


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
China Political Monthly

Top Secret

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24 November 1967





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
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Office of Current Intelligence
24 November 1967

MEMORANDUM

POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS IN COMMUNIST CHINA
OCTOBER 1967

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I. October Transition

October saw a continuation and intensification of the drive of the central authorities to restrict and circumscribe the more extreme aspects of the Cultural Revolution, but by the end of the month there were signs that extremists were again attempting to breathe new life into radical policies. Disorders, which had racked China from end to end in July and August, remained at a relatively low level in October, and transportation dislocations and other economic disruptions were greatly reduced. This trend appeared to be a reflection of the more orderly policies introduced in September, and tended to confirm reports that the military had taken a more active and direct hand in maintaining order throughout the country. Nevertheless, clashes between rival Red Guard groups and between some of these groups and the PLA never entirely ceased. By the end of the month and in the first week of November the number and seriousness of these clashes again appeared to be on the upswing. The level of disorder, however, remained far below that of last summer.


A series of central directives coupled with insistent propaganda emanating from Peking in the first three weeks of October appeared to indicate that the central authorities were willing to be more forceful than they had been at any time since mid-March in bringing disruptive Red Guard elements to heel. Rival groups were enjoined to submerge their differences and enter into "revolutionary great alliances"--umbrella organizations composed of representatives from various competing Red Guard factions. This line had been a subsidiary theme of regime propaganda since the spring, but now leading spokesmen for Peking--not only relative moderates such as Chou En-lai and Hsieh Fu-chih, but also "leftists" such as Chen Po-ta and Chiang Ching--claimed that establishment of such alliances was the first order of business in China and called on the military to assist the Red Guards in this task. Mao himself endorsed this reversal.

At the same time schools throughout the country were ordered to open and students were told to resume classes. Regime propaganda put great emphasis on the importance of a return to the classroom, but no new nation-wide curriculum was promulgated. Red Guards who had been "making revolution" in outlying areas were ordered to return to class or risk expulsion, and a directive of the central authorities announced that funds issued to Red Guards in the provinces would be cut off and Red Guard "liaison stations" disbanded.

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
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In mid-October there were also signs that Peking was attempting to re-order and strengthen its administrative apparatus. In stressing the importance of the "revolutionary great alliances" Peking renewed instructions that these organizations were to parallel existing administrative and economic "systems," which would tend to make them more easily controlled, in the pattern of the docile mass organizations functioning before the Cultural Revolution. At the same time, renewed emphasis was also placed on the establishment of "revolutionary committees"--larger catch-all organizations composed of Red Guard representatives, regular cadres, and military personnel.

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placed on the importance of making full use of regular cadres, and a People's Daily editorial claimed that the cadres were to form the "core and backbone" of the revolutionary committees. Moreover, stress was placed on the importance of the role of the Communist Party itself, for the first time this year.

Nevertheless, Peking's primary instrument in the provinces remained the PLA. In practice the military dominated the revolutionary committees and preparatory groups in provinces where they had been set up; elsewhere (in 14 provinces) the PLA ruled directly through military control commissions. Following guidelines established on 5 September, the PLA was in most places quick to put down overt outbreaks of violence, and in the cities armed military patrols remained active in an apparent attempt to keep clashes from occurring. Late in October these patrols were apparently beefed up in many places; in Peking they were reported to be operating on a 24-hour basis. Military commanders played a very large role in the 1 October National Day celebrations, which tended to confirm the supposition that the central authorities had taken military sensibilities into account in ordering a cut-back in Cultural Revolution activity in September.

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While the military has been reasonably successful in keeping the level of violence relatively low, the PLA and the central authorities have had much less success in resolving or even significantly reducing the underlying tensions between rival Red Guard groups. Peking's tactic in the current moderate phase has been to call both conservative and radical Red Guard groups in a given area equally "revolutionary," and therefore capable of entering into the "revolutionary great alliances" on equal footing. This approach has satisfied no one, and has been particularly repugnant to the radical Red Guards, who felt themselves to be the apple of Peking's eye during the spring and summer. The radicals, who still generally retain their organizational identity and propaganda outlets, are almost certainly receiving at least tacit support from militant leaders in Peking, although no direct evidence of this has as yet shown up.

