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
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
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27 June 1966

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## INTELLIGENCE REPORT

### BULGARIA'S WORLD WAR II PARTISANS AND THEIR INFLUENCE TODAY

DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE

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## FOREWORD

Bulgaria's World War II Partisans and Their Influence Today is one of a series of Intelligence Reports prepared by the Office of Current Intelligence which seek to make new contributions on long-standing US security problems.

Valuable assistance in the preparation of this report has been received from the staff of the Historical Intelligence Collection in the CIA Library. In addition this report has profited from the efforts and assistance of personnel of the Directorate of Plans and the Biographic Register/Office of Central Reference of the Directorate of Intelligence.

Comments should be directed to the Office of Current Intelligence.

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## SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

The resurgence of nationalism in Eastern Europe was dramatically shown to have penetrated the traditionally conservative Bulgarian Communist Party, when in April 1965 the Bulgarian regime crushed a nationalist-oriented conspiracy led by dissident Communist Party members, some of them highly placed in the military and party bureaucracy. The conspirators reportedly enjoyed considerable party and popular support and received comparatively light sentences for their act of high treason.

Bulgarian documents show that many of the present top Bulgarian leaders, as well as the April conspirators, were active participants in the national partisan movement in World War II. Almost half of the Bulgarian party politburo and secretaries and over one third of its central committee in early 1966 were identifiable as ex-partisans. This contrasts markedly with the situation immediately following World War II when the Soviet Union installed Moscow-trained Bulgarian Communists throughout the Bulgarian party and government hierarchy.

From an analysis of the pattern of internal political developments in the Bulgarian Communist Party since the end of World War II, certain conclusions emerge which may be useful in interpreting future party developments:

1. "Nativist" Communists, who played the leading role in the wartime partisan movement, but who lost the immediate postwar battle for control of the party to those Bulgarian Communists who spent the war years in the Soviet Union, appear to have been making a slow comeback in recent years in the Bulgarian party hierarchy.
2. For a number of historical reasons, most of the ex-partisans have developed nationalist outlooks.

3. Among those Bulgarian Communists who favor more nationally oriented and pragmatic political and economic policies, the ex-partisans, while not having any known organization, almost certainly constitute a like-minded group and could speak with the single most powerful voice by virtue of the high-level party and governmental positions many of them have attained.
4. Personal ties among many ex-partisans in Bulgaria apparently have remained very strong throughout the postwar period.
5. With the trend among Eastern European regimes of loosening their ties with the Soviet Union, Bulgaria's ex-partisans could well serve as the leading force in the party for launching Bulgaria on a more independent course. Such a development could take the form either of a new coup attempt or of more nationalist policies adopted by the government to avoid such an attempt.

## I. INTRODUCTION

In April 1965 the conservative and slavishly pro-Moscow regime in Bulgaria crushed a nationalist-oriented conspiracy led by dissident Communist Party members, some of them highly placed in the military and the party bureaucracy. The conspirators, who reportedly enjoyed considerable party and popular support, received comparatively light sentences for an act of high treason. Available Bulgarian documents show that most of the conspirators, as well as many of the present top Bulgarian leaders, were active participants in the national partisan movement in World War II. Some of the conspirators and present Communist Party leaders served together in the Gavril Genov battalion, which operated in the Vratsa district of Bulgaria and frequently in Yugoslavia. (See Annex I, The Gavril Genov Battalion.)

Although forced into political eclipse by the Soviets who installed Moscow-trained ("Muscovite") Communists in the Bulgarian leadership following World War II, the ex-partisan party members appear to have been making a slow comeback in recent years. Bulgarian national traditions, contact with Yugoslav partisans, and the dearth of Soviet leadership inside the country during World War II all combine to make most Bulgarian partisans highly nationalist in their outlook. The nationally minded ex-partisans are in a minority in the Bulgarian leadership, but they nevertheless do appear to have influenced some regime policy decisions.

In early 1966 ex-partisans accounted for 46 of the 101 members of the Bulgarian party central committee, 12 of the 66 candidate central committee members, 6 of the 11 politburo members, 4 of the 7 party secretariat members, and at least 48 of the 416 members in the National Assembly. (See Annex II, a list of ex-partisans holding national level party or governmental positions.) Together with the increasing strength of nationalist forces throughout Eastern Europe and the inevitable demise of the older, Moscow trained and Moscow-oriented leaders, the presence of this number of ex-partisans

within the hierarchy of the Bulgarian leadership suggests that Premier and party leader Todor Zhivkov, who has never succeeded in consolidating his position, will face further nationalist pressures.

The roots of the strong nationalism of the ex-partisans and the deep bonds which have continued between them for so long are found in their experiences during and after World War II. Despite the small importance accorded by Marxist doctrine to personal ties as factors determining historical events, the evidence of personal associations, given in some detail in the discussion that follows, suggests that these factors have been no less important in the history of the Bulgarian Communist Party than in many institutions of the Western world.

## II. BULGARIA'S WORLD WAR II PARTISAN MOVEMENT

Bulgarian partisan activity during World War II falls into three main periods. It was very limited prior to 22 June 1941, the date Nazi Germany attacked the Soviet Union. For the next two years it grew markedly but continued to be troubled by serious supply problems. From the summer of 1943 on, material help from the Allied Middle East and Mediterranean commands permitted further expansion of activities. On Liberation Day--9 September 1944--there were an estimated 9,000 to 10,000 full-time partisans in the country, plus an estimated 20,000 supporters who sometimes participated in larger scale partisan activities. Except in the first period, a majority of the full-time partisans were Communist in their political allegiance, and the other political parties represented in the movement were effectively dominated by the Communists through the formal organization of the "Fatherland Front."

Little is known of the social and educational background of the rank-and-file partisans, but it can be assumed that most of them had the native intelligence and peasant toughness needed for living off the country amid physical hardships. Their supply problems were compounded by problems of organization and personnel, but these difficulties, once surmounted, were such as to foster a sense of self-reliance, military camaraderie and high morale.

Activities were considerably stepped up and targets became more varied with the influx of supplies from the Allies through Yugoslavia, but most Bulgarian partisan targets were of comparatively little importance, reflecting perhaps the relative military weakness of the partisan movement. The partisans fought against the Bulgarian police, and in certain cases also against small Bulgarian Army units. They damaged communications facilities, destroyed a number of trains carrying war material to and from Germany, frequently raided and destroyed local official archives, and engaged in kidnappings and executions of "fascist" elements, i.e., progovernment mayors and village officials sympathetic to

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the Nazis. The partisans also occasionally attacked small contingents of German soldiers. The real importance of the movement lay in its sustaining Bulgarian national morale during 1941-44, in its giving the Communists political links with the other parties which they were to exploit most successfully in 1944-47, and in influencing the Bulgarian Communist Party's (BCP) course of development many years later. Three particular aspects of the Communists' wartime partisan activity were to be of special significance for future developments in the BCP: the way their movement was organized, its relations with Tito's Yugoslav partisans; and the nature of its political indoctrination program.

