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
MEMORANDUM

DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE

The Situation in Vietnam

ARMY and DOS review(s) completed.

Top Secret



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Information as of 1600
1 June 1967

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HIGHLIGHTS

Former chief of state General Duong Van "Big" Minh who led the overthrow of the Diem regime in 1963 and who has been out of South Vietnam for nearly three years, has formally requested permission to return to Vietnam, undoubtedly for the purpose of participating in the upcoming presidential elections.

I. The Military Situation in South Vietnam: Scattered skirmishes were reported between US and Communist troops in the coastal provinces of Binh Dinh and Quang Ngai on 31 May - 1 June (Paras. 1-4). An ARVN outpost was attacked and overrun by an enemy battalion early on 1 June (Para. 5). Operation PRAIRIE IV in northern Quang Tri Province has ended and has been succeeded by Operation CIMARRON (Paras. 6-8).

II. Political Developments in South Vietnam: General Duong Van "Big" Minh, a former chief of state, has asked Premier Ky and Chief of State Thieu for permission to return to Vietnam (Paras. 1-3).

III. Military Developments in North Vietnam: There is nothing of significance to report.

IV. Other Communist Military Developments: There is nothing of significance to report.

V. Communist Political Developments: Soviet officials continue to foster the impression that Moscow may increase its involvement in North Vietnam if the US continues to step up its "aggression" (Paras. 1-3).

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ANNEX:

South Vietnam Battle Statistics
1963 to week of 21-27 May 1967
-Weapons and Personnel Losses
-Viet Cong Attacks and Incidents

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I. THE MILITARY SITUATION IN SOUTH VIETNAM

1. A US Army company-size patrol participating in Operation PERSHING in the northeastern part of coastal Binh Dinh Province engaged a similar size enemy force in well-prepared defensive positions ten miles north of Bong Son early on 31 May. In a 23-hour battle, which ended on 1 June, more than 75 enemy soldiers were killed compared with reported American losses of seven killed and another 35 wounded. Since its inception on 11 February, this search-and-destroy operation has resulted in 1,762 enemy soldiers killed. Total American casualties to date are 310 killed and 1,326 wounded.

2. The enemy soldiers in the 31 May engagement--dressed in gray uniforms--were believed to be North Vietnamese Army (NVA) regulars, possibly elements of the NVA 3rd Division which traditionally operates in the Binh Dinh - Quang Ngai Province border area.

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3. Just to the north of this engagement, a US Army company of the three-battalion Operation MALHEUR, currently sweeping southeastern Quang Ngai Province, established contact about eight miles west of Duc Pho on 31 May with a Communist force of undetermined size. The day-long battle resulted in enemy losses of 13 killed. Fifteen Americans were wounded, according to preliminary reports.

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4. Several hours later another skirmish between US and Communist forces developed in the coastal plains northwest of Duc Pho. In this battle, which lasted four hours, 18 Communist soldiers were killed; there were no American casualties.

5. In Quang Tin Province to the north, a South Vietnamese Army (ARVN) outpost several miles

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southwest of the provincial capital of Tam Ky was attacked and overrun by an estimated battalion-size Communist force early on 1 June. The ground attack was preceded by a 100-round mortar barrage and small-arms fire. According to preliminary reports, friendly casualties are 25 killed, 15 wounded, and another 30 unaccounted for. Enemy losses have not yet been reported.

Operation PRAIRIE Ends in Quang Tri Province


6. The fourth and last phase of the long-term US Marine search-and-destroy Operation PRAIRIE, which began on 19 April in northernmost Quang Tri Province, ended on 31 May. American casualties for this final phase were 164 killed and 1,240 wounded. Communist losses included 489 killed; 150 Communist weapons were captured.

7. The over-all Operation PRAIRIE, which began on 3 August 1966, and its predecessor, Operation HASTINGS, have disrupted Communist military activity in the northern section of South Vietnam's I Corps area. These spoiling efforts included the interdiction of major infiltration routes, the dispersal of large enemy troop concentrations, the destruction of storage and supply caches, the discovery and subsequent destruction of complex bunker and tunnel systems which served as defensive positions, and the denial of strategic positions immediately south of the Demilitarized Zone.

8. On 1 June, seven US Marine battalions began Operation CIMARRON in the same general area as Operation PRAIRIE IV. These forces will continue to press NVA units currently active in northern Quang Tri Province in an effort to disrupt any planned future offensive operations.

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
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II. POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS IN SOUTH VIETNAM

1. Former chief of state General Duong Van "Big" Minh has asked Premier Ky and Chief of State Thieu to permit him to return to Vietnam, undoubtedly for the purpose of participating one way or another in the presidential elections.


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3. General Minh, who led the overthrow of the Diem regime, in 1963 was ousted in 1964 and has remained out of the country on a substantial government pension. Although absent for nearly three years, Minh retains genuine popular support among southern civilian and military elements. His return would introduce an additional significant factor into the presidential campaign.

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


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it is possible that Chief of State Thieu might opt for Minh's return as a means of rallying southern elements, thus complicating Premier Ky's candidacy.

