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23 May 1967

DCI BRIEFING FOR CIA SUBCOMMITTEE  
OF HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE

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CUBAN  
SUBVERSION

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23 May 1967

DCI BRIEFING FOR  
RIVERS SUBCOMMITTEE

CUBAN SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITIES IN LATIN AMERICA

- I. The recent Castro-supported guerrilla outbreaks in Bolivia, and Cuban involvement in the insurgent landing in Venezuela on May 8th are the most recent indications of Fidel Castro's long-standing determination to spread revolutionary violence in Latin America. Tangible Cuban support for revolutionary activity in Latin America has been at a somewhat lower level over the past two years than during the peak period from 1961 to 1963. This does not, however, reflect any weakening of Fidel Castro's determination to spread his revolution. On May 18th the Castro regime once again proclaimed its determination to "fulfill its duty of solidarity" with revolutionaries around the world.
  - A. Castro agreed, at an extraordinary meeting Latin American Communist parties held in Havana in November, 1964, that he would stop supporting would-be insurgent groups which were not under the control of the orthodox pro-Moscow Communists.

1. He has continued, however, to give moral, material, and financial support and training to such groups in Venezuela, Colombia, and Guatemala, and most recently Bolivia, his four priority targets at present. He <sup>has</sup> made it clear in ~~a speech last month~~ <sup>his recent speeches</sup> that he does not feel bound by the 1964 agreement.
- B. On March 13th, he repeated his persistent thesis that violent revolution is necessary to bring about any meaningful political and social change in Latin America--a theme also used in a May Day speech by Acting Minister of Armed Forces Almeida.
  1. Castro accused the orthodox Communist parties which do not support dissident insurgent groups--in Venezuela and Colombia, for example--of cowardice and betrayal.
  2. He appeared particularly irked that a Soviet delegation has been attempting to improve relations and expand trade in some of the countries--Colombia and

Venezuela in particular--where he hopes to develop revolutions. In specific reference to the Soviet Union, he complained that members of the Communist camp who deal with oligarchies in countries where insurgents are active are betraying the revolutionaries.

C. Castro's statements continue to reflect his intense disillusionment with the urban-based pro-Moscow Communist parties. They indicate that he will place even greater emphasis on the rural guerrilla movements, which frequently operate independently of the regular parties.

1. In his March 13th speech, Castro stated:  
"If, in any nation, those who call themselves Communists do not know how to fulfill their duty, we will support those who--even though they do not call themselves Communists--behave like real Communists in the struggle."
2. This was a crystal-clear renunciation of the November 1964 agreement. Castro was saying that wherever the orthodox

[redacted]

Communist parties refuse to seek the violent road of revolution to seize power, he will ignore the party leaders and work with militant extremists who are ready to fight.

II. In those Latin American countries where there is no significant insurgency under way, the Cubans have been concentrating for the past two years on developing a support mechanism while they wait for a suitable opportunity and adequate assets.

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[redacted]

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A. The Cubans continue to provide some ideological and guerrilla warfare training to militants from several Latin American countries.

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[redacted]

1. This is by no means a maximum figure for the guerrilla potential. Many of these trainees in turn trained others

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when they returned to their home countries. A few, however, probably became disillusioned with the difficulties of initiating armed revolution, and left the field to more willing martyrs.

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B. The Cubans have been able to bring about international cooperation of national movements and parties in some areas. This has helped to create or strengthen infrastructures



upon which future revolutionary activities can be built, by making it easier to channel funds, move agents and leaders, transmit communications, and obtain false documents.

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III. Castro's fervent appeals to Latin American extremists to carry out armed struggles in their countries betray a certain amount of frustration over his program's lack of success, and the lack of enthusiasm it engenders among the pro-Moscow Communists in Latin America.

- A. Several important Communist Party leaders were quick to criticize Castro's revolutionary strategy after his pointed attack on the Moscow-oriented parties in his speech on July 26th, 1966. At that time, he called them "pseudo-revolutionaries," who lacked the courage to follow the path of armed struggle.
- B. Despite the fiery declarations of the January 1966 Tri-Continent Conference in Havana, and the subsequent general call for insurgency in Latin America, no measurable continent-wide response has been noted. In fact, some potential insurgent movements have lost rather than gained ground during the last year or two, although pro-Castro insurgents in Colombia, Venezuela, and Bolivia have very recently shown signs of new life.
1. An outgrowth of the Tri-Continent Conference--the Latin American Solidarity Organization--is to hold its first meeting in Havana in late July. The efficacy

of the strategy of violent revolution in Latin America will certainly be one of the main themes.

2. It will also give the Cubans an excellent chance to offer more training, propaganda guidelines, and possibly funds to the leaders of various groups of the extreme left who will be attending the conference.

C. For the past year, inflammatory propaganda has constituted Cuba's most consistent support for insurgency in the hemisphere. The emphasis has shifted somewhat from the strident calls for immediate armed action in the early days of the Castro regime.


1. The current emphasis is more on laying a solid foundation for future revolutionary action, attempting to unite feuding factions of the extreme left, and extolling those revolutionaries who are willing to take up the fight, regardless of whether they are bonafide Communists.