#### The Organization of the Partisan Movement

Although the first Communist partisans unit was formed at Razlog in July 1941, nearly 21 months passed before the Communists established a nationwide partisan organization with a central headquarters in the Sofia area. Several major problems accounted for this delay. The police forces of the pro-German Bulgarian Government were extremely effective; the Allies were deeply committed in crucial areas of conflict far from Bulgaria and were not able to provide assistance; German victories brought on a spurious economic revival in Bulgaria which prompted the people to give scant cooperation to the partisans; and the Bulgarian political scene was a highly complex one in which Bulgaria's many non-Communist political parties found it difficult enough to cooperate with each other let alone with such a radical and unpopular group as the Communists.

During the latter part of 1941, as a result of having received directions from party boss Georgi Dimitrov, the Communist Party's central committee in Bulgaria established a Central Military Commission. This commission, headed by Tsvyatko Radoynov from its inception until his execution by the pro-Nazi government on 25 April 1942, was responsible for establishing an underground militarized resistance organization. That nationalist feeling was already of some importance in the party is suggested by the subsequent history of certain leaders prominent at that time. One of Radoynov's closest associates was

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Anton Yugov, chief of the central committee's military department during much of the war and in 1962 ousted from the premiership of Bulgaria, presumably because he posed a threat to Zhivkov's leadership of the party. Even more prominent in the early partisan movement was Traicho Kostov, leader of the Communist Party in Bulgaria until his arrest by the government in 1942, who in 1949 was attacked by "Muscovite" Communists as a "Titoist" and executed for "nationalist deviations."

By April 1942, the Central Military Commission had prepared a training manual which provided general guidelines for operating partisan warfare under conditions in Bulgaria and for conducting comprehensive programs in political indoctrination. By early 1943 a competent cadre of partisan leaders--overwhelmingly Communist in political outlook--had been developed, and during March and April a general staff was established at the People's Liberation Revolutionary Army (NOVA) headquarters in Sofia. The country was divided into 12 revolutionary operational zones (vustanicheski operativni zoni--VOZ), each with its own military staff, but tightly controlled through a system of party committees and political commissars. (See Annex III, a map of the 12 VOZ divisions, and Annex IV, a list of command personnel in each zone.)

Unlike their Communist Yugoslav counterparts who were uniformly organized along military lines, Bulgarian partisan units did not maintain an organizational structure within a VOZ that was consistent throughout the country. The following organizational structure was generally observed within each VOZ: in descending order of importance, Bulgarian partisan units were designated brigades (brigada), battalions (otryad), detachments (cheta), and independent units.

Independent units varied widely in personnel strength depending on the terrain in which they operated and their assigned functions. Detachments conventionally comprised from 20 to 50 men each. A battalion generally included two or more detachments, but some battalions had fewer personnel than some detachments. A brigade usually consisted of

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two or more battalions; no brigade is known to have exceeded 400 personnel. The first brigade was formed on 25 April 1944. Designated the "Chavdar" brigade, it was at one time commanded by Todor Zhivkov, the present party chief and Premier of Bulgaria.

Most partisan units were named after Bulgarian revolutionary heroes, mainly Communists. Some units, however, bore designations reflecting the regions in which they operated. (See Annex V for a list of brigades and battalions for each revolutionary operational zone.)

As the national partisan movement grew, it developed leaders not merely for the wartime struggle, but also for the postwar period. Those who were partisan leaders in early 1943 and likewise leading figures in the postwar Bulgarian Communist Party, with the rank of central committee member or higher, included: Todor Zhivkov, Anton Yugov, Georgi Chankov, Georgi Tsankov, Slavcho Trunski, Dobri Terpeshev, Yanko Panov, Ivan Buchvarov, Boris Taskov, Ivan Todorov-Gorunya, Dobri Dzhurov, Dimo Dichev, Pencho Kubadinski, and Diko Dikov.

#### Cooperation With Yugoslav Partisans

At least five battalions of Bulgarian partisans were formed on Yugoslav soil, and they engaged in operations in both Yugoslavia and Bulgaria. The first such battalion was composed of deserters from the Bulgarian Army and was called the "International," because it also contained some Yugoslavs and Poles. Shteryu Atanasov, at one time the BCP's representative in Yugoslavia, led the "International" and was assisted by several aides from the BCP's Foreign Bureau. The other four Bulgarian partisan battalions formed in Yugoslavia were the "soldiers' Battalion," "Sava Rakovski," "Dimitur Blagoyev," and "Vasil Kolarov."

In 1941, after the Soviet Union had been attacked, the leadership of the BCP sought to establish close ties with the peoples of Greece and Yugoslavia. Links were eventually established with

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partisans in both countries, but those with the Greeks proved largely ineffectual. Relations with Tito's Yugoslav partisans, on the other hand, enjoyed an initial advantage by virtue of the Communist orientation of Tito's partisans (the Greek partisans were predominantly anti-Communist) and because a large portion of the Yugoslav populace spoke a south Slavic language akin to Bulgarian. Bulgarian partisans reportedly had little if any contact with Yugoslav guerrillas under General Mikhajlovic.

When the Allies decided in the summer of 1943 that the Bulgarian partisans were of value to the Allied war effort and deserving of material help, British liaison officers were sent to Yugoslav and Greek units in Serbia and Thrace, respectively, with instructions to contact the Bulgarians. The Serbian base turned out to be by far the more important. Thereafter, those Yugoslav partisans that were under the command of Tito greatly assisted Bulgarian units operating along their frontiers and served as a supply line by which the Bulgarians received British and American aid.

Because the BCP attached special importance to building military cooperation between Bulgarian and Yugoslav partisan units, the party central committee sent representatives to Macedonia and Yugoslavia. One such representative was Boyan Bulgaranov (now a member of the BCP Politburo), who was on the general staff of the Macedonian Peoples' Liberation Troops from sometime in 1942 until the beginning of 1944. These groups operated in an area contiguous to that of the "Gavril Genov" Battalion, in which a number of leading Communists as well as the leaders of the conspiracy of April 1965 served.

The Trunski Battalion (named after a Bulgarian region and from which the battalion commander, Slavcho Trunski, took his name) was the main means of creating a bond of military camaraderie between Bulgarian and Yugoslav partisans, and the association seems to have had lasting significance. General Trunski himself is now chief of the Bulgarian Air Force and a central committee member, and available evidence strongly suggests he was involved in the antiregime conspiracy of April 1965 despite government

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denials of his complicity. Previously linked to an opposition group in March 1961, Trunski also was required to write a self-criticism paper in 1958. In addition, Trunski spent 1951 in prison for "Kos-tovite (i.e., nationalist) revisionism" and was "out of favor" in party circles until 1954.

Official regime sources also list other Bulgarian partisans as having had very close connections with Yugoslav partisans. Characterizing the following Bulgarians as "our well known professional revolutionaries," one regime writer describes Vlado Trichkov, Yordanka Chankova, Georgi Chankov, Georgi Avramov, Nacho Ivanov, Gocho Gopin, and Dimo Dichev as having served extensively with Bulgarian partisans in Yugoslavia.

#### Political Indoctrination

Under the combined auspices of the Communist Party and the Communist-dominated Fatherland Front, political indoctrination of partisan units was pervasive and continuous. The training manual for partisan units contained a long subsection on political indoctrination entitled "Duties, Training, Tactics, and Methods and Means."

