

Secret

38

25X1



DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE

Intelligence Memorandum

Communist Influence in Latin American Labor

State Dept. review
completed

Secret

1 February 1967
No. 0622/67

05

WARNING

This document contains information affecting the national defense of the United States, within the meaning of Title 18, sections 793 and 794, of the US Code, as amended. Its transmission or revelation of its contents to or receipt by an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC
DOWNGRADING AND
DECLASSIFICATION

SECRET

25X1

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Directorate of Intelligence
1 February 1967

INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM

Communist Influence in Latin American Labor

Summary

At the present time, Communists occupy the principal offices and control the directorates of the major labor confederations in Chile and Uruguay. These confederations were organized and built up by Communist exploitation of legitimate labor grievances. On matters concerning the rectification of grievances the Communists almost always have the full support of their unions' members. Thus far, however, they do not have anywhere near such backing of the rank and file on purely political issues.

In the rest of Latin America, Communist influence in organized labor varies from negligible to an ability, in a few countries, to exploit labor grievances against the incumbent administrations. At present, for example, the Communists appear to be making some gains in Brazil, the Dominican Republic, and possibly in Costa Rica. Although free labor strength now far exceeds that dominated by Communists, the failure of non-Communist labor leadership to raise worker benefits and wages could facilitate further Communist infiltration and control of urban and rural labor groups in several Latin American countries.

NOTE: This memorandum was produced solely by CIA. It was prepared by the Office of Current Intelligence and coordinated with the Office of Research and Reports, the Office of National Estimates

25X1

The memorandum does not attempt to assess the current status of the entire Latin American labor movement, but appraises only the degree of Communist influence on it.

25X1

SECRET

SECRET

25X1

Background

1. The Communists have always directed more attention toward penetrating and influencing labor and student movements than any other mass organizations in Latin America. In the labor field they have been encouraged both by their desire to attract working-class members into the party and by their conviction that through control of organized labor they can create enough instability to bring down an existing government. Once the labor movement is controlled, some union funds and influence can be diverted for party purposes, as well as for solidifying labor gains, and infiltration of important governmental positions can begin.

2. Communism began to have an influence on Latin American Labor organizations following the Russian Revolution and World War I. This newly propagated doctrine was in conflict with the immigrant-introduced theories of anarchism, syndicalism, and socialism. The phenomenal growth of its influence in contrast with these other radical doctrines was attributable to the fact that it was introduced and directed by traveling international agents rather than by stationary individuals with ties to immigrant groups. Furthermore, these agents tended to seek out ways and means to coexist with the traditional Latin American dictatorial regimes. An example is the manner in which the Cuban Communists were able to accommodate themselves to Batista.

3. By 1929 the Communists had established a Latin American confederation of unions as a branch of the Red International of Labor Unions (Profintern). From that time on, the Latin American Communists have sought persistently to draw their national labor units into a vast regional organization associated with their international labor front. For several years they dominated the only important regional labor confederation in the area. This was the Confederation of Latin American Workers (CTAL), established in 1938 and led by Vicente Lombardo Toledano, who was then a leader of organized labor in Mexico and later a vice president of the World Federation of Trade Unions (WFTU).

-2-

SECRET

25X1

SECRET

25X1

4. Initially the CTAL was a legitimate labor central, supported by the major labor confederations of Argentina, Chile, Colombia, Cuba, Ecuador, Peru, Venezuela, and Mexico. From the outset, however, Communist labor leaders were prominent in the confederation, and their influence increased during World War II, when Communist labor activities were encouraged or tolerated by most of the Latin American governments. Local or national labor groups from 14 countries were associated with the CTAL in 1944 and the Communists controlled most of the top offices.

5. The take-over was facilitated by Lombardo Toledano, who had been ousted from his Mexican labor post in 1940 and subsequently identified himself increasingly with Communist elements in the WFTU. With the onset of the cold war in the late 1940s, membership in the confederation fell off drastically as its non-Communist affiliates withdrew to join either the anti-Communist Inter-American Regional Labor Organization (ORIT) or the Association of Latin American Labor Unions (ATLAS), which was promoted by the Peron regime of Argentina. CTAL soon became little more than a paper organization and a propaganda instrument for the Communist movement. CTAL eventually affiliated with WFTU and parroted every theme of the Moscow Communist line, gradually losing prestige until it too became dormant in 1962. Recently there has been an attempt to establish a new labor front, the Single Center of Latin American Workers, headquartered in Chile but sponsored by Havana. Thus far, this organization exists in name only.

The Present Situation

6. At present, free labor strength far exceeds that controlled by the Communists in Latin America; the Communists play a dominant role in the labor movements only in Chile and Uruguay, but they appear to be making modest gains in Brazil, the Dominican Republic, and possibly in Costa Rica. In most countries, their emphasis is on improving organizational techniques rather than on agitation. Although the Communists' role in the various countries' labor organizations ranges from dominance to

SECRET

25X1

SECRET

25X1

insignificance, and although in no country are the Communists likely to assume a significant role in the national government at any early date, they do have a disturbing potential in certain countries to exploit legitimate popular grievances against the governments.

