

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Houston

Larry -

I understand you are DCI/DO this weekend. I will keep Watch Office informed of my reachability, but for your information as well, I will be around home all day Saturday, except for brief trip to emplane my wife for Milwaukee, in case everybody signs off on this and wants it printed forthwith. Sunday I have to go to Rehoboth to collect a daughter, but will be back ca. 2300, will check with Watch Office, and can come in and put the paper into Reproduction if it is desired oob Monday.

[Handwritten Signature]

(DATE)

FORM NO. 101 REPLACES FORM 10-101
1 AUG 54 WHICH MAY BE USED

(47)

TK
(DCI's input attached)

17 June 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR: DDCI
DDI
General Counsel

SUBJECT : Lawrence Draft STATINTL

1. DCI through [redacted] sent me his suggestions for changes in the draft reply for Lawrence, along with word that he had been over the draft we discussed Thursday, and did not wish to see it again until you three gentlemen had put your chop on revisions resulting from his input.

2. I am trying to keep the changes visible and separate so that those involved will not be re-reading all the same material half a dozen times. The copies which were circulated this morning, as well as the attached, show the changes which were made as a result of yesterday's meeting. The attachment further shows the changes requested by the Director, marked in the margin so that you can find them rapidly if you have already absorbed this morning's copy.

STATINTL

STATINTL

3. This latest version has been circulated only to DDCI, DDI, GC, and [redacted] and Commander Moran. Messrs. Moran and [redacted] inform me they have some suggestions which they will be sending either to Mr. Helms or to me.

4. Next edition, I propose, will be a clean complete re-type for re-submission to DCI.

STATINTL

[redacted]
CS/Pres, OCI

7610

17 June 1966

Attached is a draft reply for Mr. David Lawrence, revised in accordance with the suggestions of DDCI, Executive Director, and General Counsel.

A clean, complete revision will be printed and circulated after such further review and changes as DCI may direct.

CS/Pres, OCI

*(Changes made per DCI's comments
are side-lined in red.)*

DCI
DDCI
ExDir
OGC
OGC/LC
DDI
DOCI
A/DCI (Cdr. Moran)

(Note: To distinguish between the two sets of questions, those on yellow paper have retained their original numbers from 1 through 42, while those on white paper are numbered W1 through W12. The supplementary questions on white paper have been answered first because the answers provide a more general introduction to the subject.)

(W1) Q: Can you describe the role of the Central Intelligence Agency in general terms?

A: The Congress of the United States did that in the National Security Act of 1947, the same act which established the Department of Defense and the National Security Council. This legislation also created the position of Director of Central Intelligence, with responsibility for coordination of the total foreign intelligence effort of the U. S. Government, and ^{in effect} made the DCI the principal foreign intelligence adviser to the President and the NSC.

The prime responsibility of the Central Intelligence Agency is to obtain, produce, and disseminate intelligence essential to our national security. Specifically, the National Security Act says that the CIA is "...to correlate and evaluate intelligence relating to the national security, and provide for the appropriate dissemination of such intelligence within the Government..." The Act assigned five functions to the CIA, under the direction of the National Security Council. First, the CIA is responsible for advising the NSC--and of course the President--on intelligence

matters related to national security. Second, the CIA is responsible for coordinating all foreign intelligence activities. Third, the Agency is responsible for the production ^{and dissemination within the Government} of finished national intelligence. Fourth and fifth, the CIA undertakes "such services of common concern" as may be determined by the NSC--services, that is, which are useful to all the components of the government's intelligence community--and is authorized to perform such other functions as the NSC might direct.

(W2) Q: Is this role essentially one of information gathering? Would a more descriptive title be "Central Information Agency?"

A: Our principal responsibility is to gather, specifically, that information which relates directly to national security problems and objectives. The United States Information Agency deals with information in the broader sense of the term, and distributes it outside the government. It is useful both to their operations and to ours to preserve this distinction. There is a further point of professional semantics involved: "intelligence," as we use the term, refers to information which has been carefully evaluated as to its accuracy and significance. It is the important process of evaluating the accuracy and assessing the significance in terms of national security which makes the difference in our terminology between "information" and "intelligence."

other available information on the same subject, and analyzed and evaluated by competent experts in that particular field, we call it "finished intelligence." When, in addition, it represents the agreed conclusions of the entire intelligence community--the intelligence components of the Department of State, the Department of Defense, and the FBI and AEC if it should fall within the purview of those agencies--then it is "national intelligence." In short, we find that we need a terminology which can be more precise and more limiting than the broad concept of "information."

(W3) Q: People seem to have the impression that yours is a big "spying" organization, staffed by spies. Is that anywhere near a correct impression?