The principal document dealing with political indoctrination was, however, a directive of the National Liberation Revolutionary Army (NOVA) General Staff issued on 27 November 1943 and entitled "The Character, Organization, and Tasks of the NOVA." The following extract from that directive is particularly illustrative: "Besides military training, political and cultural enlightenment activities will be organized in all partisan units. Political training must put forward a unified world outlook corresponding to the programs and tasks of the Fatherland Front."

Although such training had a strong pro-Soviet bias, most Communist partisans adhered more strongly to their self-taught version of Marxist-Leninist doctrine and emphasized doctrinal ideals which they intended to adapt to postwar Bulgaria's problems. The USSR tried to keep closer control on developments by returning 55 "Muscovite" Communists to

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Bulgaria from the Soviet Union in the latter part of 1941 to provide political indoctrination and military training to the fledgling partisan groups. Parachuted into Bulgaria in two groups, these "Muscovites" were almost immediately apprehended by Bulgarian governmental forces. Their capture destroyed the single most potentially effective instrument for ensuring a thorough pro-Soviet indoctrination of Bulgaria's Communist partisans by Moscow.

The most important political indoctrination meetings were presided over by Communist political commissars or by party central committee representatives, many of whom in the postwar era have been reported by clandestine sources to harbor an essentially nationalist outlook. Persons who served in this capacity during the war and who have since achieved party central committee membership or higher are Boyan Bulgaranov, Slavcho Trunski, and Dimo Dichev, who have been mentioned previously, and the late Titko Chernokolev. The late Dimitur Ganov (politburo member and titular chief of state) is the only member of this group known to have held strong pro-Soviet views.

There were still other means of political indoctrination. The command staff of each revolutionary operating zone included a political commissar. The partisans printed and distributed pamphlets, bulletins, and newspapers. There was individual and collective reading of books and newspapers. Also available were lectures and reports, and broadcasts from the Russian clandestine station, "Khristo Botev."

Political indoctrination of younger partisans was carried on through the Workers' Youth Union (RMS), a forerunner of the present Dimitrov Communist Youth Union. RMS chapters were established in all partisan units and were explicitly designed "to instruct young partisans in the spirit of the Bulgarian Workers Party." The present Dimitrov Communist Youth Union (DEMS), a Communist Youth organization, stems from the wartime RMS.

### III. POSTWAR BULGARIAN COMMUNISM

#### The Immediate Postwar Era

After the defeat and overthrow of Bulgaria's pro-German government on 9 September 1944 by Bulgarian partisans and the Red Army through the Fatherland Front, the Communists turned their attention to the task of consolidating their position in the new "Fatherland Front" government. The Front's initial program called for waging a "decisive struggle" against anti-Front elements (i.e., anti-Communist figures) in the Fatherland Front parties, and by 1947 the "Muscovite" Communists and the "nativists" (i.e., those who had remained in Bulgaria during World War II) had together established the Communist Party as the supreme political power in the country. Anti-Communist elements remaining in the government were thrown out, and the important Fifth Party Congress was convened in Sofia in December 1948.

The probable principal reason for holding the congress in 1948 was the need to define more clearly the new orthodoxy required by the USSR as a result of the Tito-Cominform break in June 1948. Inasmuch as the Cominform's resolution expelling Tito suggested only negatively the theory underlying a "people's democracy," it was left to Bulgarian party chief, Georgi Dimitrov, to give added weight to the concept of the Cominform as a group of "equal brotherly parties."

How strongly the "Muscovite" Communists by then dominated the "nativists" was indicated by the position Dimitrov took on nationalism at that time. Dimitrov was undoubtedly the greatest figure among postwar Bulgarian Communists and had achieved international stature as well because of his widely publicized defiance of the Nazis in the Reichstag fire trial in 1933. He had himself issued a statement earlier in 1948 favoring the creation of a Balkan federation with Yugoslavia. This statement, however, had been violently attacked in Pravda--reportedly on the explicit instructions of Stalin--and he now made the following statement to the December party congress:

Nationalism is incompatible with the people's democracy. Nationalism, no matter behind what mask, is an enemy of Communism. This was clearly manifested by the anti-Communist actions of Tito's group in Yugoslavia. Hence, combating nationalism is a primary duty of Communists.

Dimitrov's warning was a portent of the campaign to be waged within the ranks of the party against a potential Bulgarian Tito, Deputy Premier Traicho Kostov, who apparently had begun to question Moscow's dictates. A long-time Communist of the nativist school, Kostov was second only to Dimitrov in the post World War II party hierarchy. Dimitrov's warning also was a harbinger of the party's coming campaign against all nativist Communists, a campaign that would strike particularly hard at the expatrians.

Before the fifth party congress, the Moscow-trained wing of the Bulgarian party knew of Kostov's deviations from Communist orthodoxy, but it was not until 18 January 1949, at a politburo meeting, that the party formally accused him of an anti-Soviet attitude. Following a party central committee declaration, Kostov was gradually stripped of his party and governmental functions. Finally, on 20 July 1949, shortly after the death of Dimitrov, the Bulgarian People's Assembly voted to have Kostov indicted for "economic sabotage." In December 1949, he was tried, condemned, and executed by Bulgarian authorities but, a firm nationalist to the end, he would not admit to being guilty of anything at his trial.

Kostov's position in the party, although not overshadowing that of Dimitrov, had been strong. Since 1925, he had been the de facto leader of the party within Bulgaria. He had personally erected the party structure and grafted it to the governmental machinery after the "liberation" in September 1944, thus retaining an important measure of control over the party's rank and file. The number of persons who owed their positions to Kostov is suggested by the fact that between 1944 and 1948 12,000 party members became "the important cogwheels of our state apparatus," according to Dimitrov's statement at the Fifth

Party Congress. Of this number, 3,533 were assigned to the People's Army, 2,000 to the Ministry of Interior, 1,101 to the Ministry of Industry, and 5,366 to other governmental agencies. A very large proportion of these positions were filled by prewar Communist intellectual followers of Kostov and by ex-partisans, almost all of whom maintained a nationalist outlook.

Prior to Kostov's trial, the greatest emphasis had been placed on purging politicians in other parties who opposed Communism or who thought they could cooperate with the Communists while maintaining their integrity. After the Kostov trial, however, the Communists began a large-scale purge of the Communist Party. Designed to eliminate those members with nationalist tendencies, the purge included some of the lowest party members as well as some of the very top members of the party's hierarchy. Apart from Kostov, nearly a dozen ministers, deputy ministers, and generals as well as a large number of regional party secretaries, lower army officers, and police chiefs were involved by purging these last three categories, the "Muscovites" also purged a very large proportion of ex-partisans from the party-state apparatus. According to published BCP sources, more than 92,500 members of the Bulgarian party had been expelled by June 1950.

Thus, by the early 1950s, the idealistic aspirations of most Communist intellectuals and ex-partisans for transforming postwar Bulgaria into a modern state by using the "scientific methods" of Communism had been crushed. Moreover, their drive for political hegemony over the "Muscovite" Communists had been decisively defeated.

This purge of the ex-partisans turned out, however, to be not a permanent defeat but rather a postponement of their progress toward the positions of power which many ex-partisans in other East European countries had attained in the immediate postwar period. For example, the three ringleaders of the antiregime conspiracy of April 1965 had been among those purged some 15 years earlier as "Titoists" and deviationists, but all three, along with many others, had been rehabilitated by the end of 1956.