2. Havana now is broadcasting about 175 hours a week to Latin America, primarily in Spanish and Portuguese. There is also, however, propaganda in French and Creole for Haiti, Guarani (Gwah-rah-NEE) for Paraguay, and Quechua (KETCH-WAH) for Bolivia. The Quechua schedule for Bolivia was increased from 1-1/2 hours per week to seven on March 31st--just one week after the first successful Bolivian guerrilla attack.

D. The extent of guerrilla activity in Latin American countries is directly related, of course, to how dissatisfied the people of a given country may be over social injustices and the lack of economic opportunity, and what chance there appears to be for reform.

1. Cuban propaganda takes the line that the ruling oligarchies have frustrated and will continue to defeat all attempts to change existing conditions by legal, parliamentary methods.

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
2. Therefore, Havana Radio argues, the so-called "via pacifica" or peaceful path of reform sought by many of the orthodox Communist parties is ineffective, and the only course is armed struggle.

IV. I propose at this point to examine Cuban goals and activities in the individual Latin American target countries, beginning with active insurgent movements in Venezuela, Colombia, Guatemala, and Bolivia.


Venezuela (Map)

V. Cuba actively supports Communist insurgency in Venezuela which heads Castro's list of Latin American targets.

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C. The other, and larger, guerrilla group that Castro supports is called the F.A.L.N., or Armed Forces of National Liberation. This group began operations more than five years ago as the combined paramilitary arm of the militant Communists and the M.I.R.


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1. In 1963, the F.A.L.N. pulled off such dramatic feats as the hijacking of a Venezuelan freighter, the ANZOATEGUI, and bombing the U.S. Embassy in Caracas. It launched major campaigns of urban terrorism, sabotage, and rural guerilla raids in an effort to forestall the visit to Washington of President Betancourt, and the subsequent Venezuelan national elections.

2. When the F.A.L.N. failed to achieve these goals, and also failed to attract any substantial sympathy in the countryside, the orthodox Communist leadership decided that its achievements were not worth the damage they were doing to the Party's political image, and tried to tone down the militancy.

D. The orders of the Politburo, however, were defied publicly by the F.A.L.N. leader, Douglas Bravo, who announced that he would continue guerrilla operations. [REDACTED]


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E. The Venezuelan government, reacting to the terrorist murder of the Foreign Minister's brother on March 1, the increasing guerilla forays in the countryside, and now Cuban involvement in the May 8th landing, plans to protest in the Organization of American States against Cuban subversion.

1. It is difficult, however, to determine what further sanctions the O.A.S. can apply beyond those already taken against Cuba.

2. Castro is unmoved. In his March 13 speech, after denying Cuban involvement in the murder of the Venezuelan foreign





minister's brother, Castro praised the guerrillas, and implied that they would continue to receive full Cuban support.

Colombia (Map)

VI. There has recently been renewed and intensified guerrilla activity in Colombia, which Castro highlights along with Venezuela as being in the forefront of those countries "struggling against imperialism."

A. There has been banditry in Colombia for 400 years, since the days of the Conquistadores. Traditionally, it has varied from outright outlawry to political warfare.

1. In recent years, many thousands were killed in the bloody fighting between Liberal and Conservative Party partisans which raged for five years after the assassination in 1948 of Liberal leader Jorge Gaitan. Revulsion over the bloodbath created the opening for the country's last military dictator, General Rojas, to take power.

2. Strong gangs variously described as bandits or Communists have been operating for years in the rugged mountains south of Bogota. These areas are often referred to as Communist enclaves. In recent years, Communists have taken over the leadership of some of these gangs, have established influence over others, or converted the bandit chieftains to Communism.
3. These are remote areas where even the army operates only with difficulty, and the peasant has little sense of identity with any national government.
4. It might be said that there are only half a dozen of these enclaves, in out-of-the-way regions. But the same statement could have been made with equal validity about South Vietnam in 1959, when there were only half a dozen areas of Viet Cong activity.
5. It is worth noting that where inroads have been made against these Communist enclaves, it has been as a result of

civic action programs, either government-sponsored or public. One of the most effective programs has been a series of radio broadcasts run by the churches, to teach the farmers easy, do-it-yourself methods to improve cultivation, sanitation, home life, and the like.

This, backed up by roads to let the government in and the farm produce out,

can do more lasting good than a regiment, *although military force is of course required to destroy the bandit gangs*

VII. Insurgent operations in the southern mountains, insofar as there is any central direction, are generally run by the F.A.R.C., or Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia, [redacted]

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[redacted] In

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the area north of Bogota, a new organization stimulated by Cuba, the E.L.N., or Army of National Liberation, has taken the field.

A. There have been six major incidents in less than three months, including an E.L.N. attack on a police post in which five policemen were killed, and an F.A.R.C. ambush of an army patrol, in which fifteen soldiers were killed.

B. Both the E.L.N. and the F.A.R.C. are strongly supported by Cuban propaganda,



C. [redacted] as in Venezuela, the Communist Party of Colombia, or PCC, is increasingly opposed to Castro's support for guerrillas not under PCC control.

1. PCC leaders correctly reason that they are the ones who suffer during government reprisals for guerrilla attacks. The recent large-scale roundup of Communist Party leaders in Bogota bears out their fears.
2. The PCC is somewhat more flexible on this issue, however, than the Venezuelan party, and pays at least lip service to the need for supporting the E.L.N. and F.A.R.C.

