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OCI No. 0718/67

**CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
Directorate of Intelligence  
17 April 1967****INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM****Situation in Ghana**

1. A coup led by junior Ghanaian army officers has apparently been quickly squelched by troops loyal to the ruling National Liberation Council (NLC). The coup was poorly planned and executed, and the leaders appear to have had the support of only a limited number of army units. No connection has been established between Nkrumah's schemes to regain power and the coup leaders, who may have been motivated primarily by personal and perhaps tribal consideration. By late morning Accra was calm and traffic was moving normally.

2. The rebels succeeded in gaining temporary control of Ghana radio and the residences of NLC Chairman Ankrah and Army Commander Kotoka. At 0100 EST they announced that the NLC had been dissolved and that a new three-man military junta had been established. At 0500 EST, however, an army captain announced over the radio that the coup had been foiled, and a short while later police commissioner Harlley, NLC vice chairman, announced that the rebel troops and their commanders had been overpowered and disarmed. Maj. Gen Ocran, an NLC member and Chief of Staff of the Ghanaian Armed Forces, was reported earlier to have been rallying loyal troops at Burma Camp (the army garrison in Accra). He clearly played a key role along with Harlley in suppressing the coup attempt.

3. Despite rebel claims of support from several army elements, the only unit positively identified as participating in the coup is the Reconnaissance Regiment at Burma Camp headed by a Major Achaab. The officer proclaimed by rebels as the head of their junta, Lt. Col. Assasie, commander of Ghana's First Paratroop Battalion at Tamale in the Northern Region, has disclaimed any knowledge of the coup.

State Dept. review completed

ARMY review(s) completed.

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4. The motivations behind the coup have not yet been clarified, but there have been some morale problems and an undercurrent of "tribalism" among junior officers and men since the overthrow of Nkrumah in February 1966. Rumblings of discontent among these officers reached a peak during the fall of 1966 and then trailed off. There have been no recent reports of serious dissatisfaction in the army. [redacted]

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[redacted] junior officers bitter over the army's poor equipment, the lack of housing, and the fact that most of the senior army leaders were away from the troops and had forgotten their problems. The younger officers have also apparently resented the fast promotion of many senior officers since the February 1966 coup. Much of this criticism appears to stem from officers of Akan tribes (Ashanti, Fanti, Akin, etc.) who claim that the preponderance of senior officers are from the Ewe tribe, and that Kotoka, an Ewe, was busy promoting his fellow tribesmen.

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
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DIRECTORATE OF  
INTELLIGENCE

# MEMORANDUM


## *The Situation in Vietnam*

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Information as of 1600  
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HIGHLIGHTS

[Redacted]

I. The Military Situation in South Vietnam:  
Phase III of Operation JUNCTION CITY began on 15 April  
in northern Tay Ninh Province (Paras. 1-4).

[Redacted]

II. Political Developments in South Vietnam:

[Redacted]

The latest round of government negotiations with FULRO collapsed (Paras. 5-6). Over 80 percent of the registered voters turned out for Sunday's local elections (Para. 7).

III. Military Developments in North Vietnam: There is nothing of significance to report.

IV. Other Communist Military Developments: There is nothing of significance to report.


V. Communist Political Developments: An unusual number of military articles have recently been published in the North Vietnamese press (Paras. 1-3).

VI. Other Major Aspects:

[Redacted] Hanoi's management of the flow of supplies from Cambodia to Communist forces in South Vietnam (Paras. 1-2).

ANNEX: Assessment of the situation in the southern delta.

[Redacted]



I. THE MILITARY SITUATION IN SOUTH VIETNAM

1. Phase III of Operation JUNCTION CITY-- the largest US ground offensive of the Vietnam war--began on 15 April, with the primary objective of preventing elements subordinate to the 9th Viet Cong Division and the Central Office for South Vietnam (COSVN) from re-establishing themselves in their War Zone "C" base area of northern Tay Ninh Province.

2. During the initial phases of JUNCTION CITY, the maximum number of allied maneuver battalions fielded at any one time was 23. However, only four battalions--three US and one ARVN--have been committed to Phase III under a new tactical formula known as the "floating brigade" concept. This concept involves the highly mobile circulation and maneuver of allied units throughout War Zone "C" to intercept and destroy Communist forces attempting to reinfiltate the area. Logistical support will be accomplished mainly by aerial resupply, utilizing airdrop by both parachute and helicopters, to keep the roving allied forces as flexible as possible.