7. Despite the fact that most Latin American pro-Moscow parties are facing some competition from pro-Peking splinter groups, Communist fortunes in Latin American labor have not been affected to any appreciable degree by the Sino-Soviet split. Neither have the Communists' appeal to labor and their ability to penetrate and exploit non-Communist unions been foiled by the publicized deterioration of Cuban Communist leadership in Latin America, by the bitter lessons learned by many democratic groups who formed labor partnerships in the past with the Communists, nor by the political developments in several countries--e.g., the exposure of Communist elements in the Brazilian labor movement and the defeat of the pro-Communist coalition's candidate in the 1964 Chilean elections.

8. Although Communists have been able to win strong positions in the labor organizations of some Latin American countries, they have not always been able to maintain their influence. Thus the rise of Peron soon undermined the important role the Communists had obtained in Argentine labor by mid-1943; the collapse of Communist control over Guatemalan labor followed hard on Arbenz' ouster in 1954; the removal of Goulart in 1964 rolled back the burgeoning influence of Communists in the Brazilian labor movement; and, since the overthrow of the Paz Estenssoro regime in late 1964, the previous strong Communist position in the Bolivian miners' unions have been sharply reduced by the the Barrientos administration.

9. Other influences contributing to anti-Communist gains include the Alliance for Progress, AID labor programs--particularly the American Institute for Free Labor Development (AIFLD)--the reinvigorated activities of the American labor movement in cooperation with the Inter-American Regional Labor Organization and the international trade secretariats,

SECRET

25X1

SECRET

25X1

the expanding activities of an increasingly social-minded Catholic church and other Catholic forces, better labor-management-government relationships, and the improving leadership and resources of the indigenous labor movements of the area. The success of these organizations has been limited, however, by the lack of organizationally strong national affiliates.

Strategy and Tactics

10. In some unions, and in some countries, the Communists might have succeeded in controlling the labor movement except for a change of government or some strong government action against them. The successes they can still claim, however, are attributable in large part to the inefficiency and disorganization of those who oppose them and to the lack of governmental attention to social reform.

11. The strategy of the orthodox Communists in respect to urban as well as rural labor in Latin America continues to emphasize long-range revolutionary goals, with present tactics aimed at uniting labor under nationalistic, anti-imperialistic (i.e., US) banners, forming other national labor centers, such as Chile's CUTCh, as rallying and coordinating points, and exploiting chronic Latin American political, social, and economic unrest. They will continue to use whatever unions they can manipulate as disruptive forces in strikes and as recruiting and training grounds for party and front-organization members and leaders. On some occasions, they may commit their labor assets to political demonstrations and other forms of direct action.

12. The present Communist strategy is by nature opportunistic and is directed by nationalistic, anti-imperialist labor unity with emphasis on dominating organizations by strategically locating activists from the top federations down to the locals. There appears to be no particular effort at the present time to develop a mass following among union members or to establish Communist unions--except where favorable conditions for such developments already exist. In other areas, activists are

SECRET

25X1

SECRET

25X1

worked into the top functionary positions of the local unions. They are well trained in trade union problems, activities, and organization techniques. Unlike many democratic labor leaders, the Communists generally are capable workers who have ample funds and can devote full time to their work. They usually do not seek the top job, but use their influence to gain this spot for a well-known, pliable, "democratic" leader. Often he holds this position at their sufferance; knowing this, he is prone to go along with their policies.

13. Minor activists also work themselves into the local unions. Again they have the funds, time, and organizing talent to move into strategic spots. They work hard on workmen's complaints, the negotiation of contracts, and the handling of details and paper work for the union in dealing with government agencies. They gain influence in union newspapers and use this propaganda medium to push their line. Their efforts sometimes pay off well enough to permit the subsequent penetration of certain key government ministries (e.g., education, welfare, and agriculture, as well as in labor as occurred in Brazil under Presidents Vargas and Goulart.)

14. Any lasting effects of disagreements on ideology and tactics or a sudden increase in tension between pro-Moscow and pro-Peking elements, in the field of labor, particularly if the peaceful line in Brazil and Chile should fail, remain to be seen. So far, however, the dominant pro-Moscow Communists are trying to rebuild their strength and appeal to the lower and emerging middle classes or urban workers and peasant groups without resorting to violence.

Outlook

15. Organized labor in Latin America has been prone to political influence and control throughout its history. In most of the countries, the Communist party is one of the most strongly disciplined political groups. In addition, it is the one most likely to appeal to the workers if the

SECRET

25X1

SECRET

25X1

economies of the Latin American countries do not expand and if the workers are unable to secure gains in wages and other benefits through collective bargaining. The Communist appeal may therefore become increasingly attractive to urban workers as well as to the rural peasants, who have long had legitimate grievances.

16. In the series of annexes which follow, the question of Communist involvement in labor in each of the Latin American countries is stated in detail.

25X1

-7-

SECRET

SECRET

ANNEX I

ARGENTINAA. Statistics

1. Total labor force : 8.2 million
2. Organized : 3.3 million (c. 40 percent)
 - (a) Communist influenced: 66,000 (2 percent)

B. List of Major Labor ConfederationsMembership (Thousands)Orientation

General Confederation of Labor (CGT)

2,500

The CGT is now controlled by the moderate faction of the "62 Bloc" Unions. The independent unions and the former "32 Bloc" are also members of the CGT. The orthodox peronists are now out of power and participate in CGT activities only spasmodically. The Communists have been systematically excluded from CGT activities.