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
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Bolivia (Map)

VIII. Cuban Embassy officers in Bolivia were extremely active in the early 1960's, supporting various leftist-extremist groups

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B. Moreover, there is strong evidence that  
Cuba is directly involved with the Bolivian  
25X1X guerrillas. [redacted]

25X1X [redacted] Cubans are present  
in the guerrilla camp [redacted]

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C. The most celebrated captured guerrilla,  
Jules Regis Debray, is a young French guer-  
rilla warfare theoretician closely associ-  
ated with Fidel Castro [redacted]

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

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Guatemala (Map)

IX. Cuba has been giving assistance and guidance to Guatemalan guerrilla and terrorist groups




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




Other Guerrilla Potential

X. Guerrilla potential exists in Panama, Ecuador, Peru, Brazil and the Dominican Republic. So far, however, nothing significant has developed.


A. Panama--because of the U.S. presence and the importance to us of the canal--is high on the list of Castro's long-range targets.



These revolution-

aries can be expected to be in the forefront of future disorders which might take place.

- B. Ecuador's long history of instability should afford a fertile ground for a Castro-oriented insurgent movement. The perpetual disorganization, lack of cohesiveness, and poor quality of leadership among all Ecuadorean political groups, however, also characterizes the leadership among the various Ecuadorean revolutionary groups. This has probably led the Cubans to conclude that revolutionary prospects in Ecuador are slight at best.
- C. In Peru, Cuba's relationship with leftist-extremist groups has been severely hampered by the government's crackdown following the initiation of guerrilla activity in June, 1965.



[Redacted]

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Today, insurgent leaders are either dead, in jail, or in exile, and their organization is badly disrupted.

[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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2. Internal bickering and successful government counterinsurgency operations, however, would seem to preclude an increase of insurgent activity in Peru to the proportions of the 1965 troubles.

[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]


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[Redacted]

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E. Cuba has continued to provide political and paramilitary training for a limited number of Dominicans, mainly members of the self-proclaimed "Leninist" 14th of June Movement and the Communist Dominican Popular Movement.



2. Direct Cuban involvement in clandestine activities was proved

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XI. In summary, Cuba has given ample notice that it intends to continue its propaganda, training, and financial support to selected revolutionary movements. As long as exploitable situations exist in the hemisphere, Cuba is on record as

being willing to contribute toward the establishment of "more Cubas and Vietnams" in Latin America.

- A. It is also apparent, however, that Havana is unwilling to run the great risks involved to provide significant military assistance to antigovernment groups in Latin America.
- B. The effect of the Communist parties' growing opposition to Castro-influenced armed action remains to be seen. Some of these parties may follow the lead of the Venezuelan party in openly denouncing Castro's revolutionary meddling. At the very least, such a development will speed up political fragmentation which -- on the leftist-extremist side -- could mean less control and discipline from above, and more urban terrorism and rural violence.

CHI . CULTURAL  
REVOLUTION

23 May 1967


DCI BRIEFING FOR  
RIVERS SUBCOMMITTEE

CHINESE DOMESTIC DEVELOPMENTS

- I. The Chinese Cultural Revolution is regaining its frenzy after a brief lull in February and March. On the surface, there is a renewed and perhaps final drive to destroy the titular Chief of State, Liu Shao-chi. Behind this facade, the extremist elements around Mao Tse-tung and Lin Piao appear to be locked in struggle with more moderate forces led by Premier Chou En-lai.
  - A. Mao, Lin and Chou maintain the appearance of unity in public; Chou remains the chief spokesman for the regime. Lin has again appeared in public after an absence of almost five months. We believe that their alliance is at best very shaky and uneasy.
  - B. The unleashing of Red Guards last month led immediately to reports of new outbreaks of violence.
    - 1. We are uncertain how much credence to give these reports, most of which are being circulated by Red Guard groups themselves.



2. According to poster reports, a particularly brutal incident occurred on May 6th in the western Chinese city of Chengtu, where troops allegedly used machine guns and grenades to kill or wound 2,000 Red Guards



- II. After the Cultural Revolution had brought the country to the brink of chaos in January, order and discipline were restored in most areas largely as a result of efforts by Chou En-lai.
  - A. Chou's most important role in that period was to reassure the army, and to make it a more responsive instrument of control. He did this by damping down a purge which had been launched in the army, and by issuing a series of policies moderating the Cultural Revolution.

III. His actions were grudgingly supported by Mao and Lin at the time. But they were hotly debated, and in some cases reversed

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[Redacted]

A. A major effort seems to be under way to remove military commanders, both in Peking and the provinces, who were vigorous in implementing the directives Chou pushed through, even when that meant arresting unruly Red Guards.

[Redacted]

IV. Vicious Red Guard poster attacks are now being aimed at Chou's proteges in the government, and at top military men who are being held responsible for letting the Cultural Revolution subside in

February. A common thread running through the charges against these men is that they resisted extremist policies desired by Mao and Lin.

