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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
Directorate of Intelligence  
19 December 1966

MEMORANDUM

Assessment of Algerian-Moroccan Relationships

Summary

Moroccan concern over the possibility of an attack from Algeria has led it to search for arms and military assistance. Although it seems unlikely that the Algerians intend, or would be able, to mount any large-scale military operation against Morocco during the next several years, the concern in Morocco is nonetheless real.

Rabat is unhappy with the US refusal in August to sell it some \$12-14 million worth of arms. However, so long as some US aid continues and some alternate Western arms sources are found, this seems unlikely to lead to a deterioration in US-Moroccan relations to the point, for example, that US use of the base at Kenitra would be jeopardized.

State Dept., OSD reviews completed


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Background


1. The continuing flow of Soviet arms into Algeria has increased the nervousness of its neighbors--Morocco and Tunisia--both of which are involved in territorial disputes with Algeria. In addition to the potential military threat which they see in a well-equipped and well-trained Algerian army, authorities in Rabat and Tunis fear that the revolutionary socialists in Algiers may seek to undermine their own regimes. Both have sought significant new quantities of US military assistance.

2. The Algerian Government, for its part, admits that the humiliation its army suffered at the hands of the Moroccan forces during border hostilities in October 1963 provided the impetus for the present military buildup, but it disclaims any aggressive intentions. It claims that its policy is to have a small but technically competent and well-armed striking force which would deter any potential attacker.

3. The Algerian Government has evinced a pathological fear of external aggression. Last spring and summer, Algerian officials clearly believed recurrent rumors to the effect that the US had concluded base agreements with both Morocco and Tunisia with the object of "encircling" Algeria. Repeated denials by American, Moroccan, and Tunisian officials seemed to quiet their fears.



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Algerian Intentions and Capabilities

4. Conclusion H of NIE 60-66, The Maghreb (Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia), 5 May 1966, states:



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"Despite the tensions among the Maghreb states, none is likely to mount a deliberate major armed attack against a neighbor during the period of this estimate" (the next two or three years). American officials in Algiers do not believe that any Algerian official, even among leftist leaders, contemplates military aggression against Algeria's neighbors. In contrast with the military display of the 1 November 1965 parade on the anniversary of the outbreak in 1954 of the rebellion (when for internal reasons the Boumediene regime felt a need to show its strength), the 1 November 1966 parade subordinated its military section to its civilian and party units. Although the army is the basis of support for Boumediene and has a major voice in policy making, the regime is not militaristic. Military men in uniform are rarely seen, and the army participates in implementing economic and political reforms as well as in backstopping the police services. Moreover, Boumediene--as well as Hassan and Bourguiba--has shown marked restraint in handling recurrent border problems.

5. Although the amount of Soviet military equipment received is impressive in quantity, type, and sophistication and is far in excess of Algeria's defense needs, there are a number of significant limitations on Algeria's military capabilities. A major training program under way for some time should begin to remedy some deficiencies in a year or two, but Algeria still suffers a shortage of skilled technicians for the operation, maintenance, and repair of equipment, a lack of operational experience with large units, and inexperience in air/ground tactical cooperation. It also lacks an effective logistic and supply system capable of supporting sustained combat operations of any magnitude.

6. Political considerations also probably impair the effectiveness of the 62,000-man Algerian Army. The single most important long-term problem faced by the army, aside from the deficiency of human talent, is its lack of homogeneity. Its officer corps is an amalgam of: (a) officers, many of them former officers or noncommissioned officers

of the French Army, who as members of the former rebel "Army of the Exterior" and General Staff set out most of the rebellion in neighboring Tunisia and Morocco; (b) ex-guerrilla chiefs of the "interior" army whose professional qualifications are relatively modest but who have developed leadership qualities and considerable influence in their own regions; (c) relative newcomers from the French Army whose professional background is good but who have little prestige because of their late conversion to the nationalist cause; and (d) "new army" officers trained abroad since independence, mostly in the USSR and the UAR. It has been Boumediene's objective to smooth over the inevitable frictions that arise among these groups and through intensive training to create a more homogeneous professional army.

7. While this objective has undoubtedly been pursued with considerable success, feelings of separate group identity have not been erased. Former members of the "interior" army are probably still in the majority among army officers. They take great pride in their role during the rebellion, but they are at a serious disadvantage in a modern army because of their weak educational and professional qualifications. As a consequence they tend to fall back on personal relationships. Professionally trained officers, on the other hand, have developed a common interest in ensuring that advancement is based on merit rather than "connections."


8. It is probably too early to count the graduates of Soviet, East European, and Egyptian military schools, who are still relatively junior, as an emerging force within the army. Within five years, however, their numbers and influence may be significant enough to give them the balance of power between the ex-guerrillas and the French-trained professionals.

#### Moroccan Capabilities and Requests for Aid

9. The Moroccan armed forces are smaller and less well equipped than those of Algeria, but they

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


are not insignificant. The 47,000-man army is comparatively well trained and loyal to King Hassan. With advance warning and preparation, Morocco is probably capable of containing an Algerian invasion at most points along its borders and of providing some defense in mountainous areas. However, because of its quantitative and qualitative inferiority in equipment, Morocco's capabilities would diminish as such a conflict progressed.