Partisan's Influence in the Postwar Army

Although most of Bulgaria's "nativist" Communists did not face the full onslaught of the "Muscovites" until the early 1950s, those ex-partisans who entered the ranks of the Bulgarian Army in the immediate postwar era were among the first to experience the militant aggressiveness of the returning "Muscovites." Sovietization of the army began shortly after September 1944 and continued until early 1956 when Khrushchev denounced Stalin. During the period, Soviet-trained Bulgarian officers replaced not only the "bourgeois-republican" officers who had initially been prepared to support the postwar government, but also many of the Communist partisan commanders who had distinguished themselves during the war. Although this process took a particularly heavy toll among those ex-partisan military officers who held field grade rank and above in the Bulgarian Army, many company grade officers also were replaced.

From 1960 until early in 1965, however, it became quite noticeable that the remaining ex-partisans were at last beginning to come into their own in the Bulgarian Army. Quietly but steadily, they were appointed to replace the older Soviet-trained commanders in most of Bulgaria's important military posts. This development may have simply reflected the fact that the prewar Frunze Academy graduates were reaching retirement age and that the only competent replacements for them were the ex-partisans, most of whom were in their early fifties or even younger, but there might also have been a political reason for that trend.

Bulgarian party chief Todor Zhivkov had never really consolidated his position in the party. Without a safe bloc of support within the party, he may have sought to buttress his position by creating a coterie of army commanders whom he believed loyal to himself and above the vicissitudes of party factionalism. In this respect, Zhivkov, like some previous Bulgarian leaders, sought to use the special position of the Bulgarian military in the nation's history as the domestic guarantor of his shaky position. In addition, as a former partisan

commander himself, Zhivkov may have believed that this similarity of backgrounds and experience coupled with his bringing the ex-partisans out of their long period of political and personal obscurity would assure him of their devotion. If this assumption is true, however, Zhivkov took a grave gamble supported neither by Bulgarian history nor by the experience of most political leaders who have created a body of Janissaries for future loyalty in return for present favors. Moreover, in Bulgaria, there is a particularly strong political reason why these ex-partisans should feel no obligation toward Zhivkov as their benefactor.

Repeated reports as well as overt evidence of factionalism, such as the conspiracy of April 1965, indicate that Zhivkov is generally considered by the "nationalist" as well as by some other segments of the Bulgarian party to have "sold out" the wartime resistance movement's ideals. In this connection, although Zhivkov is a home-trained Communist, he also is a singularly impressive exception to the concept that domestically trained Communists must necessarily be less pro-Soviet than those who have been schooled and indoctrinated in the Soviet Union. Few, if any, "Muscovites" in the darkest days of Stalinism were ever as obedient to Moscow as Zhivkov. Moreover, during a period when virtually every other Eastern European Communist country has sought some loosening of the bonds with Moscow, Zhivkov has until very recently seemed intent--for whatever reasons--on making Bulgaria into a caricature of a provincial backwater of the Soviet Union.



#### IV. FACTIONALISM IN THE BULGARIAN COMMUNIST PARTY

With the struggle against the "Titoists," serious factionalism emerged in the Bulgarian regime. Three major groupings--Stalinists, the party neutrals, and nationalists--have come into being as the party passed through three major periods: 1947 to 1950, 1950 to 1956, and 1956 to the present. Each of these periods has primarily reflected internal party dissension with respect to the nature of the relationship between the BCP and the Soviet party.

In the first postwar phase, the struggle was the classic one between the "nativist" Communists and the "Muscovites." As has been previously noted, Traicho Kostov, the "nativist" leader, was executed in 1949 and his supporters, among whom were many of the now rehabilitated ex-partisan commanders, were either imprisoned or intimidated.

The second postwar phase cannot so readily be characterized as one of active factionalism, though there were factions, as it can be regarded a period of near absolute control by the Stalinist wing of the party. Vulko Chervenkov, the Sovietized brother-in-law of Georgi Dimitrov, became Bulgaria's "little Stalin" and concentrated all power in his hands. Initially holding both the posts of premier and party first secretary, Chervenkov, as a result of his Stalinist past, gave up the latter in March 1954 during the campaign against the personality cult following Stalin's death. In retrospect this was the beginning of the end for Chervenkov. In giving up the position of party chief to Todor Zhivkov, then barely over 40 years of age and a Chervenkov protégé, however, Chervenkov at the time remained easily the most powerful political figure in the country because he had packed the party hierarchy with his Stalinist supporters. A period of relative party calm prevailed until early 1956.

Khrushchev's denunciation of Stalin in February 1956 soon made Chervenkov's position untenable. At the famous April 1956 Bulgarian party plenum, Chervenkov was ousted from the premiership and replaced

by the ex-partisan Anton Yugov, who as a former associate of Traicho Kostov had seen his career go into eclipse after 1950 and who also was one of Chervenkov's bitterest enemies.

In the years after 1956, Zhivkov moved, with the aid of Khrushchev and his own personal patronage, to strengthen his position and to eliminate one rival after another. He had former first deputy premier Chankov dismissed in 1957; in the wake of the 22nd Soviet party congress, he had Chervenkov expelled from the Bulgarian party's central committee; and at the BCP's eighth party congress in November 1962, Premier Yugov was dramatically removed from office and disgraced, allegedly for "Stalinist excesses and factional activity."

Despite his apparent success in eliminating his main rivals, Zhivkov then as now could not count on party loyalty. The middle and lower levels of party officials were not reconciled either to him or to his policies, and he also could not count on the implicit loyalty of the top party levels, even though most were appointed by him. The stage was set for a reemergence of the old factionalism but with new dimensions, particularly in the "nationalist/reformist" wing of the party. At the same time, the factional parts were once again set against one another with no one man being powerful enough to stamp his authority on the whole. Broadly speaking, three main groupings exist today: The Stalinist Chervenkovist faction, a large middle group of neutral party members, and the nationalist/reformist faction.

All of these groupings have this much in common: each questions the regime's present relationship to the Soviet Union and either implicitly or explicitly distrusts Zhivkov's leadership as well as the present leadership of the Soviet Union. At the same time, however, each grouping supports the leading role of the BCP in any future Bulgarian government.

#### The Stalinist Chervenkovist Faction

This is reportedly the smallest of the three major party groupings, although its present size

not known. A small percentage of its membership reportedly consists of ex-partisans. In addition, because Stalinism and China currently are in disrepute within the BCP, few members of this faction openly acknowledge adherence to it. Although pro-Soviet by inclination, the members of this faction were completely out of sympathy with Khrushchev and his reformism. They also view the present Soviet leadership with considerable caution. They allegedly regard Zhivkov's leadership as a temporary "deviation." Most members of this faction are currently in lesser positions in the party-state complex, but some "Stalinists" are entrenched in the party hierarchy, principally in the central committee where they customarily oppose not only Zhivkov but also the nationalist/reformists.

#### The Neutralists

The term neutralist is used for convenience and refers only to the neutrality of a large segment of the BCP's rank and file membership with respect to the issue of the Stalinists versus the nationalists. Although loosely knit, this group probably constitutes the largest segment of the party.