A. The military men under attack--Yeh Chien-ying (YEH JYAN-YING) and Hsu Hsiang-chien (SHOO SHYANG-CHYAN)--had worked very closely with Mao and Lin until recently. Both are politburo members and vice chairmen of the powerful Military Affairs Committee. Hsu (SHOO) was named head of the special army purge group formed on January 11.

1. Now, however, they are accused of opposing Lin Piao at a recent meeting of the Military Affairs Committee, and of saying that Lin was not fit to be Mao's successor.

B. In recent weeks a main target of Red Guard posters and demonstrations has been Chou's protégé, Foreign Minister Chen Yi.

1. The foreign minister has been criticized before, but never this harshly. He is now accused of being a "counterrevolutionary revisionist" who has opposed Lin Piao and followed the line of the disgraced chief of state, Liu Shao-chi.

2. Chen Yi continues to perform ceremonial duties, but he is clearly in serious trouble.
- C. So far, Chou has not come to the defense of his proteges during the new wave of attacks. With his usual flexibility, he is adjusting to the latest political winds, with his own status uppermost in his mind.
1. Chou is still running the day-to-day work of the regime. This could be by default, however, and not necessarily a reflection of his political powers. He is 69, but he is the only one of the ruling triumvirate who is physically strong enough to put in a full day's work.
  2. He does not have many people left to help him. Last August, 25 men were installed in the politburo; today, only seven of them are still active and in apparent good standing--Mao, Lin, Chou, one propagandist, two security chiefs, and one economic planner.
- V. Looking into the future, no end to the Chinese political crisis is in sight.

- A. Instability and confusion are likely to persist as long as Mao Tse-tung retains effective power.
- B. After Mao goes, we expect a disorderly and contentious struggle over the succession.
  - 1. The military may play a decisive role, but Lin Piao would not necessarily be their candidate. A collective including Chou En-lai and military leaders might emerge.
  - 2. We believe that ultimately many of Mao's radical dogmas and practices are likely to be set aside, but this might be a gradual process.
- C. The political crisis has focused the leadership's energies and attention on internal affairs, and has damaged Chinese prestige abroad.
  - 1. For the most part, Peking has maintained foreign policy positions which were well established before the Cultural Revolution. It has tended, however, to become more rigid in its major areas of preoccupation-- Vietnam and the Sino-Soviet dispute.

2. As long as Maoists retain control, deep hostility to the US and the USSR is likely to remain the predominant feature of Chinese foreign policy
3. If the internal policy eventually shifts in the direction of moderation, this could conceivably create an opening for rapprochement with the Soviet Union, but we do not see any likelihood of any change in Peking's implacable hostility toward the United States.

HONG KONG

23 May 1967

DCI BRIEFING FOR  
RIVERS SUBCOMMITTEE

HONG KONG

- I. The Chinese Communists have begun a pressure campaign against the British in Hong Kong, similar to the one they directed against the Portuguese in Macao last December and January.
- A. You may recall that in the case of <sup>Macao</sup> ~~Mexico~~, the Chinese maintained the pressure until the Portuguese authorities made an abject and public apology to Chinese Communist organizations in Macao, in effect admitting that the Chinese were the real masters of the colony.
1. It was reminiscent of the demands early in the 19th century that foreigners must "kow tow" before the Imperial Throne.
- B. In Hong Kong, the Chinese are probably not prepared to challenge British control at this time. For one thing, Peking earns about \$550 million a year in foreign exchange through Hong Kong.



1. The objectives are probably more limited. Peking may want to weaken British control by bringing enough pressure to force the Hong Kong authorities into public concessions to the leftist groups which are stirring up trouble. This would also increase public support for the Communists in the Crown Colony.

II. On the surface, the disputes are economic issues—strikes at a cement plant and a plastic flowers factory. Leftists have turned the strikes into riots, in order to raise the target from plant management to the Hong Kong government.

A. The British, who believe that a strong line might have served the Portuguese better in Macao, seem determined not to give in. They have mobilized the police reserve, alerted the British Army garrison, and slapped a curfew on part of Kowloon, the mainland part of Hong Kong.

B. On May 15, the Chinese Communist Foreign Ministry handed a statement to the British charge in Peking, warning that the British face "grave consequences" unless they immediately

accept all of the leftist demands, release those arrested, offer apologies, and promise that there will be no recurrence of the repression.

- C. Peking emphasized its strong support for the leftist campaign against the Hong Kong Government on May 18 when Chou En-lai and other top leaders attended a mass rally in the capital called to denounce British actions in the colony.
- D. As I said, the Chinese Communists probably will not push the British as hard as they did the Portuguese. I expect, however, that Peking will exert enough pressure to learn what concessions the British would make to avoid a crisis, protracted riots, and perhaps strikes cutting off the utilities.

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
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COMMUNIST  
MILITARY

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
23 May 1967

DCI BRIEFING FOR  
RIVERS SUBCOMMITTEE

COMMUNIST MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS




I. The Paris Air Show opens May 26, and as you recall, this was the occasion last year at which the Soviets first displayed their big AN-22 transport, and a model of their supersonic transport.



B. The Soviet supersonic transport, as far as we can determine, is not yet ready to fly



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in prototype, but the AN-22 will be shown again.

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


(MAP, YU-LIN NAVAL BASE ON HAINAN ISLAND)

II. The Chinese Communists are making preparations which would enable them to support extensive naval activity in the Gulf of Tonkin and South China Sea.