A: This is, of course, the popular view of any intelligence organization, but in reality our job is to provide intelligence information to U. S. Government officials on matters affecting the national security so that they may know, in a timely way, what the real news is behind the events which become public around the world. A great proportion of this work amounts to bringing expert knowledge and scholarly analysis to bear in a way which has nothing in common with the heroes of modern spy fiction. Of course, much of the world's area and population is controlled by governments operating closed societies, in which they seek to conceal their activities and objectives. Some classical espionage may be required, to determine when and how these activities

and objectives might threaten us. But to preserve the proper perspective: ~~I cannot provide you with~~ **We cannot make public any** a breakdown of how many people are in headquarters and in the field, or how many gather information and how many analyze it, but ~~I can tell you that~~ the man who joins CIA has far less chance, in the course of his career, of identifying with James Bond or "The Spy Who Came In From the Cold," than he does of identifying with an academic researcher, economist, scientist, statistician, administrator, accountant, or supply officer.

(W4) Q: Another idea is that the CIA is in the business of stirring insurrections or starting and maybe running little wars. Is that impression justified?

A: This, again, is a popular misconception. Our major business is the gathering of national intelligence, and so-called covert operations are a relatively minor part of our overall activities against Communism. Furthermore, a glance at today's headlines should make it obvious that the leaders of our government expect us to forestall or help combat insurrections, not stir them up. The government, after all, is organized on a pretty logical basis: Secretary Rusk is in charge of foreign policy and foreign relations; Secretary McNamara, together with the Secretaries of the individual

services and the Joint Chiefs, runs the armed forces;
CIA has
and ~~I have~~ enough to do coordinating intelligence
without running any wars.

(W5) Q: Do your information activities cover the globe?


A: Our intelligence responsibilities are world-wide.

(W6) Q: Why is information on this scale important to the U. S.? Is it necessary as an aid in shaping policies of this nation with its worldwide interests and worldwide aid programs?

A: Factual and unbiased intelligence information on activities going on around the world is necessary to officials of the U.S. Government on a timely basis, so that they may use it as one of the many elements which go into the decisions they have to make. At a minimum, we must have certain basic information on hand on virtually every country in the world, against some sudden need. Country X -- you name it -- may appear remote and totally unrelated to our national security, but it is nevertheless impossible to state with certainty that detailed information about Country X will not become necessary to our government on a crash basis some day.

(W7) Q: Do you work with the nation's embassies overseas and its consulates? Is that work a supplement to the diplomatic and consular service, or in competition with it?

STATINTL



(W8) Q: Is your role in information-gathering different from that of the intelligence services of the armed forces?

STATINTL

A: Our finished national intelligence derives from the work of all of the elements of the intelligence community, which includes the intelligence services of the armed forces. Foreign service officers provide the Department of State with political intelligence, commercial attachés are responsible for economic information, the military attachés sent military intelligence to their respective services, and for that matter there are agricultural attachés and labor attachés. All of them provide departmental intelligence for the specific needs of specific departments. The CIA has been added to supplement and expand the collection and fill any gaps. It has a broader charter for all types of intelligence necessary in the national interest, and--as ^{was} mentioned at the outset (W1)--the added

statutory responsibility to "correlate and evaluate intelligence relating to the national security, and provide for...appropriate dissemination." For example, a piece of political intelligence from one country, and the army attaché's report from another country, may add up to a conclusion of major significance to the National Security Council, or specifically to the AEC. It is CIA's responsibility to see to it that the two halves do get added up in Washington to make the whole, and furthermore that the finished evaluation reaches the department which needs it.

(W9) Q: Does machinery exist to correlate all of the information that flows into Washington?

A: Yes--formally, the United States Intelligence Board, or USIB. This Board, ~~under my chair-~~ **which is advisory to the Director of Central Intelligence and under his chairmanship,** ~~manship and advisory to me,~~ meets every week, or more often if necessary, to coordinate the work and review the conclusions of all of the intelligence components in the U. S. Government. It consists of: The Deputy Director of Central Intelligence, ~~the Director as chairman~~ **the Director as chairman** who represents CIA so that ~~I will be un-~~ **is uncommitted;** ~~committed as chairman;~~ the Director of Intelligence and Research, Department of State; the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency; the Director of

~~the Defense Intelligence Agency; the Director of~~
the National Security Agency; an Assistant Direc-
tor of the Federal Bureau of Investigation; and
the Assistant General Manager for Administration
of the Atomic Energy Commission. The heads of
Army, Navy, and Air Force intelligence meet with
the Board as observers. USIB assigns intelligence
priorities to see to it that there are no gaps in
our coverage, and ensures that the judgments which
go forward to the President are finished, national
intelligence.

It should be emphasized,

~~I want to emphasize,~~ however, that the task
of correlation and coordination starts long before
the product reaches USIB for final review. More
and more, as we develop and refine the concept of
an intelligence community, the analysts and the
specialists in one component are in constant touch
and interchange with their opposite numbers in the
other departments and agencies, so that the national
intelligence process begins as soon as the raw in-
formation reaches Washington, if not before.

(W10) Q: It is really possible to refine down to
fixed conclusions the vast amount of
information that you receive? Is this
machinery so geared that quick action
can follow when the flow of information
suggests impending danger or trouble?

A: We are geared to receive information, produce intelligence, and react 24 hours a day, seven days a week; nobody in the Agency, from the analysts to the Director, is guaranteed a night's uninterrupted sleep, or an unbroken weekend.

