

NSC 12/17

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16 December 1969

DCI BRIEFINGS FOR
NSC MEETINGS

I. SOUTHERN AFRICA (Cf. NSSM-39)

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Republic of South Africa	5	4:45
Rhodesia	11	4:00
Portuguese Africa	16	8:30
Angola-.....p.20		
Mozambique.....22		
Portuguese Guinea...24		

22-1/4 minutes

II. MILITARY AID TO PAKISTAN AND INDIA (Cf. NSSM-26)

The Military Balance	1	2:30
India--Recent Sources	3	1:45
Pakistan--Recent Sources	5	2:45
Present Indian-Pakistani Relations	7	2:15
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13-1/4 minutes

Briefing boards:

Map, Southern Africa

Chart, Relative Indian/Pakistani strengths in
selected military elements.

Map, South Asia

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SOUTHERN
AFRICA

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15 December 1969

DCI BRIEFING FOR
17 DECEMBER NSC MEETING

SOUTHERN AFRICA

I. Mr. President, the ~~showdown~~ ^{problem} in Southern Africa for the 1970s ~~is~~ ^{does} not so much a question of European colonialism against native nationalism, as ~~it does~~ a struggle by four million white Africans to maintain their rule over 30 million black Africans.

A. Portugal, with its holdings in Angola and Mozambique, is still a classic colonial power.

B. The Portuguese, however, are sustained in their determination to remain in Africa by the example of the whites who hold power over South Africa and Rhodesia.

C. These are the whites who are described as "Europeans" in the population statistics, ~~but that is~~ ^{not really} a historical label. The Dutch and the French Huguenots had begun settling in southern Africa more than 300 years ago. By the early 19th century, their descendants and the British had taken the land from the Hottentots, and from the Zulus and the other

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Bantus. This was long before Cecil Rhodes and Paul Kruger made it a question of who would have the empire.

1. The whites in Angola and Mozambique also have ancient roots in Africa--the first Portuguese settlers came to Angola a year before Christopher Columbus set sail, and Mozambique was colonized in 1505.
2. In Angola and Mozambique, however, blacks and whites alike are citizens of Portugal, their capital is Lisbon, and the territory is defended by troops from the European metropole.
3. The whites in Rhodesia and South Africa have no thought of retiring to Devon or Amsterdam; they have no ties other than heritage to the Empire and the Commonwealth. They are Africans--as I said, white Africans.

II. The Republic of South Africa, Rhodesia, Angola and Mozambique all have strong white governments, determined to stay in power.

- A. They are aware of their common interests, and of their ~~mutual~~ ostracism by most of the rest of the world.

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B. As a result, they have stepped up their co-operation with each other, and they are increasingly firm in their belief that they can defy world opinion and get away with it.

III. This self-confidence is warranted for the present, and there is little prospect that anything will happen to change it in the foreseeable future.

A. Certainly no black African country is strong enough to challenge them outright.

1. The international action which the black Africans have been able to obtain in the United Nations has not been effective.
2. South Africa is virtually self-sufficient, and can sustain Rhodesia ^{as well} against ~~the~~ U.N. action. The Portuguese territories are oriented toward the Motherland, and thus relatively immune to international trade sanctions.
3. The black African countries have been unable to win over the major powers for broader or more intensive sanctions.
4. Within Africa, the geography of trade gives the white African countries the upper hand over their native neighbors.

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B. The black populations are quiescent, and insurgent movements based abroad have been ineffective.

1. Liberation groups in Zambia and Tanzania have been trying to launch operations against Rhodesia and South Africa, but the security forces are so efficient that no groups have been able to carry on sustained guerrilla activities.
2. There is limited insurgency in the Portuguese territories, but it has made little headway over the past two years. The guerrillas face determined and effective countermeasures, they are plagued by internal dissent, and they have not been able to arouse any significant proportion of the black population.

IV. The Soviets and the Chinese Communists, of course, are trying to capitalize on the issue of white minority government in Africa, raising the propaganda issues of imperialism, colonialism, and racism.

A. The Soviets have given about one million dollars a year in aid to the various insurgent groups, and have provided advanced guerrilla training.

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- B. The Chinese are running a somewhat smaller program, ~~but~~ they are getting ready to build a railroad from Tanzania to Zambia which may cost at much as \$400 million, and which is designed to free Zambia from its dependence on transport routes through white southern Africa.
- C. The Communist effort in Africa is, after all, a second-priority project. Over the past 15 years, Africa has received only 15 percent of all Communist economic aid to ~~the~~ underdeveloped countries, while 70 percent has gone to the Middle East and South Asia. As for Moscow's military aid to free world recipients, Africa has had to share some five percent of the total with Latin America-- about half of it has gone to Egypt and Indonesia, with another 45 percent to Algeria, Syria, Iraq, Afghanistan, and India.
- D. In short, there is no effective challenge at present--domestic or foreign--to white minority rule in South Africa, Rhodesia, Angola, and Mozambique.

SOUTH AFRICA

- I. *Half* ~~The bulk~~ of the 30 million blacks--and the bulk of the four million whites who rule them--are in the Republic of South Africa.

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- A. The total 1969 population is estimated at 19,634,000. That breaks down, in round figures, into:
- 19 percent whites, or about 3,730,000;
 - 68 percent blacks, or about 13,350,000;
 - 10 percent of mixed blood--officially designated as "Coloureds"--or about 1,960,000;
 - and
 - 3 percent Asians--mainly Indians--about 590,000.
- B. The Territory of Southwest Africa adds another 609,000 people--81 percent black, only 14 percent white, and 5 percent Coloureds.

II. The Republic of South Africa is ~~not only the largest, but also~~ the strongest and most secure of the white regimes.