3. Since JUNCTION CITY began on 21 February, Communist losses have totaled more than 2,700 killed in contrast to US losses of 260 killed and 1,500 wounded. The kill ratio of more than 10 to 1 is one of the most favorable achieved in any of the large US operations and can be partially attributed to the unusually heavy losses sustained by the enemy during their three abortive regimental-size attacks against US positions in late March.

4. [redacted] major Communist units, including COSVN, successfully evaded the drive by US troops through War Zone "C" by seeking sanctuary in Cambodia or in more remote areas of the war zone before and during earlier phases of JUNCTION CITY. [redacted]

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
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II. POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS IN SOUTH VIETNAM



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FULRO Negotiations Collapse

5. The latest hope of accomplishing a rapprochement with Y B'ham, dissident tribal leader of FULRO--the highland autonomy movement--was squashed last weekend when he declined at the last minute to come out of Cambodia to meet with GVN officials. On 15 April, II Corps commander General Vinh Loc, along with GVN montagnard delegates and FULRO negotiators, waited at the palace in Ban Me Thuot in Darlac Province for the exile FULRO delegation, only to receive a letter from Y B'ham postponing the meeting. The letter, addressed to "my American friends," made no mention of the GVN.

6. Considering the long-standing mutual animosity between the Vietnamese and the highlanders, General Vinh Loc and other Vietnamese involved in the effort to win the confidence of the FULRO dissidents had exhibited an unusual amount of patience in arranging for the return of FULRO troops to the GVN and for the supposed meeting with Y B'ham. Vinh Loc was reportedly not surprised at the rebuff, but did suggest to a US Embassy officer that the GVN would be hard pressed to be as patient in the future. The US Embassy apparently has no specific information on the reason for Y B'ham's failure to attend the meeting as scheduled.

Local Elections

7. For the third successive Sunday, over 80 percent of registered voters turned out in the balloting to elect village councils and hamlet chiefs in 244 villages. Direct Viet Cong anti-election activity was officially reported in

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[REDACTED]

seven provinces, but none of the polling sites was apparently harassed. Two more candidates in the 16 April contest, however, were assassinated and one was kidnaped, making a total of six candidates killed and 23 abducted so far during the three successive weeks of voting. The April phase of the local contests will continue for the next two Sundays.

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III. MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS IN NORTH VIETNAM

1. There is nothing of significance to report.

IV. OTHER COMMUNIST MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS

1. There is nothing of significance to report.

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V. COMMUNIST POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS

1. Within the last ten days Hanoi has broadcast an unusual number of military articles authored by an impressive list of prominent DRV military spokesmen. On 3 April, Hanoi broadcast a speech by Defense Minister Vo Nguyen Giap given last January on the importance of the militia and self defense forces. Although the emphasis on small-scale guerrilla forces has important implications for the strategy and tactics of the war in the South, Giap appeared to be talking in relatively routine terms mostly about the role of such forces in the North.


2. Two days later Hanoi broadcast another speech given earlier by General Song Hao. General Hao discussed the importance of building strong "basic" units in the regular armed forces, a topic which he frequently discusses in his role as chief of the army's Political Department. In addition to these two speeches, Hanoi also broadcast several commentaries on the war in the South this week--one by Chief of Staff Van Tien Dung from the April Hoc Tap, and a long five-part series authored by Cuu Long, the pseudonym for an unidentified, but authoritative, military writer in South Vietnam.

3. The release of such a large volume of military speeches and articles raises the possibility that Hanoi's military strategists have concluded another round of discussions on the conduct of the war. In the past Hanoi has often delayed the dissemination of military commentaries while high-level party meetings and discussions were actually under way. The texts of the important articles and speeches given at the conference were simultaneously published at a later date. Last spring when there was evidence that military discussions on the war in the South were under way in Hanoi, the regime delayed for three months the publication of two important propaganda speeches by Party Secretary Le Duan and Defense Minister Giap at a 19 May military conference. The speeches released in the current series do not appear to be polemic in nature and give little hint of the substance of any discussions which may have taken place recently.


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VI. OTHER MAJOR ASPECTS



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
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2. [redacted] the flow of Cambodian supplies along Route 110--the "Sihanouk Trail"--to Route 96 for shipment to Communist forces in South Vietnam is controlled by a Cambodia-based North Vietnamese Army element formed from the NVA 98th Support Regiment which entered Laos in May 1964. Roughly 1,200 tons of supplies per month, including foodstuffs, medicine and POL, are reportedly sent from Cambodia in Cambodian boats up the Se Kong River to a point near the divergence of the Se Kong and the Laos-Cambodia border. North Vietnamese motorized pirogues then take the shipments to a storage area where trucks are loaded for transport east along Route 110. [redacted] a fleet of trucks--possibly as many as 140--carry the supplies from Cambodia along Route 110 toward the South Vietnamese border in two stages. The supplies are transloaded to other shuttle trucks at a point near the halfway point in Route 110 known to the North Vietnamese as "Hill 200." Considerable numbers of NVA troops, possibly as many as fourteen companies, are reported responsible for the maintenance and security of this route.