As for reaching firm conclusions, in many cases this can be done by the expert analysts available, backed up by our storehouse of background knowledge. There will always, of course, be the "unknowables"--questions which have no definitive answers, possibly because the future is open to the effects of many variables, or because the future depends on decisions which certain foreign statesmen may not even have made yet. Who will succeed Mao Tse-tung? When, and by whom, will there be a successful coup in Country X? Our policy makers need and request our best answers on the "unknowables." This we do in our National Intelligence Estimates. From what we do know, the best thinking available in the entire intelligence community makes rational inferences about the unknown,--with varying degrees of confidence, and an occasional footnote reflecting an individual dissent from the agreed opinion. Many such estimates are produced

routinely and annually, on a predetermined schedule; some are produced in times of crisis in a matter of hours. All are geared to the needs of the policy makers for information. All reflect the greatest possible professional skill and dispassionate objectivity we can bring to bear. We grind no axes, and we do not permit ourselves to become advocates of specific policies in preparing our estimates. Our job is to provide the facts and the judgment.

All aspects of every estimate get the fullest consideration, by the working groups which begin the drafting, by the Board of National Estimates--a group of distinguished senior officers of long experience and proven competence in diverse fields of government--and by the United States Intelligence Board. In the end, the National Intelligence Estimate is the report of the Director of Central Intelligence to the President and the National Security Council.

(W11) Q: Do you work largely in a vacuum, with little or no contact with the rest of the government?

A: By no means. It ~~should be~~ ^{is} inherent in the concept of a Central Intelligence Agency that any branch of the government which needs information can call on us for it. Similarly, when we need

expertise to help us in evaluation, or in the accomplishment of any of our missions, we will not hesitate to go anywhere in the government or outside it, within the limitations of security, where we might expect to find the necessary help. But our closest ties, of course, are within the intelligence community, departments and agencies of the U. S. Government, and to the ~~policy makers of the Executive Branch.~~

(W12) Q: To whom does your organization report?
Are accounts supervised or audited?
Does anyone in Congress know of what activities you are carrying on?

A: That question--or rather, those questions--are a big order and an important one. Let us summarize the answers first, and then expand on them in greater detail. We report our substantive intelligence to the National Security Council, presided over by the President, and to other components of the executive and legislative branches as he may direct--cabinet departments, congressional committees, even individual legislators who may have a need for briefings. Discussion of our activities, our methods, and our sources, however, is another matter, because Public Law 80-253 of 1947 (the National Security Act) requires the Director of Central Intelligence to protect the sources and methods of the entire intelligence community. CIA's operations are authorized and approved in the first instance by a special NSC committee representing the President and the Secre-

taries of State and Defense. The Director is authorized and directed to make complete disclosure on the legislative side to two special subcommittees of the Senate and two similar subcommittees in the House. In addition, the President has appointed a most knowledgeable and distinguished Board, composed of private citizens, to oversee the Central Intelligence Agency and for that matter the entire intelligence community, and to report regularly and directly to the President with their views on the conduct of the activities of the Central Intelligence Agency. Our requests for funds must be justified in detail to the Bureau of the Budget and approved in detail by special Appropriations subcommittees of House and Senate, and our comprehensive auditing procedures have to satisfy the standards of those who have approved the budget in the first place.

Now, to go into these questions in greater detail:

The Central Intelligence Agency budget is reviewed fully by the Bureau of the Budget, which requires the same assurances and justifications for expenditures by intelligence agencies that it requires from any other part of our government. We are not immune from detailed examination of our requests by the Bureau, nor are we exempt from its skillful pruning knife. We have to go to Congress for our funds, just like other agencies. The only difference is that after our requests have been approved by ~~a number of select subcommittees which~~ ^{the appropriate Congressional subcommittees,} ~~which will be identified in a minute,~~ ^{I will discuss in a minute,} our specific appropriations are then concealed for passage with other appropriations, to deny the hostile intelligence services information about our activities which

would be very useful to them. We have meticulous auditing procedures to ensure the tightest possible control over the expenditure of funds entrusted to the CIA.

Secondly, if ~~I may assume that~~ your question about those to whom we report includes the dissemination of the intelligence we have collected, we report in an infinite variety of formats, tailored to specific purposes. ~~I often report~~ **The Director often reports** directly and in person, of course, to the President and the NSC. In addition, we have daily, weekly, and monthly publications, some global in scope, some for a specific country. In a crisis situation, ~~I some-~~ **there will be** frequent situation reports, sometimes as often as every hour ~~times-order-hourly-situation-reports,~~ **around the** clock. We have memoranda, studies in depth, the ~~estimates I have mentioned,~~ **which were described earlier,** and an encyclopedic compilation of basic intelligence and fundamental data on just about any country you can think of. This latter series, covering everything from the economic statistics and the sociological composition of the country to its cabinet and its legal code, adds up to more than 10 times the size of the Encyclopedia Britannica, and is still growing.