- A. The official policy of Apartheid has made South Africa an international whipping boy for years. As a result, it has developed its economy with an eye to self-sufficiency. Today, with the single exception of oil, South Africa has all the natural resources and the industrial plant it needs to go it alone.

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- B. Moreover, the South Africans in recent years have come to realize that they have a number of bargaining counters they can use to induce other countries to deal with the regime on an "as is" basis.
1. Their minerals—gold, uranium and diamonds—are in demand in international markets.
 2. Their ports and their strategic location have become more important since the closure of the Suez Canal.
- C. The government of Prime Minister Johannes Vorster, armed with this new feeling of self-sufficiency, has been working quietly for better diplomatic and economic relations with neighboring black African states.
1. Formal relations have been established with Malawi.
 2. South Africa is giving economic and technical assistance to Lesotho, one of the former British protectorates in southern Africa which have recently been given independence.
 3. Other black African countries—for instance, Malagasy, Gabon and Ivory Coast—are also

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interested in relations and aid, but are hesitant to risk criticism by their neighbors.

4. Many African countries ~~(even including radical Tanzania)~~ (have been trading secretly or quietly with South Africa.

III. Within the country, the regime has not loosened its strict Apartheid, or "separate development" laws.

- A. The government is being challenged by a new, far-right political party ~~(nicknamed the Weiskraempe, or narrow-minded ones)~~ which argues that the government is already doing too much for the blacks. From now until the elections next April, the government can be expected to be rigid in its application of Apartheid.
- B. The blacks have made little headway toward the Bantustans, or separate nations, which are the ultimate goal of separate development.
 1. They are needed in white urban areas as the major semi-skilled and unskilled labor

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- force. And they can make more money there than they could farming in their own tribal homelands.
2. The government has also done little~~er~~ for example, such as major financial investment in homeland industries--to make return to the Bantustans more inviting.
- C. For the foreseeable future, then, there will be little change in South Africa's racial system, and no possibility of ousting the white government.
1. There are two insurgent groups based in Tanzania seeking to liberate South Africa. Their membership within the country is unknown, probably minimal, and relatively invisible, because it is inactive. Both groups combined have less than 400 members outside the country.
- D. South Africa's defense and security forces have some 57,000 on duty, and another 82,000 in the active reserve. The air force has 422 pilots, 197 jets, and 358 other aircraft; the navy is led by one destroyer and two destroyer escorts.

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1. South Africa produces most of the small arms, mortars and ammunition it requires. It assembles armored cars from French components, and has begun assembling Macchi jet trainers supplied by Italy. In 1966, France passed the United Kingdom as the principal source of military hardware imports.
2. 300 South African police have been stationed in Rhodesia to help local security forces, and a few helicopters have been furnished on loan.
3. No South African forces are stationed in Angola or Mozambique, but South Africans cooperate with Portuguese officials, and have supplied some ammunition.

RHODESIA

- I. Rhodesia has a population of just over 5 million, with 230,000 whites and 4.8 million blacks. The issue of majority African rule has dictated events in Rhodesia over the past 10 years.
 - A. London in the early 1960s began working toward broadened voting rights which would have led eventually to majority rule. To forestall this, Prime Minister Ian Smith in November 1965 issued a Unilateral Declaration of Independence, and for white Rhodesians, the initials U.D.I. have the same ring today that 1776 has in this country.
 - B. Smith's political party, the Rhodesian Front, came to power in 1962, and is now unchallenged.
 1. The African nationalist groups which were its main opponents have been outlawed since 1964, and now operate mainly from exile in Zambia.

2. They are weak, badly split, and have little indigenous support. Active insurgents number only about 700, and the rural black population inside Rhodesia is passive. The tribal chiefs cooperate with the Smith government in Salisbury.
 3. The nationalists have been ^{relatively} inactive since a series of unsuccessful guerrilla incursions in 1967 and 1968. ~~We have learned of~~ They plan to try infiltration of small units soon, but the Rhodesian security forces are capable of handling any new attempts.
- C. The Rhodesian Front is again expected to win most, if not all, of the 50 white parliamentary seats in new general elections some time in early 1970. There is no real political opposition to the Smith regime.
1. Tobacco farmers—once one of the most powerful pressure groups in Rhodesia—recently criticized the Smith regime for reducing tobacco production quotas.

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They have been hurt by the U.N. sanctions, and the government is trying to reduce the necessary subsidies by gradually cutting back on production.

2. Railway workers are also bitter because the government threatened to jail union leaders if they struck for higher pay.
3. There is, however, no strong party which could turn this dissatisfaction against the Rhodesian Front.

II. Rhodesia's new constitution has recently been signed into law, and will go into effect at the time of the new elections.

A. It institutionalizes the existing white rule, and will transform Rhodesia into an independent republic without any further formal declaration.

1. This reflects Ian Smith's confidence that Rhodesia no longer needs a settlement with London, or its old Commonwealth ties, to ride out economic sanctions and diplomatic isolation.

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2. We do not expect any immediate recognition of the new Rhodesian state, even by South Africa or Portugal. Smith hopes, however, that western governments which still have missions in Salisbury will leave them there when the new constitution takes effect. He could interpret this as de facto recognition.

III. One of the main reasons for Smith's confidence is the health of the economy.

A. Exports dipped sharply immediately after U.D.I., and have not regained their 1965 levels, but with the help of South Africa and Portugal, Rhodesia has gradually increased both exports and imports since 1967.

1. Only the tobacco industry is still suffering significantly, and with the passage of time sanctions are likely to become less and less effective.

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2. Gross domestic product may well have increased by 7 percent in 1969, and Rhodesia is well endowed with natural resources.

