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17 JUN 1966

No. 1578/66a

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Honorable Walt. W. Rostow
Special Assistant to the President
(Foreign Policy)
The White House

SUBJECT : The Leadership Upheaval in
Communist China

The attached memorandum presents a comprehensive roundup by CIA's China analysts of information bearing on the current upheaval in the hierarchy of Chinese Communist leadership. It also speculates as to what course this struggle may take in the future.

(signed) W. F. Raborn

W. F. RABORN

Attachment

(Attachment is No. 1578/66, 17 June 66,
"The Leadership Upheaval in Communist
China," (SECRET) as revised 17 June)

Concur:

/s/ R. J. Smith 17 JUN 1966

R. J. SMITH
Deputy Director for Intelligence

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17 June 1966

No. 1578/66

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INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM

THE LEADERSHIP UPHEAVAL IN COMMUNIST CHINA

DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
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No. 1578/66

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Directorate of Intelligence
17 June 1966

INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM*

The Leadership Upheaval in Communist China

SUMMARY

Communist China has, in a sense, entered a transition period even before Mao's final departure. Mao's absences from the public scene are growing longer and longer, suggesting recurring illnesses, perhaps of growing seriousness. Circumstances surrounding his last absence for five and one-half months this past winter and spring are unknown, but it is inconceivable that events would have unfolded as they have if his grip on the party had not slipped.

Mao Tse-tung probably remains the dominant leader, and can probably impose his will, but at least since November has not had the sure sustained control of events that a party leader aims at; he is more dependent on his key lieutenants than he used to be; and not all of them are thoroughly reliable in his terms. It is possible, moreover, that he is being pushed by ambitious colleagues to turn over to them more and more of the party machinery and the authority to make domestic and foreign policy decisions. It could be that we are seeing the beginning of the end of the long Mao era.

At the present moment, the situation is highly fluid. Disclosures already made point to a power play by Teng Hsiao-ping, the powerful general secretary of the party, who seems to be making a bid to replace Liu Shao-chi as Mao's deputy in the party and therefore the heir apparent, and in this he may be succeeding. Teng is probably working with or

*Prepared by the Office of Current Intelligence and coordinated with the Office of National Estimates.

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using Lin Piao, whose place in the army would make him a useful ally. Teng probably built the case that led to the recent ouster of Peng Chen, a rival in Mao's inner circle of advisers, and is probably attempting to place loyal followers in key spots throughout the party, security, and military apparatus. Peng Chen has already been replaced in the Peking city apparatus with one of Teng's proteges.

Teng is in a key slot. As general secretary of the party and ranking member of the secretariat, he controls the day-to-day business of the party machine. There are important parallels between Teng's position today and that of Stalin and Khrushchev when they made their bids for supreme power.

The duration of this fight and its outcome are conjectural. Forces have already been loosed which may be hard to cage again. If the process is a lengthy one--a definite possibility--it could turn disorderly. Men who have submerged differences and ambitions under Mao will not necessarily continue to do so under his successor. The situation could even degenerate into regionalism, which traditionally appears when central authority is weakened.

We do not expect to see abrupt shifts in domestic or foreign policy while the struggle goes on. All the contenders--Liu Shao-chi, Teng Hsiao-ping, Chou En-lai and Lin Piao--are hardline Chinese Communists, and quick changes are unlikely. There might be some modifications in approach, however, if only in reaction to the immobilism of Mao's declining years. Any new leadership might, for example, elect to turn the country's attention to the problems it faces at home in an effort to get the Chinese Communist revolution moving again.

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The Fall of Peng Chen

1. The Chinese Communist Party, long one of the most stable and tightly knit in the Communist world, is being racked by an unprecedented chain of events which have already extended over six or more months (a detailed chronology is provided as Annex A). The external manifestations of the internal realities of these events are fragmentary and usually tardy. Firm conclusions as to what really is going on are a risky business, since the known facts lend themselves to several explanations.

2. Conceivably, Mao Tse-tung may be fully in charge of the purge of an errant comrade or two. If so, he is proceeding in a most uncharacteristic way. In the past, Mao has conducted his infrequent purges by acting first and explaining to the Chinese public later. He has shown a distaste for airing dirty leadership linen in public. In the present case, leading party journals have been openly and persistently attacking one another over a period of months. This we take to be a sure sign of disarray in the higher councils of the party, from which normally flow the rigid guidelines governing the makeup of the publications.

3. The hypothesis which best fits this and other unusual features of the Chinese political landscape this past winter and spring is that a genuine power struggle has been and is under way in Peking. Central to this interpretation are both the case of Peng Chen, until March one of the five or six top Chinese Communists, and the indications since his fall in April that some party leaders remain unsatisfied. Peng was a key figure in the control of the party apparatus, and it was whispered in Peking that he was a leading contender for party leadership after Mao was gone. As such he was a natural rival of Teng Hsiao-ping, similarly placed and with similar ambitions.

4. The case Teng built against Peng Chen, the only important figure publicly removed so far, reveals tactics which may be used to bring down other officials.

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5. Peng's authority stemmed primarily from his senior positions in the politburo and the secretariat, the body responsible for running the party's day to day affairs. He also performed largely ceremonial functions as first secretary of the Peking municipal party committee and mayor of Peking, and it was through these positions that he was publicly attacked.

6. The chief charge leveled against him, but never specifically articulated, is that he tried to pave the way for a coup d'etat. He reportedly did this by directing party journals published by his Peking committee to print numerous essays and articles from 1959 through 1962 satirizing and slandering Mao Tse-tung and the party. Writers employed by him are now described as revisionist renegades of the worst sort. They include men like Teng To, a Peking party secretary, and Wu Han, a vice mayor of Peking.

7. The major work which figured in the attack on Peng Chen was "Dismissal of Hai Jui," a play written by Wu Han in January 1961. This play depicts the trials of a virtuous Ming Dynasty (1368-1644) official who tried to help oppressed peasants and was dismissed by an unjust emperor for his pains. Since April, all major party newspapers have seen this as a symbolic play, in which the leading figure represented former defense minister Peng Te-huai, purged as a "right opportunist" in August 1959. The unjust emperor, of course, was taken to represent Mao Tse-tung. The charges go on to claim that Wu Han, working on behalf of right opportunists who survived the 1959 purge, wrote the play both to protest Peng's removal and to encourage other survivors to wait for an opportunity to seize party leadership.

8. The charges make no effort to explain how the true meaning of "Hai Jui" and other allegedly slanderous material escaped the attention of the party for so many years, and it is difficult on other grounds to accept the charges at face value. Peng Chen was long a member in good standing of the dominant doctrinaire group of top leaders and had risen in recent years. In 1964 Peng was brought into the elite group of men identified as Mao's "close

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comrades-in-arms." Liu Shao-chi, Chou En-lai, Teng, and Lin Piao are the others given this accolade. As a hardliner, Peng has been in the forefront of the anti-intellectual campaign begun several years ago by the regime.

