kariuki will soon begin a very sensitive phase of its work. Within the next week it will reexamine three senior police officers whose previous testimony was evasive. Unless these officials provide useful testimony--which they probably will not--the committee may be able to come up with nothing more damaging to the government than lack of cooperation. There is no indication that the committee has come up with any evidence linking any high ranking figures to the Kariuki murder or to the irregular and inept handling of the case by the police.

3  
Despite the lack of evidence, much of the public already suspects President Kenyatta and his top associates of complicity in Kariuki's murder. Even a report pointing to the refusal of police officials to cooperate with the investigation would further discredit the president.

3  
Kenyatta normally makes a major speech on June 2, a national holiday. If the committee report has been published by then, he is likely to encounter an unfriendly crowd. If the crowd rebuffs the increasingly irascible Kenyatta, it will only reinforce his present inclination to take a tough line with his critics.



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Bangladesh

*First Hundred Days of the  
"Second Revolution"*

Three months after assuming dictatorial powers Mujibur Rahman still is not providing the effective leadership his impoverished nation needs. His much-publicized "second revolution" has made little progress toward:

- Producing an effective civil service;
- Organizing the country's single national political party;
- Improving the policymaking process;
- Improving economic conditions.

Internal security remains fragile, despite the considerable publicity that has accompanied the President's use of the army and security forces to control smuggling and terrorism. The check on smuggling--although effective--may have been only temporary.

Disillusionment and discontent remain rife over economic issues, particularly high prices and shortages of basic commodities. Most Bengalees realize the dangers of outright opposition to Mujib, however, and appear to be reserving judgment for a while longer.

Mujib's approach to leadership inhibits quick decisions and dynamic policy initiatives. He makes all final decisions himself, but because he has little understanding of economic and technical subjects, this is a very time-consuming process. He still relies primarily on compromise, promises and manipulation to attain his goals, but will use intimidation if necessary. Personal and political relationships continue to be more important to him than an understanding of the issues. Accordingly, key positions

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2 | in government continue to be held by close family members or political cronies, often in preference to more capable personnel.

Despite his shortcomings and a continued erosion of his popular support, Mujib is still widely respected and remains the only person who has the national credentials to unify and lead Bangladesh. Presumably, he recognizes that under the new system of government he will be held personally responsible for all future failures and successes.

2 | Mujib apparently has been able to retain the loyalty of most members of the military and security forces. Nonetheless, they are impatient for signs of economic progress and political stability, and continue to represent the greatest potential threat to his continued rule. (CONFIDENTIAL)



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