Movement of Unity and Coordination (MUCS)
Communist

19

C. Current Activities and Assessment of Communists in Labor

1. The Communists have had a notable lack of success in gaining control of organized labor in Argentina. In fact, what strength they do have has diminished ever since the days of Peron, as the Argentine working man looks to Peronism rather than to Communism for labor gains. The Communists have made repeated efforts to work with the Peronists, but the latter have consistently rejected any real alliance. Today, only a fringe group of Peronists who believe in violence and extremism have expressed any interest in working with the Communists against the government.

-8-

SECRET

SECRET

2. The Communist-led Movimiento de Unidad y Coordinacion (MUCS) is doing very little. Two Communist unions in Buenos Aires have been intervened by the government, apparently with Peronist support. CGT leaders have systematically excluded MUCS from participation in CGT activities.

3. Communism is, therefore, an ineffective force in Argentine labor and there seems to be little prospect at the present time that it will ever be resurrected. The major difference between Argentina and the other countries of the hemisphere is, of course, Peronism, which has proved to be an effective alternative to the more radical philosophy of Marxism. It appears that the MUCS will continue to lose followers to the point where it may disappear as a representative of organized labor.

SECRET

SECRET

ANNEX II

BOLIVIAA. Statistics

1. Total labor force : 1.3 million
2. Organized : 480,000 (c. 37 percent)
 - (a) Communist influenced: 24,000 (5 percent)

<u>B. List of Major Unions</u>	<u>Membership</u> <u>(Thousands)</u>	<u>Orientation</u>
Federacion Sindical de Trabajadores Mineros De Bolivia (FSTMB) Communist	20	Communist/Leftist (Outlawed 1965)

C. Current Activities and Assessment of Communists in Labor

1. Since May 1965, the Bolivian labor situation has been chaotic. In early June 1965, the ruling military junta abolished all existing labor unions and federations. It was the junta's intention to weaken the leftist-led labor unions and federations, and then rebuild a strong movement, which would be democratically oriented. This process is still in progress.

2. Although the labor movement in Bolivia has always been a main pillar of Communist strength and the major target of Communist activity, the party's future in the country's labor appears to be poor at this time. Only the FSTMB, which is not recognized by the government, is still in extremist hands.

SECRET

SECRET

ANNEX III

BRAZIL

A. Statistics

1. Total labor force : 24 million
 2. Organized : 7 million (c. 29 percent)
 (about 1.5 million are dues paying members)
 (a) Communist influenced: Unknown

<u>List of Major Confederations</u>	<u>Membership (Thousands)</u>	<u>Orientation</u>
National Confederation of Industrial Workers (CNTI)	5,000	*N-C. ICFTU ORIT
National Confederation of Commercial Workers (CNTC)	3,500	N-C. ICFTU ORIT ITS-International Federation of Commercial, Clerical, and Technical Employees
National Confederation of Land Transport Workers (CNTTT)	500	N-C. ICFTU ORIT
National Confederation of Workers in Credit Institutions (CONTEC)	140	N-C.
National Confederation of Maritime, Water and Air Transport Workers (CNTTMFA)	450	N-C.
National Confederation of Agricultural Workers (CONTAG)	2,500	N-C.
National Confederation of Communications and Publicity Workers (CONTCOP)	85	N-C. ICFTU ORIT PTTI

*Non-Communist

SECRET

SECRET

C. Current Activities and Assessment of Communists in Labor

1. After the 1964 revolution, most Communist union leaders were purged and the government intervened many unions. Because of the government control currently exercised over the labor movement, the Communists seem to be content to sit back, maintain a minimum level of activity, and wait. Government wage restrictions have resulted in a decline in the real wages of almost all workers. Non-Communist leadership--which has more or less been imposed from above on many unions--has not been able to win wage increases in line with the rise in the cost of living. As a result, there has been a continuing drift to the left in union sentiment which is not likely to be reversed, at least until real wages begin to increase.

2. The long-range outlook for the Communists is fairly favorable. They have been able to seize a position as the focal point for antigovernment sentiment. The gradual drift to the left and the resurgence of leftist and pro-Communist leadership in the unions could be affected by several factors. For instance, any violent strike which brought workers into sharp clashes with security forces could speed up the swing to the left, as could a repressive government labor policy. On the other hand, such a swing could be slowed if the government tried to talk to workers and to alleviate their most pressing problems--wages, housing, education, etc. However, a Communist base organization exists and would probably regain considerable influence if governmental controls were lifted.

SECRET

SECRET

ANNEX IV

CHILEA. Statistics

1. Total Labor Force : 2.75 million
2. Organized : 410 thousand (c. 15 percent)
 - (a) Communist influenced: 287 thousand (c. 70 percent)

B. List of Major Unions

<u>List of Major Unions</u>	<u>Membership (Thousands)</u>	<u>Orientation</u>
Central Union of Chilean Workers (CUTCh)	400	*P-C. No international affiliation
Union de Campesinos Cristianos (UCC)	30	Christian Democratic
Confederation of Chilean Private Employees (CEPCH)	22	Contains both Communist and non-Communist unions
Chilean Trade Union Association (ASICH)	20	**N-C. CISC
National Confederation of Workers' Unions (CNSO)	15	N-C. No international affiliation
Maritime Confederation of Chile (COMACH)	28	N-C. ICFTU. ITS-Int'l. Transport Workers' Federation

C. Current Activities and Assessment of Communists in Labor

1. The Communists, in alliance with the Socialists, started the Single Center of Chilean Workers (CUTCh) and have never lost control. Thus far, the Christian Democrats have been unable to challenge the Communists in the labor field except in rural peasant organizations.