9. The opening gun for the attack was fired in the 10 November Shanghai Wen Hui Pao in an article by Yao Wen-yuan, a name later linked directly with the attacking forces. Yao called "Hai Jui" a big poisonous weed. The article was republished in the 29 November Liberation Army Journal, which appended an editorial note endorsing Yao's view. The journal later called this an "important, militant and correct" view. The Peking Daily, published by Peng's party committee, also reprinted Yao's article on 29 November, but added a neutral editorial note stating that "Hai Jui's" status was undetermined. This stand was promptly endorsed explicitly by People's Daily and implicitly by Red Flag, the prestigious organs of the central committee itself.

10. The stand taken by these two organs means that Peng, in effect, was being protected from attacks by the party leader then in charge, who would have been Liu Shao-chi in Mao's absence. Peng's heavy schedule of appearances from November through March also indicates that his position remained secure. In that period he made numerous speeches, some on important issues, and greeted many foreign delegations. (See Annex B). On 1 January, Red Flag published a major statement which took an extremely harsh line against "cultural" enemies and attributed this line to Peng Chen, as well as to Mao and Lin Piao. Peng's last major act was to host Le Duan, first secretary of the Vietnamese party, on his 22-25 March visit to Peking. Le Duan may still be puzzling over that one.

11. During April, the case aimed at Peng Chen began building up in the party press in a way indicating that he had come under heavy attack in high party circles about the end of March. Red Flag on 5 April finally conceded that "Hai Jui" was indeed an antiparty, poisonous weed. People's Daily broke down on 8 April, admitting that "all" articles published since November labeling "Hai Jui" a poisonous weed had been correct.

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12. The ambivalent record of the two organs later in April, however, could suggest that Peng was still being defended among top leaders who were trying to mitigate the charges against him. Perhaps a better explanation is that they had already thrown Peng to the wolves and were busy trying to defend themselves.

13. The next major development in the case against Peng Chen was an abject confession by Peking Daily (Peng's journal) on 16 April. This bore all the earmarks of a last-minute, desperate attempt to defend against behind-the-scenes attacks. The Peking paper admitted that it had published much "antiparty" material in 1961-62 and that the principal authors--Teng To, Liao Mo-sha, and Wu Han, all Peng's subordinates--were members of an "antiparty gang." Neither People's Daily nor Red Flag took note of the confession. People's Daily on 19 April attacked a writer not connected with the Peking apparatus, possibly to divert attention from it. Red Flag on 29 April again attacked Wu Han, but not Teng To or Liao Mo-sha.

14. By early May, the fate of Peng Chen appeared to be settled. The Liberation Army Journal, which has stayed in the forefront of the attack, declared on 4 May that the party was engaged in a "life and death" combat with unnamed "right opportunists" within the party. This was the first public revelation that such enemies were currently active. On 8 May, the Liberation Army Journal unleashed a savage attack on the Peking Daily and Teng To.

15. The army journals' onslaught signaled the beginning of a nationwide campaign of extraordinary intensity. For more than three weeks, all party papers, including People's Daily and Red Flag, were filled with attacks on Teng To's "black store." Meetings and symposia were held throughout the nation to denounce Teng To and his "backers." Exposure of the "behind-the-scenes boss" was demanded with increasing frequency. The Chinese people were therefore well prepared for the disclosure on 3 June that Peng Chen had been dismissed. Peng has publicly been stripped only of his post as first secretary of Peking, but the press has been treating his downfall in all political roles as an accomplished fact.

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16. Behind these public revelations lie the facts of the matter: that persons opposed to Peng Chen used the intensifying anti-intellectual drive set in motion by Mao in 1964 and 1965 to get Peng, and that they carefully built a case against him. The record indicates that Peng was brought down shortly after his last public appearance on 29 March and was formally stripped of his powers in early May, possibly after a behind-the-scenes trial during April.

The Power Struggle Continues

17. It is possible that Mao, morbidly suspicious, was persuaded that Peng Chen was no longer reliable and condoned the purge for this and no other reason. This is not likely, however. The slow development of the attacks against Peng and the growing signs that other key figures fell with him and that still others are under attack strongly suggest that this is not a situation where a unified leadership under Mao is conducting a purge, but that it is a genuine power struggle.

18. The two ostensible charges against Peng-- that he is a bourgeois revisionist opposed to Mao's thinking and that he aspired to the top post--are implausible. Peng's record stamps him unmistakably as a doctrinaire hardliner. He was sixth in the power structure, and did not have enough power assets to pull off a coup by himself.

19. As already noted, in the past when Mao found it necessary to remove an errant comrade, he moved quietly, not even hinting that a purge was under way until it was an accomplished fact.

20. If this were a purge of men who could not be trusted to carry out Mao's revolutionary line, then the wrong leaders have been brought down. Peng Chen, and others on a growing list of suspects, are hardbitten old revolutionaries, without an ounce of softness, stamped in the same mold as Mao. They are mainly key officials in the control apparatus of the party and army, the kind of men one would expect to see picked off early in a genuine power struggle. (See Annex D)

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21. Signs of confusion at the top last winter and spring--while Mao was out of sight--also argue that the leadership had been disputing.



22. The clearest evidence that factions have been disputing is the differing, and at times opposing, lines taken by major party journals since last November. Liberation Army Journal was in the forefront of the attack that led ultimately to Peng Chen's downfall. From November through March, People's Daily and Red Flag were trying to soften and deflect the attack. The two fell in line after 1 May, but there are still signs of differences, and the army paper continues in the forefront. Its attacks have been consistently sharper than those of the two central committee publications, and other differences remain.

23. So far the Liberation Army Journal has not attacked the People's Daily and Red Flag by name, as it did Peng Chen's Peking Daily. It has criticized stands taken by the pair and implied that they had lagged in the struggle. On 17 May the army journal blasted the "absurd" view set forth by the People's Daily on 14 April that the purpose of putting politics in command was to get work done. According to Liberation Army Journal, the purpose should be to revolutionize people's outlook.

24. On 6 June the Liberation Army Journal published a list of key statements on the struggle that have appeared in various party journals. The paper represented itself and the Shanghai Wen Hui Pao as being in the forefront of attacks launched in November 1965, with Red Flag entering the fray in February and People's Daily in June. This version of history, however, was promptly disputed in an 11 June NCNA (New China News Agency) broadcast. The broadcast agreed that Shanghai Wen Hui Pao had launched the attack, but did not credit the Liberation Army Journal with playing a role until May. The first follow-ups to the Shanghai attack cited by NCNA were articles that had appeared in Red Flag and People's Daily in early April.

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25. It is reasonably clear by now that a group controlling the Liberation Army Journal and the Shanghai Wen Hui Pao has been attacking the group in control of the major central committee organs, People's Daily, Red Flag, and NCNA. The attackers appeared to have won the first round by early May, but the struggle is far from ended.

26. The Liberation Army Journal has been described recently as an organ of the military affairs committee of the central committee. Because of its responsibility for indoctrination in the armed forces, the general political department (which is subordinate to Teng Hsiao-ping's secretariat) may actually publish the paper. In any event, the editor in chief is an old associate of Teng's.