Despite the strong words of the central authorities, many of Peking's instructions are still being ignored by Red Guard elements, as they were last spring and summer, when less authoritative and explicit appeals to end violence and factionalism were issued. Peking's continued emphasis on the importance of ending disputes and on the necessity of a return to the classroom strongly suggest that its demands in these areas are still not being fully obeyed. [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] In Tibet the Lhasa authorities specifically announced that the regulations concerning a return of students to their schools were to be "suspended until further notice" because the local transportation situation made such movements an impossibility. This attempt to mollify the militant Red Guards was almost certainly endorsed by the central authorities, although the impetus for its promulgation may not have originated in Peking.

The present approach, then, is to end Red Guard violence, to circumscribe and downplay Red Guard activities, but not to do away with the militant Red Guard groups entirely--except insofar as these groups enter into paper "great alliances" with their rivals. This approach contrasts rather sharply with that of last February and March, when many militant organizations were suppressed outright and the Red Guard movement was specifically attacked for "immaturity." This cautious attitude probably reflects a feeling on the part of the moderate sponsors of the present policies that their strength is not great enough to run roughshod over the militant Maoists in Peking.

It may also represent a more subtle tactical approach on the part of the "moderates" than evidenced in February and March. The heavy-handed suppression of the militants at that time created wide-spread resentment against the military on the part of the young radicals, and this resentment was exploited by their leaders in Peking to help to overturn the policies of consolidation and retrenchment. The sponsors of the present line may calculate that a more cautious approach at this time will eventually defuse tensions among the Red Guards, but at less cost than last winter.

Despite the care exercised thus far, there are signs that the extremists in Peking have again begun to accuse the PLA of being too harsh toward the Red Guards. A continuing series of editorials in People's Daily and Liberation Army Journal in early November have warned that the military needs further "education" and that PLA elements do not properly understand mass movements. The most significant of these editorials, published in Liberation Army Journal on 6 November, warned military personnel that they should not "blindly obey orders" when those orders conflict with the thought of Mao Tse-tung. This line is a virtual incitement to disorder and violence, and was prominently used last spring to exhort radicals after the February-March pause in Cultural Revolution activity. Other signs of resurgent radical activity, such as large-scale poster attacks on "moderates" and mass demonstrations against prominent officials, have not thus far been noted, although they were major features of the upturn in militant activity in late March and April. The present muted attacks on the PLA may be no more than a trial balloon put up by the Peking Maoists; nevertheless, they are indicative of continuing tensions and disagreements at the top-most levels of leadership. Another sign of such disagreements is the charge on 2 November by conservative Red Guards in Tibet that their radical rivals were attempting to tone down criticism of Wang Li, a fairly prominent Peking "ultra-leftist" who had come under attack by all factions in early September.

Although a number of middle level "ultra-leftists" such as Wang were discredited in September, prominent radicals--in particular Lin Piao and Kang Sheng--remain in place and are active. Articles lavishly praising Lin were a prominent feature in the central press during early November. These "leftist" leaders are very closely identified with the radical policies of the Cultural Revolution, and it is unlikely that they will permanently acquiesce in the current moderate policies without further attempts to get them reversed.

II. The Central Leadership

The Top Leaders

The abrupt switch to a more moderate line in early September suggested that changes of considerable magnitude had taken place in the Chinese power structure. This impression was strengthened by the turnout of leaders for National Day celebrations on 1 October. At this time men who had been out of sight or in deep political distress throughout much of the Cultural Revolution were accorded new prominence; others who had played a large part in encouraging the political convulsions of the past year seemed to be at least temporarily in eclipse.

The New Line-up

In the aftermath of the violent disorder of last summer several Cultural Revolution figures have fallen from favor, chief among them CRG members Wang Li and Kuan Feng. Some of the remaining members may be in jeopardy. These men have been linked to the "May 16 Corps," the propaganda target charged in early September with opposing Chou En-lai and the People's Liberation Army.

The shape of the decision-making machinery which rules in Peking, today, imperfectly known though it is, has now almost certainly shifted quite far from the monolithic mode of operation of 1965 toward a looser and less predictable kind of consensus politics. Chou En-lai, who appears to have had a major role in working out the new policies adopted in September and October, can be expected to bring forward again those leaders who had cooperated with him in the past but had fallen afoul of Red Guard attacks. To date, the only evidence that this has occurred at the top levels is the renewed importance of such figures as Li Hsien-nien and Nieh Jung-chen. A better case can be made at secondary levels.