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
PORTUGUESE AFRICA

- I. Portugal--in its treatment of its African possessions--is as defiant of world opinion as is the Republic of South Africa.
 - A. Lisbon maintains that these territories are overseas provinces of Portugal, and an integral part of the nation. Hence, any action by other nations or in the U.N. constitutes an interference in Portugal's internal affairs.
 - B. There is little prospect, in actual fact, that Lisbon will loosen its present controls, let alone move toward majority rule in Angola, Mozambique, and the other overseas territories.
 1. At present, even minor policy recommendations by the white-dominated territorial administrations must have Lisbon's approval.
 2. Premier Caetano early in 1969 suggested a move toward greater autonomy, but dropped the proposal in the face of a strong reaction by powerful old guard elements.

- C. Governors are appointed by Lisbon, and hold most of the power that is not exercised by the home government. Theoretically, blacks in Angola and Mozambique have the franchise, and could outvote the relative handful of whites in balloting for the Portuguese legislature and the provincial representative assemblies.
1. In point of fact, however, the electoral law is so complex that even many whites in Portuguese Africa fail to vote, and the blacks who wish to do so face an array of qualifications including literacy, property, and other tests.
 2. Caetano says participation will be extended to black Africans "who totally accept Portuguese culture"--a phrase which could mean that the African tribesman will have to pray, marry, and even think like a European Portuguese before he can vote.

3. The Lisbon government has implemented educational and economic reforms which will improve the welfare of blacks,

25X6



- II. Lisbon, in maintaining its hold over the African territories, so far has not been pushed beyond diplomatic efforts to obtain understanding for Portuguese sovereignty, and informal cooperation with the other white regimes of southern Africa.
 - A. The Portuguese are probably opposed to a permanent security pact with their White African neighbors except as a last resort.
 - B. Lisbon, independent-minded and fearful of South African political domination, has even tried to keep direct assistance to a minimum.
 - C. Portugal is not known to have diverted any NATO-committed forces, or MAP-restricted weapons supplied by the United States, to the defense of its African territories.

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1. Lisbon resents U.S. prohibitions on the use of such material, but has been able to manufacture--or purchase elsewhere--equipment restricted by the United States.

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Angola

- II. Angola's 270,000 whites make up about five percent of the population, ~~and there are~~ ^(are) another 75,000 mulattoes. From almost five million blacks, two nationalist organizations have recruited some 12 to 14,000 members. About half of these are active guerrillas, and no more than 3 to 4,000 of them are operating inside Angola at any one time.
- A. The Portuguese government, using 60,000 troops and some 33,000 local defense militiamen and auxiliaries, has confined guerrilla operations to a harassment level.
1. Areas where the guerrillas have been able to operate are poor in resources, and they must rely on bases outside Angola for arms and equipment.
 2. There are guerrilla bases in Zambia and Congo-Kinshasa, but these countries have to depend on Portuguese Africa for transportation facilities. As a result, they have restrained the guerrillas whenever Portugal has put on the pressure.

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3. On several occasions when there has been a surge of sabotage or terrorism, the Portuguese have announced that railroads on which Zambia and the Congo depend would have to be shut down for repairs. The African governments have quickly understood the hint.


B. The first Angolan nationalist organization in the field was the GRAE of Holden Roberto, but starting in 1960, Communist countries and radical black Africans began building up the rival, Marxist-oriented MPLA.

(Government of the Republic of Angola in Exile.)

(Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola.)

1. Roberto's organization staged most of the insurgency in Angola until 1965. At that time, the Portuguese managed to contain his operations, and simultaneously his support from outside sources was drastically cut back in favor of the MPLA.
2. The long-standing rivalry of GRAE and MPLA has wasted the limited resources of the guerrillas and weakened their overall effectiveness.

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Mozambique

III.

In Mozambique, the 100,000 whites make up less than 1.5 percent of the estimated 7,500,000 population.

A. The principal nationalist organization, known as FRELIMO, has 8 to 10,000 members, but less than a third of them manage to operate inside Mozambique at any one time.

1. Tanzania provides a hospitable base, but a Portuguese defensive belt of fortified villages confines the guerrillas to sparsely populated and economically unimportant areas along the northern border.
2. FRELIMO is trying to penetrate more rewarding areas of Mozambique by way of Zambia and Malawi, but the host governments depend on the white regimes of Southern Africa for transportation routes.
3. There are 40,000 Portuguese troops and almost 10,000 auxiliaries in Mozambique.

(Front ^(FRENTE)
for the
Liberation of
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B. FRELIMO's efforts to push deeper into the country are plagued by logistical problems, by the apathy and tribal rivalries of the Mozambique blacks, and by a measure of factionalism among the nationalists.

1. FRELIMO's original leader, Eduardo Mondlane, was assassinated last February. He was replaced briefly by a triumvirate, until the chief of the guerrilla forces, Moises Samora Machel, eased out one of the members and took over control.

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Portuguese Guinea

IV. Finally, I want to mention Portuguese Guinea briefly, although it is not a part of what we generally consider white Southern Africa.

Portuguese Guinea provides a sharp contrast, because here the black insurgents ~~appear to be winning.~~ hold the advantage.

A. The total population is only 530,000, and the whites and mulattoes combined--exclusive of Portuguese troops--make up less than one percent.

B. The major insurgent group is the African Party for the Independence of Portuguese Guinea and Cape Verde, or PAIGC.

1. This group has bases in Guinea and Senegal, and it also controls extensive territory within ~~the long, skinny outline of~~ Portuguese Guinea, especially along the southeastern border, with African Guinea.

2. It gets arms, funds, and training from Communist countries--mainly the Soviet Union. It also has military support from radical African states, and financial

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support from the Organization of African Unity.

C. The Portuguese Governor is using 16 battalions against the insurgents--some 27,000 troops in all--but 5,000 of these have been recruited among the natives.