27. The Shanghai Wen Hui Pao is published by the East China bureau of the party. This bureau has been without an announced head since April 1965, and is quite likely being run directly by the secretariat.

28. The People's Daily and Red Flag, the party's most authoritative journals, have always been controlled by the top leadership. Their secondary, and at times defensive, role in developing the attacks on party "enemies" is significant; it indicates that the entrenched top leadership team of Mao and Liu was not behind the attacks.

29. Mao himself may not necessarily be under attack. He could, however, be under strong pressure to replace Liu with a more impressive deputy to serve during his absences.

30. Much of the vacillation apparent in People's Daily and Red Flag recently could be explained by Mao's reluctance to turn against his old comrade Liu. Or, since Mao presumably condoned the ouster of Peng Chen, a Liu protege, he may have already agreed to retire Liu, but is still undecided on his replacement.

31. Whatever the explanation, fresh disclosures of leadership turnover are expected. Since Peng's announced ouster on 3 June, the Peking press has hinted several times that there are "party overlords" and enemies in "very high positions" who will not be able to conceal themselves much longer.

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The Role of Mao Tse-tung and Others

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Mao Tse-Tung

33. Mao's personal position is most uncertain.

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His absences from public view are getting longer and longer. He did not make a single public appearance between 26 November last year and early May. On 10 May Peking announced that he recently met with a visiting Albanian delegation. He has not reappeared.

34. The meeting came at a time when diplomatic rumors and press stories that Mao was incapacitated had reached a high point. Foreign press speculation to this effect had drawn angry denials from Chinese Communist Foreign Ministry spokesmen on 26 March and 3 May.

35. Mao's grip on party affairs appeared to be weak during his absence. This is suggested by a number of things. Almost immediately after Mao went out of sight on 26 November, party newspapers began taking opposing positions on issues which led to the ouster of Peng Chen.

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36. There was a remarkable upsurge in adulatory attention to Mao as an institution in the Chinese press from December through March, and again in June as all parties tried to wrap themselves in Mao's mantle.

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37. Most signs of leadership confusion since November occurred during his long absence. He probably was incapacitated, especially in the early months of his absence, but he has been able to exercise a greater unifying influence since his return. In general, however, his position seems to have been weakened and his current role must be put down as uncertain.

Liu Shao-chi

38. The role of Liu Shao-chi, who has been Mao's deputy in the party and chosen successor since the mid-50s, is equally in question. It is difficult to see how Liu could avoid being weakened by his irresolute leadership from November through March as well as by Peng's downfall. Peng had been Liu's deputy in the party from 1949 to 1954 when Teng Hsiao-ping came in and squeezed Peng out of the inner circle. Liu was presumably at least partially responsible for Peng's comeback in recent years.

39. Liu's appearances since Peng was brought down in March and the slight but perhaps significant change in treatment of him in the Peking press suggest that his party stature has declined. From 22 March to 20 April, during a period of intense political infighting in Peking Liu was out of town. He was abroad for much of this period.

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25X1 [REDACTED] There was no reception for him on his return to Peking or even an acknowledgement that he was back. No precedent is known for this omission. Even minor officials are greeted publicly on their return from abroad. Liu did not appear with Mao at his resurfacing ceremony in May. Liu's place at Mao's right hand was taken by Teng Hsiao-ping.

40. Liu continues to appear routinely in his ceremonial role as chief of state (Chairman of the Chinese People's Republic), but press attention to him as a leader and ideological authority has dropped off since March. All top leaders are normally greatly overshadowed by the attention given to Mao, but for several years Liu, more than his colleagues, has

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been allowed to share a small part of the limelight. His work "How To Be a Good Communist" has been recommended, along with Mao's works, as ideological study material. Liu had been described as an effective leader, a reliable interpreter of Mao, and--along with Mao--an authority for domestic policies. Last winter Liu's name was cited in this manner two or three times a month, but few such references have been noted since March. (See Annex C)

Teng Hsiao-ping

41. On the surface, the three remaining men in the top power structure--Teng Hsiao-ping, Chou En-lai, and Lin Piao--appear to have remained in good shape or gained as a result of recent developments. All appeared with Mao Tse-tung in early May. Photographs of that meeting show Teng, Chou, and Lin, in that order, sitting to the right of Mao.

42. At the moment, Teng seems to be gaining. The removal of a potent rival, Peng Chen, strengthens his position. Peng's replacement as first secretary of the Peking city apparatus, North China party boss Li Hsueh-feng, probably is a protege of Teng's. Few of the key officials who dropped out of sight with Peng had important past connections with Teng, who may well be replacing them with his own loyal followers. The most important official whose status is in question is Lo Jui-ching, army chief of staff and top security chief. Lo has not appeared since 27 November and, according to diplomatic rumors in Peking, was removed in March. A likely replacement for him, at least in the security job, would be Minister of Public Security Hsieh Fu-chih, a long-time Teng man.

Chou En-lai

43. Premier Chou En-lai, China's Mikoyan in terms of flexibility, appears thus far to have managed to stay aloof from the struggle. He is a useful technician and as such has a good chance to survive.

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Lin Piao

44. Contrary to western press speculation, Defense Minister Lin Piao probably is not a contender for the top slot. His name is sometimes used to reinforce Mao's authority, but this practice goes back several years. Exhortations to study the instructions of Lin Piao as well as Mao have appeared with increasing frequency since the publication of a major article by Lin in September 1965.

45. Lin Piao may be cooperating with Teng Hsiao-ping, presumably the driving force behind the attacks. Lin's place in the army would make him a useful ally. It is unlikely that Lin himself, with his long record of illness and absence from public life, seriously aspires to the top job. This and the fact that Lin has little strength in the party may be reasons why Teng might be willing to work with him. It is possible that Mao now considers Lin Piao a suitable interim successor. If so, Teng might acquiesce, believing he could use Lin as a front man.

46. Lin has a brilliant record as a revolutionary field commander and is the only military man in the inner circle. This in itself makes him an unlikely candidate for the top post in a state that places such great stress on party primacy over the army.

The Period Just Ahead

47. Thus, on the basis of all information available to us, we believe that a struggle for Mao's mantle has already broken out and will go on until Mao finally does shuffle off and his successor is able to consolidate power. Although the struggle has developed with a rapidity which must have been startling to some in Peking, its duration and outcome are uncertain at this point of time.

48. The process could turn out to be even more disorderly than it has been so far. We cannot expect men who have submerged their personalities and ambitions for years under Mao's restraining hand to be equally willing to do so for another figure. Mao was absent for five and one-half months this past

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winter and spring and was probably ill for some part of this period. His absence seems to have reminded party officials that he will not be around forever. Signs of disarray were not long in appearing.

49. There is indeed a chance that Mao's final removal will permit differences to be brought more clearly into the open. This could lead to overt factionalism, affecting the cohesion and direction of the regime. If the struggle is protracted we may even see a recrudescence of regionalism, which traditionally appears in China when the central authority is weakened.