Men Associated with Chou

There were two groups of leaders, both associated with the moderate end of the policy-making spectrum, whom Chou attempted to shield from militant Red Guard attacks in January. One of these groups consisted of five Vice Premiers more or less consistently identified with the pragmatic policies championed by Chou: Li Fu-chun, Chen Yi, Li Hsien-nien, Tan Chen-lin, and Hsieh Fu-chih. Chou's strong public defense of the five probably put his own standing in jeopardy, but he

managed to extract the perhaps reluctant support of Chiang Ching and Chen Po-ta, who sided openly with Chou in defense of his subordinates. As a result, Li Fu-chun and Hsieh Fu-chih escaped from the ordeal unscathed, and the attacks on the other three abated during the thaw of February and March.

In May they began again, those on Chen Yi and Tan Chen-lin becoming particularly virulent. It now appears that Tan Chen-lin was permanently knocked out by those attacks. Li Hsien-nien, who was never entirely counted out last spring, has been appearing for the last two months in a position of renewed importance.

Chen Yi is a special case. The Foreign Minister has made only two publicly reported appearances since 18 August, both at National Day observances. He has been conspicuously absent on other occasions when his normal duties would have required his presence, and it had seemed quite possible for some weeks that he had finally been removed after months of strong criticism from revolutionaries.

Nevertheless, there is now a substantial body of evidence, none of it yet definitive, that Chen may be slated for reinstatement.

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
The last reported anti-Chen rally was held on 27 August, and posters since then have pictured him as one of the victims of Wang Li and the "May 16 Corps" outlawed in September.

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The second group criticized by Red Guards beginning in January was primarily military: two old army heroes and MAC members, Hsu Hsiang-chien and Yeh Chien-ying, and the head of

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the state's scientific and technical program, Nieh Jung-chen, who is also an MAC member and Vice Premier. These men were also defended by Chou, which suggests that they shared his pragmatic viewpoint. Despite Chou's backing, it appeared by May that the roles of the three had been reduced to making mere ceremonial appearances. According to poster reports, they had been removed from some posts.

Of the three, the only one who appears to have been reinstated thus far is Nieh Jung-chen. Despite an abject "confession" by Nieh and a public defense of him by Chou in January,

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
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however, several weeks after the new moderate policies had been instituted, Nieh gave the main speech at a 100,000-man rally held in Peking to celebrate the formation of a "revolutionary great alliance" among national defense scientific and technological units and national defense industrial units. Most of the top leadership as well as thirty military leaders were listed in attendance. Nieh's keynote speech at this rally was his first prominent appearance this year, but he has appeared several times since then

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Representatives from the Military

A group of younger military leaders have apparently been recently included in the policy making machinery. These men have started to appear regularly at important functions and it seems probable that they now dominate the military establishment. Key men in this group are acting Chief-of-Staff Yang Cheng-wu, Vice Minister of National Defense Su Yu, two Deputy Chiefs-of-Staff--Li Tien-yu and Wang Hsin-ting--and the respective chiefs of the rear services department, the air force, and the navy. One point of considerable interest is the continued presence in Peking since 25 July--in circumstances that enhance their political status--of Huang Yung-sheng and Chen Hsi-lien, the commanders of the Canton and Mukden Military Regions. They may be acting as the spokesmen at the center for regional leaders. The individual roles played by these military leaders in making policy is not clear, but their influence as a group is probably growing.


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The Militants

Several of the major figures most closely tied to radical policy during the Cultural Revolution--Kang Sheng, Chen Po-ta, and Chiang Ching--are still members of the inner elite and, in fact, are consistently so listed in all protocol turnouts. Moreover, all three have publicly endorsed the drive to restore social order which began in September. Nevertheless, the position of at least one of these--Chen Po-ta--seems to be somewhat shaky.

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


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Attacks on the ultra-leftists of the "May 16 Corps," which began on 1 September, conveyed the strong implication that some more important member of the radical wing of the inner circle was involved. Chen Po-ta, who has close connections with Wang Li and other disgraced leftists, has seemed a likely candidate. It is possible that Lin is using Chen as a scapegoat for the disasters of the past summer, perhaps in an effort to deflect any potential moves against his own position.