One source reports that the neutralists include the "real proletariat" of the BCP--some 100,000 factory, agricultural, governmental, and office workers who are rather vague on ideological issues. Most neutralists have advanced educations or technical training, but they systematically resist party indoctrination and party work in favor of concentrating on the benefits the regime can provide for their daily lives and careers. Their principal complaint concerning Zhivkov is the poor economic status of the country. At present this group is a passive supporter of the regime and appears to have only slight political influence and ambition. It is expected that with the introduction of the new economic system and the concomitant expanded need for technical specialists, this group's political awareness will markedly increase.

#### The Nationalist Reformist Faction

This has traditionally been a large, but ill-defined group. Recent reports indicate, however,

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that its cohesiveness is increasing. Its membership reportedly consists principally of ex-partisans, followers of the late Traicho Kostov, and former political prisoners who were imprisoned by the "Muscovites" in the late 1940s and early 1950s.

The group's increasing cohesiveness allegedly stems not only from its common tribulations at the hands of the "Muscovites" but also from its claim to having some of the best educated Communists and the best prepared ideological cadres. In addition, one source indicates that within the ex-partisan element of this faction, there is a hard core cadre of about 1,000 decisive and experienced men who are capable of revolutionary political action, and who, though not formally organized, trust each other and frequently exchange views. The April 1965 conspirators came from this group. Central committee member and chief of the Bulgarian Air Force, Col. Gen. Trunski, also is a prominent member.

Nationalist members of this faction are angered by Zhivkov's servility to the Soviet Union at a time when almost every other Communist East European country has gained added independence from Moscow. The reformists are impatient with the snail-like progress of political and economic reforms, even though their agitation for Bulgaria's new system of economic management allegedly resulted in the new system's acceptance by the regime.

Whatever their precise attitude toward Zhivkov at the moment, it is in any case clear that many ex-partisans and "Kostovites" have now reached positions in the party-state complex from which they can effectively influence changes in regime policies. As noted earlier, ex-partisans alone account for 46 of 101 members of the central committee; 12 of the 66 candidate central committee members; 6 of the 11-member politburo; 4 of the 7-member national secretariat; and at least 48 of the 416 members in the National Assembly. In the national governmental apparatus, 17 of the 33 ministerial level positions are currently held by ex-partisans.

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## V. THE ANTI-REGIME CONSPIRACY OF APRIL 1965

The anti-regime conspiracy which Bulgarian and Soviet authorities uncovered and squelched in April 1965 was led exclusively by dissident party members having a "nationalist" outlook. It allegedly intended to seize power through force of arms. Despite the gravity of their actions, the conspirators received relatively short prison terms.

The plot was allegedly planned exclusively by Communist military figures or by Communists with a military background, several of whom served in the same Communist partisan unit--the Gavril Genov battalion--during World War II. One of the three ringleaders, Ivan Todorov-Gorunya, a central committee member and ex-partisan from the Vratsa area, apparently was killed resisting arrest. Major General Tsvetko Anev, commandant of the Sofia garrison, and Tsolo Krustev, a former commander of Vratsa partisans, were the remaining two identified ringleaders. Among the seven others publicly implicated in the plot were three individuals of general officer rank, two lesser officers, and two civilians.

Although information on the plot is both contradictory and fragmentary, the conspirators apparently intended to take over key points in Sofia in mid-April when a plenum of the BCP's central committee was in session. The goal of the conspirators was to persuade the plenum to adopt a more liberal political and economic line on the Yugoslav pattern. Force was to be used only if the central committee refused to make the desired changes.

The conspiracy of April 1965 resembled in several important respects the so-called "generals plot" in early 1961 which was also aimed at Zhivkov. In 1961, as in 1965, there were rumblings of very serious discontent inside the Bulgarian party. At the core of the dissension in 1961 were former generals Dobri Terpeshev and Yonko Panov, who along with former first deputy premier Georgi Chankov had been expelled from the central committee in 1957. Terpeshev and Panov along with Nikola Kufardzhiev, a confederate, were former partisans. Bulgaria's

foremost wartime partisan, Col. Gen. Slavcho Trunski, also was implicated in the 1961 conspiracy.

Terpeshev and Panov were men of similar background and outlook to Todorov-Gorunya and General Anev, and in neither the 1961 nor the 1965 case is it difficult to identify Yugoslavia as the model which the conspirators wanted Bulgaria to follow.

Although the regime squelched the conspiracy on the night of 6-7 April, the leadership seems to have had some problem in deciding how and when to disclose the conspirators' arrest. The first news of the conspiracy reached the West on 8 April from a Bulgarian citizen who was a minor employee in the Foreign Office and a stringer for a Western press service. Although it is most unlikely that he could have wired his report without the regime's knowledge, the regime did not take public note of that or subsequent coup reports until 22 April. In the period 8 to 22 April, however, the regime acted to inform party organizations of the conspiracy. According to Western diplomatic sources in Sofia, a Bulgarian party ideologist spoke of the plotters' activities to a party central committee plenum on 14 April and to a small select group of party leaders on 15 April. Furthermore, most of the leading party figures--including Zhivkov--addressed local party meetings in the immediate wake of the regime crackdown.

When the regime did publicly disclose the arrest of the plotters on 22 April, it denied that any threat to the "public order" or the "regime's stability" had been involved, and characterized the plot as "pro-Chinese." This label, which has meager support in the BCP, served as a convenient instrument with which to mitigate the obvious anti-Soviet aspects of the conspiracy. As in the 1961 case, the discovery of the conspiratorial group was almost immediately followed by loud protestations from Zhivkov of fealty to the USSR and its Communist Party.

A secret military tribunal in June 1965 passed surprisingly mild sentences--ranging from three to fifteen years--on the conspirators. Other Bulgarian court actions in recent years have decreed the

death penalty for alleged embezzlement and sentences of five years imprisonment for telling political jokes.

The lightness of the conspirators' sentences and the protracted appeal that the regime has made to the army for its loyalty since the April conspiracy was uncovered raise an interesting speculative point. Although several of the conspirators held positions of some power, none would appear to have had sufficient prestige or power in either the party or state apparatus to rally widespread support against Zhivkov. If they were part of a much more broadly-based political opposition with perhaps sympathizers close to Zhivkov, however, their chances of success would have been significantly enhanced. The reported strong ex-partisan and military character of the conspiracy might well cause the regime to move with circumspection against the conspirators and to seek actively the loyalty of the military. Zhivkov, in his attempts to consolidate his political leadership, has largely surrounded himself with ex-partisan and military individuals, who might at some time offer strong opposition if seriously provoked.

The unsuccessful conspiracy apparently has, nevertheless, had several important repercussions in the organization and leadership of the Bulgarian military, security, and party-state control apparatus. The establishment of a military department in the central committee apparatus probably reflects the fact that two generals in the conspiracy were closely associated with efforts to maintain political control over the military. In addition, the Ministry of Internal Affairs was reorganized, although Minister Dikov--a prominent ex-partisan but also one who has "sold out" to Moscow--was retained. The Committee for State Security was removed from the Interior Ministry and subsequently elevated to ministerial level in March 1966. A number of political and security officials were included in the list of general officers promoted in September 1965, but significantly none is known to have been a partisan. Finally, there has been a reshuffling of party responsibilities assigned to politburo members Boris Velchev and ex-partisan Boyan Bulgaranov.

