


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
MEMORANDUM

DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE

The Situation in Vietnam

ARMY and DOS review(s) completed.

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18 November 1966

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Information as of 1600

18 November 1966

HIGHLIGHTS

X1 [redacted] presence of one occupied North Vietnamese surface-to-air missile site close to the DMZ. In South Vietnam reports continue to be received that General Quang has been removed from his command of IV Corps.

I. The Military Situation in South Vietnam:

Only scattered skirmishes were reported as Operation ATTLEBORO continues sweeping the area north of Tay Ninh city (Para. 1). Viet Cong guerrillas penetrated the Long Binh ammunition depot and detonated an explosive charge which caused a fire, but no personnel injuries (Para. 2). Communist units in South Vietnam may be experiencing leadership problems according to the interrogation of 96 captured prisoners (Paras. 5-8). Weekly Review of South Vietnam battle statistics (Paras. 9-10).


II. Political Developments in South Vietnam:

The military generals of the Directorate have eased General Quang from his delta command, but Premier Ky did not mention the fact when he announced a new cabinet line-up today (Paras. 1-3). The Constituent Assembly is still discharging its lesser tasks while waiting for preparation of the "basic principles" of the constitution to be completed (Paras. 4-5).

X1 III. North Vietnamese Military Developments:

[redacted] presence of two SAM sites within 10 miles of the DMZ (Paras. 1-2). The North Vietnamese Army journal on 15 November provided an analysis of the Communist view of the war in South Vietnam (Paras. 3-7).


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V. Communist Political Developments: North Vietnamese vice premier and politburo member Pham Hung has been relieved of his duties as chairman of the premier's Board of Finance and Commerce and from his post as chief of the State Price Commission possibly to assume greater party duties (Paras. 1-3).



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ANNEX:

South Vietnam Battle Statistics


1963 through the week of 6-12 Nov

-Weapons and Personnel Losses

-Viet Cong Attacks and Incidents

18 November 1966

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106

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I. THE MILITARY SITUATION IN SOUTH VIETNAM

1. Only scattered skirmishes between elements of the 19-battalion allied force of Operation AT-TLEBORO and Communist troops north of Tay Ninh city have been reported on 18 November. Troops of the US 1st Infantry Division, combing areas near the Communist War Zone "C," located another Viet Cong base camp which contained a large hospital building and a tunnel complex. Other units found 15 enemy bunkers nearby. Three American soldiers were killed and ten wounded as a result of two clashes early today. A total of 20 Viet Cong bodies were discovered, bringing the cumulative total of enemy soldiers killed since this operation began on 14 October to 1,006.

2. Viet Cong guerrillas last night staged another attack on the large American ammunition depot at Long Binh, 13 miles northeast of Saigon. This is the second such attack in three weeks. The guerrillas penetrated the barbed wire defenses and the increased security patrol, which included guard dogs, and planted satchel charges near a stack of 105-mm. howitzer ammunition. One of the charges started a fire which burned nearly four hours. There were no casualties reported; however, 1,165 105-mm. artillery rounds were destroyed.

3. A South Vietnamese Army (ARVN) platoon reported heavy contact with an estimated battalion-sized Communist force yesterday about 25 miles northwest of Chu Lai in Quang Tin Province. The ARVN platoon was later reinforced by two ARVN companies. Allied artillery and tactical air strikes were called in to support the friendly troops. A total of 37 enemy soldiers were killed during the one-hour engagement. ARVN casualties were 18 killed, 11 wounded, and six missing.

4. The four-battalion South Vietnamese Army Operation LAM SON 318 ended yesterday in Quang Tri Province near the DMZ. A total of 163 Communists

18 November 1966

I-1

were killed and six captured in this operation which began on 2 October. Allied casualties were reported as 38 ARVN and one American killed and 261 ARVN and five Americans wounded.

Reports of North Vietnamese Leadership Problems

5. MACV has reported indications--based on the interrogation of some 96 captured Viet Cong or North Vietnamese prisoners--of possible leadership problems among VC/NVA units in South Vietnam. One of the problem areas cited by the prisoners was the loss of confidence in squad-level leadership. The most common reason for this was a lack of experience and training. Enlisted men were apparently being promoted to cadre positions without receiving the requisite training. Cadre were also reported to be weak in command and combat efficiency.

6. Another reported problem area was the friction between North Vietnamese and South Vietnamese cadre. Some of the prisoners reported that heated arguments were conducted constantly between the two groups.

7. A third general problem area was the lack of qualified replacements to fill leadership positions. Some prisoners reported that the noncommissioned officer training of replacements had been reduced. One corporal, for example, had received only three months' military training prior to infiltration. There were also reports of South Vietnamese conscripts being assigned without military training to North Vietnamese units. Their lack of training and high desertion rates were, in turn, having a detrimental effect on the combat effectiveness of the NVA units.

