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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
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INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM

Prospects for Violence in Indonesia


1. Isolated armed incidents by pro-Sukarno elements are likely in Indonesia if Sukarno refuses to resign and has to be deposed by congressional action. The principal locale for opposition would be East Java where marine and police units, backed by major elements of the population, still support the President. Incidents could also occur in Central Java, North Sumatra, and possibly Djakarta.

2. Significant long-term dissidence seems unlikely for a number of reasons. Military elements which may offer resistance are considerably outnumbered by more disciplined forces. The national commanders of all military forces have committed themselves to General Suharto's constitutional strategy against Sukarno. As in past political crises, when the time for congressional action approaches, the armed forces will certainly be placed on alert status against surprise moves by disloyal military or civilian elements; they should be capable of prompt and effective retaliation or even preventive action. Lastly, the desire to be on the winning side is likely to outweigh the Sukarno loyalties of most potential dissidents.

3. Indonesian Army officers expect trouble in East Java, particularly in Surabaya, the provincial capital, if Congress deposes Sukarno. The provincial police chief

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is a devoted follower of the President, and army officers say that East Java paramilitary (Mobile Brigade) police units, totaling three battalions or about 2,500 men, are solidly pro-Sukarno. One of these is an understrength battalion of about 500 men in Surabaya.

4. Indonesian Army officials believe that the majority of marines in East Java are pro-Sukarno and suspect that the local marine commander is a "Sukarnophile." There are six marine battalions in East Java, totaling about 5,000 men, of which three or four are in Surabaya. Marines are reported to have provided military training to leftist youths in the province perhaps numbering up to 1,000.

5. Army strength in East Java is approximately 50,000. The strongly pro-Suharto commander, General Sumitro, has attempted to purge his units of unreliable officers. Although pro-Sukarno army elements certainly remain in East Java, a breach of military discipline on a significant scale seems unlikely. The deputy army commander in East Java has told the US Consul in Surabaya that the army is developing contingency plans and that he believes that any resistance could be suppressed within a week.

6. Incidents in Central Java probably would involve clashes between pro- and anti-Sukarno civilian youth groups, each supported by small military units. Despite significant pro-Sukarno sentiment in the province, the numbers involved in his behalf probably would be relatively small. The army maintains approximately 34,000 men in the province. These are supplemented in time of trouble by elements of the strongly pro-Suharto RPKAD, the highly mobile and efficient regiment of paracommandos. The marine and police contingents in Central Java are small; marine elements are said occasionally to infiltrate--sometimes in civilian clothes--from East Java.

7. Incidents in North Sumatra would be chiefly civilian inspired. Clashes between pro- and anti-Sukarno youth groups occur periodically, and feeling would surely intensify if Sukarno were deposed. The

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army and police--which in North Sumatra appear pro-Suharto--can be expected to keep a much tighter rein on youth groups, however, as the time for congressional action approaches.

8. In and around Djakarta, the strong and strategic deployment of anti-Sukarno forces is such as to discourage pro-Sukarno elements and to reduce the element of surprise. Any pro-Sukarno incidents by small contingents of marines or police probably would be quickly suppressed.

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