

FORM 12-62 2024

COMPLETED AS No. 1364/66 DATED 23 JUNE 1966

Approved For Release 2001/03/09 : CIA-RDP79T00826A000900260001-8

No. 210-66

Date \_\_\_\_\_

SUBJECT

The Latest Cyprus Imbrolio

REQUESTED BY : DDI via D/OCI

PURPOSE : Enlightenment

DESIRED LENGTH : \_\_\_\_\_

SPECIAL DISSEM : Routine internal and external GRAPHICS?

COORDINATION  
OUTSIDE OCI : \_\_\_\_\_

ASSIGNED TO

: ME Div

DUE DATE: \_\_\_\_\_

OAD REVIEW : \_\_\_\_\_

1. O/DCI \_\_\_\_\_

4. CS/II \_\_\_\_\_

6. WA \_\_\_\_\_

7. AA \_\_\_\_\_

8. \_\_\_\_\_

2. O/DDI \_\_\_\_\_

5. DAY/SIDO \_\_\_\_\_

P/A \_\_\_\_\_

P/A \_\_\_\_\_

Approved For Release 2001/03/09 : CIA-RDP79T00826A000900260001-8

I HAVE COPY.

STATINTL

*BEST COPY*

*Available*

*THROUGHOUT  
FOLDER*

**STATINTL**

**Approved For Release 2001/03/09 : CIA-RDP79T00826A000900260001-8**

**Approved For Release 2001/03/09 : CIA-RDP79T00826A000900260001-8**

ALL MESSAGES ARE TRANSMITTED ROUTINE UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED.

FORM 4 12-63 **Approved For Release 2001/03/09 : CIA-RDP79T00826A000900260001-8** (24)

**CONFIDENTIAL**

<b>SPECIAL CENTER CLASSIFIED MESSAGE</b>		DATE <b>24 JUNE 1966</b>	OUT NO.
TO:	<b>25X1A</b>	PRIORITY IMMEDIATE	<b>25X1A</b>
INFO:		ORIGINATOR	
FROM:	<b>CIA/OCI</b>	DIVISION <b>OCI/PRES</b>	EXTENSION <b>9400 2</b>
		SOURCE REF.	

TYPE IN CAPITAL LETTERS, DOUBLE SPACED

TO: **CONFIDENTIAL** **WASHINGTON**

PRIORITY **25X1A**

**25X1C**

**INTEL MEMO NO. 1914/64 DATED 23 JUNE ENTITLED THE LATEST CYPRUS INTELLIGENCE HAS BEEN RELEASED**

**THE MEMO MAKES THE FOLLOWING OBSERVATIONS REGARDING RESTRICTIONS IMPOSED BY MAKARIOS ON THE MOVEMENT OF TURKISH CYPRIOTS TO AND FROM THE TURKISH SECTOR OF NICOSIA ON 2 JUNE AND AGAIN ON 21 JUNE:**

**1. THESE TACTICS SEEM TO BE PART AND PARCEL OF MAKARIOS' STRATEGY TO ERODE THE POSITION OF THE TURKISH CYPRIOTS GRADUALLY, TO DESTROY THEIR CONFIDENCE IN THE TURKISH MAINLAND LEADERSHIP, AND TO COMPLICATE THE EFFORTS OF THE GREEK AND TURKISH GOVERNMENTS TO FIND A WORKABLE SOLUTION. ANKARA'S REACTION TO THE INCIDENTS THIS WEEK--ITS "ULTIMATUM," WITHOUT ANY SIGNIFICANT FOLLOW-UP-- FURTHER UNDERCUTS THE TURKISH POSITION. THE LOCAL TURKISH CYPRIOTS IN PARTICULAR MAY WILL BE WEAKENED BY WHAT SEEMS TO HAVE BEEN A**

SIGNATURE OF RELEASING OFFICER	SIGNATURE OF COORDINATING OFFICER	SIGNATURE OF AUTHENTICATING OFFICER
--------------------------------	-----------------------------------	-------------------------------------

9

ROUTING			
1	4	7	
2			
3	6	9	

**CONFIDENTIAL**

GROUP 1  
Excluded from automatic  
downgrading and  
declassification

**Approved For Release 2001/03/09 : CIA-RDP79T00826A000900260001-8**

ALL MESSAGES ARE TRANSMITTED ROUTINE UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED.