50. The possibility of such a series of developments would be less if the hard-driving Teng Hsiao-ping were able to bring down his major party rivals before Mao goes. He has already been instrumental in Peng Chen's downfall. In the process he has probably weakened Liu and possibly even Mao. He has not yet won all the cards. He could still be stopped if his potential victims were to write and work energetically against him. Now, however, the tide seems to be running in his favor.

51. As we see it now, the struggle among the leaders is primarily over power, not issues. Its public manifestations have been couched in terms of hard-core revolutionary purity and an absolute fidelity to the thought of Mao Tse-tung. The attackers present themselves as unswerving champions of both, willing and able to spot the first hint of deviation. Those attacked are presented in this material as having tried over a period of years to besmirch the true revolutionaries, undercut Mao's thought, and restore the hated bourgeoisie. These antiparty elements are shielded by "knuckleheaded" party leaders who cannot tell a fragrant flower from a poisonous weed.

52. Such charges and testaments of orthodoxy are, however, poor guides to what the attackers actually represent and will do if they win out. In the Soviet Union the attackers sometimes stole the very policies espoused by those they attacked and vanquished. It is too early to speculate as to what will come out of the struggle in the way of specific policy.

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53. Some special remarks can, perhaps, be made. It seems fair to say that for the duration of the struggle, the attention of the top men in Peking will be fastened on the issue of personal survival. Abrupt shifts in policy--or even in the execution of established policy--do not seem likely either at home or abroad. There is already evidence that the disarray at the top is breeding confusion at the lower levels.

54. All the contenders for the leadership are confirmed and practicing dogmatic Communists, and this is not likely to change no matter who comes out on top. There might be changes in approach, however, if only in reaction to the immobilism of Mao's declining years, which has gained the Chinese precious little at home and led to a series of setbacks abroad. Future Chinese leaders would surely wish to better this record, and could conceivably turn their attention to an effort to get the nation rolling again. The task at home will be formidable, especially since the party apparatus is likely to be damaged and made less effective by fallout from the power struggle.

55. We see no reason to expect any changes from the present implacable hostility toward the US. Nor do we see Chinese leaders moving quickly to kiss and make up with the Soviets. Basic changes, of course, are possible over the long term but the shift would take time.

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ANNEX A

CHRONOLOGY OF THE LEADERSHIP STRUGGLE
1 SEPTEMBER 1965 to MID-JUNE 1966

- Sep 65 AT A PARTY CENTRAL COMMITTEE PLENUM, MAO SAYS IT IS NECESSARY TO CRITICIZE "BOURGEOIS REACTIONARY THINKING." LIBERATION ARMY JOURNAL ON 6 JUNE 1966 IMPLIED THIS INSPIRED CURRENT STRUGGLE.
- 1 Oct Routine National Day speech by Peng Chen.
- 10 Nov SHANGHAI WEN HUI PAO (A PARTY PAPER PUBLISHED IN SHANGHAI) LABELED WU HAN'S 1961 PLAY "DISMISSAL OF HAI JUI" A "POISONOUS WEED." LATER SAID TO BE OPENING GUN IN ATTACKS AIMED AT PENG CHEN. THIS INITIAL CRITICISM, BY AN UNKNOWN WRITER YAO WEN-YUAN, CHARGED WU HAN WITH PRETTIFYING THE FEUDAL CLASS IN HIS PORTRAYAL OF HAI JUI AS A VIRTUOUS MING DYNASTY OFFICIAL WHO HAD THE PEASANTS' INTERESTS AT HEART. WU HAN WAS ACCUSED OF OPPOSING THE COMMUNES IN HIS DESCRIPTION OF HAI JUI'S EFFORTS TO GET LAND RETURNED TO THE PEASANTS.
- 12 Nov Liberation Daily (Shanghai municipal party committee organ, not the Liberation Army Journal) reprints Yao's article.
- 22 Nov Liu Shao-chi drops out of sight, does not reappear for two months.
- 24-26 Nov East China provincial committee organs reprint Yao's article.
- 26 Nov Mao, Chen Po-ta drop from sight (Chen is a politburo member, ghost writer for Mao, and editor of Red Flag.)
- 27 Nov Lo Jui-ching, army chief of staff, made his last noted appearance. It was in Shanghai.

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- 28 Nov 65 Shanghai Wen Hui Pao initiates a column for discussion, calls for "hundred flowers," i.e., open, debate.
- 29 Nov Yang Shang-kun, Mao's aide-de-camp, drops from sight.
- 29 Nov LIBERATION ARMY JOURNAL REPRINTS YAO'S 10 NOVEMBER ARTICLE, LABELS HAI JUI A "POISONOUS WEED."
- 29 Nov PEKING DAILY (ORGAN PEKING MUNICIPAL PARTY COMMITTEE) ALSO REPRINTS YAO, BUT EDITOR'S NOTE CALLS FOR "HUNDRED FLOWERS" DEBATE.
- 30 Nov PEOPLE'S DAILY (THE ORGAN OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE) MAKES HAI JUI A NATIONAL ISSUE BY REPRINTING YAO BUT IT ENDORSES PEKING DAILY'S VIEWS; EDITOR'S NOTE CALLS FOR "HUNDRED FLOWERS" DEBATE.
- 6 Dec Shanghai Wen Hui Pao prints a box-score on which papers had printed what on "Hai Jui."
- 6 Dec RED FLAG ARTICLE IMPLICITLY ENDORSES REFUSAL OF PEOPLE'S DAILY AND PEKING DAILY TO CALL HAI JUI A "POISONOUS WEED."
- 13 Dec Peking municipal party committee sponsors forum of literature students to discuss Hai Jui; Teng To, a committee official, speaks, defends Wu Han, criticizes Yao's article on Hai Jui.
- 15 Dec People's Daily presents summary of views on Hai Jui; editor's note finds weaknesses but still does not condemn it.
- 27 Dec Peking Daily publishes a self-serving criticism by Wu Han. Wu admits to unintended error but says he wished to portray true character of Hai Jui and thus prevent "right opportunists" from using him.

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- 30 Dec 65 People's Daily republishes Wu Han's self-criticism.
- 1 Jan 66 RED FLAG PUBLISHES SPEECH BY CHOU YANG, A MAO SPOKESMAN AND REGIME'S CHIEF HATCHETMAN IN CULTURAL MATTERS. ALLEGEDLY GIVEN ON 29 NOVEMBER, IT WAS ONE OF BITTEREST ATTACKS EVER MADE AGAINST INTELLECTUALS. CHOU QUOTES PENG CHEN AS AN AUTHORITY, CITES LIN PIAO'S INSTRUCTIONS AS RIGHT FOR ALL CULTURAL WORKERS, FAILS TO CALL "HAI JUI" A POISONOUS WEED.
- 7 Jan Shanghai symposium discusses Wu Han's self-criticism; some defend, most are critical. Wen Hui Pao in publishing minutes labels the self-criticism a counterattack and charges that he actually had been trying to support "right opportunists" in Hai Jui.
- 13 Jan People's Daily reprints the minutes of the symposium and the Wen Hui Pao comment.
- 21 Jan Liu Shao-chi reappears.
- 1 Feb Signed article in People's Daily charges that Wu Han, Tien Han and a third writer wrote "antiparty" plays in 1961. First antiparty charge levelled at Wu Han. Brunt of attack aimed at Tien Han, who has no connection with Peking city, was not mentioned in later Liberation Army Journal charges.
- Feb Red Flag addresses itself to Hai Jui, describes Wu Han as anti-Marxist but not as antiparty; claims he aimed at class reconciliation, not class struggle.