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ANNEXAssessment of the Situation in the Southern DeltaSummary

Recent US intelligence assessments from the southern Mekong Delta provinces conclude generally that the Viet Cong have lost their momentum in this area and are now conducting what is essentially a "holding operation." At the same time these reports warn that there has been little positive progress on the government side. Despite some ambitious plans for Revolutionary Development, the situation in the southern delta at present appears to be virtually a stalemate.

Viet Cong Status

1. The Communist loss of momentum in the southern delta provinces--including An Giang, An Xuyen, Ba Xuyen, Bac Lieu, Chau Doc, Chuong Thien, Kien Giang and Phong Dinh--has been caused to a considerable extent by the presence of US and other allied forces north of Saigon during the past year and a half. To try to "balance" and counter this presence, Viet Cong troops, including guerrillas, were drawn out of the delta, causing a decline in their strength in the far south. Another major factor contributing to the present static nature of the war in the delta is the vulnerability of the Communists in this area to US air operations. The open terrain, which characterizes most of the delta, makes it difficult to conceal large conventional combat units. Viet Cong attacks of battalion size and larger declined sharply after US tactical jet aircraft were introduced in early 1965. In this context, tactical air support has given ARVN forces in the delta a great advantage in engagements with the enemy.

2. Consequently, the Viet Cong have apparently been forced to maintain only a low tempo of operations in the southern delta provinces. They have launched a few company- and battalion-size attacks in recent months, and have mounted mortar attacks against

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government outposts and several district towns. Current tactics for the most part, however, consist of such harassments as sniping, mining of roads, and setting booby traps. According to the various provincial assessments, these actions have been sufficient to keep the populace well aware of the VC presence and to prevent any significant government gains.

#### GVN Pacification Efforts

3. On the government side, the tempo of operations has been correspondingly low. Many South Vietnamese Government officials in the lower delta are considered by US observers to be apathetic, inefficient, and corrupt. The Revolutionary Development program in most of these provinces has started poorly, and there has been little genuine interest in the present round of village elections, except on the part of those officials ordered to be concerned.

4. In nearly all of the southern delta provinces, US officials characterize the prevailing attitude among the general population as political apathy, with the primary desire being for personal physical security. This frame of mind has made it difficult for GVN officials to mobilize the people for effective action. The average peasant shows respect for the government only when the South Vietnamese Army increases its operations and shows force in an area.

5. In many instances, GVN provincial officials apparently tolerate known Communist elements often because VC economic activities dovetail with their own. This is particularly apparent in Chau Doc Province where, according to a US provincial representative, a great deal of revenue comes from the smuggling trade to and from Cambodia, and where both GVN and Viet Cong officials are heavily involved in the profits from this trade.

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6. [redacted] in many parts of the lower delta, there appears to be tacit agreement between the South Vietnamese Government and the Viet Cong to maintain the status quo. Both the ARVN and the Viet Cong have maintained "safe" areas for many years and neither side has shown a strong desire to disturb this arrangement in recent months.

7. In the southern delta, the main VC stronghold is the U Minh Forest complex in Kien Giang and An Xuyen provinces. Another important base is in the Co To mountain region near O Lam village in Chau Doc Province. The U Minh complex has remained essentially untouched since the early 1950s despite sporadic ARVN forays into the area. There is no permanent GVN presence in O Lam village, one of the richest rice-producing and cattle-raising areas of Chau Doc Province. GVN forces rarely dare to enter this area.

8. A change in the status quo did occur recently when, after many weeks of vacillation, ARVN troops moved into the Hon Chong peninsula in Kien Giang Province. This was not accomplished without rumors of a Viet Cong/GVN "accommodation." This rich and productive area had formerly been under firm Communist control. Now the Communist control is not overt, but [redacted] it is quite probable that peasants in areas such as this still pay taxes to the clandestine Viet Cong infrastructure.

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### Prospects

9. Many of the reporting officers comment that the Viet Cong are expecting a sizable number of US troops to enter the delta and that some reactions are already evident. In several areas the Communists are building up their main force battalions, suggesting an intention to meet the US forces head on. At the same time, they are reportedly storing caches of food and arms in various locations to support an increased emphasis on guerrilla activity.

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