* Pro-Communist

**Non-Communist

SECRET

2. The Communist-Socialist dominated CUTCh has capitalized on labor opposition to the Frei administration's stabilization program to press for wage increases larger than the maximums set by the program. In certain key cases, such as copper mining, CUTCh has succeeded but has not had much luck in mobilizing its unions on political issues. Its strength in the labor field, however, could be sharply expanded if the Frei government should falter in its program of social and economic reforms, or if a Popular Front alliance were to come to power in 1970.

SECRET

ANNEX V

COLOMBIAA. Statistics

1. Total labor force : 5.4 million
2. Organized : 590,000 (c. 11 percent)
 - (a) Communist influenced: 83,000 (c. 14 percent)

<u>B. List of Major Unions</u>	<u>Membership (Thousands)</u>	<u>Orientation</u>
Trade Union Confederation of Workers of Colombia (CONSICOL)	150	*P-C. No int'l aff.
National Union of Colombian Workers (UTC)	499	**N-C. ICFTU
Colombian Confederation of Workers (CTC)	150	N-C. ICFTU
Colombian Federation of Telecommunications Workers (FCTT)	8	N-C. ITS-Postal, Telegraph and Tele- phone Int'l.

C. Current Activities and Assessment of Communists in Labor

1. Communism is not a seriously disruptive factor in Colombian labor at this time. Communist labor unions are spending their time on normal trade union activities, with their main effort directed toward increasing the strength and influence of CONSICOL. They lack dynamism and have not grown in recent years, probably because of disunity within the Communist movement and fear of government repression. It is difficult at this time to foresee circumstances in which the Communists could improve their over-all position, but the situation could change very rapidly.

2. As the petroleum industry expands, however, the strength and influence of the small Communist-oriented Federation of Petroleum Workers (GEDEPETROL) could increase.

* Pro-Communist

**Non-Communist

SECRET

ANNEX VI

COSTA RICAA. Statistics

1. Total labor force : 400,000
2. Organized : 20,000 (c. 5 percent)
 - (a) Communist influenced: 4,000 (20 percent)

<u>B. List of Major Unions</u>	<u>Membership</u> (Thousands)	<u>Orientation</u>
Costa Rican Confederation of Democratic Workers (CCTD)	6	*N-C. ICFTU
General Confederation of Workers of Costa Rica (CGTC)	2.5	**P-C WFTU
Christian Worker and Peasant Federation (FOCC)	.2	N-C. CISC
National Confederation of Workers (CNT)	.8	N-C. Formerly Peronista. No int'l aff.
Capital Workers Federation (PCC)	1.2	N-C.
Sole Workers' Federation of the Southern Pacific Zone (FUTRA)	.1	P-C. No int'l. aff.

C. Current Activities and Assessment of Communists in Labor

1. Communist unions have not attempted to disrupt the government but have been expanding their organizational efforts while non-Communist oriented groups have been inactive in an organizational sense for two or three years. Communists have recently organized the 700-member National Association of Transport Workers and several campesino organizations.

2. The relatively weak WFTU-affiliated CGTC serves as a useful propaganda arm of the illegal Partido Vanguardia Popular (PVP), the Communist Party. The CGTC faithfully follows the Moscow line on international issues and has attempted to form a united labor front, issuing repeated calls for cooperation in achieving goals vital to labor--such as job protection for unionists. These efforts, largely aimed at the CLASC affiliate, have not prospered.

* Non-Communist

**Pro-Communist

SECRET

SECRET

ANNEX VII

DOMINICAN REPUBLICA. Statistics

1. Total labor force : 1.3 million
2. Organized : 156,000 (12 percent)
 - (a) Communist influenced: 23,000 (c. 15 percent)

B. <u>List of Major Unions</u>	<u>Membership</u> (Thousands)	<u>Orientation</u>
Autonomous Confederation of Christian Unions (CASC)	30	*N-C.
National Confederation of Free Workers (CONATRAL)	30	ORIT affiliate
National Confederation of Workers (FOUPSA-CESITRADO)	5	**P-C.

C. Current Activities and Assessment of Communists in Labor

1. The Communists made significant gains in the labor movement in the wake of the 1965 revolt. The provisional government of Garcia Godoy, besieged with many problems, took a hands-off attitude toward labor, and CONATRAL lost support because of its backing of US policy during the revolt. The Communists quickly adopted strong-arm tactics and took advantage of CONATRAL bungling to take over unions that had formerly been linked to this confederation. In addition, the Communists used such classic tactics as delaying meetings for hours before voting, attempting to discredit existing leaders by implying corruption, and confusing the issues.