A. They are expanding the naval base at Yu-lin, the only well-protected harbor on Hainan Island.

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B. The Japanese used Yu-lin as a submarine base in World War II. Communist China has some 34 submarines

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VIETNAM

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23 May 1967

DCI BRIEFING FOR  
RIVERS SUBCOMMITTEE

VIETNAM

- I. In Vietnam, the enemy build-up along the Demilitarized Zone, which we have been watching for several months, was first dramatized April 6th and 7th by the major Communist raids in and around Quang Tri city and Hue, the capitals of South Vietnam's two northernmost provinces.
  - A. The tempo of enemy operations in northern I Corps has continued to accelerate in recent weeks, accompanied by heavy and well-coordinated mortar, rocket, and artillery bombardment of U.S. Marine positions just south of the D.M.Z. in Quang Tri Province.
  - B. In late April U.S. Marines engaged elements of two North Vietnamese regiments in nearly two weeks of sustained heavy fighting near Khe Sanh in the western region of Quang Tri Province. The battle for control of three strategic hills astride key enemy infiltration routes into Quang Tri from both Laos and the DMZ proved very costly to both sides,


as reflected in Communist losses of 800 confirmed killed (plus an additional 600 estimated killed) and US losses of 133 killed and 383 wounded.

- C. US Marines and South Vietnamese Army forces on May 18 began a three-pronged offensive against North Vietnamese regulars--numbering approximately 9,000 men--south of the Ben Hai River in the DMZ and in the northeastern section of northernmost Quang Tri Province. Only moderate enemy resistance was met in the opening phase, as 12 allied battalions swept the area in search of the enemy and his supply points. Cumulative casualties reported on 22 May show more <sup>than</sup> ~~the~~ 550 Communists killed, in contrast to allied losses of 83 killed and 648 wounded.
- D. Early this year elements of the North Vietnamese 341st Division, along with units of the 324B Division which had retreated into North Vietnam after last summer's incursions, began slipping back into Quang Tri Province.

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
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E. In recent months the Communists have also extended a feeder road--Route 922--from the Laos panhandle into the A Shau Valley of western Thua Thien Province, giving them their first motorable through road from the North, all the way down the Laotian panhandle, and into the South.

1.



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confirmed

a considerable build-up and extensive stockpiling in the A Shau Valley, and in base areas near Route 922 in Laos.

II.



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indicated that the Communists plan a major "summer" campaign in the Quang Tri - Thua Thien areas;



plans for regimental and even

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division-sized actions.

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the enemy's 1967 "summer

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campaign" would begin in early April in Quang Tri and Thua Thien provinces, subsequently expanding to the western highlands and the coastal provinces of north-central Vietnam by June. Of these three major battlefields, the western highlands of Pleiku and Kontum provinces were reportedly considered of prime importance to the Communists' overall strategic objectives in the northern half of South Vietnam.

B. A threat to such towns as Quang Tri and Hue cannot be ruled out, but the Communists seem more likely to undertake actions designed to protect their infiltration routes through Laos and the western DMZ area, and to keep allied forces spread out.

1. The Communists have stepped up their efforts to harass and kill the pacification teams. The effort is nationwide,

but more than half of the 300-plus attacks since the first of January have taken place in the northern First Corps area.

III. The Communists are maintaining a replacement and convalescent group on Cambodian territory, according to documents captured in March and April during Operation JUNCTION CITY, the spoiling operation in the Communist War Zone "C" along the Cambodian border west of Saigon.

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A. This group, [redacted] amounts to about 7,500 men, and is subordinate to the Central Office for South Vietnam.

B. The Viet Cong Ninth Division, composed of the North Vietnamese 101st and the Viet Cong 271st and 272nd Regiments, lost more than 2,700 killed during JUNCTION CITY, and pulled back into Cambodia to regroup and retrain.

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C. There are indications that the three regiments have now made up their losses from the [redacted] Replacement Depot, and are now back in War Zone "C."

IV. Our military command in Saigon has pulled together some statistics which will give you an idea of the increase in incoming enemy fire.

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- A. MAC-V figures for enemy mortar, rocket, and artillery attacks--excluding enemy reaction to operations initiated by our side--show that in 1966 there were an average of 60 such incidents per month.
1. In 1967 there were 44 incidents in January, 51 in February, but 141 in March and 100 in April.
  2. This increase is compounded by a greater number of rounds per incident, and heavier projectiles.
- B. General Westmoreland's headquarters estimates that the weight of the incoming barrages was less than ten tons altogether during the last six months of 1967--but 49.4 tons for March and April alone in 1967.
- C. This would seem to give added significance to our observations that the enemy was able to move 15 to 20 thousand tons of supplies south, to or across the South Vietnamese border, by daylight during the four-day Lunar New Year truce in mid-February.
- D. The enemy has brought a number of new weapons into play in the first quarter of 1967. In 1966, his heaviest bombardment weapon was the 120-millimeter mortar.

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E. Now he is using Soviet 122 and 140-millimeter rockets, Chinese 102-millimeter rockets, and artillery firing 100, 105, 122 and 152-millimeter shells from positions in or behind the so-called "Demilitarized" Zone.