Various publications have dissemination lists, depending on their sensitivity and purpose, ranging from less than half a dozen copies to more than 1,000. Our first and foremost customer is the President, followed by the cabinet-level officers who comprise the National Security Council. We also serve departments in the Executive Branch which are not in the NSC, as their needs may require. We disseminate widely, of course, within the intelligence community. We serve U. S. missions and commands overseas, and U. S. delegations at international conferences. As for the Legislative Branch, we give extensive briefings to committees, subcommittees, individual members of Congress and committee staff personnel, both in the form of broad global reviews and in response to requests for the intelligence appreciation of specific situations.

Thirdly, there is the intricate question of which governmental authorities are aware of CIA activities.

~~Let me stress that~~ U. S. intelligence agencies do not make policy, and undertake no actions, covert or otherwise, which are not consistent with U. S. policy and objectives as

established by the appropriate officers of the Executive Branch. There is a special committee under NSC auspices, representing the President, the Secretary of State, and Secretary of Defense, which sees to it that CIA does not undertake any covert action which is not in consonance with the policies of the U.S. Government. In the field, as has been Secretary of Defense, in the field, as I mentioned

earlier (W7), we are required to have the foreknowledge and approval of the Ambassador.

We also report fully, not just on our intelligence findings but on our operations, our plans, and our expenditures and funding requirements to duly constituted subcommittees of the Appropriations and two select subcommittees in the House, and two Armed Services Committees of both the Senate and the House. Similar subcommittees, often meeting jointly, of The Director and his senior aides report regularly to the Senate. I report regularly to these subcommittees, and am authorized by the President and

indeed instructed by him to make full disclosure of U. S. intelligence activities and be completely responsive to their questions, no matter how sensitive. There have been suggestions that this Con-

gressional oversight is sporadic and casual; on the contrary, in 1965, for instance, the Director and other senior CIA officers mention only that in the first six months I held met a total of 34 times with these special subcommittees, (and the position of DCI, I averaged one such congressional briefing every fourth day. As for the degree can see that there is a major effort to keep the Congress of disclosure, some of my CIA aides have had to be informed. The Director himself, in the first 12 weeks he was on board, met 16 times with these special subcommittees.

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of disclosure, matters are discussed with the subcommittees which are so sensitive that only a small percentage of the personnel in CIA have access to them.

~~cleared-retroactively-for-special-operational-infor-~~
~~mation-to-which-they-had-had-no-access-until-they-~~
~~accompanied-me-to-a-meeting-with-one-of-the-select-~~
~~-subcommittees.~~

One distinction should be made clear: ~~the Director~~
~~let-me-make-this-distinction-clear;-I-am--~~
is authorized to brief any Congressional committee having a
~~authorized-to-brief-any-congressional-committee-en-~~
proper jurisdictional interest in the subject on substantive
~~substantive-global-intelligence---By-law,however,~~
global intelligence, and does. By law, however, he has
~~i-have~~ been given the exclusive responsibility of
maintaining the security of intelligence sources
and methods--and in ^{his} ~~my~~ relations with Congress, ~~he~~ has
~~have~~ been authorized by the President and by the
National Security Council to discuss such details
~~of our operations only with these four select sub-~~
~~designated for this purpose,~~
~~committees-of-the-Congress,~~ the four special subcommittees
not with any others.

This is not an arbitrary or bureaucratic limitation;
we are safeguarding the lives of trusted agents and
our own staff people all over the world who contrib-
ute to our Government's intelligence objectives.
We owe it to them to take every precaution to pro-
tect them--and we owe it to our Government to give
hostile intelligence services no indirect hints or
clues which might enable the opposition to take
steps to blunt our intelligence operations, methods,
and sources.

Finally, on the subject of oversight, ^{we} should mention a number of reviews, including one standing group, which have been instituted by the Executive Branch. We have been examined in detail by Hoover Commission task forces, the Doolittle Committee, the Clark Committee, and several special investigating groups for specific purposes. Our activities are under continuing and full scrutiny by the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, first established in January of 1956 as the Killian Committee, and now under the chairmanship of Mr. Clark Clifford. The present membership includes Dr. William O. Baker of Bell Telephone Laboratories; Mr. Gordon Gray, former Special Assistant to President Eisenhower and one-time President of North Carolina University; Professor William Langer of Harvard; General Maxwell Taylor; Ambassador Robert Murphy, former Under Secretary of State; Mr. Frank Pace, Jr., former Secretary of the Army and former Director of the Bureau of the Budget; Dr. Edwin Land, head of the Polaroid Corporation; Admiral John Sides, USN (ret.); and Mr. Augustus Long, formerly the top executive of the Texas Company.

This Board meets in full session about every six weeks to examine in detail the work, the progress,

and the shortcomings of the entire U. S. intelligence program. The meetings last two or three days and include comprehensive discussions with **the Director and his** ~~no and my~~ senior officers, heads of other intelligence components, and senior officials of the Government who are our "customers." Upon completion of each such session, the Board reports to the President and makes recommendations for the improvement of the intelligence effort. In addition, the Board has a number of two-man or three-man panels and subcommittees to delve more deeply and on a full-time basis into specific aspects and categories of intelligence work.

