

VIETNAM

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Situation in South Vietnam

(As of 0830 a.m. EDT)

Saigon

Buddhist leaders in Saigon apparently have convinced their more militant followers to accept for the time being the government's pledge to expand the Directorate (National Leadership Committee) by 6 June. Thich Ho Giac apparently addressed some 2,000 persons at the Buddhist Institute today urging them to give the Directorate until Monday to add ten civilian members to it, according to press reports. Signs of opposition to Ho Giac's statement of acceptance were noted, however, Some members of the Buddhist Monks and Nuns Association reportedly condemned the move and indicated more suicides as a protest. During a funeral procession for two immolated Buddhists led by Tam Chau today, marchers reportedly beat a plainclothes security agent but did not demonstrate.

In the opinion of General Khang, one of the more militant Directorate members, the Buddhists are suffering from a "severe" power struggle and are losing popular support.

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Hue

General Nhuan, the 1st Division commander, moved back into Hue along with several disparate military elements of the 1st Division who are supposedly loyal to the government. According to the Consular officer, however, the loyalty of these troops would probably be to the struggle forces in the event of a showdown. The situation is similar to that of a few days ago when Colonel Khoa moved a supposedly loyal battalion of the 3rd Regiment into the city to guard US installations only to have them capitulate in front of the struggle students who burned the Consulate building. The Consular officer fears renewed violence in Hue and feels that the situation will continue to deteriorate given government vacillation.

Thich Tri Quang's only reaction so far to the Buddhist-government compromise was in the form of a message to President Johnson. Quang said the attack on Thich Thien Minh was organized by the Ky-Thieu regime. He made no mention of the meetings in Saigon between Buddhist Institute leaders and government officials.



2 June 1966

DCI BRIEFING NOTES

VIETNAM

(Information as of 4:30 AM EDT)

- I. The cautious compromise worked out between government and Buddhist leaders should quiet the crisis atmosphere in Saigon for at least the next few days.
 - A. Buddhist leaders in Saigon have generally restrained excessive reactions by their followers to the attack on militant bonze Thien Minh on 1 June.
 - B. They have also cautioned their followers to avoid excessive agitation against the regime until it is clear how the agreement on expansion of the "war cabinet" leadership bodies will be carried out.
- II. The Buddhists apparently agreed to dampen their agitation in return for implementation of recently announced government plans to expand the present National Leadership Committee (NLC).
 - A. Ten civilian representatives--presumably including spokesmen for the Buddhists--are to be added before 6 June.

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[REDACTED]

B. The chairman of the NLC, General Thieu, will apparently resign as agreed by the members at yesterday's meeting.

C. The enlarged NLC will "make an effort" to set up a "civilian and armed forces council" prior to 19 June to "assist" the Central Executive Committee, chaired by Ky.

1. It is not clear whether references by government leaders to the "National Leadership Committee" are synonymous with Buddhist references to the "Directorate."

III. It appears that the accord to enlarge the NLC was agreed upon without too much reaction from the Directorate generals.

A. It is possible that they feel their positions as daily executors of Directorate policy will not be significantly threatened.

IV. Some agitation may occur during the celebration of Buddha's birthday on 3 June.


A. There are indications that some Buddhist groups hope to conduct the observances with dignity and without political overtones.

B. There is other evidence that efforts are being made, possibly with some Buddhist connivance, to organize strikes and demonstrations on 3 June.

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- V. In Hue, meanwhile, progovernment troop units moved in today without any resistance.
 - A. Government sources said the radio station and key points of the city have been secured without a shot being fired so far.
 - B. It is not clear, however, whether the troops will obey orders to prevent further violence by the dissident forces or participate in any effort to disarm or overpower the rebels.
 - 1. Some "struggle" troops obtained supplies of heavy caliber automatic weapons during the violence in the city on 1 June.
- VI. Only light contact with the Viet Cong has been reported during the past several days.
 - A. Border surveillance patrols are continuing in allied Operation PAUL REVERE, a major sweep operation in western Pleiku Province.
 - B. All other operations involving US personnel continue without significant contact with the enemy.
- VII. There are continuing indications that the Communists are moving substantial numbers of reinforcements into northwestern Pleiku Province.