1. At present, he is trying to apply a program of resettlement in fortified hamlets.
2. The prospects are for a prolonged insurgency, and the balance is now swinging in favor of the PAIGC.

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ITALIAN
Memo

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No. 2626/69

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Directorate of Intelligence
16 December 1969

INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM

Political Stability in Italy

Each of the three governments since the national parliamentary elections of May 1968 has faced widespread dissatisfaction and insistent speculation that its tenure would be short. This results from failure of the center-left parties, which have governed Italy since 1962, to receive a strong and clear endorsement in the 1968 elections. Each of the political parties has since been seeking a more attractive stance, and the various factions within the parties have at the same time been vying for position.

Italy's fundamental political problem is that no government in the postwar period has been able to accomplish needed reforms without years of parliamentary and political maneuver. Relatively little public criticism is now directed against financial policy, which has contributed to increased material welfare of the population, or against foreign policy, which has been friendly to the United States. In areas particularly affecting such vocal pressure groups as students and labor, successive governments have shown concern and made some moves. They have been unable, however, to get quick legislative action even on reforms to which opposition was minimal. For example, almost no progress has been made toward reform, of the outdated judicial system and the bureaucratic government administration, and great public impatience is evident.

This memorandum was produced solely by CIA. It was prepared by the Office of Current Intelligence.

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The Interim Government of Mariano Rumor

1. Since last summer when efforts to form a majority government failed, Prime Minister Mariano Rumor has headed a minority Christian Democratic government. It was intended to last only until regional and local elections could give a new reading on popular attitudes toward the various political parties. These elections are now expected to take place next March or April.

2. Meanwhile, speculation has increased, particularly in recent weeks, over the possibility of an earlier change of government. Several reports mention January 1970 as the time a change might occur. This development could come about if key political leaders--such as Foreign Minister Moro and Senate President Fanfani of the Christian Democrats and President Saragat, a right-wing Socialist--were to agree behind the scenes on a successor government. Decisions reached at such a top-level meeting would be closely held, and thus surprise is possible. We believe that these and most political leaders still prefer to wait for spring election results, but they might feel forced to make a change earlier because of concern over recent threats to public order such as the explosions in Milan and Rome on 12 December. The police are inclined to attribute these explosions, which took a large toll in death, injuries, and property damage, to extremists of the left. The center-left political parties have voiced support for the government in the wake of the latest terrorist incidents. Prime Minister Rumor has cited the pressures of the political situation as making it impossible for him to visit the United States in January.

Labor Unrest

3. The atmosphere of instability around the Rumor government this fall has been fostered by the coincidence that labor contracts affecting half the industrial force were due for renewal in the last six months of 1969. Labor has engaged in brief but frequent strikes to improve its bargaining position for the new contracts. In addition, a 24-hour general strike for better housing was held on 19 November. It was peaceful in most cities, but tension

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rose sharply throughout the country when one policeman was killed and others were injured during demonstrations in Milan.

4. Some of the biggest unions have now signed contracts. The contract for one million metalworkers in private enterprise (including FIAT) is still under negotiation, however, and the three major labor federations have called on their followers for a four-hour sympathy strike on 19 December.

The Communist Factor

5. Another factor in the uncertainty surrounding the Rumor government has been the continuing discussion over the possibility of an evolving role for the Communist Party in Italian political life. Such speculation was at the root of a Socialist Party split last July. Debate on the subject was intensified late last summer when veteran Communist leader Amendola suggested that the time was ripe for the Italian Communist Party to enter the government. The idea of a coalition some day between Communists and non-Communists in Italy has been bruited about for years. But most serious left-wing politicians have not gone further in public statements than to discuss the possibility of accepting parliamentary cooperation from the Communists, who hold more than one fourth of the seats in the Chamber of Deputies. Amendola's suggestion frightened Italian leaders and was rejected by politicians of all stripes, including most prominent Communists.

6. More recently a sharpening disagreement within the Communist Party has highlighted the preference of one important faction for following Soviet directives and of another for revolutionary action. Both positions are repellent to most Italian leaders, and discussion of the advantages of working more closely with the Communists has thus been curtailed for the time being.

The Economy

7. Italy's economic situation, which is characterized by extraordinary economic growth, lends elements of both weakness and strength to the political scene. Rapid industrialization has intensified

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urbanization with all its concomitant problems. A threat of inflation and the likelihood of continued capital flight also offer possible grounds for attacks on the government. A growth in GNP estimated at a minimum of five percent for 1969, however, with a population increase below one percent, has resulted in greater prosperity at almost all levels. Wage increases gained from this fall's labor negotiations are estimated at ten percent annually for the next several years. Substantial social security pension increases, government employee raises, and low industrial inventories give promise of rising domestic consumption and production.

Prospects

8. Italy is likely in any case to have a new government sometime in the first half of 1970. The chances seem somewhat better than even that it will be made up of the four parties of the center-left: the Christian Democratic, the two Socialist parties, and the small Republican Party. The men most often mentioned as probable prime ministers are Senate President Fanfani and Foreign Minister Moro. Both have been prime minister before, and both hope to be elected to the Italian presidency by Parliament in 1971. Either would probably be somewhat more inclined than Prime Minister Rumor to consider accepting Communist votes to pass reform measures in Parliament, but we would not expect that either would introduce radical change in the government's direction.

9. Less likely is a coalition of the Christian Democrats with the right-wing Socialists, the Republicans and the conservative, business-oriented Liberals, or a Christian Democratic coalition with left-wing Socialists. Although each of these groupings would make up a mathematical majority in Parliament, neither would have a sufficient margin for stable government. Hence, consideration would probably be given to moving up the national elections, which would normally take place in the spring of 1973, before attempting such coalitions. The possibility of rescheduling, however, is likely to lead to renewed efforts to find a practical working coalition that would avert early national elections, which deputies and senators of all parties regard with repugnance.