Some of these changes may well have reflected Zhivkov's awareness that historically the Bulgarian army has been an active, and sometimes a decisive factor in Bulgarian politics. Although not a militaristic nation, the Bulgarians have accorded their army a special and honored status among national institutions. This, and the army's own awareness that it is often the most stable national element, has led the army to intervene in political affairs several times since the country's liberation from the Turks in 1878. Moreover, Zhivkov cannot have forgotten that in the most recent instance of military intervention, 9 September 1944, it was the Bulgarian Communist partisans, a Communist-infiltrated Bulgarian army, and the Soviet Red Army which overthrew the pro-German government. Inasmuch as the present Bulgarian officer corps--particularly the general officer ranks--includes so many ex-partisans and in view of the strong military character of the April conspiracy, Zhivkov can be expected to face increasing difficulties in maintaining his never overly secure position.



## VI. THE ZHIVKOV DILEMMA

Although party chief Zhivkov has always ultimately had support from Moscow in maintaining his position, he has evidently attempted also to keep in balance the influence of the remaining Stalinists in the Bulgarian party and the nationalist/reformist faction which has pressed for liberalization of certain aspects of the nation's political and economic life. To achieve this balance, however, Zhivkov has been unable to bolster his own weak position and has had to settle for a coalition type party and government. The regime's policy actions and reactions, therefore, have come to reflect more the ebb and flow in power between the Stalinists and nationalists than any ability of Zhivkov to control and direct national and party affairs.

Although insufficient information is available to judge accurately the over-all and specific influence of the nationalist/reformist faction, several recent Bulgarian developments have been most uncharacteristic of the Zhivkov regime and suggest a basis for speculation about the increasing power of the faction and the threat this may pose for Zhivkov.

Bulgaria's long-held conservative foreign and domestic policies, for example, appear to have been under intensive study by the regime during the fall of 1965, and there have been indications that some liberalizing revisions were made. Moreover, in a dramatic speech to the National Assembly on 8 December 1965, Zhivkov pledged to employ all means "to develop economic and cultural relations with all countries and peoples on the basis of equality, mutual advantage, and noninterference in domestic affairs."

Zhivkov's surprising use of this "Rumanian-style" policy formulation probably reflected the Sofia leadership's intention to alter its foreign policy to further its own national interests. Some signs of this have already appeared in recent reports of Bulgarian political and economic overtures to the West. Thus, late in 1965, Sofia made its first request to the UN for technical aid, with an expressed

preference for US technicians. This initiative closely followed Sofia's proposal to send a construction delegation to the US, its request for a US delegation of electric power specialists, and its renewed interest in negotiating a consular agreement with Washington. Since the summer of 1965 Bulgaria also stepped up its campaign for better economic and cultural ties with Western Europe and its non-Communist Balkan neighbors.

Zhivkov evidently concluded from observing his Yugoslav and Rumanian neighbors that he could safely and profitably expand contacts with the West as well as with other non-Communist areas without basically altering the support Moscow gives his regime. Never a dynamic nor imaginative leader, Zhivkov presumably hoped to satisfy both political wings in his party by indicating to the nationalists a new maneuverability in foreign relations, and to the Stalinists that this is possible without breaking the traditional and comfortable support from Moscow.

If this has been Zhivkov's goal, however, it would almost certainly be doomed to failure. Although the moves Zhivkov has taken thus far are somewhat surprising for Bulgaria, his extremely cautious approach to the over-all problem of domestic and foreign policies has probably not bolstered his position with either the nationalists or the Stalinists. In fact, this approach might encourage the nationalists to step up their pressure while the Stalinists' poor opinion of Zhivkov will only be reinforced.

Zhivkov's dilemma also was reflected in his decision in March 1966 to retain the premiership, despite numerous reports--including Zhivkov's interviews with visiting journalists--to the contrary. It seems probable that Zhivkov kept the premiership, because in the face of party factionalism, he feared the further eroding effect his resignation would have on his insecure control of the BCP. Although Zhivkov has only occasionally displayed bursts of political acumen, he undoubtedly recognizes that resurgent nationalism in Communist Eastern Europe has not gone unnoticed in the Bulgarian party. Given this political fact of life along with the strong nationalist faction in the BCP, Zhivkov also must realize that his successor as premier probably will

be more nationalistically inclined than he is and will not be encumbered by Zhivkov's poor record. If this is the case, his retention of the premiership has offered no relief to the nationalist faction. Under these circumstances, it should not be at all surprising if new nationalist-oriented conspiracies against the Zhivkov regime come to light.

Whether such plots materialize or not, it is also likely that Zhivkov will keep trying to ensure against them by pointing Bulgarian Government policy in an increasingly nationalist direction. The ten cabinet level visits which Bulgaria exchanged with Yugoslavia, Rumania, and Greece between mid-February and late May 1966 seem to be positive--if still minor--moves in a nationalist direction.

## ANNEX I.

### The Gavril Genov Battalion

The Gavril Genov Battalion is of special interest because the three known members of the April 1965 antiregime conspiracy were at one time the battalion's principal officers. Formed in the spring of 1943, the Gavril Genov Battalion operated in Vratsa district and frequently in Yugoslavia as a component of the Twelfth Revolutionary Operational Zone. Because the battalion often fought alongside Tito's partisans, the battalion's veterans were subsequently considered politically suspect by postwar Bulgarian Communist Party leaders.

After the initiation of war between the Soviet Union and Germany in 1941, the pro-German Bulgarian Government attempted to apprehend all leading Communists in the country; it also rounded-up several BCP district committees, including the Vratsa party committee. Ivan Todorov-Gorunya (one of the plotters in the April 1965 coup attempt) was the only Vratsa committee member to escape. By the end of 1941, however, the party central committee sanctioned the formation of a new party committee with party authority even encompassing the territories of Vratsa, Byala Slatina, and Oryakhovo. Todorov-Gorunya was named party secretary.

In early 1942, the central committee reinforced its earlier action by sending several party emissaries and representatives to assist the newly organized district committee. Among those individuals were Diko Dikov, now Minister of Internal Affairs; Dimo Dichev, present chief of the central committee department for international relations and foreign policy; and Dancho Dimitrov, deputy chairman of the National Assembly's Presidium. Dikov and Dichev subsequently became commander and political commissar, respectively of the Twelfth Partisan Zone.

By late 1942, the Gavril Genov Battalion's first detachment was formed, and Todorov-Gorunya was appointed its political commissar. The battalion's second partisan detachment was established early in 1943 and, owing to previous shifts in personnel, the

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new detachment's command staff was composed of the three known participants in the antiregime plot of April 1965. These officers were Tsolo Krustev, commander; Todorov-Gorunya, political commissar; and Tsvetko Anev, deputy commander. Two other detachments also were formed under the Genov Battalion during 1943.

Political activity also increased during 1943, and in September of that year, the first conference of the Vratsa District Communist Party committee met. Attended by 12 delegates and by Dimo Dichev, the zone's political commissar, the conference discussed problems of international and domestic policy, the development of the partisan movement, and the objectives of the Fatherland Front. The conference also chose a new district party committee with Todorov-Gorunya as secretary, and Tsolo Krustev, Dancho Dimitrov, Avram Mitev, and Boris Dilkov as members.