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DOM. REP



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2 June 1966

DCI BRIEFING NOTES

DOMINICAN REPUBLIC
(Information as of 0900 AM EDT)
in Paragraph V below

- I. Only fragmentary returns from yesterday's election are available. Vote totals have been coming in slowly and it may not be possible to discern any clear trend until late today.
 - A. With an estimated 50 percent of the expected Santo Domingo vote of 240,000 reported:
 1. Dominican Revolutionary Party candidate Juan Bosch appears to be leading with about 59.4 percent of the vote.
 2. Reformist Party candidate Balaguer has 38.8 percent of the vote.
 3. Bonnelly trails with only 2.2 percent.
 - B. In 1962, Bosch captured 78 percent of the capital's vote, and without a similar margin will have difficulty overcoming the lead Balaguer is likely to develop elsewhere. Scattered returns from the interior show Balaguer doing extremely well.
- II. No significant instances of fraud or violence marred the election, which foreign observers lauded as "exemplary."

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- A. Provisional President Garcia Godoy and the OAS commission have issued statements praising the conduct of the electorate.
 - B. None of the political factions has levied charges of voting irregularities--which may help pave the way to popular acceptance of the outcome.
- III. Favorable weather aided in promoting a good-sized turnout--estimated at 1.2 million, or 65 to 70 percent of the eligible voters.
- IV. The turnout and the relatively large number of women who cast ballots are thought to favor Balaguer's chances.
- V. As of 0900 AM EDT unofficial returns show Balaguer with 168,366 votes while Bosch is trailing with 122,078. The two Santo Domingo morning papers indicate that a Balaguer sweep may be in the making.

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OCI No. 1309/66

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Office of Current Intelligence
2 June 1966

INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM

Dominican Election Situation Report No. 12

(As of 5:45 AM EDT)

1. Radio Santo Domingo's tabulation of the vote count has fallen considerably behind tallies reported by the press services. At 0230 local time, Reuters credited Balaguer with 154,110 to 133,498 for Bosch in the total national vote.
2. Radio Santo Domingo's tabulation, which provides a breakdown by polling place, shows Bosch carrying the National District by 57.5 percent--a drop of 20 percentage points below his 1962 margin. Bosch's share of the National District vote has declined slowly but steadily during the night.
3. Scattered returns from outside the capital indicate that Balaguer is doing extremely well; even in areas where Bosch is leading, the PRD candidate's total is down markedly from four years ago.
4. According to the press, an unidentified high official of Bosch's party has said that if the PRD wins, it will do so by a narrow margin.

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2 June 1966

DCI BRIEFING NOTES

DOMINICAN REPUBLIC

(Information as of 4:30 AM EDT)

- I. Only fragmentary returns from yesterday's election are available. Vote **totals** have been coming in slowly and it may not be possible to discern any clear trend until late today.
- A. With an estimated 20 percent of the expected Santo Domingo vote of 240,000 reported:
1. Dominican Revolutionary Party candidate Juan Bosch appears to be leading with about 60 percent of the vote.
 2. Reformist Party candidate Balaguer has 37 percent of the vote.
 3. Bonnelly trails with only 2.1 percent.
- B. In 1962, Bosch captured 78 percent of the capital's vote, and without a similar margin may have difficulty overcoming the lead Balaguer is likely to develop elsewhere.
- II. No significant instances of fraud or violence marred the election, which foreign observers lauded as "exemplary."

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- A. Provisional President Garcia Godoy and the OAS commission have issued statements praising the conduct of the electorate.
 - B. None of the political factions has levied charges of voting irregularities--which may help pave the way to popular acceptance of the outcome.
- III. Favorable weather aided in promoting a good-sized turnout--estimated at 1.2 million, or 65 to 70 percent of the eligible voters.
- IV. The turnout and the relatively large number of women who cast ballots are thought to favor Balaguer's chances.