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27 Feb 66 Red Flag again attacks those who will not apply "class struggle" to history and will not put history in service of politics; this again is "anti-Marxist."

3 Mar Teng Hsiao-ping drops out of sight and remains out through March.

Possibly Mar Ouyang Chin, believed to be a protege of Peng Chen, replaced as first secretary of Heilungkiang Province.

18-22 Mar High Soviet officials indicate Chinese still expected to attend Soviet congress.

22 Mar Peking sends letter refusing invitation to Soviet congress.

22 Mar Liu Shao-chi and Foreign Minister Chen Yi leave Peking for Urumchi, in far western China, as first step in a foreign tour.

22 Mar Ai Ssu-chi's funeral committee: Peng Chen is chairman, Teng To a member.

24 Mar Historian Chien Po-tsan first comes under attack. Red Flag and People's Daily accuse him of taking a "bourgeois" view of history and call him the "chief anti-Marxist" historian, along with Wu Han, to have emerged in recent years. Apparently, this is an attempt to divert attention from Wu Han as the dominant culprit.

26 Mar PEKING SAYS THAT MAO IS NOT ILL.

26 Mar Liu and Chen Yi leave Urumchi for West Pakistan.

26 Mar Peng Chen makes a speech at Peking rally for visiting Japanese Communists; speech is tough, anti-Soviet.


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29 Mar 66

PENG CHEN MAKES HIS LAST APPEARANCE.



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5 Apr RED FLAG DESCRIBES HAI JUI AS "POISONOUS WEED," CHARGES THAT WU HAN WAS PROMOTING AN "IMPORTANT GENERAL" OF RIGHT OPPORTUNISM WHO HAD BEEN DISMISSED IN 1959 (FORMER DEFENSE MINISTER PENG TE-HUAI). ALSO, FOR FIRST TIME, RED FLAG DESCRIBES WU HAN AS "ANTIPARTY."

5 Apr Liberation Army Journal editorial, on politics to the fore, says "old comrades" and those in "high positions" must engage in self-criticism.

7 Apr People's Daily links Hai Jui directly to the 1959 Lushan plenum of the central committee. Paper all but explicitly charges that Hai Jui in reality represents Peng Te-huai and that Wu Han was inciting surviving members of Peng's group to try a comeback.

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ANNEX C

TREATMENT OF LIU SHAO-CHI IN THE CHINESE PRESS
SINCE NOVEMBER 1965

For several years the Chinese press and radio have been building up Liu Shao-chi as an ideological authority, an effective leader, a reliable interpreter of Mao, and Mao's deputy. This buildup has been in a low key, with usually only one or two references a month to Liu's name in this manner. No other leader besides Mao has been given this attention, however, and it has been clearly designed to groom Liu as Mao's successor.

This list of references to Liu's name is limited to those that deal with his party role and his writings, and does not include his numerous public activities as ceremonial chief of state.

The attention to Liu in his party role was heavier than usual last winter and spring, but dropped off after March.

In this listing, SCMP is an abbreviation for "Survey of China Mainland Press" published by the American Consulate General in Hong Kong. All references to "FBIS" are to the FBIS Far East Daily book.

--4 November 1965, Peking, Kuang-ming Daily: An article on agricultural middle schools stated "We have not sufficiently studied and implemented the directives of the party center, Chairman Mao and Chairman Liu, and as our experience is still inadequate, there are still many problems in our work." (SCMP 3582, 22 November 1965)

--5 December 1965, Peking, NCNA: Peking reported that a National Conference on Part-Work Part-Study Education in cities "was called under the direct leadership of the party central committee and Chairman Liu and presided over by the Ministry of Education. Chairman Liu,

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Premier Chou, and other leaders gave important instructions at the conference. The conference recalled the instructions given by the party central committee, Chairman Mao and Chairman Liu about the party's educational guideline." (SCMP 3598, 15 December 1965)

--8 December 1965, Nanking, NCNA: At a National Conference of Higher Education held in Nanking delegates "studied Chairman Mao's idea of education and Chairman Liu's instructions about enforcing two laboring systems and two educational systems and intensifying spare-time education and the CCP central committee's related documents." (SCMP 3599, 16 December 1965)

--9 December 1965, Peking, NCNA: Minister of Higher Education told a rally of young people on the 30th anniversary of the "December 9 movement" that Liu Shao-chi had organized and led the movement. The front-page of the 9 December issue of Jen-min Jih-pao headlined both Mao and Liu's role in the movement, with calligraphy of both prominently displayed. (SCMP 3597, 14 December 1965)

--18 December 1965, Peking, Liberation Army Journal: An editorial quoted Liu's How To Be A Good Communist in exhorting every member of the Communist Party, of the Communist Youth League and the PLA to emulate Wang Chieh in "absolute obedience to the Party's orders." (SCMP 3606, 29 December 1965)

--31 December 1965, Peking, People's Daily: An article by Soong Ching-ling reviewing 16 years of "liberation" quoted Liu (The Victory of Marxism-Leninism in China): "...We have in practice discovered the road that, under the prevailing conditions in our country, will lead to the gradual transition from socialist collective ownership to socialist ownership by the whole people, and to the future gradual transition from socialism to communism in the countryside." (FBIS, 5 January 1966)

--24 January 1966, Peking, Radio: A report by Hsiao Hua, director of the General Political Department of the PLA, at a PLA conference on political work quoted Liu on cadre relationship with the "masses." (FBIS, 27 January 1966)

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--3 February 1966, Canton, Yang-ch'eng Wan-pao: An article by a regimental commander in Canton tells how he studied Chairman Liu's directive requiring leading cadres to work at selected spots at the basic level and this "made his regiment technically proficient." (SCMP 3637, 14 February 1966)

--7 February 1966, Peking, NCNA, English; 10 February 1966, Peking, NCNA, English; 11 February 1966, Canton, Yang-ch'eng Wan-pao: These items dealt with the February campaign to "emulate" Chiao Yu-lu. They all mentioned the two books found under the pillow of Chiao's sickbed: Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung and Liu Shao-chi's How To Be A Good Communist. (SCMP 3639-3641, 16-18 February 1966)

--12 February 1966 Peking Radio (on the transfer of the department of philosophy of China People's University to a commune in Peking's suburbs): "Old teaching method consisted entirely of lectures, unsatisfactory. Now students work... When Ch Mao and Ch Liu gave their views in support of the work-study educational system, the department discussed the possibilities and, in the summer of 1964, started a work-study course on an experimental basis..." (FBIS, FE, 23 Feb 66)

--18 and 25 February 1966, Peking Review (issues 8 and 9): Both issues had items on Chiao Yu-lu and both included the reference to the two books found under Chiao's pillow: the Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung and Liu's How To Be A Good Communist.