During February 1944, the battalion's third and fourth detachments were formed, and by May of that year, the battalion numbered about 120 men, according to regime sources. The fifth and sixth detachments of the battalion were not established until June and July 1944, at which time regime sources indicate the battalion numbered more than 150 partisans.

As the tempo of the war increased and the Red Army advanced, the district's second Communist Party conference was held between 8 and 14 May 1944. A new district party committee was elected consisting of Tsolo Krustev as secretary and the following members: Todorov-Gorunya, Dancho Dimitrov, Avram Mitev, and Petko Kanchev.

Immediately after the second party conference, the leadership of the Gavril Genov Battalion was realigned to conform with its leadership of 1943, and Tsolo Krustev was reappointed commander; Tsvetko Anev, deputy commander; and Todorov-Gorunya as political commissar. This leadership remained unchanged until liberation on 9 September 1944.

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ANNEX II

Ex-Partisans Holding National Level Party or Governmental Positions

Name	VOZ	Present Position
ANGELOV, Lyubomir	Unk	Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs
ANTANASOV, Grudi	11th	Member of the central committee and Ambassador to Yugoslavia
AVRAMOV, Luchezar	Unk	Member of the central committee and of the Secretariat; Minister without portfolio; and member of the National Assembly
AVRAMOV, Ruben	Unk	Member of the central committee; BCP archivist; and, member of the National Assembly
AVRAMOVA, Ekaterina	1st	President of the Committee for Friendship and Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries; and, member of the National Assembly
BALKANDZHIEV, Nikola	2nd	Member of the central committee and of the National Assembly
BASHEV, Ivan	1st	Minister of Foreign Affairs
BOKOV, Georgi	4th	Member of the central committee and the National Assembly; chief editor of the leading BCP newspaper, <u>Rabotnichesko Delo</u> (Workers' Cause)
BONEV, Vladimir	1st	Candidate member of the central committee and member of the National Assembly

<u>Name</u>	<u>VOZ</u>	<u>Present Position</u>
BOZHKOVA, Tsvetko	12th	Member of the central committee; first secretary of the Vratsa òkrug BCP organization and former member of the Gavril Genov battalion; also member of the National Assembly
BUCHVAROV, Ivan Col. Gen.	8th	Member of the central committee and Ambassador to East Germany
BUDINOV, Ivan	Unk	Minister of Foreign Trade
BULGARANOV, Boyan	1st, 2nd and 10th	Member of the politburo, secretariat, and the central committee; also a member of the National Assembly
CHOBANOV, Yordan	9th	Ministry of Foreign Affairs official and former permanent representative to the United Nations
DASKALOVA, Svetla	Unk	Minister of Justice and member of the National Assembly
DICHEV, Dimo	12th	Member of the central committee; chief of its Foreign Policy and International Relations Department; and, a member of the National Assembly
DIKOV, Diko Col. Gen.	12th	Member of the central committee; Minister of Internal Affairs; and, a member of the National Assembly
DIMITROV, Atanas	5th*	Former member of the central committee; Chairman of the Committee for Food Industry

\*The asterisk (\*) indicates the VOZ with which an ex-partisan was probably associated.

Name	VOZ	Present Position
DIMITROV, Dancho	12th	Member of the central committee; former member of the Gavril Genov battalion; and, Deputy Chairman of the National Assembly's Presidium
DIMOV, Dimitur	6th	Candidate member of the Politburo; member of the central committee; Pres. BCP Control Commiss.; and a member of the National Assembly
DRAGOYCHEVA, Tsola	1st & 2nd	Member of the central committee; deputy chairman of the Executive Committee of the Fatherland Front; and, a member of the National Assembly
DZHUROV, Dobri Col. Gen.	1st	Member of the central committee; Minister of National Defense; former member of the Chavdar Battalion; and, a member of the National Assembly
ELAZAR, David	1st	Candidate member of the central committee and chief of its Department of Agitation and Propaganda; and, a member of the National Assembly
GANOVSKI, Sava	11th	Member of the central committee and of the National Assembly
GEORGIEV, Zdravko Col. Gen.	1st	Member of the central committee and Deputy Minister of National Defense
GRASHNOV, Marin	Unk	Member of the central committee; Minister of Construction; and, a member of the National Assembly



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Name	VOZ	Present Position
GYUAROV, Stoyan	1st & 2nd	Member of the central committee and Chairman of the Central Council of Trade Unions
IGNATOV, Kiril	6th	Minister of Public Health and Social Welfare and a member of the National Assembly
IVANOV, Petko	12th*	Member of the National Assembly
KANCHEV, Petko	12th	Chairman of a committee directly subordinate to the Council of Ministers; a former member of the Gavril Genov Battalion; and, a member of the National Assembly
KARAPENEV, Pencho	8th	Member of the central committee and the National Assembly; also first secretary of the Gabrovo <u>okrug</u> BCP organization
KORTSANOV, Gospodin	5th	Candidate member of the central committee; first secretary of the Khaskovo <u>okrug</u> BCP organization; and, a member of the National Assembly
KOSEV, Kiril	8th	Candidate member of the central committee and a member of the National Assembly
KUBADINSKI, Pencho	9th	Candidate member of the politburo; member of the central committee; deputy chairman of the Council of Ministers; and a member of the National Assembly
KUNIN, Petko	11th	Member of the central committee and the National Assembly


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Name	VOZ	Present Position
MINCHEV, Mincho	6th	Member of the central committee and of the National Assembly
MISHEV, Misho	1st*	Member of the central committee; Chairman of the Committee for Labor and Wages; and, a member of the National Assembly
NACHEVA, Vera	2nd	Member of the central committee and deputy chief of its Department for Foreign Policy and International Relations
ORLOVSKI, Khristo	8th	Candidate member of the central committee and deputy chief of its Department of Transportation and Communications; and, a member of the National Assembly
PANAYOTOV, Petur	8th	Member of the National Assembly
PAPAZOV, Nacho	Unk	Member of the central committee, the secretariat, and the National Assembly
PENEV, Blagoy Lt. Gen.	2nd*	Candidate member of the central committee and Chairman of the Main Administration for Compulsory Labor
POPOV, Dimitur	Unk	Member of the central committee; Minister of Finance; and, a member of the National Assembly
PRAKHOV, Todor	Unk	Chairman, central auditing commission of the BCP, and a member of the National Assembly's Presidium

Name	VOZ	Present Position
PRUMOV, Ivan	2nd	Member of the central committee, the secretariat, and the National Assembly
RAYDOVSKI, Vasil	2nd	Member of the central auditing commission of the BCP; also a member of the National Assembly
SEMERDZHIEV, Atanas	3rd	Candidate member of the central committee; Chief of the Army's General Staff
SEMKOV, Velko	12th	Member of the central committee; first secretary of the BCP in Vidin <u>okrug</u> ; and, a member of the National Assembly
STANOEV, Stoyu	1st	Candidate member of the central committee; first secretary of the BCP in Kyustendil <u>okrug</u> ; and, a member of the National Assembly
STEFANOV, Ninko	1st & 12th	Member of the central committee; chairman of the Committee for State Security; and a member of the National Assembly
SYULEMEZOV, Stoyan	11th	Candidate member of the central committee; first deputy chairman of the State Planning Committee
TAKOV, Peko	11th	Member of the central committee; Minister of Internal Trade; and, a member of the National Assembly
TARABANOV, Milko	Unk	Member of the central committee and Permanent Representative to the UN