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COM CHINA

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1 June 1966

DCI BRIEFING NOTES

COMMUNIST CHINA -- DEVELOPMENTS IN
THE LEADERSHIP STRUGGLE
(since last briefing on 26 May)

- I. A shake-up of Mao Tse-tung's inner circle of advisers definitely appears to be taking place.
 - A. Last week we told you that we had been detecting signs that a behind-the-scenes power struggle was under way.
 - B. Mao Tse-tung's personal position still seems to be secure. His grip probably was loosened for a time during his recent 5½ month absence from public view, but he appeared to be healthy and alert in movies taken in early May.
 - C. This is what we now think about the status of his five top advisers:
 1. Peng Chen, sixth in the power structure, has probably been the victim of a power play engineered by his old rival Teng Hsiao-ping. He is still out of sight and a Rumanian official in Peking told a British diplomat on 26 May that Peng has lost his positions.

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2. Teng is the powerful general secretary. Peng's removal would strengthen his position and likely weaken that of Liu Shao-chi who has been number two in the party since at least 1945. It is even possible that the highly militant and vigorous Teng has supplanted the colorless Liu as Mao's chosen successor.
3. The flexible Chou En-lai--China's Mikoyan --appears thus far to have managed to stay aloof from the fray. He is a useful technician and as such has a good chance to survive.
4. Contrary to Western press speculation, Defense Minister Lin Piao probably is not a contender for power. His name is often used to reinforce Mao's authority, but he has been chronically ill for nearly 30 years. Lin seemed to be extremely frail in recent movies taken with Mao Tse-tung. He probably does not aspire to the top job.

II. The Chinese Communists still haven't named any important victims.

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- A. This indicates that the shake-up is still unfolding.
- B. The Rumanian official I mentioned earlier also said that Lo Jui-ching had been removed as army chief of staff two months or so ago. Lo, a top security man as well as chief of the army, is one of a group of key officials who have been out of public view for many months and who may have been casualties of the struggle. Others on the list are the head of the central committee's propaganda department and the commander of the Peking Military Region, who is Yang Yung.
- C. On 26 May a deputy director of the Central Committee Propaganda Department was accused of backing an "antiparty" play produced in Shanghai. Certain other "muddleheaded" high officials were also said to have supported the play.
- D. A new nationwide campaign has been developing this past week against unnamed high officials who have ridiculed the practical value of Mao Tse-tung's political tracts.

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1. One of the most widely publicized cases involves a Shanghai melon peddler who wrote an article in 1965 explaining how Mao's works had helped him sell his melons before they rotted. This article was republished on 14 May by Liberation Army Journal, which as we pointed out last week has been spearheading the attack on "antiparty" officials.
 2. The melon peddler on 25 May then published a statement demanding the unmasking of a high official who, he said, had ridiculed his article.
 3. A similar incident involving a ping pong player who claims he was greatly benefited by Mao's thinking has been widely publicized.
 4. Referring to these incidents, Liberation Army Daily promised "to fight to the bitter end against anyone that strikes at Mao's thinking regardless of how powerful he may be, how high his position is, how famous, or how strong a backer he has."
- E. On 27 May "antiparty" charges were leveled for the first time against a provincial

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official. This was a vice governor of Shantung Province, who was also director of the cultural department of the provincial party committee. He was accused of working hand in glove with the group of conspirators in the Peking city apparatus whom we told you about last week. The charges against this man probably will lead to attacks on higher officials in Shantung and perhaps other provinces.

III. We still feel strongly that factions in the leadership have been disputing with one another.

A. This is indicated by the conflicting positions taken by various party newspapers over several of the crucial issues.

1. The initiative in launching the attacks has been consistently taken by Liberation Army Journal, not the Peoples Daily and Red Flag, normally the two most authoritative journals in China.