Other coalitions are mathematically possible, but it is more likely that --if Center-Left fails-- National Elections would be moved up from Spring 1973 streets.
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16 December Dissem, NSC Briefings on Southern Africa
and South Asia

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1- Elizabeth for NSC Secretariat

11 December 1969

NSC BRIEFING NOTICE

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1. There are at present requirements for the DCI for three NSC briefing texts, any one or all of which may be needed for the next NSC meeting the morning of 17 December:

- a) Southern Africa (with NSSM-39 on agenda)
- b) Military Aid Policy for South Asia (NSSM-26)
- c) The Italian Political Situation.

2. The White House NSC staff obviously hopes that the President's request for an Italian political briefing can be met in memorandum form, because Kissinger's intention is to deal with both NSSMs on 17 December; if not, they will try to arrange another NSC meeting for ~~21~~ or ~~23~~ December. As things now stand, however, DCI will need to see all three briefing texts by oob Tuesday 16th at latest.

3. Deadline: This means I must have your drafts by noon Monday, 15 December, at latest--and if any of them, or any part of them, can be left with SDO before 7 p.m. Sunday, it will make Monday and Tuesday a bit more survivable for everybody. Please let me know when I can expect contributions.

4. Graphics: For NSC use, we will need 30X40" briefing boards; these need not be ready before close of business Tuesday, but should be started through the Graphics shop before the week-end. For Southern Africa, one locator map should do, showing Africa up to about Mombasa-Brazzaville latitude, with political boundaries, principal areas of insurgency, and major transport features such as railways existing and proposed, pipelines, and enough towns or regions so DCI can talk about Zambian copper, Katangan exports, etc. For South Asia, a general locator map with such features as Kashmir, ChiCom road-building activities, Rann of Kutch, Indus & Ganges waterways. Also one or several charts on relative Pak/Indian military strength in organization and equipment. For Italy, Parliamentary pie chart (or a series of them if shift in voting trends is significant to the text) and a board with

enlarged mug shots of four or six principal characters.

5. Content: The definitive agenda for the NSC meeting normally is not set until after the briefing texts have to be ready, but DCI is usually called on to brief for 10 to 15 minutes (one doublespaced page in our standard NSC format is usually just about one minute, and he sometimes will go longer if he feels that important material would otherwise have to be omitted.) As for what's to be covered, I can only suggest that in most cases the best approach is to start out with a summary statement of the background, nature, and immediate status of the problem, and then proceed to fill in the details in a standard current intelligence approach; e.g., the Habiru came into Palestine out of the Arabian desert 3,300 years ago, the Arabs followed them 600 years later, and from a common ethnic, geographic and linguistic background they have now hated each other's guts for 2,700 years; this cannot easily be unraveled in one generation etc etc etc.

a) to include

(1) Siam in White states, their racial policies, their durability

(2) Reaction of blacks in side & credit, scope of insurgency, any U.S. involvement,

(3) Role of USSR & China

b) to include

(1) overview of Indo-Pak military balance, today + in contrast to 1965 hostilities

(2) mil supply relationships to US SR + Chi Coms.

a) Southern Africa--pretty much a general current intelligence briefing with some emphasis on insurgency in the White Redoubt, the effectiveness of sanctions, the extent of Soviet and ChiCom involvement with the insurgents/nationalists, dependence of New African govts on White Africa for trade, transportation etc.

b) South Asia--NSSM-26 gives you a pretty good idea of what the topic is: should we resume shipment of lethal hardware to Pakistan, or back away from both India and Pakistan? DCI will presumably want to talk about the military disparity, the issues between Pak/India and likelihood of solution or conflict, deterioration of US rels with Pak and obverse, Pak-ChiCom rels, and I think we should offer him a page or so on [redacted]

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c) Italy: I think best bet is for you to draft the proposed memorandum, and I'll extract a briefing from your draft, with or without State's chop--but keep me informed on where the sticking points are in getting their agreement.

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[redacted] X-7610, Red 9380, BZ-4

MEMORANDUM FOR:

*F.I. 'NSSM
/ # 39*


Maps provided to NSC staff on 4 Dec 69.
They apparently will be incorporated in briefing
books for NSC principals.

*+ general political map
of Africa*

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
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Southern Africa: Areas of Insurgency



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0800 Hours
15 December 1969

NSC ACTIVITIES
15 - 19 December 1969

NSC The NSC is scheduled to meet on Wednesday, 17 December, at 1000 hours to consider NSSM-39, US Policy Toward Southern Africa. The Director will be asked to brief and a briefing is being prepared.

Note: The NSC Staff is trying to schedule a meeting for either 22 or 23 December to deal with NSSM-26, US Military Supply Policy in South Asia. Failing in this, the Staff will make one more attempt to put this on Wednesday's agenda. A "just-in-case" briefing is being prepared for the Director.

Review Group The Review Group is scheduled to meet at 1400 hours to consider two related NSSM's--31, US Policy Toward Malaysia and Singapore and 61, A Review of US Indonesian Policy. Both papers are on board and comments are being prepared.

Other There are no other meetings known to be scheduled.