10. Morocco has received military assistance from France totaling some \$34 million in the past few years; however, the French aid program, which amounted to \$4 million annually, was suspended some months ago because of political difficulties between the two countries. A French training program of some magnitude continues, however. Although Spain has provided Morocco with little if any military equipment, it has allegedly agreed to come to Morocco's aid should Algeria invade.

11. US military assistance to Morocco began on a modest scale in 1960, and has so far amounted to about \$25 million. It was substantially increased in 1965, when a combined grant-sale agreement of \$11 million was signed, chiefly for 12 F-5 aircraft. Delivery began in November 1966, and will be concluded in 1968. In May 1966, King Hassan requested permission to purchase from the US \$12-\$14 million worth of military equipment, chiefly tanks and anti-tank weapons. This request was denied in August 1966.


12. Although Hassan indicated he might solicit arms from the USSR during his visit there in late October 1966, he probably did not do so in view of the emphatic Soviet statement to him that in case of conflict the USSR would side with Algeria.



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13. The Moroccans are, nevertheless, discussing possible arms deliveries with a number of governments. They have raised the question with Iran and Saudi Arabia. They are reported to be negotiating with Italy for the purchase of self-propelled guns and tanks.

#### Stability of the Moroccan Regime

14. The Moroccan regime, supported by its military forces and police and accepted by the vast majority of the population, is generally stable. Its principal immediate need is to put idle industrial capacity to work and to develop new industries to relieve unemployment and create purchasing power. It also needs to reform agriculture and step up production in order to feed its rapidly growing population.

15. Morocco maintains a nonaligned stance, but nevertheless is Western oriented. Although its relations with the US have become closer as relations with France have declined during the past several years, there are some indications that the latter are about to improve.

16. The King was bitterly disappointed with the US refusal to meet his arms request, but he has been somewhat mollified by continuing close contacts with American officials and by high-level discussions regarding the potential threat from Algeria. He can be expected to solicit arms and economic assistance from any likely source and will surely at least raise the question of arms with President Johnson when he visits the US next year.

17. Inevitably the close relationship developed by US Ambassador Tascas with King Hassan will diminish somewhat as Morocco finds alternate sources for arms and economic aid. This will not necessarily

mean that US-Moroccan relations will deteriorate profoundly but rather, mainly, that Hassan will have expanded the number of partners he does business with. US-Moroccan relations would suffer, however, were the US to cut off aid at any time, for example over Moroccan trade with Cuba. The most serious aspect of a Moroccan arms-buying spree is that it will serve to curtail essential economic development projects.

Lack of Parallel With Portuguese and Turkish Position On US Bases

18. The Moroccan objective in the search for arms is essentially to provide a defense against neighboring Algeria. So long as Rabat feels that the US relationship provides at least some support for this objective, it seems unlikely that the limited US position in Morocco will be subjected to the same uncertainties affecting the US position elsewhere in the general area, as in Turkey and the Azores.

19. The principal US problem in Turkey stems primarily from US lack of support for the Turkish position on the Cyprus issue. This is compounded by the upsurge of leftism and nationalism following the 1960 military revolution which leftist elements in the Turkish press are especially adept at exploiting.

20. At Turkey's request, American base agreements with Turkey, which were concluded before the 1960 military revolution, are currently under review. This may become very involved and time consuming. The review was believed necessary by pro-American Turkish political and military leaders who felt personally vulnerable to opposition criticism of agreements made by the prerevolutionary regime without legislative approval.

21. The Turkish Government now wants to consolidate some 55 separate agreements into one package. It has assured the US that all current

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agreements will remain in force until revised through bilateral action. Nevertheless, some US privileges exercised under these agreements probably will be restricted or denied in the future, as indeed they are now—for example, "scientific flights" over the Black Sea and relatively unlimited flights out of Incirlik Air Base in Turkey.

22. The very fact that any revised agreement probably will be submitted for debate and approval to the Turkish National Assembly, in which the left now enjoys some representation, will undoubtedly cause problems.

23. US economic and military assistance to Turkey, which has been very substantial since 1947, has never been a major source of discontent in Turkey. However, it has been expected for some time that, as this aid is diminished, Turkey's attitude toward bases and extraterritorial privileges probably will tighten.

24. As long as the Demirel government is in power, the US probably will continue to be accorded base rights and privileges that have a mutual value for both the US and Turkey within the context of the NATO alliance. Privileges sought outside this context, however, may become expensive and be granted only after tough bargaining.

25. Portugal has been cool toward the United States in the past several years because it resents Washington's refusal to back Portuguese policy in Africa. Lisbon is especially upset by the US refusal to permit Portugal to use NATO military equipment to subdue natives in the Portuguese African provinces. To show its displeasure, Portugal refused to renew formally the agreement under which the US maintains bases in the Azores. De facto authorization for US forces to remain in the Azores now continues on the basis of an agreement which expired in December 1962. The present prospects are that the existing *modus operandi* for the bases may be continued indefinitely, since Lisbon's only hope of exerting any pressure on the US depends on the leverage offered by American occupation of the bases.

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