~~So it appears to me that it is somewhat inaccurate, to say the least, to charge that nobody is aware of the activities of the Central Intelligence Agency.~~

Against that background, it must certainly be obvious that the activities of the Central Intelligence Agency are under continuing, frequent, and searching scrutiny by those charged with this function in both the Executive and Legislative branches of our Government.

(1) Q: While we know you can't tell us exactly how much money you spend on particular activities, could you give us an idea of how your appropriation is divided--that is, as between gathering of information abroad and transmission of it to various parts of our government and information that is related to clandestine operations? Just the proportions might be interesting.

We
A: ~~I am sorry, but we~~ do not disclose that information except to the ~~select oversight groups,~~ special supervisory groups, because opposition intelligence ~~and propaganda services could~~ would ~~probably~~ find it ~~very~~ most useful.

(First part of Question 2 omitted because it duplicates W2)

(2) Q: Isn't it true, for instance, that much of the information that you gather isn't really secret at all, but that if someone were at the proper place at the proper time, he would be able to get the information in a normal way--as, for instance, a newspaperman gets it?

Yes, a
A: A considerable part of the information used by the Agency in preparing its finished intelligence reports ~~and radio,~~ is derived from the foreign press/ from technical journals of foreign countries, and from official publications of these countries; we don't disregard information simply because it is not secret. Finished intelligence, however, consists of the expert correlation and interpretation of all the information we can obtain, by both overt and clandestine means.

(3) Q: When the information is gathered, is it interpreted by somebody on the spot, or is it brought to you in raw form so that you can feel sure it is factual rather than opinionated?

A: We require the original report, or the original statement of the primary source, whenever we can get it. When this "raw material" reaches us, it may be accompanied by the opinions and interpretations of intermediaries through whom the information has passed, and by the informed comment and preliminary evaluation of our own collectors in the field, but these additions are clearly labeled as such.

(4) Q: What is the importance of this type of information to the operations of our government?

A: ~~I'm not sure I understand the question.~~ It is our mission to provide the policy makers with the most accurate, most objective, and most comprehensive information available about the situation as it exists, together with whatever we can learn or project about possible impending developments.

(5) Q: Since it has been stated that you yourselves do not make policy, would you say from your contacts with government officials that they have found the information valuable when they start to formulate particular policies?

A: ~~I might say~~ In answer to both this and your preceding questions, ~~that~~ there is one unique contribution

which the CIA can make to the government officials who are faced with a choice among several possible policies. Precisely because the CIA is not committed to any one of the possible courses of action, our intelligence input to the ultimate decision process is objective, free from partisanship and advocacy. Our best indication of the usefulness of our reports to the ^{top officials of the} ~~policy~~ Administration and members of the Legislative Branch ~~makes~~ is the constant increase in the requests they levy on us for both current intelligence and our projective estimates.

(6,7) Q: As we understand it, you do not operate within the United States in the matter of clandestine operations of any kind. Is that correct? Is this left entirely to the FBI?


A: The Central Intelligence Agency is charged with conducting operations outside the country, whereas the FBI has as its principal mission the internal security of the United States and its possessions. There is, of course, close cooperation and considerable interplay between our organizations because we are combatting an international conspiracy whose operations and agents move back and forth between this country and foreign nations. The FBI and CIA therefore work very closely together and keep each other intimately informed on items of potential interest or concern to each other. This allows us to combat international conspiracy in

the most effective possible manner. The division of responsibility for clandestine operations, of course, should not be confused with the perfectly overt contacts we have domestically, for example, with experts in the academic world to discuss international situations and exchange analyses.


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STATINTL

(8) Q: In working abroad, what is the system of contact that you have with our embassies and legations. Do you have any representatives in any of the embassies?



(9) Q: Do you transmit any information directly to the embassies, or does it have to come to Washington and then be relayed back to the embassies or legations abroad?



STATINTL

(10) Q: What comments have you had, in a general way, from government officials as to the value of the information they have received through your system?

A. ~~I~~ have already mentioned ^{The} growing demand for our intelligence reports *was cited earlier.*

(11) Q: Prior to the establishment of the CIA, was there a feeling in the State Department and elsewhere that they were handicapped in getting information from other countries, while the governments abroad themselves carried on a constant information-gathering operation in our country as well as in others?

A: *Without our presuming to assess "feelings" in the State Department,*
You have to take into consideration, firstly, that the collection of intelligence is not the primary responsibility of the Department of State and the Department of Defense, and that the representatives they send abroad must operate in the open as recognized officials of the US Government. In effect, we are in a better position to obtain the intelligence we need because CIA is specifically organized for the clandestine collection of intelligence, and can give it first priority.

If, by handicaps, you mean the obstacles which foreign governments place in the way of intelligence collection, ^{*it must be said*} ~~I must say~~ that foreign governments--both before and after the establishment of CIA--make every effort to preserve their essential secrets, just as we do, and that year by year security procedures become more sophisticated and more difficult to circumvent.