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15 December 1969

DCI BRIEFING FOR
17 DECEMBER NSC MEETING

SOUTHERN AFRICA

- I. Mr. President, the showdown in southern Africa for the 1970s is not so much a question of European colonialism against native nationalism, as a struggle by four million white Africans to maintain their rule over 30 million black Africans.
- A. Portugal, with its holdings in Angola and Mozambique, is still a classic colonial power.
- B. The Portuguese, however, are sustained in their determination to remain in Africa by the example of the whites who hold power over South Africa and Rhodesia.
- C. These are the whites who are described as "Europeans" in the population statistics but that is only a historical label. The Dutch, the French Huguenots, and the British had begun settling southern Africa more than 300 years ago. By the early 19th century, their descendants had taken the land from the Hottentots, and from the Zulus and the

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other Bantus--long before Cecil Rhodes and Paul Kruger made it a question of empire.

1. The whites in Angola and Mozambique also have ancient roots in Africa--the first Portuguese settlers came to Angola a year before Christopher Columbus set sail, and Mozambique was colonized in 1505.
2. In Angola and Mozambique, however, blacks and whites alike are citizens of Portugal, their capital is Lisbon, and the territory is defended by troops from the European metropole.
3. The whites in Rhodesia and South Africa have no thought of retiring to Devon or Amsterdam; they have no ties, other than heritage, to the Empire and the Commonwealth. They are Africans--as I said, white Africans.

II. The Republic of South Africa, Rhodesia, Angola and Mozambique all have strong white governments, determined to stay in power.

- A. They are aware of their common interests, and of their mutual ostracism by most of the rest of the world.

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B. As a result, they have stepped up their co-operation with each other, and they are increasingly firm in their belief that they can defy world opinion and get away with it.

III. This self-confidence is warranted for the present, and there is little prospect that anything will happen to change it in the foreseeable future.

A. Certainly no black African country is strong enough to challenge them outright.

1. The international action which the black Africans have been able to obtain in the United Nations has not been effective.
2. South Africa is virtually self-sufficient, and can sustain Rhodesia against the U.N. action. The Portuguese territories are oriented toward the Motherland, and thus relatively immune to international trade sanctions.
3. The black African countries have been unable to win over the major powers for broader or more intensive sanctions.
4. Within Africa, the geography of trade gives the white African countries the upper hand over their native neighbors.

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B. The black populations are quiescent, and insurgent movements based abroad have been ineffective.

1. Liberation groups in Zambia and Tanzania have been trying to launch operations against Rhodesia and South Africa, but the security forces are so efficient that no groups have been able to carry on sustained guerrilla activities.
2. There is limited insurgency in the Portuguese territories, but it has made little headway over the past two years. The guerrillas face determined and effective countermeasures, they are plagued by internal dissent, and they have not been able to arouse any significant proportion of the black population.

IV. The Soviets and the Chinese Communists, of course, are trying to capitalize on the issue of white minority government in Africa, raising the propaganda issues of imperialism, colonialism, and racism.

A. The Soviets have given about one million dollars a year in aid to the various insurgent groups, and have provided advanced guerrilla training.

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- B. The Chinese are running a somewhat smaller program, but they are getting ready to build a railroad from Tanzania to Zambia which may cost at much as \$400 million, and which is designed to free Zambia from its dependence on transport routes through white southern Africa.
- C. The Communist effort in Africa is, after all, a second-priority project. Over the past 15 years, Africa has received only 15 percent of all Communist economic aid to the underdeveloped countries, while 70 percent has gone to the Middle East and South Asia. As for Moscow's military aid to free world recipients, Africa has had to share some five percent of the total with Latin America-- about half of it has gone to Egypt and Indonesia, with another 45 percent to Algeria, Syria, Iraq, Afghanistan, and India.
- D. In short, there is no effective challenge at present--domestic or foreign--to white minority rule in South Africa, Rhodesia, Angola, and Mozambique.

SOUTH AFRICA

- I. ^{Half} ~~The bulk~~ of the 30 million blacks--and the bulk of the four million whites who rule them--are in the Republic of South Africa. ✓

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- A. The total 1969 population is estimated at 19,634,000. That breaks down, in round figures, into:
- 19 percent whites, or about 3,730,000;
 - 68 percent blacks, or about 13,350,000;
 - 10 percent of mixed blood--officially designated as "Coloureds"--or about 1,960,000;
 - and
 - 3 percent Asians--mainly Indians--about 590,000.
- B. The Territory of Southwest Africa adds another 609,000 people--81 percent black, only 14 percent white, and 5 percent Coloureds.
- II. The Republic of South Africa is ~~(not only the largest, but also)~~ the strongest and most secure of the white regimes. ✓
- A. The official policy of Apartheid has made South Africa an international whipping boy for years. As a result, it has developed its economy with an eye to self-sufficiency. Today, with the single exception of oil, South Africa has all the natural resources and the industrial plant it needs to go it alone.

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- B. Moreover, the South Africans in recent years have come to realize that they have a number of bargaining counters they can use to induce other countries to deal with the regime on an "as is" basis.
1. Their minerals--gold, uranium and diamonds--are in demand in international markets.
 2. Their ports and their strategic location have become more important since the closure of the Suez Canal.
- C. The government of Prime Minister Johannes Vorster, armed with this new feeling of self-sufficiency, has been working quietly for better diplomatic and economic relations with neighboring black African states.
1. Formal relations have been established with Malawi.
 2. South Africa is giving economic and technical assistance to Lesotho, one of the former British protectorates in southern Africa which have recently been given independence. ✓
 3. Other black African countries--for instance, Malagasy, Gabon and Ivory Coast--are also

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interested in relations and aid, but are hesitant to risk criticism by their neighbors.

4. Many African countries, ~~even including radical Tanzania~~ have been trading secretly or quietly with South Africa. ✓

III. Within the country, the regime has not loosened its strict Apartheid, or "separate development" laws.

A. The government is being challenged by a new, far-right political party, ~~nicknamed the Verkrante, or narrow-minded ones~~ which argues that the government is already doing too much for the blacks. From now until the elections next April, the government can be expected to be rigid in its application of Apartheid. ✓

B. The blacks have made little headway toward the Bantustans, or separate nations, which are the ultimate goal of separate development.