2. The Communists have recently put a considerable amount of work into political activities. In December 1965, and in January and February 1966, they were in the forefront of strikes designed to attack the military leadership and support Garcia Godoy in his effort to effect military command changes. In December 1966, however, they failed miserably in an attempt to confront Balaguer with a general strike over the Christmas bonus issue.

* Non-Communist

**Pro-Communist

SECRET

3. At the present time, the Communists are a significant nuisance but not a major threat in the Dominican labor movement. They are not strong enough in terms of unions, finance, and leadership to challenge the government. Furthermore, because of their predominance in government-controlled sectors of the economy, they are also vulnerable to government counteraction. As was demonstrated many times under the provisional government and again in December 1966, the Communists need to enter into a working alliance with CASC and Dominican Revolutionary Party labor groups to be effective and to pose a problem for the government.

SECRET

SECRET

ANNEX VIII

ECUADORA. Statistics

1. Total labor force : 2.2 million (c. 900,000 are wage and salary earners)
2. Organized : 108,000 (c.12 percent)
 - (a) Communist influenced: 16,000 (c.15 percent)

B. List of Major Unions

<u>List of Major Unions</u>	<u>Membership (Thousands)</u>	<u>Orientation</u>
Confederation of Ecuadorean Workers (CTE)	60	*P-C. WFTU
Ecuadorean Confederation of Christian Workers (CEDOC)	12	**N-C. CISC
Social Christian Peasant Federation (FCSC)		N-C. CISC
Ecuadorean Confederation of Free Trade Union Organizations (CEOSL)	20	N-C. ICFTU
National Federation of Telecommunications Workers of Ecuador (FENETEL)	3	N-C. ITS-Postal, Telegraph, and Telephone Int'l.
Union for Railroad Workers Action and Betterment (SAMF)	3.2	N-C.
National Union of Educators (UNE)	8.5	N-C.

C. Current Activities and Assessment of Communists in Labor

1. The Communists have lost influence in Ecuadorean labor in recent months in part because the hard-line and the Moscow-line groups are fighting for control of the CTE, the largest

* Pro-Communist

**Non-Communist

SECRET

SECRET

labor federation. The Moscow group won control of the CTE directorate at the congress in December 1966. In the fight, the CTS has lost influence and is now relying heavily on its campesino affiliates. In August 1966, the largest union in Ecuador, that of the chauffeurs, pulled out of the federation, leaving it, for all practical purposes, only a facade.

SECRET

SECRET

ANNEX IX

EL SALVADORA. Statistics

1. Total labor force : 1 million
2. Organized : 30,000 (c. 3 percent)
 - (a) Communist influenced: 7,500 (25 percent)

B. <u>Lists of Major Unions</u>	<u>Membership</u> (Thousands)	<u>Orientation</u>
General Confederation of Trade Unions (CGS)	15	*N-C.
Salvadoran Labor Unity Federation (FUSS)	6	**P-C.
National Union of Christian Workers (UNOC)	.2	N-C CLASC Affiliate

C. Current Activities and Assessment of Communists in Labor

1. The inhospitable atmosphere in which the trade union movement came into being in El Salvador--mostly during the dictatorship of General Maximiliano Hernandez Martines (1931-1944)--forced it to remain clandestine and made it an easy target for Communist domination. Beginning around 1950, the labor movement was allowed more freedom to operate and was granted more legal protection. Since that time, the movement, although still weak, has attained a degree of respectability and has, for the most part, produced responsible leaders. The Communists--discredited by their complicity in the peasant uprising of 1932 and by their activities--have been unable to regain their earlier leadership.

2. The most recent attempt by the Communists to gain control of the entire labor movement occurred in 1965 when they invited the CGS to attend a conference aimed at "strengthening the social security system." Representatives of the CGS joined in the discussion, but the FUSS was unable to interest them in any form of permanent or continuing association. It is unlikely that the Communists will be able to make any successful inroads into democratic labor as long as the government continues to support the free trade union movement and makes an effort to improve the living conditions of the lower economic groups.

* Non-Communist

** Pro-Communist

SECRET

SECRET

ANNEX X

GUATEMALAA. Statistics

1. Total labor force : 1.5 million
2. Organized : 30,000 (c. 2 percent)
 - (a) Communist influenced: Unknown

<u>B. List of Major Unions</u>	<u>Membership</u> <u>(Thousands)</u>	<u>Orientation</u>
Railway Workers Union (SAMF)	3.6	*N-C.

Other small unions

C. Current Activities and Assessment of Communists in Labor

1. Labor has not been a serious source of subversion in Guatemala since Castillo Armas purged many labor leaders soon after the beginning of his presidency in 1954. The most important and largest union in the country, the Railway Workers' Union (SAMF), has been working recently toward the construction of a democratic unified labor movement free of ties to domestic political parties or foreign labor groups.

2. The Guatemalan Communist Party (PGT) has had little success in its efforts to gain influence within the SAMF movement or in SAMF itself. It has, however, apparently revived FASGUA, The Autonomous Trade Union Federation of Guatemala, which had been moribund for several years, and has entered into a period of unaccustomed activity. It may have made some progress in organizing the migrant workers in rural areas.