Other leftist leaders, although less important, are clearly in serious trouble. Several members of the Central Committee's Cultural Revolution Group--a driving force in the Cultural Revolution--fell in early September. Included in this category are Mu Hsin, Lin Chieh and Kuan Feng, all of whom have been accused of being sponsors of the discredited "May 16 Corps." A somewhat more important figure who also fits into this category is Wang Li--a man who had been given a hero's welcome in Peking in late July, following his brief detention in Wuhan by forces responsive to the recalcitrant former Wuhan Military Region commander. Wang has not appeared in public since August and has been criticized by other members of the leftist leadership in Peking, including Chiang Ching. He has also been under severe poster attack both in Peking and the provinces since early October. However, in early November conservative Red Guards in Tibet were accusing

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their extremist rivals of putting up posters defending Wang, and his "case" may become a cause celebre, to be exploited by the radicals if they attempt to regain the ground they lost in early September.

The Apex

In terms of his public image, Lin Piao has suffered no discernible loss as a result of the policy shift adopted in September, nor has Mao Tse-tung. Mao is still the near-deified supreme leader, teacher, commander-in-chief and helmsman, and Lin was reconfirmed on 1 October as his first deputy and heir. Although both were conspicuously absent from public view for most of August and September, Mao has been credited with conducting an extensive "inspection" tour of troubled provinces, and has been associated in central directives with the new policy line. Nevertheless, a central directive issued in mid-October found it necessary to assure the public that, contrary to rumors, Mao was alive, in good health and working in Peking. September's abrupt retreat from the radical policies with which Mao has long been associated apparently suggested to some that he was no longer active and perhaps had died.

While Lin's public statements in September and October were in general agreement with the more restrained stance adopted in early autumn, the Red Guard press in at least one instance has seen fit to publish a fire-eating Lin speech presumably delivered at the height of the radical push of last summer. Another Lin speech delivered in early August has recently been approved for wide dissemination and discussion. Moreover, in early November a series of editorials dealing with problems in the army made a conspicuous point of lavishly praising Lin--a line that had been noticeably in abeyance in late September and October. While it appears that current policy has shifted from the line that Mao and Lin would probably prefer to follow, their continued presence at the apex of affairs raises the strong possibility that they may again press for a radical resurgence of the Cultural Revolution.

III. Current Status Of Leading Organs Of The Political System

In the past year four organizations have usually been associated with the official directives of the decision-making apparatus: the Central Committee--which in practice means the Standing Committee of the Politburo; the State Council; the Military Affairs Committee; and the Cultural Revolution Group of the Central Committee. All four of these organs have suffered considerable attrition in the course of the Cultural Revolution. These changes are discussed below. In addition to these four organizations, this report covers the Cultural Revolution Group of the People's Liberation Army. This body, though apparently largely inactive, includes in its membership four of the more important rising younger officers of the PLA.

POLITBURO

Prior to the Cultural Revolution the Politburo was the locus of power within the Chinese political system. In the course of the struggle eight of its thirteen members have thus far been casualties. If the alternate members are included, eleven out of eighteen members have fallen. An assault of such dimensions on the most significant political body in China demonstrates the force of the impact of the Cultural Revolution on the body politic.

The current full and alternate members represent both the Cultural Revolution militants (Lin Piao, Chen Po-ta and Kang Sheng) usually associated with Mao Tse-tung, and individuals thought to be more pragmatic (Li Hsien-nien, Li Fu-chun, Nieh Jung-chen, and Hsieh Fu-chih) and associated with Chou En-lai. The events since August, especially the attacks upon the more militant of Mao's aides in the Cultural Revolution Group (Wang Li and Kuan Feng), leave the relative stature of the militants in the Politburo in some doubt.

The spectrum of attitudes represented by the membership of the Politburo makes an analysis of the dominant members difficult. Recent policy decisions, however, make it quite clear that some kind of moderate-pragmatic coalition, probably led by Chou, has achieved at least a stand-off with the radicals in the policy-making consensus process within the inner circle. This situation is probably in part a result of more coherent military opposition to the extremist policies of the past summer.

POLITBURO

TABLE I

(Inactive in parenthesis)