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INFILTRATION TOTALS SINCE 1 OCT. 1965

Based on MACV holdings as of 31 May 1967

		ACCEPTED			POSSIBLE	MONTHLY TOTALS
		CONFIRMED	PROBABLE	TOTAL		
1965	October	6,500	-	6,500	200	6,700
	November	3,600	-	3,600	1,000	4,600
	December	-	600	600	200	800
1966	January	4,200	1,700	5,900	2,500	8,400
	February	6,700	2,300	9,000	2,000	11,000
	March	11,500	1,500	13,000	3,700	16,700
	April	100	500	600	-	600
	May	900	900	1,800	3,500	5,300
	June	10,500	600	11,100	1,300	12,400
	July	5,000	1,200	6,200	4,400	10,600
	August	1,600	400	2,000	3,100	5,100
	September	1,400	200	1,600	900	2,500
	October	100	600	700	4,600	5,300
	November	500	-	500	600	1,100
	December	500	200	700	1,500	2,200
1967	January	-	600	600	1,400	2,000
	February	500	-	500	400	900
	March	1,500	-	1,500	4,400	5,900
	April	-	-	-	100	100
	May	-	-	-	-	-
TOTALS		55,100	11,300	66,400	35,800	102,200

MONTHLY AVERAGE (1 OCT 1965-31 MAY 1967)**ACCEPTED: CONFIRMED AND PROBABLE 3,300****TOTAL ACCEPTED AND POSSIBLE 5,100**

ACCEPTED INFILTRATION: Those NVA personnel, groups, and units which have entered South Vietnam and are carried in the confirmed or probable categories.

CONFIRMED: A confirmed infiltration unit/group is one which is accepted in South Vietnam on the basis of information provided by a minimum of two POWs or returnees (Hoi Chanh) from the unit/group, or two captured documents from the unit, or a combination of personnel and documents.

PROBABLE: A probable infiltration unit/group is one which is accepted in South Vietnam on the basis of information provided by one POW or returnee (Hoi Chanh) from the unit/group, or a captured document, supported by information from other sources which can be evaluated as probably true.

POSSIBLE INFILTRATION: A possible infiltration unit/group is one which may be in South Vietnam on the basis of information which can be evaluated as possibly true even though no POW, returnee (Hoi Chanh), or document is available to verify the reports.

MONTH OF INFILTRATION: The month established as the date an infiltration unit/group crosses the international border into South Vietnam for the first time.

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III. NORTH VIETNAMESE MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS

1. The most recent MACV listing of infiltration shows that almost 9,000 North Vietnamese troops have been detected moving into South Vietnam between 1 January and 31 May 1967. Of these 2,000 are listed as confirmed, 600 as probable, and 6,300 as possible. Moreover, there are indications

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[redacted] that other large-scale but as yet undetected infiltration has taken place throughout the northern part of South Vietnam during the first five months of 1967.

2. The enemy's infiltration methods make it difficult to detect many infiltration groups until they have been in South Vietnam for as long as six months and in some instances even longer. Therefore, the figures currently cited for the period 1 December 1966 through 31 May 1967 are considered to be incomplete.

3. If average infiltration were computed for the period 1 October 1965 through 30 November 1966 (the period for which infiltration data is considered to be relatively complete) the figures would be approximately 4,500 men per month for the accepted category, and approximately 6,500 men per month for the accepted and possible categories together.

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IV. OTHER COMMUNIST MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS

1. There is nothing of significance to report.

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V. COMMUNIST POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS

1. The US Embassy in London has noted two more attempts by Soviet officials over recent weeks to foster the impression that Moscow might be forced to increase its own involvement in North Vietnam if the US continues stepping up its "aggression" against the North. The reported remarks of two Soviet Embassy officers followed the familiar lines of public and private statements made elsewhere

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This general line emerged shortly after Kosygin's visit to the UK in February and the renewal and widening after the Tet holiday of US air attacks on North Vietnam.

2. Soviet Second Secretary Makarov warned a university audience in Britain on 28 April that "if the US persists in its aggressive actions it will meet our troops and Chinese troops." In a private conversation with US Embassy officers a month later, Russian First Secretary Loginov announced a similarly hard line on Vietnam, obviously intended for the same effect. Loginov, however, explicitly confined his protestations strictly to US actions in the North. His comment that the USSR is not concerned with what happens in South Vietnam echoes private remarks made by other Soviet officials in the past.

3. Additional SAM personnel or other specialists might be dispatched to aid in the defense of the DRV but there is no good reason to believe that the Soviets intend to send ground "troops" to Vietnam. The USSR can be expected to provide more and heavier military equipment to the Vietnamese Communists, but Moscow seems no less intent on avoiding steps that could precipitate a direct Soviet-US military confrontation.

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
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
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Weapons Losses




Personnel Losses (Killed only)*







US Casualties to Date: Killed 10,566 Wounded 64,041 Captured 175 Missing 441

*Due to a change in the reporting of personnel losses, beginning 12 February 1967, the weekly figure will represent only personnel killed

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