1. The 140-millimeter rocket has a range of about six miles, and the 122-millimeter about 10 miles--in either case outside the defense perimeter which is normally maintained around one of our bases.

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POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS

- V. The forthcoming presidential election, in South Vietnam, scheduled for 3 September, is becoming complicated by the rivalry between Premier Ky and Chief of State Thieu.
- A. Ky has already announced that he will run, and Thieu has all but committed himself to do likewise.
1. Previously, the armed forces leadership had announced that it would not formally back a candidate, hoping to avoid taking sides between Ky and Thieu.
  2. If the two men do run against each other, however, they will split the military vote, and could touch off severe divisions in military unity.
  3. On the other hand, if only one military man eventually runs, his chances for victory are fairly strong, since the army is the only effective national organization.
- B. Only two of seven civilian candidates, assembly president Phan Khac Suu and former premier Tran Van Huong, seem to have any substantial support. Both appeal largely to southerners in the delta area, and therefore could cancel each other out.



VI. Meanwhile, the local elections for village and hamlet offices, which began in early April and will run into early June, have been proceeding fairly well.

- A. Despite considerable voter apathy and some reluctance by candidates to risk Viet Cong retaliation, voter turn-out in areas where elections were held averaged 78 percent for the five Sundays of voting for 984 village councils.
- B. In these elections the Viet Cong killed 12 and kidnaped 31 of the candidates.
- C. Voting for some 4,600 hamlet chiefs, which began on May 14th, has proceeded with about the same amount of voter participation and Viet Cong harassment.

NORTH VIETNAM

VII. North Vietnamese officials have not withdrawn their offer to consider talks with the U.S. in exchange for a permanent cessation of the air strikes, but they have indicated clearly that this concession is as far as they are prepared to go at the present time.

A. The Hanoi leaders have resumed their emphasis on the importance of the "Four Points" as the only basis for a settlement of the war. On at least three occasions they have gone out of their way to underscore this attitude.

VIII. Peking is the only DRV ally who has not approved of Hanoi's recent offer to talk in exchange for a cessation of the bombings.

A. The Chinese have greeted both the original offer by the DRV foreign minister and the Ho-Johnson correspondence with stony silence.

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IX. The most interesting recent North Vietnamese development is the trip Pham Van Dong made to Moscow in late March and early April. He spent about five days in Peking on his way home.

A. This trip is believed to have been connected with an increase in Soviet military assistance. It was kept strictly clandestine at the time, although word later leaked out

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3. It also appears that Pham stopped off in Peking for about a week on his way home from Moscow, perhaps arranging further Chinese aid and a commitment <sup>from</sup> ~~for~~ Mao's men that Soviet supplies will be moved through to the DRV.

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ARAB/  
ISRAELI

23 May 1967

DCI BRIEFING FOR  
RIVERS AND RUSSELL  
SUBCOMMITTEES

NEW LEAD

ARAB-ISRAELI SITUATION

- I. The Arab-Israeli confrontation this morning has reached a critical point. An incident, an accident, or a miscalculation could result in war.
- A. Neither side <sup>appears to</sup> wants a full-blown war, but the moves and counter-moves of the past week or 10 days have evoked a chain of reactions which are now perhaps beyond the control of the leaders on <sup>both</sup> either sides.
- B. The most dangerous development overnight has been the defiant statement by UAR President Nasir that he is closing the Gulf of Aqaba to Israeli shipping and to any ships carrying strategic cargoes to the Israeli port of Eilat at the head of the Gulf.
- C. We believe that interference with Israeli shipping to Eilat is one of the contingencies which Israeli security policy rates as a cause of war.
1. In 1956, the Israelis took Sharm al-Shaykh, the Egyptian headland which dominates the shipping channel into the southern end of

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The Gulf of Aqaba, and spiked the Egyptian guns which had been guarding the Strait.

2. Since then, a detachment of the United Nations Emergency Force has been stationed at Sharm-al-Shaykh, but it is now withdrawing.

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4. Egypt also has submarines and guided missile patrol boats in the Gulf of Suez. They could quickly move into position to guard the entry into the Gulf of Aqaba.

D. War could result from this situation, from the Israeli ground and air patrolling to monitor Egyptian moves near the Israeli border, or from continued Palestinian raids into Israel, provoking Israeli retaliation and a Syrian call for Egyptian help.

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pages 60-61)*

23 May 1967


DCI BRIEFING FOR  
RIVERS SUBCOMMITTEE

ARAB-ISRAELI SITUATION

I. The current Arab-Israeli crisis is an outgrowth of the Palestinian terrorist harassment of Israel which has been supported by Syria.

A. Two recent incidents--on May 5th and 8th-- were particularly responsible for causing the subsequent buildup of military forces in Israel, Syria, and Egypt.

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2. At the time, Israeli officials said those incidents were the 13th and 14th since the Israeli-Syrian air clash in early April.

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted] Pressure

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began to build up in Israel in favor of some kind of counterattack. Official spokesmen, led by Prime Minister Eshkol and Army Chief of Staff Rabin, publicly warned again that unless the sabotage ceased, Israel would punish Syria for its support of the terrorists.