	<u>October 1965</u>	<u>August 1966</u>
	(Formal-1958, less those who died)	
Chairman	Mao Tse-tung	Mao Tse-tung
Vice Chairmen	Liu Shao-chi Chou En-lai (Chu Te) (Chen Yun) Lin Piao	Lin Piao
Other Standing Committee Members	Teng Hsiao-ping	Chou En-lai Tao Chu Chen Po-ta Teng Hsiao-ping Kang Sheng Liu Shao-chi (Chu Te) Li Fu-chun (Chen Yun)
Other Politburo Members	(Tung Pi-wu) Peng Chen Chen Yi Li Fu-chun (Peng Te-huai) Liu Po-cheng Ho Lung Li Hsien-nien Li Ching-Chuan Tan Chen-Lin	(Tung Pi-wu) Chen Yi Liu Po-cheng Ho Lung Li Hsien-nien Li Ching-chuan Tan Chen-lin Hsu Hsiang-chien Nieh Jung-chen Yeh Chien-ying
Alternate Politburo Members	Ulanfu (Chang Wen-tien) Lu Ting-i Chen Po-ta Kang Sheng Po I-po	Ulanfu Po I-po Li Hsueh-feng Hsieh Fu-chih

ACTIVE MEMBERSHIP OF THE POLITBURO, OCTOBER 1967

Chairman	Mao Tse-tung
Vice Chairman	Lin Piao
Other Standing Committee Members	Chou En-lai Chen Po-ta Kang Sheng Li Fu-chun
Members	Li Hsien-nien Nieh Jung-chen
Alternate Member	Hsieh Fu-chih

MILITARY AFFAIRS COMMISSION

Within the formal structure of the Chinese political system the MAC still maintains its critical and potent position as the key military body. In the turmoil of the Cultural Revolution, however, its membership has been attacked, purged and revised. Nevertheless, the critical role of the military in enforcing and maintaining the present relative calm, and the presence of more pragmatically oriented individuals on its board, makes the MAC one of the most important political bodies in China.

The current group consists of three new members (Hsieh Fu-chih, Yang Cheng-wu, and Su Yu), and three old members, with the two top positions being held now--as in October 1965--by Mao Tse-tung and Lin Piao. As Mao is assumed to be the chairman ex officio, Lin has been consistently the acting chairman of this body since 1959. Nieh Jung-chen, [redacted]

[redacted] is the third current member of the MAC who appears to have survived the Cultural Revolution. Although strongly criticized by Red Guards, Nieh appears to have been completely rehabilitated.


The men added to the MAC are Hsieh Fu-chih, who is primarily occupied with the Ministry of Public Security; acting Chief-of-Staff Yang Cheng-wu; and Su Yu, the Vice Minister of National Defense who emerged from a nine year term in political limbo last fall. Yang and Su have both become more active and influential during the course of the Cultural Revolution. Both, however, have been identified with the professional military structure rather than with the political officer wing. Both, moreover, are in their 50's, appreciably younger than the dismissed members. Thus, the overall effect of personnel changes in the MAC appears to be in the direction of a younger, pragmatic professional leadership.




MILITARY AFFAIRS COMMITTEE (MAC)

TABLE II

	<u>October 1965</u>	<u>June 1966</u>	<u>August 1966</u>	<u>January 1967</u>	<u>May 1967</u>
Chm Ex Officio	Mao Tse-tung	Mao Tse-tung	Mao Tse-tung	Mao Tse-tung	Mao Tse-tung
Acting Chm	Lin Piao	Lin Piao	Lin Piao	Lin Piao	Lin Piao
	Lo Jui-ching	Ho Lung	Nieh Jung-chen	Nieh Jung-chen	Hsieh Fu-chih
	Ho Lung	Nieh Jung-chen	Ho Lung	Hsiao Hua	Yang Cheng-wu
	Nieh Jung-chen	Hsiao Hua	Hsiao Hua	Hsu Hsiang-chien	Su Yu
	Liu Po-cheng	Liu Po-cheng	Liu Po-cheng	Yeh Chien-ying	
	Yeh Chien-ying	Yeh Chien-ying	Hsu Hsiang-chien	(Chen Yi)	
	Hsu Hsiang-chien	Hsu Hsiang-chien	Yeh Chien-ying		
	Hsiao Hua		(Chen Yi)		





ACTIVE MEMBERSHIP OF THE MILITARY AFFAIRS COMMITTEE, OCTOBER 1967

Chairman ex officio

Mao Tse-tung

Acting Chairman

Lin Piao

Other Standing
Committee Members

Nieh Jung-chen
Hsieh Fu-chih
Yang Cheng-wu
Su Yu



STATE COUNCIL

The State Council was, prior to the Cultural Revolution, the apex of power within the governmental apparatus, but its position in the political system was overshadowed by the retention of ultimate political power in the hands of the party. The destruction visited on the party machinery in the course of the past year has probably shifted the balance of political power to some degree, but whatever freedom the government apparatus may have gained as a result was attenuated by Red Guard harassment and the purge within its own ranks. Attacks on government officials seriously hindered the administrative apparatus of the country, but several key members of the State Council appear to have survived this onslaught under the protection of Chou En-lai.