1. They are needed in white urban areas as the major semi-skilled and unskilled labor

force. And they can make more money there than they could farming in their own tribal homelands.

2. The government has also done little-- for example, such as major financial investment in homeland industries--to make return to the Bantustans more inviting.

C. For the foreseeable future, then, there will be little change in South Africa's racial system, and no possibility of ousting the white government.

1. There are two insurgent groups based in Tanzania seeking to liberate South Africa. Their membership within the country is unknown, probably minimal, and relatively invisible, because it is inactive. Both groups combined have less than 400 members outside the country.

D. South Africa's defense and security forces have some 57,000 on duty, and another 82,000 in the active reserve. The air force has 422 pilots, 197 jets, and 358 other aircraft; the navy is led by one destroyer and two destroyer escorts.

1. South Africa produces most of the small arms, mortars and ammunition it requires. It assembles armored cars from French components, and has begun assembling Macchi jet trainers supplied by Italy. In 1966, France passed the United Kingdom as the principal source of military hardware imports.
2. 300 South African police have been stationed in Rhodesia to help local security forces, and a few helicopters have been furnished on loan.
3. No South African forces are stationed in Angola or Mozambique, but South Africans cooperate with Portuguese officials, and have supplied some ammunition.

RHODESIA

- I. Rhodesia has a population of just over 5 million, with 230,000 whites and 4.8 million blacks. The issue of majority African rule has dictated events in Rhodesia over the past 10 years.
 - A. London in the early 1960s began working toward broadened voting rights which would have led eventually to majority rule. To forestall this, Prime Minister Ian Smith in November 1965 issued a Unilateral Declaration of Independence, and for white Rhodesians, the initials U.D.I. have the same ring today that 1776 has in this country.
 - B. Smith's political party, the Rhodesian Front, came to power in 1962, and is now unchallenged.
 1. The African nationalist groups which were its main opponents have been outlawed since 1964, and now operate mainly from exile in Zambia.

2. They are weak, badly split, and have little indigenous support. Active insurgents number only about 700, and the rural black population inside Rhodesia is passive. The tribal chiefs cooperate with the Smith government in Salisbury.
3. The nationalists have been ^{relatively} inactive since a series of unsuccessful guerrilla incursions in 1967 and 1968. They plan to try infiltration of small units soon, but the Rhodesian security forces are capable of handling any new attempts. ✓

C. The Rhodesian Front is again expected to win most, if not all, of the 50 white parliamentary seats in new general elections some time in early 1970. There is no real political opposition to the Smith regime.

1. Tobacco farmers--once one of the most powerful pressure groups in Rhodesia--recently criticized the Smith regime for reducing tobacco production quotas.

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They have been hurt by the U.N. sanctions, and the government is trying to reduce the necessary subsidies by gradually cutting back on production.

2. Railway workers are also bitter because the government threatened to jail union leaders if they struck for higher pay.
3. There is, however, no strong party which could turn this dissatisfaction against the Rhodesian Front.

II. Rhodesia's new constitution has recently been signed into law, and will go into effect at the time of the new elections.

A. It institutionalizes the existing white rule, and will transform Rhodesia into an independent republic without any further formal declaration.

1. This reflects Ian Smith's confidence that Rhodesia no longer needs a settlement with London, or its old Commonwealth ties, to ride out economic sanctions and diplomatic isolation.

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2. We do not expect any immediate recognition of the new Rhodesian state, even by South Africa or Portugal. Smith hopes, however, that western governments which still have missions in Salisbury will leave them there when the new constitution takes effect. He could interpret this as de facto recognition.

III. One of the main reasons for Smith's confidence is the health of the economy.

A. Exports dipped sharply immediately after U.D.I., and have not regained their 1965 levels, but with the help of South Africa and Portugal, Rhodesia has gradually increased both exports and imports since 1967.

1. Only the tobacco industry is still suffering significantly, and with the passage of time sanctions are likely to become less and less effective.

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2. Gross domestic product may well have increased by 7 percent in 1969, and Rhodesia is well endowed with natural resources.

PORTUGUESE AFRICA

- I. Portugal--in its treatment of its African possessions--is as defiant of world opinion as is the Republic of South Africa.
 - A. Lisbon maintains that these territories are overseas provinces of Portugal, and an integral part of the nation. Hence, any action by other nations or in the U.N. constitutes an interference in Portugal's internal affairs.
 - B. There is little prospect, in actual fact, that Lisbon will loosen its present controls, let alone move toward majority rule in Angola, Mozambique, and the other overseas territories.
 1. At present, even minor policy recommendations by the white-dominated territorial administrations must have Lisbon's approval.
 2. Premier Caetano early in 1969 suggested a move toward greater autonomy, but dropped the proposal in the face of a strong reaction by powerful old guard elements.


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- C. Governors are appointed by Lisbon, and hold most of the power that is not exercised by the home government. Theoretically, blacks in Angola and Mozambique have the franchise, and could outvote the relative handful of whites in balloting for the Portuguese legislature and the provincial representative assemblies.
1. In point of fact, however, the electoral law is so complex that even many whites in Portuguese Africa fail to vote, and the blacks who wish to do so face an array of qualifications including literacy, property, and other tests.
 2. Caetano says participation will be extended to black Africans "who totally accept Portuguese culture"--a phrase which could mean that the African tribesman will have to pray, marry, and even think like a European Portuguese before he can vote.