[Redacted]


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II. Following the Israeli warnings, the Syrian Government became genuinely concerned about the prospect of another round with Israel,



especially so soon on the heels of their defeat  
in the April 7th clash (in which they lost six  
MIG-21s).

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III. The response in Egypt has been, of course, more clear in terms of the support Cairo appears ready to give to Syria in the event of an Israeli attack.

A. Egypt has a joint defense agreement with Syria. Moreover, during Syria's disastrous engagement with the Israelis in April, Cairo was conspicuously silent--a silence which the Jordanians were quick to point out.

B. For these reasons--intimately tied up with Nasir's prestige as an Arab leader--Nasir realized he probably would have to intervene in the next major Israeli-Syrian clash.

[Redacted] Egypt

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began a series of moves which have strengthened forces in Sinai and increased over-all capabilities vis-a-vis Israel.

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
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[Redacted]

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~~B. Other Egyptian military preparations include~~  
the steps that have been taken which would  
enable Cairo to interdict Israeli shipping  
through the Gulf of Aqaba in the Red Sea.  
This is a route which the Israelis consider  
vital, largely because their oil shipments  
from Iran come that way. Until the Sinai  
~~war of 1956, the Egyptians had blockaded~~

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B. The ~~apparent defensive~~ posture assumed by Egypt, and the widespread publicity that has been accorded its military preparations, suggest that Cairo hopes Israeli awareness of these moves will discourage any aggressive Israeli intentions.

V. The withdrawal of the 3,400-man U.N. Emergency Force (UNEF) has removed one of the deterrents to trouble along the border.

A. Nasir initially asked UNEF to congregate its troops in Gaza, "to ensure their safety." U Thant, however, refused to agree to any such curtailment of UNEF's operations, and this apparently forced Nasir to follow through by requesting its complete withdrawal. He clearly was moved to take some action to remove UNEF because of past Jordanian criticism about his "hiding behind a UN shield."

B. U Thant saw no legal basis for resisting Nasir's demand, and the withdrawal is now under way. The Secretary-General arrived in Cairo on 22 May to seek some other means of preserving peace along the border, and he probably will try to reactivate the Egyptian-Israeli Mixed Armistice Commission. Israel, which repudiated the commission in 1956, has indicated it would oppose this.

VI. The key to the situation probably lies with the Palestinian terrorists.

A. They're still making forays into Israel--

[Redacted]

25X1

[REDACTED]

the Israelis eventually may be compelled to strike back. They almost certainly would take some action if Israeli lives are lost as a result of the sabotage. There haven't been any fatalities in recent weeks, however.

- B. Syria shows no sign of trying to restrain the terrorists, if indeed it could do so. Foreign Minister Makhus told our ambassador in Damascus on 20 May that the Syrian government "once and for all" disclaimed any responsibility for the actions of the Palestinian extremists.
- C. The Jordanians, incidentally, are trying harder than ever to prevent the terrorist incursions from Jordanian territory, and we doubt that Israel would punish them again for terrorism which King Husayn's regime opposes.

[REDACTED]

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YEMEN

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23 May 1967

DCI BRIEFING FOR  
RIVERS SUBCOMMITTEE

YEMEN

- I. The recent crisis in our relations with the Egyptian puppet regime in Yemen centered on a completely fraudulent charge that two American AID employees--accused by the Yemenis of being CIA personnel--fired bazookas at an ammunition dump in an effort to blow up the city of Taiz.
  - A. Four bazooka rounds were, in fact, fired at a camp of the Egyptian 85th Parachute Battalion, not far from the U.S. residential compound outside Taiz. At least two men were killed. The Egyptians and Yemenis say dogs followed a scent from the scene of the firing to the U.S. compound, and that bazooka rounds were found in the compound.
  - B. The facts are that the two AID representatives are not CIA personnel, and that they were in the compound, in the company of other Americans, at the time the shots were fired.

Y-1



1. Sabotage of this kind is attempted frequently in Yemen by various tribal groups under the control of South Arabian Federation leaders who are anti-Egyptian, and the U.S. is often publicly accused of complicity in subversion, in which we are not involved.

C. The Yemeni Government ordered the AID mission out, and all American personnel have been evacuated except for 11 diplomatic personnel. AID equipment has been commandeered.

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Y-2

3. The two AID employees were never formally indicted, and were well-treated while in custody. They were finally released on bail on May 16, and allowed to leave the country.

II. Four days after the arrests, the Egyptians began to realize that they could make propaganda points whether or not they could ultimately prove the involvement of AID officials. Top Egyptian authorities began controlling the handling of the investigation.

- A. Cairo took the line, however, that the quarrel was between Yemen and the U.S., with Egypt as the honest broker arranging for release of the prisoners.
- B. The Yemenis, probably at Egyptian direction, have asked for closure of the Taiz office, claiming that it is "unsafe" for Americans, and the U.S. will shut it down.

III. The Egyptians are carrying out an intensive air offensive against tribal dissidents, royalist and republican alike. The chief weapon in this terror bombing has been gas

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
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GRECE

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23 May 1967


DIC BRIEFING FOR  
RIVERS SUBCOMMITTEE

GREECE

I. Since I briefed you on Greece, the Revolutionary Committee has taken a small step toward restoring parliamentary government by announcing that constitutional changes will be drafted within six months and submitted to a popular referendum. After this, parliamentary elections will be held, but no time has been set for the referendum or the elections.