18 November 1966

I-2

25X1

8. There have been intimations for some time that VC and NVA units have been faced with these types of leadership problems. The evidence used by MACV in this particular analysis, however, is not yet available in Washington for independent analysis. Efforts are being made to obtain these reports.

Increase In Viet Cong Incidents

9. A summary of enemy activity for the week ending on 12 November shows the total number of Viet Cong - initiated incidents increased from 569 for the previous week to 694. This total is above the weekly average for October. Viet Cong attacks and ambushes increased last week after an unusually low number of incidents the previous week. The pattern remained the same as in previous weeks with the Viet Cong continuing to concentrate their attacks on squad and platoon size Regional Force and Popular Force units and outposts. Most of the increase in harassments and terrorism can be attributed to mortar and small arms harassment of outposts.

10. The week of 6-12 November compared with 30 Oct-5 Nov:

I. Viet Cong Incidents

<u>Time Period</u>	<u>At-tacks</u>	<u>Regimental size</u>	<u>Battalion size</u>
30 Oct-5 Nov	7	0	0
6-12 Nov	21	0	1

<u>Time Period</u>	<u>Company size</u>	<u>Harassment</u>	<u>Terrorism</u>
30 Oct-5 Nov	0	347	33
6-12 Nov	1	459	36

18 November 1966

I-3

25X1

<u>Time Period</u>	<u>Sabo- tage</u>	<u>Propa- ganda</u>	<u>Anti- Aircraft</u>	<u>Total Incidents</u>
30 Oct- 5 Nov	21	12	149	569
6-12 Nov	20	18	140	694

II. Casualties

	<u>VC/NVA</u>		<u>GVN</u>	
	<u>30 Oct-5 Nov</u>	<u>6-12 Nov</u>	<u>30 Oct-5 Nov</u>	<u>6-12 Nov</u>
Killed	893	1,525	113	237
Wounded	---	-----	268	556
Missing/ Captured	<u>199</u>	<u>193</u>	<u>11</u>	<u>66</u>
TOTALS	1,092	1,718	392	859

	<u>US</u>		<u>FREE WORLD</u>	
	<u>30 Oct-5 Nov</u>	<u>6-12 Nov</u>	<u>30 Oct-5 Nov</u>	<u>6-12 Nov</u>
Killed	127	126	8	21
Wounded	605	810	14	45
Missing/ Captured	<u>8</u>	<u>16</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>
TOTALS	740	952	22	66

III. Weapons Captured

	<u>VC/NVA</u>		<u>GVN</u>	
	<u>30 Oct-5 Nov</u>	<u>6-12 Nov</u>	<u>30 Oct-5 Nov</u>	<u>6-12 Nov</u>
Individual	287	Not	47	127
Crew-Served	<u>18</u>	Reported	<u>2</u>	<u>1</u>
TOTALS	305		49	128

18 November 1966

25X1

II. POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS IN SOUTH VIETNAM

1. General Dang Van Quang has been eased out of his job as the commander of IV Corps by the other military members of the ruling Directorate, according to Bui Diem--Ky's right-hand man [redacted]

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[redacted] Diem, presumably acting in an official capacity, told an embassy officer today that Quang will head a newly created planning and development ministry. That assignment could lessen the political impact of his dismissal while still providing him with a high-level function. Diem said that Major General Nguyen Van Manh, the commander of the 23rd Division in the central highlands, will assume Quang's corps command. Manh, a southerner, was the choice of Chief of State Thieu [redacted]

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[redacted] These and other proposed shifts in the military command structure, however, have not been publicly announced by the government and they could undergo further alterations before they become official.

2. Premier Ky did officially announce the line-up of his revised cabinet on 18 November, but he gave no indication that key military officers had been re-assigned. The list of new cabinet members, all of southern origin, came as no surprise, and parallels press accounts of the changes during the past few days. As rumored, the work of the Ministry of Economy and Finance is to be split between a new Ministry of Commerce and a new Ministry of Industry. Deputy Premier Nguyen Luu Vien, one of the more influential southern ministers who temporarily resigned over north-south differences, will retain his Cultural Affairs Ministry, according to Bui Diem.

3. The status of four other strategically placed government functionaries, General Nguyen Duc Thang, Bui Diem, Dinh Trinh Chinh, and police director Loan, is still in limbo. All four have been the subject of debate lately, especially by the militant southern politicians, and they may still be moved into less

18 November 1966

II-1

controversial positions. An earlier report that Thang would move to the chief of staff job on the Joint General Staff was squashed by Bui Diem, who said that the generals decided to drop the idea.