On the other side of the coin, there are few if any countries in the world today which are as much of an "open society" as the United States.

(12) Q: Do you collect information of a business nature, as well as that which concerns governmental operations?

A: We collect any economic information which may be useful to the security interests of the US Government. We collect it exclusively for that purpose.

(13) Q: Do you gather information about the operations of the governments themselves throughout a country?

A: As ~~I have~~ ^{was} pointed out earlier, (W5, 6) our interests and responsibilities are pretty comprehensive, although they may vary from country to country. ~~I don't~~ ^{It is} ~~see how you can~~ ^{obviously impossible to} confine yourself to a nation's foreign affairs, or the situation in the capital city alone, if you are responsible for assessing, for example, the stability of the regime, the health of a nation's economy, or the prospect for subversion in the boondocks.

(14) Q: At what point do you feel that the information gathered is of a nature which requires you constantly to report it back to our government? We are speaking now only of information which would be available to anybody who happened to live in the country, and does not involve clandestine operations in any way.

This goes

A: ~~I refer you~~ back to the distinction we make between information and intelligence. (W2) If everything is quiet, there may be an occasional situation report based largely on open information. If the situation has a direct relation to US national security interests, particularly in a crisis, we will be trying to get as close to "real time" reporting as modern communications permit.

(15) Q: In dealing with clandestine operations are you up against countermeasures taken by other governments to thwart the activities of our own people?

A: Yes.

(16) Q: Do foreign governments operate within the United States through their clandestine operations differently than we do when agents of your office operate abroad?

A: ~~I~~ *We* prefer not to discuss our methods even by indirect comparison.

(17) Q: Would you say that the discovery of the atom bomb secrets or rather the getting of information of a secret nature both in this country and in England by the Russian government was accomplished through clandestine operations of an agency analogous to yours, and could it have been thwarted by activities on our part? In other words, do we have better measures now to protect our secrets than we had then?

A: That answer is not in ^{our} province, except for the fact that it was certainly a Soviet intelligence operation.

(18, 19) Q: How do you cooperate with the intelligence agencies of the military services? Does each one of the armed services have its own intelligence units and operatives? Do they operate in foreign countries? Are they confined strictly to military information? Or is the CIA expected to collect this, too, in cases where the units of the armed services are not represented or do not have agents?

A: The respective armed services collect departmental intelligence required by their respective services or the Department of Defense. We are responsible for correlating intelligence on all matters of national security interest, across the board. ^{We (already)} have described how the intelligence community cooperates in reaching agreed conclusions. (W9, 10) ^{Specifically, the machinery of the United States Intelligence Board sees to it that the efforts should come from the Department of Defense.} ~~I think any further answer of CIA and DIA complement and supplement each other.~~
(20) Q: Do you have any outside counsel or advisers? What is the nature of this activity?

A: We have several panels of technical experts, inside and outside the government, to keep us informed on new developments and techniques which could be of use to us. ^{On these panels are the best brains in this country, on} ~~We try to get the best brains in the country to~~ ^{virtually the entire range of human endeavor. We contract for} ~~help us on special technical matters. We contract for~~ studies and research projects ^{(wherever in the United States} ~~As for "advisers" outside~~ these can best be performed.

We have found that patriotic citizens in all walks of life ~~the government, however, security considerations make~~ are glad to work with us in serving the national security ~~it virtually impossible to disclose enough information~~ interest. We find this very gratifying because it does ~~about our operations to nongovernmental agencies to~~ give the President, the Executive Branch and the Legislative ~~enable them to "advise" us on the conduct of our~~ Branch the very best information that can be made available. ~~activities.~~

(21) Q: How long ago did the CIA begin to disclose to congressional committees information about its activities?

A: ~~As I understand it,~~ The Agency has been under legislative oversight since its establishment.

(22) Q: Have the congressional committees which have been in contact with CIA expressed any dissatisfaction over the years that they were not getting enough information?

A: We have never withheld any information, substantive or operational, from the ~~select~~ ^{four special} subcommittees. On some occasions, in fact, they have asked us not to give them the identities of very sensitive sources, because they did not wish to know, and we have complied. If you refer to dissatisfaction with the amount of information which we have--rather than the amount we give them--~~I doubt that~~ ^{no} any professional intelligence operation anywhere in the world is ever satisfied with the extent of its knowledge, and these gentlemen have been working with us long enough so that ~~I am sure~~ ^(probably) they have acquired this same professional dissatisfaction.

(23) Q: Do you find that leakages of information have been detrimental to your operation in any respect?

A: It is one of the first principles of the art that when another country learns or suspects that you have obtained information they were trying to keep secret, they will do everything possible to locate and destroy your source, and counter your method of operation.

(24) Q: Do all the major countries operate intelligence services?

A: ~~I~~ ^{We} know of no major country that does not. After all, it simply amounts to obtaining information which you need to have. You might say that football teams and rival department stores operate intelligence services, for instance; they just happen to call them scouts or comparison shoppers.