In the present calm the State Council has become an important center of moderate influence. Although it is difficult to assess the degree to which the Council is now formally operating, it is safe to say that it is directing the governmental apparatus in one way or another. Because the active membership of this body is now small, it must be assumed that much of the work done by fallen vice premiers is now being discharged by subordinates, and that those men remaining on the Council, in particular Chou En-lai, Li Hsien-nien and Li Fu-chun, have taken on additional responsibilities.



MEMBERSHIP OF THE STATE COUNCIL

TABLE III

<u>October 1965</u>	<u>June 1966</u>	<u>August 1966</u>	<u>January 1967</u>	<u>May 1967</u>
PREMIER:				
Chou En-lai	Chou	Chou	Chou	Chou
VICE PREMIERS:				
Lin Piao (Chen Yun)	Lin (Chen)	Lin (Chen)	Lin (Chen)	Lin (Chen)
Teng Hsiao-ping	Teng	Teng	--	--
Ho Lung	Ho	Ho	--	--
Chen Yi	Chen	Chen	Chen	(Chen)
Ulanfu	Ulanfu	Ulanfu	--	--
Li Fu-chun	Li	Li	Li	Li
Li Hsien-nien	Li	Li	Li	(Li)
Tan Chen-lin	Tan	Tan	Tan	(Tan)
Nieh Jung-chen	Nieh	Nieh	Nieh	(Nieh)
Po I-po	Po	Po	--	--
Lu Ting-i	--	--	--	--
Lo Jui-ching	--	--	--	--
Tao Chu	Tao	Tao	--	--
Hsieh Fu-chih	Hsieh	Hsieh	Hsieh	Hsieh



ACTIVE MEMBERSHIP OF THE STATE COUNCIL

Premier

Chou En-lai

Vice Premiers

Lin Piao
Li Fu-chun
Li Hsien-nien
Nieh Jung-chen
Hsieh Fu-chih

[REDACTED]

CULTURAL REVOLUTION GROUP

The primary function of the CRG seems to be to serve as an executive board for implementing the more extreme goals of the militant Maoists. In this capacity, the membership in the CRG has become associated with the militant side of the militant-moderate spectrum.


As membership in the CRG brought previously unimportant individuals into the locus of power, it also brought them into the power struggle. It is difficult, however, to associate the resultant purge of members of the CRG solely with their CRG roles. The downfall of Tao Chu, party boss of the Central South Regional Bureau, and his lieutenants Wang Jen-chung and Chang Ping-hua in January 1967--all former CRG members--was probably related to their attempts to build an independent power base in southern China. The purge of Wang Li and Kuan Feng last month, however, appears to be directly related to their functions as implementers of militant Maoist policy. Wang and Kuan had been two of the chief trouble-shooters for the militants, and had exercised their power in the summer of 1967 by touring the provinces and settling local disputes in favor of the more militant groups. When the political tide began to turn in early September, they were rewarded for their fervor by being criticized and later purged. Recently the charges against Wang have expanded; he is now accused of being a leader of the outlawed "May 16 Corps," and with supporting Yao Teng-shan, an extremist who had been brought back from his post as chargé in Djakarta to lead the struggle against Chen Yi in the Foreign Ministry. Mu Hsin, who fell at about the same time, seems to be a direct victim of central power politics. He too is charged with being one of the leaders of the extremist "May 16 Corps" that has become the symbol of the militant-moderate conflict in Peking.

In its year of existence the CRG has suffered a purge of almost half of its membership, and the policies it has stood for are presently not being pushed hard; thus its present influence upon the decision-making apparatus is probably relatively low. However, some individuals that compose its current membership are still significant. Official references to the CRG and public appearances indicate that they remain close to the locus of power. If the Cultural Revolution should return to its earlier state of frenetic activity, the CRG members would gain greater significance. For the moment, however, the leading spokesmen for the group appear to be adhering to the current moderate line of the dominant coalition.