2. In fact Peoples Daily and Red Flag have at times directly opposed the army paper. A major charge implicating Peking Mayor Peng Chen has been that the journals of his municipal party committee refused to

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accept a dictum laid down by Liberation Army Journal on 29 November 1965 that a certain play was a quote big poisonous weed unquote.

3. Although the parallel has not yet been publicly drawn, we have checked and found that Peoples Daily and Red Flag also took the incorrect line of the Peking city journals. Our check also reveals that neither Peoples Daily nor Red Flag got around to labeling the play a poisonous weed until April.
- B. What the confusing record of these newspapers indicates to us is that Mao Tse-tung has been standing above the struggle while the acting party leader has been under attack by someone who controls the Liberation Army Journal.
1. During Mao's absence the acting party leader would be Liu Shao-chi.
 2. Teng Hsiao-ping could control the army paper, which is not actually published by the army but by the army's General Political Department. This is directly

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subordinate to the party secretariat
headed by Teng.

C. Since April Peoples Daily and Red Flag have both fallen in line with the army paper, a sign that Mao is again exercising a unifying influence.

1. The Liberation Army Journal continues to spearhead some attacks, however, suggesting that its backers still have objectives they haven't yet reached.

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INDONESIA




1 June 1966

ADDITION TO DCI
BRIEFING NOTES OF
12 MAY 1966

INDONESIA

I. The three-day Indonesia-Malaysia talks held in Bangkok from 30 May to 1 June appear to have made considerable progress toward ending confrontation but have left some ends dangling, and further talks will be necessary.

A. Indonesian military operations, although greatly reduced for the past year, apparently will end only when final agreement is reached.



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12 May 1966

DCI BRIEFING NOTES

INDONESIA

- I. The new Indonesian Government is embarking on a moderate course in both domestic and international affairs.
 - A. Indonesia's three major leaders now are General Suharto, Foreign Minister Adam Malik, and the Sultan of Jogjakarta, who directs economic matters.
 1. They are giving top priority to solving domestic problems. This means, first of all, trying to put Indonesia's long misused economy on a more rational basis.
 2. Malik and the Sultan have stated publicly that they will accept aid from any country. The US is sending 50,000 tons of rice--a fraction of Indonesia's need--in the near future.
 3. Malik has announced that Indonesia will return to its former neutral path in international affairs, and has expressed an intention to return Indonesia to the United Nations.
- II. Sukarno is still president and prime minister, but his de facto power is slight.

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- A. He continues to maneuver to regain at least the appearance of political initiative. His assets have been so greatly reduced, however, that at most he should only be able to obstruct the government's new policies temporarily.
- B. Some of General Suharto's advisers are suggesting that he depose or exile Sukarno; Suharto, aware of Sukarno's continuing popularity in parts of the nation, apparently prefers to do neither.

III. While relations with the West have improved, relations with Communist China are at an all-time low.

- A. Anti-Chinese activity has mounted throughout Indonesia.
 - 1. Overseas Chinese schools have been closed, and many Chinese businesses have been confiscated by anti-Communist Moslem groups.
 - 2. In mid-April, in the most extreme of many attacks on official Chinese installations, the Communist Chinese Embassy in Djakarta was sacked.

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- B. The new Djakarta regime, by its failure to curb this activity, appears to be pushing relations with Peking to the breaking point. Neither Peking nor Djakarta appear willing to initiate a formal break, however. Continuing propaganda warfare between Peking and Djakarta is likely to become more and more abusive.
- C. Foreign Minister Malik and other leaders have expressed a desire to end Indonesia's confrontation with Malaysia, but there are no firm indications that the new government is ready to accept the present composition of the Malaysian federation.
1. Confrontation, therefore, is likely to continue on a political level, while its military aspect, already at a low level, gradually diminishes.
 2. Djakarta's announcement that it will soon recognize Singapore is viewed primarily as an effort to bolster the Indonesian economy by resuming the once-lucrative trade with Singapore. At the same time, Djakarta's overture to Singapore has already served to widen the breach between Malaysia and Singapore--an extra dividend for Indonesia.