A. These steps are likely to take a year to eighteen months to carry out. But the pressure to take constructive steps is now on the Committee.


II. Andreas Papandreou remains in custody, apparently well treated. He has now been charged in civil court with conspiracy to commit high treason



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GR-1



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THAILAND

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23 May 1967

DCI BRIEFING FOR  
RIVERS SUBCOMMITTEE

THAILAND


- I. Communist insurgents are intensifying their activities in northeast Thailand in an apparent attempt to counter government security programs there.
  - A. During March the insurgents initiated 30 per cent more armed encounters than in February.
    1. This means an average of one clash a day, and matches the number started by government forces.
    2. A marked rise in casualties was noted on both sides.
  - B. Although the picture is not clear, there are indications that the insurgents are tailoring their effort to meet a government security program begun last January in areas of known Communist strength.
    1. The guerrillas have apparently attempted to avoid direct confrontation with large security units. In some cases the guerrillas have moved some of their assets into peripheral areas.

TH-1



2. At the same time, they appear to be trying to upset Bangkok's efforts to establish local defense forces in isolated villages.


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
C. The insurgents are also stepping up their political activities.

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TH-2

D. Despite the rise in the Communists' activity there is no evidence that they have significantly increased their strength or have brought new areas under their influence.



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TH-3

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INDIA

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23 May 1967

DCI BRIEFING FOR  
RIVERS SUBCOMMITTEEINDIA

- I. In India, the food crisis is going to become even worse this summer, and it will remain acute at least until the end of this year.
  - A. The second straight year of drought in some of the major grain regions is going to reduce this fall's harvest.
  - B. On top of that, the summer monsoons will make roads impassable, creating serious distribution problems for food imports.
    1. Many of the areas hardest hit by food shortages can be reached only by road.
- II. The slim Congress Party majority in Parliament remains intact, but only eight of India's 17 states are under Congress control.
  - A. Strained relations between the Congress Party central government and non-Congress state governments could create additional food supply and other problems.
  - B. Several of the non-Congress state governments are shaky coalitions that may not last long.

IND-1

C. The splintered opposition parties, at least in New Delhi, have been largely unable to form a common front against the weakened ruling party.

III. The victory of the ruling Congress Party's candidate for president has given a much needed boost to the sagging prestige of both the party and Prime Minister Gandhi.

A. Zakir Husain, a prominent educator and previously vice president, is the first Indian Muslim to occupy this prestigious, though largely ceremonial, office.

B. Husain reportedly favors a strong Indian government and improvement of relations with Pakistan, but his influence on policy is likely to be minimal.

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IND-2

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PANAMA  
CANAL TALKS

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23 May 1967

DCI BRIEFING FOR  
RIVERS SUBCOMMITTEE

PANAMA NEGOTIATIONS

- I. Negotiations with Panama for a new canal treaty have entered a crucial stage. From here on in, the Panamanians are bound to look at them as a major issue in the campaign for their presidential elections in May, 1968.
- A. President Robles, in a speech on his return from Punta del Este, said he was elated over his meeting with President Johnson, and hopeful that the canal talks could be finished within the time frame set by the Panamanians.
- B. Robles sent Foreign Minister Eleta to New York on May 8 to wind up the canal treaty negotiations [REDACTED]
- [REDACTED]
- C. The Panamanians want a draft treaty completed in time to be ratified by a special assembly session late this summer. Robles feels that he needs at least six weeks before the special session for an intensive campaign to "sell" the merits of the new agreement to the country.

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PAN-1

1. If ratification is delayed until the regular session begins on October 1, the pressures of the presidential campaign will make it increasingly difficult to hold the fragile government coalition of seven parties together.

II. Opposition leader Arnulfo Arias and his mass-based Panamenista Party have begun to step up attacks on the efforts to reach a canal settlement with the U.S.

- A. Arias claims he was robbed in the 1964 presidential election, and that the present regime is therefore illegal and does not represent a majority of the people. As a result, "the people" will reject any canal agreement reached by the Robles regime regardless of its content.
- B. Arias has not yet decided whether to run again in 1968. He is convinced the election would be rigged against him, and might prefer to abstain, claim fraud, and then try to seize power by force.

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DOMINICAN  
REPUBLIC

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May 1967

DCI BRIEFING FOR  
RIVERS SUBCOMMITTEE

DOMINICAN REPUBLIC

- I. There has been some deterioration recently in the political position of President Balaguer.
  - A. He has come under intensified attack from the left and the "anti-Trujillo" right over such issues as the government's failure to prevent or solve sporadic incidents of political terrorism and the presence of associates of Trujillo in the government.
  - B. Moderates have been critical of the President's failure to respond positively to responsible criticism.
- II. There is no available evidence that this dissatisfaction has yet been translated into serious plotting that threatens the government.
  - A. Balaguer still appears to be accepted by most of the military and has the enthusiastic backing of some officers.

DR-1

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B. Nevertheless, if trends evident over the last few months continue, there will be increasing polarization into pro- and anti-Balaguer elements, and the chance of a serious threat to stability will increase.

DR-2

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