FORM 4 USE PREVIOUS EDITION 12-63

Approved For Release 2001/03/09 : CIA-RDP79T00826A000900260001-8

(24)

**CONFIDENTIAL**

SPECIAL CENTER CLASSIFIED MESSAGE :		ROUT NO.
TO:	PRIORITY	IMMEDIATE
INFO:	ORIGINATOR	
FROM:	DIVISION	EXTENSION
SOURCE REF.		

TYPE IN CAPITAL LETTERS. DOUBLE SPACED

TO CITE

FILE TWO

FAILURE OF COORDINATION IN ANKARA BUT MAY LOOK LIKE A FAILURE OF NERVE. MAKARIOS HAS TALKED IN ANOTHER ROUND. THE LATEST EPISODES ALSO WILL TEND TO MISLEAD THE TURKISH AND GREEK NEGOTIATORS, WHO PLAY TO RESUME TALKS SOON, THAT THE WILY ARCH-BISHOP MUST BE A PARTY TO ANY AGREEMENT BEARING ON THE ISLAND'S FUTURE. THE PROSPECT THIS IS FOR MAKARIOS TO CONTINUE WHITTILING AWAY AT THE TURKISH CYPRIOIS WHILE ANKARA PUNES AND PERIODICALLY CREATES AN INTERNATIONAL CRISIS BY THREATENING TO INTERVENE. THE DANGER NONETHELESS REMAINS THAT AT SOME POINT TURKEY'S FRUSTRATIONS MAY BECOME OVERWHELMING.

END OF MESSAGE

25X1A

SIGNATURE OF RELEASING OFFICER

SIGNATURE OF COORDINATING OFFICER

SIGNATURE OF AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

9

ROUTING				
1		4		7
2				
3		6		9

**CONFIDENTIAL**

GROUP 1  
Excluded from automatic  
downgrading and  
declassification

Approved For Release 2001/03/09 : CIA-RDP79T00826A000900260001-8

~~SECRET~~

DISTRIBUTION LIST  
INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM  
CATEGORY E - ROUTINE

OCI Special Paper Notice No. \_\_\_\_\_

Control No. 1364/66

SUBJECT: The Latest Cyprus Imbroglio

Date 23 June 1966

INTERNAL

1-6 DDI	7-12 D/OC	13-17 DDI STAFF	18-22 OD/OCI STAFF	23,24 MCO
DCI		25 D/ONE	39 DCI Briefers	
DDCI	26-28	PICL	40,41 INDICO	
EXEC. REG.	29-37	OPSCEN		
EXEC. DIR.	38	DDP Duty Ofcr.		
42,43 D/NIPE		-2 85		25X1A
44 G. COUNS.		-1 86		-1
45 I. G.		-1 87-92		-6
46,47 DD/S&T		-2 93		-1
48 DD/S&T		-1 94 SA/R		-1
49-61 DDP	(COLLATERAL)	-13 95,96 CA/EUR		-2
		97,98 CA/MEA		-2
62 DIR/PPB		-1 99,100 CA/WH		-2
63,64 ONE		-2 101,102 CA/FE		-1
65 ONE Reading Room		-1 103 CD/West		25X1A
66-70 D/ORR (CSS)		-4 104-106 CS/Pres		-2
71-75 D/OSI		-4 107 ADMIN (VM)		-1
76,77 D/OSI (SR/OCR)		-2 108		25X1A
78 Chief, DD/OCR (COLLATERAL)		-1 109,110 Orig. Div		-2
79-81 DIR/NPIC (LS/PID)		-3 111,112 Orig. Br.		-2
82 DDI/CGS		-1		
83 NMCC (OPSCEN)		-1		
84 DDI/RS		-1		