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3. Talks in Bangkok on 30 April and 1 May between the Indonesian and Philippine foreign ministers produced an understanding that the Philippines will recognize Malaysia in early June and that Indonesia will recognize Singapore shortly thereafter.
4. Malik has told a Malaysian official that Indonesia would like another survey of public opinion in Malaysia's Borneo territories as to whether people want to remain under Malaysian administration.

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CONGO

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1 June 1966

DCI BRIEFING NOTES

CONGO

- I. The plot which the Congolese army foiled on 30 May was less significant than President Mobutu's reaction to it.
 - A. The four main plotters were all run-of-the-mill civilian politicians. None had any particular political power, none had shown any conspiratorial skills, and the plot was never a real threat to Mobutu.
 - B. Mobutu nevertheless ordered their summary trial and public execution.
 1. This is in line with other indications of a growing authoritarianism as Mobutu wrestles with the problem of making his authority felt throughout the country.
- II. In breaking up the plot, the top ranks of the army once again proved their loyalty to Mobutu, but at the same time they demonstrated the degree to which Mobutu must cultivate that loyalty in order to stay in power.

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- A. Mobutu and his officers will probably remain interdependent for some time, with neither willing nor able to challenge the other.
- B. The officer corps will probably assume an ever-larger role in Congolese political life and will reinforce Mobutu's own authoritarian tendencies.

- III. Some members of the Belgian Embassy in Leopoldville apparently were involved to a minor degree with the plotters, although no foreign embassy gave the plot any active support.
- A. The Belgian involvement will aggravate Mobutu's current animosity toward Belgium.
 - B. His attitude may be reflected in a harder Congolese line in the current economic talks with Belgium, now recessed after two weeks of inconclusive negotiations.

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CUBA

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1 June 1966

DCI BRIEFING NOTES

CUBA

I. Fidel Castro's recent actions appear to result from deepening personal frustrations over the regime's continuing inability to surmount basic economic and administrative problems.

A. The administrative purge of a number of medium-level officials in the ministries of foreign affairs, foreign trade, and CUBANA airlines was designed to restore dynamism to Castro's regime and to revive revolutionary enthusiasm. It may have had the opposite effect, however.

1. The March 7 to March 11 trial of Major Rolando Cubela, sentenced for plotting to assassinate Castro, probably had the same goal, as well as the aim of deterring other would-be plotters.

2. Armed Forces Vice Minister Ameijeiras was dismissed on March 17.

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he had long been in

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disfavor with the regime. Several top military commands have been routinely

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reshuffled since the first of the year;
the principals involved were not cashiered
and retain their prominence as political
bureau members of Castro's Communist
Party.

- B. In his speech on March 13 at Havana University, Castro hurled new insults at Peking and charged that the Chinese leaders, in their old age, have confused Marxism-Leninism with fascism. The attack was essentially a reiteration of Castro's earlier statements and came exactly one year after his first criticism of China.
1. For the first time Castro has denounced President Eduardo Frei of Chile and his Christian Democratic Party.
 - a. He said that in Chile "the only way to win the revolutionary struggle will be by armed struggle," and he denounced Frei as a coward, a liar, and a reactionary. Havana radio has begun beaming a special propaganda program to Chile attacking Frei and his government.
 - b. The attacks reflect the same militancy displayed at the January

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Tri-Continent Conference and indicate that Castro is losing interest in co-existence and compromise in the hemisphere.