*Non-Communist

SECRET

SECRET

ANNEX XI

GUYANAA. Statistics

1. Total labor force : 225,000
2. Organized : 49,500 (c. 22 percent)
 - (a) Communist influenced: 1,500 (c. 3 percent)

B. <u>List of Major Unions</u>	<u>Membership</u> (Thousands)	<u>Orientation</u>
Guyana Trade Union Council (GTUC)	42	*N-C. ICFTU/ORIT
Guyana Manpower Citizens Asso. (MPCA) (an affili- ate of the above)	21	N-C. ICFTU/IFPAAW
Guyana Agriculture Workers Union (GAWU)	3	**P-C.
Rice Marketing Board Workers Union (RMBWU)	1	P-C.

C. Current Activities and Assessment of Communists in Labor

1. A number of small unions are loosely linked to the Communist-oriented People's Progressive Party (PPP), which is using its ability to provide funds in an effort to gain firmer control over them.

2. Over the long run, because of its East Indian domination, the PPP's prospects for further penetrating the East Indian labor unions are fairly good. It is unlikely to make much progress among the Negroes, however, and unless strains within the governing coalition should bring PPP leader Cheddi Jagan back to power, its influence in the labor movement is unlikely to increase significantly. Nevertheless, the PPP can presently create major upheavals in the East Indian - dominated sugar industry.

* Non-Communist

**Pro-Communist

SECRET

SECRET

ANNEX XII

HAITIA. Statistics

1. Total labor force : 2.6 million
2. Organized : Less than 1 percent
 - (a) Communist influenced: Insignificant

B. List of Unions

	<u>Membership</u> <u>(Thousands)</u>	<u>Orientation</u>
National Union of Workers of Haiti in Exile (UNCH in Exile)	.03	*N-C. ICFTU
Haitian Confederation of Workers (CHT)		N-C.
Federation of Workers and Peasants of Haiti (FOPH)		N-C.
Inter-Syndical Union of Haiti (UIH)		**P-C. Activities sus- pended 12/63.
Haitian Federation of Christian Trade Unions (FHSC)	5	N-C. CISC
Government Labor Federa- tion	16	N-C.

C. Current Activities and Assessment of Communists in Labor

1. The Moscow-oriented Parti d'Entente Populaire (PDP) controls the Front Syndical Haitien (FSH-Haitian Syndicate Front) which may include some of the leaders and rank and file of the Inter-Syndical Union of Haiti (UIH)--suspended in 1963. The

* Non-Communist
**Pro-Communist

SECRET

SECRET

FSH probably has the sympathy of some influential labor supervisors in foreign-owned industries in and around Port-au-Prince. These supervisors could be counted on to create disturbances if the climate for such activity were to improve. Their influence over the rank and file at present, however, is slight.

2. The development of any independent labor movement under Duvalier is impossible, given his complete control of all segments of society. Even when that control is removed, labor organizers will be hampered by the indifference and illiteracy of the people, and by the fact that over 80 percent of the population is dependent on agriculture.

SECRET

SECRET

ANNEX XIII

HONDURASA. Statistics

1. Total labor force : 640,000
2. Organized : 19,500 (c. 3 percent)
 - (a) Communist influenced: Insignificant

<u>B. List of Major Unions</u>	<u>Membership</u> (Thousands)	<u>Orientation</u>
North Coast Federation of Workers' Unions of Honduras (FESITRANH)	9.4	*N-C. ICFTU
Authentic Federation of Honduran Unions (FASH)		N-C. CISC
Central Labor Federation (FECESITLIH)	.6	N-C. ICFTU
National Federation of Workers and Campesinos of Honduras (FENACH)	2.5	N-C. No int'l. aff. (defunct)

C. Current Activities and Assessment of Communists in Labor

1. Communism in the Honduran labor movement, on the wane in recent years, received a further setback in 1965 with the election of pro-democratic elements to the board of directors of the Central Labor Federation (FECESITLIH). Although there are a few examples of Communist infiltration in some of the smaller labor unions, total Communist influence in the Honduran labor movement appears to be at an all-time low and generally ineffective.

2. Communist attempts to infiltrate the campesino movement in 1963 failed. The Communist-sponsored Federation of Honduran Campesinos has since collapsed, and a new and democratic campesino organization, ANACH, has been formed in close association with the Honduran Labor Confederation (CTH). The Christian Democratic peasant leagues in southern Honduras appear to have offset the possibility of a Communist-infiltrated campesino movement in that area.

* Non-Communist

SECRET

SECRET

ANNEX XIV

MEXICOA. Statistics

1. Total labor force : 13.8 million
 2. Organized : 2.7 million (c. 20 percent)
 (a) Communist influenced: Insignificant

B. <u>List of Major Unions</u>	<u>Membership</u> <u>(Thousands)</u>	<u>Orientation</u>
Confederation of Mexican Workers (CTM)	1,500	*N-C. ICFTU
Federation of Unions of Government Workers (FSTSE)	325	N-C. No int'l. aff.
Revolutionary Confederation of Mexican Workers and Farmers (CROC)	270	N-C. No int'l. aff.
Workers' Regional Confederation of Mexico (CROM)	135	N-C. Formerly was Peronista member in ATLAS.
General Confederation of Labor (CGT)	40	N-C. No int'l. aff.
National Workers' Center (CNT)	370	N-C. No int'l. aff.
General Union of Workers and Farmers of Mexico (UGOCM)	7.5	**P-C. WFTU
Federation of Independent Trade Unions of Nuevo Leon (FSINL)	27	N-C. No int'l. aff.