Constituent Assembly Developments

4. Official Constituent Assembly activity has tapered off. The first plenary discussion of the "basic principles" of the constitution is expected to take place during the week of 27 November. In the meantime, the assembly deputies will invite a member of the Directorate to brief the assembly on the results of the Manila Conference and the "situation in country," presumably a general overview of government plans and accomplishments. During the 17 November session, the deputies approved a rather large final quarter budget which will cover the cost of several automobiles and provide for substantial salaries for them. It is not clear whether some government office must now take final action on the assembly budget.


5. At least one of the deputies, Chairman Chau of the constitution drafting committee, thinks that Chief of State Thieu will take a soft enough stand on Article 20 of the controversial government decree law to satisfy the assemblymen. Chau believes that the government will reduce the vote needed by the deputies to override the government revisions from two thirds to an absolute majority. A recent press release claims that the Directorate has agreed to consider the assembly's desire to make some amendments of the decree law. However, there is no indication that the 12-man assembly committee that is delving into the issue has confronted the government with its proposals.

18 November 1966

II-2

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III. NORTH VIETNAMESE MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS

[REDACTED]

the presence of two North Vietnamese SA-2 missile sites within ten miles of the Demilitarized Zone. One of the sites is occupied with a surface-to-air missile (SAM) firing unit.

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2. A pilot reported on 18 October that the North Vietnamese had deployed SAMs in this area. On that occasion at least one SA-2 was fired at two US Navy pilots [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] The occupied site will pose a threat to US air operations, including B-52 strikes, in the vicinity of the DMZ.

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DRV Analysis of the War in South Vietnam

3. A 15 November article in the DRV Army newspaper Quan Doi Nhan Dan offered a conventional effort to analyze the military situation in South Vietnam. The article assured its readers that there were limits to US power and perseverance in the Vietnam war and that those limits had almost been reached.

4. In effect, it promised that, if Communist forces in the South can continue to hold out, their victory will be assured. After making the usual assertions that the US could not impose a military solution on South Vietnam because of the contradictions of its political position, the author pointed out alleged deficiencies in manpower, tactics, weaponry, and morale which he felt necessitated the defeat of America's "panoplied expeditionary troops."

5. The article asserted that the US had almost exhausted its resources of combat forces available for service in Vietnam. It noted that of the eight US divisions not currently committed to overseas assignments, six were trained and equipped only for European operations, and the remaining two were not combat ready. The author stated that the end was in sight in terms of US troop deployments to South Vietnam. He further asserted that public outrage in the US would prevent the expansion of the military manpower base by increased drafts or mobilization of the reserves.

18 November 1966

III-1

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6. In discussing US tactics, the DRV military journal alleged that American forces in South Vietnam are essentially following the same course as the French and that their efforts would come to the same result. The author discounted the effects of US air power in both South and North Vietnam and went on to assert that the current allied ground campaign cannot suppress guerrilla forces which have the will for an indefinitely prolonged campaign.

7. The Quan Doi Nhan Dan article conceded US superiority in firepower and military equipment, but asserted that while these advantages could give an appearance of preserving the situation in South Vietnam they could not defeat the Viet Cong. The author pointed out that in a war without conventional fronts US military power cannot be brought to bear on lucrative objectives and thus could not be counted on as a decisive factor.

8. Finally, the DRV reporter asserted his belief that mounting US losses in Vietnam and increasing isolation from its traditional allies would force the Americans to abandon its efforts and leave the field to the Communists. He repeated the usual DRV line that both the US military and the American people are "afraid of a long war" and could not bear the war of attrition that the VC/PAVN forces were prepared to wage.

18 November 1966

III-2

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V. COMMUNIST POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS

1. Hanoi radio announced on 14 November that politburo member and Vice Premier Pham Hung had been relieved of two governmental responsibilities-- chairman of both the premier's Board of Finance and Commerce and the Commission for State Prices. No reason for his loss of these duties was given.

2. This move could indicate that Pham Hung has been assigned more important responsibilities which leave him little time for routine management of government economic affairs. Pham Hung has been the regime's top financial planner and it is possible that he may have become increasingly preoccupied for over a year with the massive reorganization and mobilization of the North Vietnamese economy to meet the stepped-up requirements of the war effort. The announcement that the party had reached down into the ranks of the alternate central committee members to replace him in these jobs, tends to support the thesis that the regime cannot afford, under wartime conditions, to use a man of Pham Hung's abilities in a largely administrative post.

3. It is also possible that Pham Hung may have assumed more important party responsibilities. In the party, Pham Hung is the number two man in the important party secretariat. In view of the continuing indications that party First Secretary Le Duan, who heads the secretariat, has become less active, the possibility cannot be dismissed that Pham Hung may have assumed increasing duties either in the secretariat or elsewhere in the party apparatus.

18 November 1966

V-1



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

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



Weapons Losses



Personnel Losses (Excluding Wounded)



US Casualties to Date: Killed 5,866 Wounded 33,710 Captured 79 Missing 371



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