<u>Name</u>	<u>VOZ</u>	<u>Present Position</u>
TODOROV, Stanko	1st	Politburo member; member of the central committee; Bulgaria's permanent CEMA representative; and, deputy chairman of the Council of Ministers
TODOROVA, Rada	1st*	Member of the central committee and of the National Assembly
TRUNSKI, Slavcho Col. Gen.	1st	Member of the central committee; Commander of the Bulgarian Air Force; Deputy Minister of National Defense; and, a member of the National Assembly
TSANEV, Angel Lt. Gen.	2nd	Member of the central committee and chief of its Military Department; also a member of the National Assembly
TSOLOV, Tano	11th	Member of the central committee; candidate member of the Politburo; Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers; and, a member of the National Assembly
VACHKOV, Marin	Unk	Member of the central committee; Minister of Transportation; and, a member of the National Assembly
VIDINSKI, Radenko	1st	Member of the central committee; chairman of its Construction Department; and, a member of the National Assembly
VRACHEV, Ivan Col. Gen.	Unk	Member of the central committee and First Deputy Minister of National Defense

<u>Name</u>	<u>VOZ</u>	<u>Present Position</u>
VUTOV, Petur	11th	Ambassador-designate to the UK
ZHIVKOV, Todor	1st	Member of the central committee; Premier and party First Secretary; politburo member; and, a member of the National Assembly
ZHIVKOV, Zhivko	Unk	Member of the central committee and the politburo; and, a member of the National Assembly



ANNEX IV

List of Revolutionary Operational Zones (VOZ)  
Their Centers, Dates of Establishment, and Principal Officers

- I VOZ - Sofia - April 1943  
Commander - PERENOVSKI, Toni  
Deputy Commander - TRAYKOV, Ivan (until July 1943)  
ZHIVKOV, Todor (after July 1943)  
Chief of Staff - PENCHEV, Stoyan  
Political Commissar - GESHKOV, Angel  
Deputy Political Commissar - DZHUROV, Dobri
- II VOZ - Plovdiv - Spring 1943  
Commander - ZHECHEV, Georgi  
Deputy Commander - TERZIEV, Vasil  
Chief of Staff - IVANOV, Yanko  
Political Commissar - GROZEV, Gocho  
Deputy Political Commissar - KIRKOV, Rayko
- III VOZ - Pazardzhik - Autumn 1943  
Commander - KHRISTOV, Marin D.
- IV VOZ - Blagoyevgrad - March 1944  
Commander - RADONOV, Krum  
Deputy Commander - TRICHKOV, Ivan  
Political Commissar - RACHEV, Nikola  
Deputy Political Commissar - STOYCHEV, Krustyu
- V VOZ - Stara Zagora - December 1943  
Commander - CHOCHOLU, Stoyu  
Chief of Staff - DIMITROV, Velko  
Political Commissar - VULEV, Yordan
- VI VOZ - Yambol - Spring 1943  
Commander - DIMOV, Dimitur  
Deputy Commander - KARAKACHANOV, Panayot  
Chief of Staff - SYULEMEZOV, Stoyan  
Political Commissar - YANEV, Nikola  
Deputy Political Commissar - CHANKOV, Velko

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NOTE: Solid line underscoring indicates full membership in  
the Central Committee  
Double line underscoring indicates candidates membership  
in the Central Committee

- VII VOZ - Khaskovo - Spring 1944  
Commander\* - ARAKLIEV, Ivan G.  
Deputy Commander\* - GEORGIEV, Yanko  
Political Commissar\* - KOSTOV, Yancho  
Deputy Political Commissar\* - SIMEONOV, Stefan
- VIII VOZ - Gorna Oryakhovitsa - July 1943  
Commander - KOPCHEV, Boris and ORLOVSKI, Khristo  
Chief of Staff - Raykov, Ivan  
Political Commissar - BUCHVAROV, Ivan
- IX VOZ - Kolarovgrad - July 1943  
Commander - DIMITROV, Grudi A.  
Deputy Commander - VIDINSKI, Kiril  
Chief of Staff - IVANOV, Ivan Marinov  
Political Commissar - RADEV, Todor P.  
Deputy Political Commissar - KUBADINSKI, Pencho
- X VOZ - Varna - August 1943  
Commander - TEOLOV, Lambo  
Deputy Commander - DOBREV, Ivan  
Political Commissar - BORACHEV, Demir
- XI VOZ - Pleven - June 1943  
Commander - PELOVSKI, Pelo  
Chief of Staff - EDREV, Stoyan  
Political Commissar - TAKOV, Peko  
Deputy Political Commissar - TSVETANOV, Lyuben
- XII VOZ - Vratsa - Spring 1943  
Commander - DIKOV, Diko  
Deputy Political Commissar - TASKOV,\*\* Boris

\*Tentative

\*\*Removed from Central Committee in November 1962



ANNEX V

Brigades and Battalions by the VOZ to which Attached

I VOZ - Sofia

Brigades

First Sofia  
Second Sofia  
Chavadar  
Georgi Dimitrov

Battalions

Monchil Voyevoda  
Trun  
Brezhnik  
Srednohoretski  
Dragovishtitsa  
Georgi Benkovski  
Kosta Petrov  
Georgi Dimitrov  
Shopski  
Chavdar

II VOZ - Plovdiv

Brigades

Vasil Levski  
Khristo Botev  
Georgi Dimitrov  
Vasil Kolarov  
Chepinets  
First Rodopski  
Second Rodopski

Battalions

Anton Ivanov  
Kocho Chestimenski  
Vasil Petleshkov  
Georgi Zhechev  
Lilyana Nikolova

III VOZ - Pazardshik

Brigades

Georgi Benkovski  
Chepinets

Battalions

Panayot Volov  
Angel Kunchev

IV VOZ - Blagoyevgrad

Brigades

Data not available

Battalions

Nikola Kalupchiev  
Yano Sandanski  
Anton Popov  
Aneshti Uzanov  
Nikola Parapunov  
Rila-Pirin

V VOZ - Stara Zagora

Brigades

Georgi Dimitrov

Battalions

Vasil Levski

VI VOZ - Yambol

Brigades

Khadzhi Dimitur  
Petur Momchilov  
Death to Fascism  
Vasil Levski  
The People's Fist

Battalions

Georgi Georgiev  
Vladimir Zaimov  
Khadzhi Dimitur

VII VOZ - Khaskovo

Brigades

Data not available

Battalions

Asen Zlatarov  
Vasil Levski

VIII VOZ - Gorna Oryakhovitsa

Brigades

Data not available

Battalions

Gorna Oryakhovitsa  
Gabrovo-Sevlievo

IX VOZ - Kolarovgrad

Brigades

Data not available

Battalions

Popova  
Mikhail Moravka  
Avgust Popov  
Omurtag

X VOZ - Varna

Brigades

Data not available

Battalions

Vasil Levski

XI VOZ - Pleven

Brigades

Cherven

Battalions

Danube  
Vasil Levski  
Khristo Kurpachev  
Dyado Vulko  
Chavdar  
Popovski

XII VOZ - Vratsa

Brigades

Data not available

Battalions

Gavril Genov  
Georgi Benkovski  
Khristo Mikhaylov  
Stefan Karadzha

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