- C. The state of alert declared throughout Cuba on May 27 was ostensibly a Cuban reaction to US moves, the most outstanding of which was the killing of a Cuban soldier by a sentry at the Guantanamo Naval Base on May 21. In reality, there are indications that Cuba intended to provoke an incident with the US in order to reinforce its "anti-imperialist" posture and to divert the attention of the people from current economic difficulties.
1. The soldier was shot and killed by the US sentry after penetrating the base perimeter during a reconnaissance of a newly laid minefield. Such penetrations of the base perimeter have continued--presumably at the direction of the Cuban Government. Any additional incidents will further heighten the already tense situation on the island and provide the Castro regime with additional "justification" to demand greater sacrifices of the people.

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2. The alert also is probably intended to test the efficiency of the Cuban defensive system, provide realistic training for armed forces personnel, and flush out "counterrevolutionaries" unfortunate enough to misjudge the reasons for the alert.

II. Despite Castro's deepening frustrations, his position in Cuba remains pre-eminent.

- A. The large and efficient military and security forces under Raul Castro are strong and loyal to the regime. We think they are more than adequate as a defense against insurrection or invasion--barring substantial US assistance.
- B. The 55,000 members of the Cuban Communist Party are drawn from an elite core of Castro's most militant supporters. They form the regime's inner bureaucracy.
 1. Last October Castro announced the formation of a political bureau, a secretariat, and five standing committees within a 100-man central committee.
 2. The party controls provincial and local affairs, education and indoctrination, and the mass organizations.

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3. About one fifth of the party members and two thirds of the central committee members are from the Cuban armed forces.
- C. Factionalism in the regime appears to be at its lowest level since Castro came to power.
1. Nearly the entire top civilian and military leadership is included in the central committee.
 - a. About 20 prominent "old" Communists have gained added stature through membership.
 - b. There are no adherents of the economic policies of Che Guevara on the central committee.
- D. Despite these factors contributing to the regime's stability, there is no doubt that the over-all political climate in Cuba has shifted somewhat in the past year. An air of uncertainty is prevalent in Havana which--if not checked--could lead to further disenchantment.
- III. Castro recognizes that he has no alternative to continued large-scale aid from the Soviet Union. As a result, he has continued to move closer to Moscow, and has cooled toward the Chinese.

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- A. The October visit of Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko to Cuba and Raul Castro's six-week visit to the USSR and Eastern Europe in October and November were probably generally aimed at reviewing Soviet-Cuban relations.
- B. Castro probably no longer views all of Latin America as on the brink of revolution. He now limits clandestine Cuban support and concentrates it where revolutionaries are most active. Nevertheless, Cuban propaganda on behalf of armed revolution since the Tri-Continent Conference has reached a level of intensity not seen since 1963.
1. Venezuela, Guatemala, and Colombia are Castro's three principal targets.
 2. In addition, Cuba has sent military personnel to help insurgents in the Congo, and to train other African revolutionaries in Brazzaville.
- IV. Ernesto "Che" Guevara, the former minister of industries, and the regime's foremost revolutionary, left the Cuban political scene last spring. He may also have left Cuba.

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- A. Guevara may be carrying out the pledge attributed to him by Castro to assist other revolutionary movements.
 - B. Guevara's eclipse stemmed from differences with Castro over basic questions relating to the development of the Cuban economy, and to the attitude Cuba should take toward revolutionary activity elsewhere in the hemisphere.
- V. Cuba's economic performance remains spotty, and the long-range outlook is uncertain.
- A. The 1965 sugar harvest of about 6 million tons surpassed the yearly harvest of the pre-Castro years.
 - 1. This demonstrated the effectiveness of wide economic and administrative reforms applied during 1965.
 - B. The 1966 harvest probably will be in the neighborhood of 4.5 million tons--2 million tons short of the goal. Severe drought has been blamed by Castro for this shortfall.
 - 1. The outlook for future sugar earnings is clouded by continuing harvesting and milling problems, and by uncertain world sugar prices.

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2. General economic mismanagement continues, although some improvement has been made in the past year.
3. Shortages in certain food and consumer goods may become worse in 1966, but Castro can continue to rely on large-scale Soviet assistance.

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