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3. The Lisbon government has implemented educational and economic reforms which will improve the welfare of blacks,

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- II. Lisbon, in maintaining its hold over the African territories, so far has not been pushed beyond diplomatic efforts to obtain understanding for Portuguese sovereignty, and informal cooperation with the other white regimes of southern Africa.
 - A. The Portuguese are probably opposed to a permanent security pact with their White African neighbors except as a last resort.
 - B. Lisbon, independent-minded and fearful of South African political domination, has even tried to keep direct assistance to a minimum.
 - C. Portugal is not known to have diverted any NATO-committed forces, or MAP-restricted weapons supplied by the United States, to the defense of its African territories.

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1. Lisbon resents U.S. prohibitions on the use of such material, but has been able to manufacture--or purchase elsewhere--equipment restricted by the United States.

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Angola

- II. Angola's 270,000 whites make up about five percent of the population, and there are another 75,000 mulattoes. From almost five million blacks, two nationalist organizations have recruited some 12 to 14,000 members. About half of these are active guerrillas, and no more than 3 to 4,000 of them are operating inside Angola at any one time.
- A. The Portuguese government, using 60,000 troops and some 33,000 local defense militiamen and auxiliaries, has confined guerrilla operations to a harassment level.
1. Areas where the guerrillas have been able to operate are poor in resources, and they must rely on bases outside Angola for arms and equipment.
 2. There are guerrilla bases in Zambia and Congo-Kinshasa, but these countries have to depend on Portuguese Africa for transportation facilities. As a result, they have restrained the guerrillas whenever Portugal has put on the pressure.

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3. On several occasions when there has been a surge of sabotage or terrorism, the Portuguese have announced that railroads on which Zambia and the Congo depend would have to be shut down for repairs. The African governments have quickly understood the hint.
- B. The first Angolan nationalist organization in the field was the GRAE of Holden Roberto, but starting in 1960, Communist countries and radical black Africans began building up the rival, Marxist-oriented MPLA.
1. Roberto's organization staged most of the insurgency in Angola until 1965. At that time, the Portuguese managed to contain his operations, and simultaneously his support from outside sources was drastically cut back in favor of the MPLA.
 2. The long-standing rivalry of GRAE and MPLA has wasted the limited resources of the guerrillas and weakened their overall effectiveness.

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Mozambique

- III. ~~There is a somewhat similar situation~~ In Mozambique, ~~where~~ the 100,000 whites make up less than 1.5 percent of the estimated 7,500,000 population.
- A. The principal nationalist organization, known as FRELIMO, has 8 to 10,000 members, but less than a third of them manage to operate inside Mozambique at any one time.
1. Tanzania provides a hospitable base, but a Portuguese defensive belt of fortified villages confines the guerrillas to sparsely populated and economically unimportant areas along the northern border.
 2. FRELIMO is trying to penetrate more rewarding areas of Mozambique by way of Zambia and Malawi, but the host governments depend on the white regimes of Southern Africa for transportation routes.
 3. There are 40,000 Portuguese troops and almost 10,000 auxiliaries in Mozambique.

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B. FRELIMO's efforts to push deeper into the country are plagued by logistical problems, by the apathy and tribal rivalries of the Mozambique blacks, and by a measure of factionalism among the nationalists.

1. FRELIMO's original leader, Eduardo Mondlane, was assassinated last February. He was replaced briefly by a triumvirate, until the chief of the guerrilla forces, Moises Samora Machel, eased out one of the members and took over control.

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Portuguese Guinea

IV. Finally, I want to mention Portuguese Guinea briefly, although it is not a part of what we generally consider white Southern Africa.

Portuguese Guinea provides a sharp contrast, because here the black insurgents ~~appear to be winning.~~ *hold the advantage.*

A. The total population is only 530,000, and the whites and mulattoes combined--exclusive of Portuguese troops--make up less than one percent.

B. The major insurgent group is the African Party for the Independence of Portuguese Guinea and Cape Verde, or PAIGC.

1. This group has bases in Guinea and Senegal, and it also controls extensive territory, ~~(within the long, skinny outline of Portuguese Guinea)~~ especially along the southeastern border with African Guinea.

2. It gets arms, funds, and training from Communist countries--mainly the Soviet Union. It also has military support from radical African states, and financial

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support from the Organization of African Unity.

C. The Portuguese Governor is using 16 battalions against the insurgents--some 27,000 troops in all--but 5,000 of these have been recruited among the natives.

1. At present, he is trying to apply a program of resettlement in fortified hamlets.

2. The prospects are for a prolonged insurgency, and the balance is now swinging in favor of the PAIGC.

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15 December 1969

DCI BRIEFING FOR
17 DECEMBER NSC MEETING

SOUTHERN AFRICA

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A. Portugal, with its holdings in Angola and Mozambique, ~~admittedly~~ is still a classic colonial power.

B. The Portuguese, however, are sustained in their determination to remain in Africa by the example of the whites who hold power over South Africa and Rhodesia.

C. These are the whites who are described as "Europeans" in the population statistics, but that is a historical label. They are the descendants of the British, the Dutch, and the French Huguenot settlers who took southern Africa from the ~~Kaffirs~~ ^{Hottentots and} other, the Zulus and the Bantus more than 100 years ago in

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the early 19th century--long before Cecil Rhodes and Paul Kruger made it a question of empire.

1. The whites in Angola and Mozambique also have ancient roots in Africa--the first Portuguese settlers came to Angola a year before Christopher Columbus set sail, and Mozambique was colonized in 1505.
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3. The whites in Rhodesia and South Africa have no thought of retiring to Devon or Amsterdam; they have no ties other than heritage to the Empire and the Commonwealth. They are Africans--as I said, white Africans.

II. The Republic of South Africa, Rhodesia, Angola and Mozambique all have strong white governments, determined to stay in power.

- A. They are aware of their common interests, and of their mutual ostracism by most of the rest of the world.

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