--19 February 1966, Peking Radio: Peking announced that it was "equally necessary" for "leading cadres at all levels" of the army to "repeatedly study" three of Mao's works and Liu's How To Be A Good Communist.

--2 March 1966, Peking, Liberation Army Journal: This article used Liu as a source for stressing the importance of Mao's work "as highest directive for all PLA work." ... "More than 20 years ago Comrade Liu already said: 'When the revolution was directed by Mao and his thinking, it would win victories and achieve development. Whenever it was separated from the direction of Comrade Mao and his thinking, it would fail and fall back.' This is the conclusion of history: nothing else is so efficacious as the thought of Mao Tse-tung." (SCMP 3652, 8 March 1966)

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--8 April 1966, Canton, Yang-ch'eng Wan-pao: Cadres in the Central-South Bureau of the CCP referred to Liu's writing in discussions on the need to study Mao's works. (SCMP 3680, 19 April 1966)

--31 March 1966, Urumchi Radio: Foreign Minister Chen Yi spoke at a banquet, given by the Hotien CCP committee honoring the visit of Liu and Chen, at which he stated: "It is hoped that cadres at all levels and the masses will study Chairman Mao's works seriously and Chairman Liu's works, work well, produce more grain and industrial goods..." (FBIS, 4 April 1966)

--April/May 1966, Liu met Albanians in his role as Party Vice Chairman.

--May 1966, China Pictorial, both English and Chinese versions, date of publication uncertain but probably early May: The lead article was titled "Chiao Yu-lu, Good Student of Chairman Mao" and contained the reference to the two books found under Chiao's pillow: the Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung and Liu's How To Be A Good Communist.

--9 May 1966, Canton, Nan-fang Jih-pao: A hsien party committee decided that works of Mao and Liu should be studied for the next two months and be used "as weapons for thought reform." (SCMP 3702, 20 May 1966)

--18 May 1966, People's Daily carries a long article attacking Teng To, written by four Chinese People's University staffers, in which Comrade Liu Shao-chi's speech at the 1961 celebration of the 40th anniversary of the founding of the CCP is mentioned as praising Mao's works at the same time that Teng To is ridiculing one of them.

--21 May 1966, Kweiyang Radio: A work-study conference in Kweichow Province reviewed the "relevant instructions" by Mao and Liu on the educational system. (FBIS, 26 May 1966)

--2 June 1966, Central-South China regional party boss Tao Chu praises the accomplishments of the masses of people from the home villages "the two chairmen, Mao Tse-tung and Liu Shao-chi." People's Daily carries Tao's speech on the first page of its

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3 June issue. This is a mention of Liu in his ceremonial role.

--6 June 1966, People's Daily, on page 4, prints a summary of an article in the April issue of the Australian Communist Party (Marxist-Leninist) journal which is largely devoted to the value of Mao's "On Contradictions" and "On Practice" in training Communist Party members. In the last paragraph, the document is quoted as saying: "Marxism-Leninism definitely strives to create a new man, to create the kind of man spoken of by Liu Shao-chi in his How To Be A Good Communist."

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ANNEX D

Status of Chinese Communist Leaders

Normally in a Communist state the power structure equates roughly to the Central Committee. In China, however, the current central committee was formed ten years ago, and many members have become inactive for one reason or another, while some who are not central committee members have risen to positions of authority. The following list includes the men who were at the top of the apparent power structure in 1965, plus selected provincial leaders whose career have been connected to either Peng Chen or Teng Hsiao-ping.

I. LEADERS WHOSE STATUS IS IN QUESTION

Name	Positions	Last Noted Appearance as of 13 June	Number of Appearances 31 Oct 65 to date			Est. Associations, if any, with Teng or Peng	Comment
			With Teng	With Both	With Peng		
<i>Party and Security Officials</i>							
P'eng Chen	Politburo and secretariat member, one of Mao's inner circle of advisers; 1st secretary and mayor of Peking	29 Mar 66	First important target and victim of current power struggle.
Lo Jui-ch'ing	Army chief of staff; chief of secret police; party secretariat; secretary general of Military Affairs Committee of CCP-CC	27 Nov 65	A Mao protege. As one of few Chinese leaders to hold a considerable power position with a large degree of independence from General Secretary Teng, he would be, like Peng, a natural rival with Teng for the succession. He is rumored in Peking diplomatic circles to have been ousted about late March.
Lu Ting-i	Director, party propaganda department; alternate politburo member and secretariat member	Mar 66	2	3	1	...	Close to Mao. Has not been seen in Peking since 28 February; noted at undated appearances in provinces in March.
Yang Shang-k'un	Mao's personal aide and party secretariat alternate member	29 Nov 65	0	0	3	Mixed Association	Has served directly under P'eng Te-huai, Chu Te, and Mao, as well as Teng; had some connection with anti-Mao "28 Bolsheviks" in 1930s, but has worked as Mao's personal link with the secretariat since 1956.
An Tzu-wen	Director, party organization department (dealing with personnel)	25 Mar 66	0	0	1	Possibly Peng	...
Chou Yang	Deputy Director, party propaganda department	3 Jan 66	0	0	1	...	Part of Mao's brain trust since 1937, has held his present job since 1955, has been a chief spokesman for Mao's policies in the field of culture.
<i>Military Men</i>							
Hsiao Hua	Head of army's General Political Department; deputy secretary general of MAC	27 Mar 66	0	2	1	...	Has served as political commissar under Lin Piao and Yang Yung.
Nieh Jung-chen	Runs advanced weapon program; MAC Vice Chairman	1 Oct 65	Closely allied with Chou En-lai throughout his career. A former Marshal.
Yang Yung	Commander, Peking Military Region	8 Feb 66	Listed as possibly a Teng man	Has served primarily (1939-52) under Liu Po-ch'eng and his political commissar, Teng; has also served under P'eng Te-huai, Lin Piao, and Hsü Hsiang-ch'ien. As Peking commander, he presumably worked closely with P'eng Chen.
Wang Shu-sheng	Vice Minister of National Defense	20 Jan 66	Activities have been primarily military, avoiding involvement in political shakeups.
Hsiao Ching-kuang	Navy commander	23 Feb 66	Served under Lin Piao in late 1940s; went to school with Liu Shao-ch'i and probably Mao; studied in Moscow for several years.
Wu Fa-hsien	Air Force Commander	22 Mar 66	0	1	1	...	Political commissar of air force 1957-65; Deputy PC 1954-57; before that a political commissar in Kwangsi Military District. The Air Force was attacked by <i>Liberation Army Journal</i> on 20 May for its ideological problems.
Yang Ch'eng-wu	Deputy chief of staff	22 Mar 66	0	1	1	...	Deputy to Nieh Jung-chen, early 1950s; succeeded Nieh as Peking Military Region Commander (1954-1959), and as such associated with P'eng Chen; Air Defense commander in late 1950s.
Chang Ai-p'ing	Deputy Chief of Staff	27 Mar 66
Liao Han-cheng	Vice Minister, National Defense	Mar 66	0	0	1	...	Probably a P'eng Te-huai protege.
Liang Pi-yeh	Deputy Director, General Political Department, PLA	14 Feb 66	0	0	1
<i>Provincial Leaders</i>							
Liu Jen	2nd Secretary, Peking	26 Mar 66	0	0	3	Peng (entire career)	Replaced by Wu Te, 3 Jun 66.
Ou-yang Ch'in	1st Secretary, Heilungkiang	10 Feb 66	Possibly Peng	Replaced by Pan Fu-sheng, May 66.
T'an Ch'i-lung	1st Secretary, Shantung	29 Mar 66	Branch of Teng To's "black store" exposed in Shantung Province in May 66.
Chia Ch'i-yün	1st Secretary, Kweichow	5 Apr 66	Branch of "black store" exposed in Kweichow Province 5 June 66; Chia, best-known as incompetent head of State Statistical Bureau during Leap Forward, was made head of Kweichow party in summer (Jul or Aug) 1965.
Huang Ou-tung	Governor, Liaoning	6 Mar 66	Possibly Peng	...
Ch'en P'ei-hsien	1st Secretary, Shanghai	14 Feb 66	0	0	1	...	Named to succeed the late K'o Ch'ing-shih, who was possibly a Peng man, in Nov 65.
Li Pao-hua	1st Secretary, Anhwei	Apr 66	Possibly Peng	A "black store" has been identified in Anhwei.
Lin T'ieh	1st Secretary, Hopeh	24 Mar 66
Ma Ming-fang	3rd Secretary, Northeast Bureau	Mar 66	A schoolmate of Kao Kang and Hsi Chung-hsin, he also served under Teng and was probably moved into NE Bureau to help weed out Kao supporters.