EXTERNAL

THE WHITE HOUSE

Smith	-5
Vice President	-1
Gen. Maxwell Taylor	-1

STATE

DEFENSE

Hand	-1
------	----

TREASURY

Fowler	-1
USIB (Distribution Points)	
NSA	-5
State (COLLATERAL)	-13

USIA

Marks	-1
-------	----

AID

BeTL	-1
------	----

ACDA

--	--

NASA

Halpern	-1
---------	----

DIA (COLLATERAL)	-44	Sullivan (FBI)	-1
State (COLLATERAL)	-10	NIC	-1
BROWN (AEC)	-1		
NON-USIB (Intelligence Distribution Points)			

Special Instructions:

Distribution

Authorized by

To be released by 23 June 1966

~~SECRET~~

No. Copies 225

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
CLASSIFICATION

OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE

MEMO NO. : ~~100-100000~~ 100-100000 of 10 June 1966

SUBJECT: ~~The Cuban Missile Crisis~~

REQUESTED OR ORIGINATED BY: ~~ONE~~

DISSEMINATION: ~~Review; Review 1 and returned. Review completed on 13 June.~~

ADDITIONAL COMMENTS:

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
CLASSIFICATION

**CONFIDENTIAL**



23 June 1966

No. 1364/66

Copy No. 23

**INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM**

**THE LATEST CYPRUS IMBROGLIO**

**DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE**

GROUP 1  
Excluded from automatic  
downgrading and  
declassification

**CONFIDENTIAL**



**WARNING**

This Document contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States, within the meaning of Title 18, Sections 793 and 794, of the U.S. Code, as amended. Its transmission or revelation of its contents to or receipt by an unauthorized person is prohibited by law. The reproduction of this form is prohibited.

No. 1364/66

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
Directorate of Intelligence  
23 June 1966

INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM\*

The Latest Cyprus Imbrolio

1. The political temperature on Cyprus has risen again. Two blockades of the Turkish sector of Nicosia in the last three weeks appear to be part and parcel of Cyprus President Makarios' strategy to erode the position of the Turkish Cypriots gradually, to destroy their confidence in the Turkish mainland leadership, and to complicate--if not wreck--the efforts of the Greek and Turkish governments to find a workable solution.

2. On 2 June and again on 21 June, Makarios clamped restrictions on the movement of Turkish Cypriots to and from the Turkish sector of Nicosia. He cited bombing incidents in the Greek sector of the city as justification. Some of the bombings may have been the work of Turkish Cypriots, but there is good reason to believe that others were contrived by Greek Cypriot officials. To keep the Greek Government in Athens out of his act, Makarios assigned the implementation of the blockades to his minister of interior, rather than to his old rival, General Grivas, who commands the Cyprus armed forces but is more responsive to Athens.

3. Immediate Turkish Cypriot reaction to the first blockade was relatively mild. Turkish Cypriot judges, however, subsequently withdrew from participation in courts in the Greek sector

---

\*Prepared by the Office of Current Intelligence.

of the city. These courts were one of the few vestiges of official cooperation between the two communities. The judges apparently meant their action to support the aims of the Turkish Cypriot leadership, which seeks de facto partition; in effect, however, the withdrawal served to underscore Makarios' argument that it is impossible for the Greeks to work with the Turkish community.

4. Ankara's reaction to the incidents this week--its "ultimatum," without any significant follow-up--further undercuts the Turkish position. The local Turkish Cypriots in particular may well be shaken by what seems to have been a failure of coordination in Ankara but may look like a failure of nerve.

5. Makarios has thus won still another round. The latest episodes also will tend to remind the Turkish and Greek negotiators, who plan to resume talks soon, that the wily archbishop must be a party to any agreement bearing on the island's future. This fact of Cyprus' politics makes it even less likely that Athens and Ankara can work out something politically tolerable at home. The prospect thus is for Makarios to continue whittling away at the Turkish Cypriots while Ankara fumes and periodically creates an international crisis by threatening to intervene. The danger nonetheless remains that at some point Turkey's frustrations may become overwhelming.

Approved For Release 2001/03/09 : CIA-RDP79T00826A000900260001-8

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Approved For Release 2001/03/09 : CIA-RDP79T00826A000900260001-8

*CONFIDENTIAL*