(25, 26,) Q: Is there cooperation between the intelligence systems of friendly countries and our own?
(27) If we collect information that is of vital importance to one of our allied countries, would it be transmitted to the State Department or Defense Department and to the proper governmental units abroad which are friendly to us? To what extent is the cooperation between the intelligence agencies of allied governments a factor in the successful operation of intelligence activities by your unit?

A: ~~I am~~ ^{We are} not at liberty to go into detail, but wherever it is of mutual interest and advantage, there is substantial cooperation among the intelligence services of friendly countries.

(28) Q: What was the origin of CIA? Was it born during wartime? Is it operated any differently now than it was then?

A: The Agency grew from the need to establish a centralized and objective intelligence organization in peacetime. A primary impetus, of course, was the experience of Pearl Harbor, and the determination to ensure against such surprises in the future. The requirement for a centralized organization stemmed from the successful experience during World War II of the Office of Strategic Services under General Donovan. The requirement was made all the more real by the threat posed by the USSR and international Communism which became readily apparent shortly after the close of World War II. There was general agreement within the Government that there was need for a nonpartisan coordinating agency in the intelligence field. As a result, the CIA was created by the National Security Act of 1947. ~~In some respects the Office of Strategic Services of World War II was our ancestor, but none of our predecessors had CIA's responsibility for coordinating the work of the entire intelligence community, or our requirement for across-the-board coverage.~~

(29, 30,)
(31)

Q: What are the names of your different divisions, if you can give them to us? Do you maintain offices abroad, or is this secret? Does most of your personnel live abroad?

A: We have personnel abroad. ~~I cannot answer the rest of the question.~~

(32, 33) Q: What can be said in answer to the criticism that dishonorable methods are used by the CIA? Do you consider that the CIA is an instrument of the "cold war," and is justified in taking any measures to get information that are being taken by other governments in their efforts to get information inside the United States?

A: We can be rough and unorthodox, ~~but-as-a-matter of personal opinion-and-judgment--I-have-to-reject-the word--"dishonorable."~~ We may be clandestine and devious, ~~but we emphatically reject the word "dishonorable."~~ We ~~but-we~~ are, after all, Americans with the same ideals and codes as the rest of the nation. ~~Let-me-refer-you~~ **remarked** ~~to-the-remarks-of~~ Secretary Rusk/in a press conference earlier this year:

"..... I would emphasize to you that CIA is not engaged in activities not known to the senior policy officers of the Government. But you should also bear in mind that beneath the level of public discussion, there is a tough struggle going on in the back alleys all over the world. It's a tough one, it's unpleasant, and no one likes it, but that is not a field which can be left entirely to the other side. And so once in a while some disagreeable things happen, and I can tell you that there is a good deal of gallantry and a high degree of competence in those who have to help us deal with that part of the struggle for freedom."

in Admiral Raborn as
President Johnson, when he was swearing ~~me-in-as~~
Director of Central Intelligence on April 28, 1965, put
it this way:

"..... We have committed our lives, our property, our resources and our sacred honor to the freedom and peace of other men, indeed to the freedom

and peace of all mankind. We would dishonor that commitment, we would disgrace all the sacrifices Americans have made, if we were not every hour of every day vigilant against every threat to peace and freedom. That is why we have the Central Intelligence Agency....."

(34, 38) Q: Would you say that there is any essential difference between the methods used by the Army, Navy, and Air Force in their intelligence units to get information abroad, and that which is used by the CIA? Although the Armed Services have intelligence units, does the CIA feel responsible for the collection of any military information that could possibly be of value to the Armed Services?

A: To summarize what ^{was} I said earlier (particularly in reply to W8, 11, 18, and 19) CIA's intelligence requirements cover anything and everything related to national security, intelligence is our primary business, and we are specifically geared for the job. The services collect departmental intelligence for departmental purposes, their attachés operate under the liability of being known, and they have other missions which take priority over the collection of intelligence.

(35, 36,) (37) Q: On the whole, would you say that former employees have maintained integrity and have not broken confidence over the years? Have you had many instances of defections? Do other governmental intelligence agencies have something of the same problem?

A: ~~These again are questions to which I cannot make a public response.~~
The only answer which can be given to these questions is the general statement that the personnel of the Agency are of very high caliber and have shown great devotion to their duties over the years.

(39-42) Q: To what extent does the CIA operate under direct instructions from the President or Secretary of State? Are there some general instructions given covering a number of activities? Do you have anything which might be called regulations to govern your activities? Are these prescribed by the President or Secretary of State or any other Cabinet officer? In other words, to what extent do you operate under specific instructions in certain types of cases?

A: To recapitulate, the Central Intelligence Agency operates under a charter consisting of the National Security Act of 1947 as amended, which provides that we function at the behest and under the control of the President and the National Security Council. We are governed by several layers of regulations known as the NSCID's or National Security Council Directives; the DCID's or Director of Central Intelligence Directives, which are issued in the name of the Director in his capacity as head of the entire intelligence community and chairman of the United States Intelligence Board; and, as in the case of any other governmental component, our own Agency regulations.