* Non-Communist

**Pro-Communist

SECRET

SECRET

Industrial Union of Mine, Metallurgical and re- lated workers of the Re- public of Mexico	80	N-C. No int'l. aff.
Union of Railroad Workers of Mexico	100	N-C. No int'l. aff.

C. Current Activities and Assessment of Communists in Labor

1. There is not much organized Communism in Mexican labor, but some party members are active in labor matters.

2. The most powerful labor organization in Mexico is the Confederation of Mexican Workers (CTM), founded by Vicente Lombardo Toledano and associated during the 1930s and 1940s with his Latin American labor movement and with the Communist WFTU. Since 1950, however, it has shifted its affiliation to the ICFTU and has become the labor arm of the governing Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI).

SECRET

SECRET

ANNEX XV

NICARAGUAA. Statistics

1. Total labor force : 500,000
 2. Organized : 15,000 (c. 3 percent)
 (a) Communist influenced: 3,000 (20 percent)

<u>List of Major Unions</u>	<u>Membership</u> <u>(Thousands)</u>	<u>Orientation</u>
General Confederation of Labor (CGT)	3	*N-C. ORIT ICFTU
"Illegal" General Confederation of Labor ("Illegal" CGT)	2.8	**P-C. No int'l aff.
United Transport Workers' Federation of Nicaragua (FTUN)	2.9	N-C. ITS-Int'l ORIT ICFTU Transport Workers' Federation
Autonomous Trade Union Movement	2.0	N-C. CISC CLASC
National Confederation of Democratic Workers (CNTD)	2	N-C. ORIT ICFTU
Workers and Peasants; Federation of Nicaragua (FOCN)	2.8	N-C. ORIT ICFTU

C. Current Activities and Assessment of Communists in Labor

1. Communists have recently formed several peasant organizations in Nicaragua. These organizations have not yet become active, however, and are not likely to make any progress in the near future.

* Non-Communist
 **Pro-Communist

SECRET

SECRET

2. Communist involvement in labor has been growing weaker since 1964 as democratic international groups have assisted their affiliates to become stronger. Communist potential for the future is slight, especially as long as the Somoza dynasty endures.

SECRET

SECRET

ANNEX XVI

PANAMAA. Statistics

1. Total labor force : 360,000
 2. Organized : 18,000 (c. 5 percent)
 (a) Communist influenced: 1,000 (c. 6 percent)

<u>List of Major Unions</u>	<u>Membership (Thousands)</u>	<u>Orientation</u>
Confederation of Workers of the Republic of Panama (CTRP)	4.5	*N-C. ICFTU
Trade Union Federation of Workers of the Republic of Panama (FSTRP)	.2	**P-C. WFTU
Isthmian Federation of Christian Workers (FITC)	3	N-C. CISC
General Confederation of Labor of Panama (CGTP)		N-C. ITS-Int'l. Union of Food and Allied Workers' Associations
General Union of the Re- public of Panama (UCTRP)	.4	N-C. No int'l. aff.
Panamaian Syndical Action (ASP)		N-C. CISC
Federation of Workers of the North Zone of the Republic of Panama	1.8	N-C. No int'l. aff.

* Non-Communist
 **Pro-Communist

-31-

SECRET

SECRET

C. Current Activities and Assessment of Communists in Labor

1. The FSTRP is the labor arm of the Moscow-oriented Peoples Party (PDP). There have been indications that the FSTRP has agreed to accept the support of Peking-line Communists, but this group is so disorganized that its support would be insignificant. The FSTRP is affiliated with the Communist-controlled Confederation of Workers of Latin America (CTAL) and with the WFTU.

2. The Communists are having difficulties within the labor movement and their influence has been steadily declining in recent years. During the riots of January 1964, despite a concerted effort, the FSTRP was unable to muster labor forces in Panama City into a solid front to participate in the violence. The Communists will certainly try to exploit individual areas of labor instability or socioeconomic tensions, and to identify with other groups engaged in antigovernment activities. However, their chance of success is slim.

SECRET

SECRET

ANNEX XVII

PARAGUAYA. Statistics

1. Total labor force : 600,000
2. Organized : 30,000 (c. 5 percent)
- (a) Communist influenced: Insignificant

<u>B. List of Major Unions</u>	<u>Membership</u> <u>(Thousands)</u>	<u>Orientation</u>
Confederation of Paraguayan Workers (CPT)	30	*N-C. No int'l. aff.
Confederation of Paraguayan Workers in Exile		N-C. ICFTU
Christian Confederation of Workers (CGT)	0.3	N-C. CISC

C. Current Activities and Assessment of Communists in Labor

1. For all practical purposes there is no Communist penetration of what poses as a labor movement in Paraguay. The Communist Party has fewer than 500 members inside the country and most of these are not particularly active. The Stroessner government is strongly anti-Communist, keeps close tabs on Communist activity, and would quickly end any efforts to influence the CPT or the member unions.