MEMBERSHIP OF THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION GROUP

Table IV

	<u>October 1966</u> (FORMAL)	<u>January 1967</u>
Head	Chen Po-ta	Chen Po-ta
Advisers	Tao Chu Kang Sheng	Kang Sheng
Deputy Heads	Chiang Ching Wang Jen-chung Liu Chih-chien Chang Chun-chiao	Chiang Ching Chang Chun-chiao
Members	Chang Ping-hua Wang Li Kuan Feng Chi Pen-yu Mu Hsin Yao Wen-yuan	Yao Wen-yuan Wang Li Kuan Feng Chi Pen-yu Mu Hsin Hsieh Tang-chung (?)



ACTIVE MEMBERSHIP OF THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION GROUP

Head	Chen Po-ta
Adviser	Kang Sheng
1st Deputy Head	Chiang Ching
2nd Deputy Head	Chang Chun-chiao
Members	Yao Wen-yuan
	Chi Pen-yu



CULTURAL REVOLUTION GROUP OF THE PEOPLE'S LIBERATION ARMY

The public announcement of the reorganization of the PLA CRG on 11 January 1967 and reports on its activities in the following two weeks were the only real public manifestations of its role in the Cultural Revolution. Prior to this time, and immediately following this flurry of activity, the PLA CRG has not played a public role.

Compounding the apparent inactivity of the PLA CRG since the end of January is the high level of attrition suffered by its membership. Virtually half its membership has been either purged, severely criticized, or appear to be politically dormant. Nevertheless, as with the CRG of the Central Committee, many of the individuals that compose the current membership list are important figures in their own right or are close to the inner circle of decision-makers in Peking. The addition of two men-- Chiu Hui-tso and Chang Hsiu-chuan--to the PLA CRG in late summer has not clarified the current role of this body.

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THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION GROUP OF THE PEOPLE'S LIBERATION ARMY (PLA CRG)

Table V

	<u>11 January 1967</u> (FORMAL)	<u>May 1967</u>
Head	Hsu Hsiang-chen	
Adviser	Chiang Ching	Chiang Ching
Deputy Heads	Hsiao Hua Yang Cheng-wu Wang Hsin-ting Hsu Li-ching Kuan Feng Hsieh Tang-chung Li Man-tsun	Yang Cheng-wu Wang Hsin-ting Kuan Feng Hsieh Tang-chung (?) Li Man-tsun (?)
Members	Wang Hung-kun Yu Li-chin Liu Hua-ching Tang Ping-chu Hu Chih Yen Chun *Wang Feng *Ho Ku-yen *Chang Tao	Wang Hung-kun Yu Li-chin Liu Hua-ching Tang Ping-chu (?) Yeh Chun *Wang Feng *Ho Ku-yen *Chang Tao

*Appeared on the formal list, but were never mentioned after 11 January 1967.



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CURRENT MEMBERSHIP OF THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION GROUP OF THE
PEOPLE'S LIBERATION ARMY

Head	Wu Fa-hsien
Adviser	Chiang Ching
Deputy Heads	Yang Cheng-wu Wang Hsin-ting Chiu Hui-tso Chang Hsiu-chuan Yeh Chun
Members	Wang Hung-kun Yu Li-chin Liu Hua-ching


IV. The Provincial Situation

There were few major changes in the provinces during October. The military dominate the leadership in virtually every province in the country (Heilungkiang is a conspicuous exception). "Revolutionary Committees"--organs composed of representatives of the Red Guard "revolutionary" groups, regular cadres and the military, but in fact controlled by the PLA--have been established in six provinces and in the independently governed cities of Peking and Shanghai. The regime has indicated that these bodies are to become the governing bodies at the provincial level, and that similar bodies are to be established at lower levels as well. Several cities have already formed revolutionary committees of their own. Five or six provinces have formed "preparatory groups" that are eventually to lead to the establishment of revolutionary committees. The military also dominate these bodies. The remaining provinces are governed directly by the PLA through Military Control Commissions.

Most revolutionary committees and preparatory groups were set up prior to the September policy shift. Only two changes have been noted since then. On 1 November a revolutionary committee was formally promulgated in Inner Mongolia. Announced leaders show no significant change from the preparatory group previously in existence in Inner Mongolia. According to a radio Lanchow broadcast, a preparatory group was set up in Kansu on 5 November. In fact, earlier Lanchow broadcasts and an NCNA account of National Day proceedings in Lanchow indicated that this group has been in existence since early August; the new announcement showed no change in the leadership lineup. It would appear that the new announcement was designed to suggest a sense of movement toward a more stable and regularized situation in the province although no such movement was actually taking place.

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CHINESE COMMUNIST PARTY REGIONS





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