Our missions are assigned by the President, the National Security Council or its elements, and USIB. Our activities are approved in advance and controlled by a special element of the NSC representing the President, the Secretary of State, and the Secretary of Defense.

To sum it all up, may ^{we} stress again that there are sufficient checks and balances, enough controls and ^{supervisory} ~~oversight~~ groups, to ensure that the Central Intelligence Agency is a servant and an instrument of United States policy, and does not and cannot operate except in complete accordance with and for the implementation of that policy.

Note to DCI -

It has been suggested that in line 2 above, we drop the words "sufficient" and "enough" to avoid making a judgment which would be challenging to some legislators. Drafter's view is that it is a valid and justified judgment and legislators are unlikely to be mollified in any case.


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MEMORANDUM FOR:



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DCC's input,
per our telecon.

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(DATE)

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17 June 1966


Page 1, Paragraph 2: In describing the functions of CIA, I would emphasize "information and production of intelligence" by listing them first.

Paragraph W.2.: Suggest rewording more on the positive side, such as, "Yes, our principal job is one of intelligence gathering on foreign countries which relates specifically to information bearing on national security problems and objectives. There is another agency called the United States Information Agency which deals with information in the non-intelligence categories. (Then work in the rest of the paragraph accordingly.)

Paragraph W.3.: Start out the answer by "disarming" the thought that CIA is a big spy organization, such as, "This, of course, is the popular view of any intelligence organization, but in reality our job is to provide national intelligence information to the U. S. Government/^{officials} on matters affecting the national security in order that they may know in a timely way what is the real news behind the news around the world." (Then work in rest of paragraph.)


Paragraph W.4.: Answer: I would suggest again disarming the question by starting off the paragraph something like this, "There again, this is a popular misconception. Our major business is the gathering of national intelligence and so-called covert operations are a relatively minor part of our overall activities. against Communism. (Work in rest of paragraph.)

Paragraph W.6.: Answer: "Factual and unbiased intelligence information on activities going on around the world is our principal job. This information must be furnished officials of the U.S. Government in a timely way in order that they may use this as only one of the many elements that go into decisions. which they make." I would avoid any reference to "policy" or the use of information in shaping policy, as this seems to be a "loaded" question.



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 (You may wish to work in something along the line of the last sentence of the proposed answer to this question.)

Paragraph W.8.: I would suggest starting off the answer to this question something along these lines, "The CIA provides national finished intelligence which is derived from all elements of the intelligence community, which includes the Intelligence Services of the Armed Forces. (Then go on to make the points you have made in the answer.)

Paragraph W.11.: Answer: In the second sentence I would change the word "should" to "is" and delete the word "be." Last sentence of this answer, delete the words, "policy makers of the Executive Branch" and substitute "the departments and agencies of the U.S. Government."

Paragraph W.12.: Answer: Be more specific in the initial sentences, such as, "Yes, our organization reports directly to the National Security Council which is presided over by the President of the United States." I would also bring in the PFIAB at this point by making a statement something like this, "Additionally, the President has appointed a most knowledgeable and distinctive Board, composed of private citizens, who go into great detail into all our activities and report directly to the President to give him their views as to the conduct of the activities of the Central Intelligence Agency."


I would further suggest following this statement immediately with such words as, "On the Legislative side, we also report to a Senate oversight committee and to two House oversight committees. We regularly brief all these on intelligence matters. As I will explain later, we also brief other members of the Congress on intelligence matters upon request." In order to clarify a point, I would follow this by another sentence, such as, "We, of course, protect the sources and methods of the intelligence material as required of the Director of Central Intelligence in Public Law 80-253 of 1947, which specifically requires such action by the Director of Central Intelligence for the entire intelligence community." (Then go on and amplify this.)

Paragraph W.12: Subparagraph (5): In the last sentence of the proposed answer I would delete "policy makers" and substitute "top officials of the Administration and members of the Legislative Branch."

Paragraph W.12: Subparagraphs (6), (7): I would reword this reply by striking out the first sentence, which says, "That is generally correct." And then start off by saying something like this, "The Central Intelligence Agency is charged with conducting operations outside of the country, whereas the FBI has as its principal mission, the internal security of the United States and its possessions. There

is of course considerable interplay between our organizations because Communists and their agents move between foreign countries and this country. The CIA and the FBI therefore work very closely together and keep each other intimately informed of items of potential principal interest to each other. This allows us to combat international conspiracy in the best possible manner." (Then go on and make some of the other points you have made. In general, I would avoid emphasizing overlaps.)

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W.12. Subparagraph (18), (19): I would delete the words, "I think any further answers should come from the Department of Defense." Can't we think of something better to say?

W.12. Subparagraph (20): In this answer I would work in the thought that patriotic citizens in all walks of life in the United States are glad to assist the Central Intelligence Agency in serving our President. We find this very satisfactory because it does give to our President and the Legislative Branch the very best information that can be made available.