*Non-Communist

SECRET

SECRET

ANNEX XVIII

PERUA. Statistics

1. Total labor force : 3.1 million
2. Organized : 1.4 million (c. 45 percent)
 - (a) Communist influenced: 170,000 (c 12 percent)

B. <u>List of Major Unions</u>	<u>Membership</u> (Thousands)	<u>Orientation</u>
Peruvian Confederation of Labor (CTP)	500	*N-C. ICFTU
Christian Trade Movement of Peru (MOSICP)	30	N-C. CISC
Executive Committee for the Reorganization and Unifi- cation of the Peruvian Confederation of Labor	22.5	**P-C. No int'l aff.

C. Current Activities and Assessment of Communism in Labor

1. The greater part of the Peruvian labor movement, united in the Peruvian Confederation of Labor (CTP), has been politically linked to APRA, a leftist, non-Communist party. Its dominance has not gone unchallenged, however, and conflicts with opponents have had a disruptive and far-reaching effect on labor union development. Anti-APRA governments have traditionally worked with the Communists against the Apristas. The most recent example is the entrance of President Belaunde's Popular Action Party (AP) and the Christian Labor Movement (MOSICP) into the contest. The result has been an intensification of political involvement and factionalism among the various labor groups, which has benefited the Communists.

* Non-Communist

**Pro-Communist

SECRET

SECRET

2. The present Communist goal is the establishment of a new labor confederation to rival the CTP. [REDACTED]

25X1

[REDACTED] The US Embassy sees a serious possibility of collaboration in this endeavor between the Communists and certain leftist AP leaders, which would constitute a greater danger to democratic labor forces in Peru than earlier attempts to create a rival labor confederation 1962-1963.

SECRET

SECRET

ANNEX XIX

URUGUAYA. Statistics

1. Total labor force : 1 million
2. Organized : 280,000 (c. 28 percent)
 - (a) Communist influenced: 250,000 (c. 90 percent)

<u>B. List of Major Confederations</u>	<u>Membership (Thousands)</u>	<u>Orientation</u>
Confederation of Uruguayan Trade Unions (CSU)	10	*N-C. ICFTU (defunct)
Autonomous Union Front (FAS)	8	N-C. No int'l. aff. (inactive)
Christian Trade Union Movement of Uruguay (ASU)	2	N-C. CISC (ICFTU)
National Workers' Convention	200	**P-C. No int'l. aff.

C. Current Activities and Assessment of Communists in Labor

1. Until late in 1965 the Communists followed a policy of keeping labor militancy within acceptable bounds in order not to provoke repressive governmental measures. They then changed to a policy of violent and general strikes which were designed to encourage worker discontent with the government, and to establish the Communists as champions of the people.

2. At the present time, the party is not trying to organize any major labor agitation, but is continuing to exploit worker grievances. Action may be stepped up again following the inauguration of the new government in March.

* Non-Communist
**Pro-Communist

SECRET

SECRET

3. The Communists are extremely powerful in the labor movement and their potential is great. They are skillful, well financed, have a deteriorating economic situation to work with, and have a tremendous lead over any democratic organization. Only strong, decisive government action could limit the strong influence of this major leftist segment of society.

SECRET

SECRET

ANNEX XX

VENEZUELAA. Statistics

1. Total labor force : 2.8 million
2. Organized : 1.5 million (c. 54 percent)
 - (a) Communist influenced: 225,000 (c. 15 percent)

B. List of Major Unions

<u>List of Major Unions</u>	<u>Membership (Thousands)</u>	<u>Orientation</u>
Confederation of Venezuela Workers	1,300	*N-C. ICFTU
Sole Central of Workers of Venezuela (CUTV)	100	**N-C. Not legally recognized. WFTU
Central Committee of Christian Trade Unionists (CUSIC)	20	N-C.
Society of Letter Carriers of Venezuela (SCV)*	5	N-C. Government employees are not permitted to join or form trade unions and therefore form associations. ITS-Postal, Tel. & Tel. Int'l.

C. Current Activities and Assessment of Communists in Labor

1. The Venezuelan labor movement is one of the healthiest in Latin America. It has benefited somewhat from AID and ORIT programs, and the governing Democratic Action Party has promoted the development of organized labor.

* Non-Communist

**Pro-Communist

SECRET

SECRET

2. Labor is dominated by the Confederation of Workers of Venezuela (CTV), which is heavily influenced by the labor-oriented government party. Therefore, the Communists have not been able to exert much influence. Barring a complete change in the current Venezuelan situation (e.g., a military dictatorship), it is not likely that the Communists will make significant inroads.

SECRET

Page Denied

~~SECRET~~

1 February 1967

Talking Paper for the memorandum,
"Communist Influence in Latin American Labor"

1. The memorandum focuses on the extent of Communist influence in Latin American labor today; it also gives some of the historical background and the tactics employed over the years by the Communists in the hemisphere.

2. The memorandum was self-initiated in OCI's Western Hemisphere Area, [redacted]

[redacted]. We believe the individual country annexes will provide a particularly useful research aid to future studies on labor in Latin America as well as proving generally enlightening to our consumers, especially those making preparations for a possible presidential "summit" meeting later this year.

25X1

3. The memorandum was coordinated with ONE, ORR, [redacted] we recommended that it receive normal dissemination inside and outside CIA.

25X1

~~SECRET~~

25X1

ILLEGIB

25X1

Page Denied