H. LEADERS WHO APPEAR TO BE IN GOOD STANDING

Party and Government Officials

Name	Positions	Last Noted Appearance as of 13 June	Number of Appearances 31 Oct 65 to date			Est. Associations, if any, with Teng or Peng	Comment
			With Teng	With Both	With Peng		
<i>Party and Government Officials</i>							
Mao Tse-tung	Chairman, CCP and Politburo	May 66	1	0	0	...	As Mao's personal position of leadership can hardly be helped by the present divisive party struggle, it is possible that Mao had already lost partial control of the party machinery to Teng after a serious illness last winter.
Liu Shao-ch'i	Chairman, PRC (ceremonial chief of state), and Mao's chosen successor since 1959 as Vice Chairman, CCP and Politburo	7 Jun 66	12	2	1	...	As the long-established heir-designate to Mao, Liu has undoubtedly lost stature as the result of current party in-fighting. There is further evidence that the low-key process of grooming him for the succession virtually halted at about the time of Peng's political demise in March.
Teng Hsiao-p'ing	General Secretary, CCP; Politburo and ranking secretariat member; Vice Premier (Acting Premier in Chou's absence)	11 May 66	Occupies strategic position in placement of top personnel and transmission of party policy; third in power structure since mid-1950's, he appears to have benefitted the most from the political demise of his rival for leadership within the radical wing of the party, Peng Chen. May now play the leading role in party.
Chou En-lai	Premier; Vice Chairman, CCP and Politburo	8 Jun 66	22	5	13	...	Once the focus of loyalty for the party's "moderates," he appears so far to have gone along with, perhaps even abetted, Teng's drive. He is a useful technician and probably will survive.
Lin Piao	Minister of National Defense; Vice Chairman, CCP and Politburo; First Vice Chairman, CC Military Affairs Committee	May 66	1	0	0	...	Lin is the only leader besides Mao to have been cited as an ideological authority during the past two months in the major party journals. It is likely, however, that he is being used as little more than a front man for Teng. A former Marshal.
Li Hsien-nien	Politburo; overseer of 4 finance and trade ministries; Minister of Finance; party secretariat	13 Jun 66	9	4	5	...	An unlikely ally of Teng, Li has managed so far to stay out of obvious trouble, like Chou.
Ch'en Yi	Minister of Foreign Affairs; Politburo	9 Jun 66	8	1	5	...	In most respects closely associated with Chou, but may have profited from the purge of Jao Shu-shih and, thus, from Teng's concomitant rise. A former Marshal.
Po I-po	Director, Industry and Communications Staff Office (overseeing 24 industrial ministries); also heads State Economic Commission; Vice Premier; Alternate Politburo member	14 May 66	10	3	0	Possibly a Teng man	One of Peking's three top economic administrators, aligned with radical group during Great Leap.
T'ao Chu	Chief, Central-South Regional Bureau	2 Jun 66	As the only regional leader who seems to have built his own personal power base, T'ao would be a likely ultimate target for Teng. There has been some evidence that Central-South propaganda outlets have not kept pace in the attacks aimed at Peng Chen. As of now, however, T'ao seems to have made his temporary peace with the victors.
Li Fu-ch'un	Chairman, State Planning Commission; Politburo and secretariat member	11 May 66	11	4	0	...	Counted among the economists of the party's moderate wing.
T'an Chen-lin	Coordinator of four agriculture and forestry ministries; Politburo and secretariat member	11 May 66	5	3	3	...	Long an associate of Mao; spokesman for radical agricultural policies of Leap Forward period.
Li Ching-ch'uan	Heads Southwest Bureau of CCP; Politburo member	1 May 66	1	0	0	A Teng man	Long associated with Teng in Southwest and Szechwan, has risen rapidly as a result, made Central Committee in 1956, Politburo in 1958. Also serves as Political Commissar for Ch'eng-tu Military Region.
Li Hsueh-feng	Heads North China Bureau of CCP; now also 1st Secretary, Peking; secretariat member	11 May 66	5	1	0	Closely associated with Teng since 1940s, has now emerged as one of his chief hatchetmen	First key leader to receive new public prominence as result of current power struggle, he has replaced Peng Chen, first major purge victim, in one of his posts.
K'ang Sheng	Secretariat and alternate politburo member	11 May 66	16	5	8	...	Until 1956, reputed to be secret police boss; has since specialized in ideological work.
Liu Lan-fao	Heads Northwest Bureau of CCP; alternate party secretariat member	22 May 66	Possibly a Teng man	Liu has a background as political commissar in the military, owes his NW appointment to Teng.
Hsieh Fu-chih	Minister of Public Security, also overseeing Ministry of Internal Affairs; Vice Premier	27 May 66	6	1	2	A Teng man	Served as army political commissar in units under Teng Hsiao-p'ing in Southwest China; replaced Lo Jui-ch'ing in public security in 1959 when Lo went over to the PLA general staff; will likely replace Lo in latter capacity.
Sung Jen-ch'ung	Heads Northeast Bureau of CCP	5 May 66	Probably a Teng man	Formerly a military political commissar, later minister for atomic energy and defense production, Sung is now top party man in region which Kao Kang used to build a personal power base.
Liao Ch'eng-chih	Deputy Director, Foreign Affairs Staff Office; heads Overseas Chinese Affairs Commission	9 Jun 66	2	1	9	...	Increasingly active in foreign trade matters, especially with Japan.
Ch'en Po-ta	Alternate Politburo; Editor, Red Flag; Deputy Director, Central Committee propaganda department	10 May 66	1	1	0	...	Red Flag was slow to join the attack on Peking committee; also, an unnamed deputy director of the CCP-CC's propaganda department has been made a public target. Ch'en could be in trouble on both counts.
Wu Hsiu-ch'uan	Director, party Central Committee's International Liaison Department	11 May 66	11	0	0	...	Has specialized in Sino-Soviet and East European inter-party affairs. A strong voice in anti-revisionist propaganda.

Name	Positions	Last Noted Appearance as of 13 June	Number of Appearances 31 Oct 65 to date			Est. Associations, if any, with Teng or Peng	Comment
			With Teng	With Both	With Peng		
<i>Party and Government Officials</i>							
Liu Ning-1	Heads All-China Federation of Trade Unions; Deputy Director, Foreign Affairs Staff Office	20 May 66	12	4	15	...	Active in China's foreign relations, especially with non-Communist countries.
Chao I-min	Deputy Director, CCP International Liaison Department	2 Jun 66	7	2	5	...	Spokesman for Peking's anti-Soviet propaganda since 1962.
Lin Feng	Head, Higher Party School; long-time propagandist	8 Jun 66	9	0	6	A Possible Peng man	
Wu Leng-hsi	Editor, <i>People's Daily</i> ; Head of NCNA; deputy director, propaganda department	6 May 66	0	0	2	Listed as possible Teng man	Like Ch'en Po-ta, Wu's party role and the lag in his paper's taking up the attack make him suspect to the Teng forces, but past linking to Teng may mitigate.
Chang Chi-ch'un	Director of Culture and Education Staff Office, overseeing four ministries; deputy director, party Propaganda Department	25 Mar 66	0	0	3	Probably a Teng man	
Hu Yao-pang	1st Secretary, Young Communist League	20 Apr 66	0	0	2	Possibly a Teng man, but mixed	Perhaps associated with Liu Shao-ch'i, his status is in doubt, largely because of obvious failures of YCL.
T'ao Lu-chia	Vice Chairman, State Economic Commission	Apr 66	1	0	0	Possibly a Teng man	Transferred to SEC from 1st secretaryship in Shansi Province in 1965; has also been a secretary on North China Bureau, CCP.
Chu Te	Vice Chairman, CCP and Politburo; Chairman, NPC	1 Jun 66	9	2	9	...	Chu at 79 is pretty much out of it as far as political maneuvering within the party is concerned. A former Marshal.
Tung Pi-wu	Politburo; heads party's Control Commission; Vice Chairman of the PRC	14 May 66	1	1	0	...	One of 12 founders of CCP with Mao, Tung still sits in inner party circles, but at 80 is no longer an important active member.
Ulanfu	Alternate politburo member; 1st Secretary, Governor, Military Commander and Political Commissar in Inner Mongolia; 2nd Secretary, North China Bureau	11 May 66	3	0	1	...	Top non-Han leader in CCP, but apparently has little authority in his own right.
<i>Military Men</i>							
Ho Lung	Politburo member, vice chairman, Military Affairs Committee of CCP-CC	25 May 66	6	0	3	...	A former Marshal, is probably not as important as his posts might indicate.
Yeh Chien-ying	Member, standing committee of Military Affairs Committee	3 May 66	6	2	2	...	A Chou associate and former Marshal.
Hsü Hsiang-ch'ien	Top military figure for 40 years; member Military Affairs Committee's standing committee	5 May 66	1	0	0	...	Associated in 30s with Chang Kuo-tao, who was purged in 1938, Hsü has nevertheless remained publicly active. A former Marshal.
Hsü Kuang-ta	Vice Minister, National Defense; Commander, PLA Armored Forces	2 Jun 66	Served under P'eng Te-huai, but not implicated in 1959 purge.
P'eng Shao-hui	Deputy Chief of Staff, PLA	20 May 66	0	0	1	...	Not on Central Committee.
Wang Hsin-ting	Deputy Chief of Staff, PLA	28 Apr 66	1	0	1	Probably a Teng man	Not a Central Committee member.
Chang Tsung-hsin	Deputy Chief of Staff, PLA	3 May 66	1	0	1	...	Over 30 years service with Chu Te, Ho Lung, and P'eng Te-huai, does not appear greatly important.
Liu Chih-chien	Deputy Director, PLA's General Political Department	3 May 66	Not a Central Committee member.
Hsü Shih-yu	Vice Minister, National Defense; Commander, Nanking Military Region	20 Apr 66	Appointed to Ministry in 1959 after P'eng Te-huai purge; however, earlier associated with Chang Kuo-tao; once opposed Mao in Yanan.
<i>Provincial Leaders</i>							
Liu Chien-hsin	1st Secretary, Honan; Secretary, Central-South Bureau, CCP	May 66	Possible Teng man	Replaced Wu Chih-p'u in Honan (1960 or 62) after Wu's radical Leap Forward and commune policies there had led to agricultural disaster and peasant/militia riots.
Li Ta-chang	Secretary, Southwest Bureau, CCP; Governor, Szechwan	1 May 66	Probably a Teng man	Served apparently as trouble-shooter for the party in Kweichow Province in spring of 1965, replacing Chou Lin as 1st Secretary there until relieved himself by Chia Ch'i-yün.
Liao Chih-kao	1st Secretary, Szechwan; Secretary, Southwest Bureau, CCP	1 May 66	Possible Teng man	
Yen Hung-yen	1st Secretary, Yunnan; Political Commissar, K'un-ming MR	1 May 66	Probable Teng man	A military commander since the 1930s, Yen has served under Teng, Li Ta-chang, Li Ching-ch'uan, and Hsieh Fu-chih.
Wu Te	2nd Secretary, Peking (since 3 Jun 66)	5 Jun 66	Mixed associations, including Teng, P'eng, and police	Was 1st Secretary, Kirin, at time of his assignment to help Li Hsiieh-feng clean out Peking party machinery.
Ts'ao Ti-ch'iu	Mayor, Shanghai; Secretary, Shanghai party committee	10 Jun 66	Probable Teng man	Succeeded Ko Ch'ing-shih as mayor in Dec 65 (Ko had died in Apr); appears frequently, his last appearance being directly connected with the present "cultural revolution" (i.e., power struggle).
P'an Fu-sheng	1st Secretary, Heilungkiang (since May 66)	5 May 66	Had been 1st Secretary in Honan until accused of "right opportunism" in May 1958 and replaced by Wu Chih-p'u; later headed All-China Federation of Supply and Marketing Cooperatives. His new job, replacing Ou-yang Ch'in, a possible P'eng Chen man, suggests some connection with Teng Hsiao-p'ing.
Li Fan-wu	2nd Secretary, Heilungkiang	5 May 66	Possibly, P'eng	

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