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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY





THE SITUATION IN VIETNAM

Information as of 1600 16 June 1966

ARMY, DIA and DOS review(s) completed.

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16 June 1966

HIGHLIGHTS

The government's move with force against dissidents in Hue has thus far resulted in relatively little violence. Another North Vietnamese Army regiment has been confirmed in South Vietnam.

- I. The Military Situation in South Vietnam: Heavy fighting was reported early today between a Viet Cong battalion and a USMC reconnaissance team near Chu Lai (Para. 1). MACV confirms another North Vietnamese Army (NVA) regiment in South Vietnam (Paras. 2-3). A recently reported NVA unit was apparently destined for southern South Vietnam (Paras. 4-5). Weekly review of South Vietnam transportation routes and battle statistics (Paras. 6-7).
- II. Political Developments in South Vietnam: The government's forceful move against dissidents in Hue has been accompanied by relatively little violence thus far (Paras. 1-4). Police continued to disperse Buddhist demonstrators in Saigon today (Para. 5), as Buddhist Institute representatives told US Embassy officers that militants now determining Institute policy are determined to maintain their hard line until Premier Ky and Chief of State Thieu are deposed (Paras. 6-7).

THE Other Communist Military Days lapments

IV. Other Communist Military Developments: There is nothing of Significance to report.

16 June 1966

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V. Communist Political Developments: A French Foreign Office official has characterized as much too optimistic the recent press report that Hanoi is moving toward accepting the idea of a peaceful settlement of the war (Paras. 1-4).


ANNEX:

South Vietnamese and Viet Cong Casualties and Weapons Losses: 1962 - 31 May 1966

General Statistical Data Composite Annual Totals Viet Cong Incidents

South Vietnam: Battle Statistics

Personnel Losses--May 1966 Viet Cong Incidents--May 1966 Weapons Losses--May 1966 Chieu Hoi--May 1966 Desertions--April 1966



I. THE MILITARY SITUATION IN SOUTH VIETNAM

1. Communist forces, striking in estimated battalion-strength, launched a predawn attack today against an 18-man US Marine reconnaissance team defending an isolated hilltop observation post approximately 12 miles northwest of Chu Lai. Tactical air strikes and artillery bombardment supported the badly outnumbered Marine unit, but heavy ground fire in the vicinity of available landing zones impeded reinforcement and extraction operations for almost six hours. Preliminary results of the action indicate US losses of nine killed, 15 wounded, and two helicopters damaged and one destroyed. Enemy casualties have been placed at 43 killed.

Another PAVN Regiment in South Vietnam

2. MACV has accepted another North Vietnamese Army regiment—the 88th—in South Vietnam. The 88th has a strength of 2,000 men and is located in the triborder area of Laos, Cambodia, and South Vietnam adjacent to Kontum Province. It is the fifteenth confirmed NVA regiment to date in South Vietnam. The parent unit of the 88th Regiment is the 308th Division. If past patterns of infiltration were followed, cadre from this regiment were probably left in the DRV to form and train a new 88th Regiment.

3. Total confirmed NVA strength in South Vietnam now stands at 32,810. Another 4,200 men in various units are carried in the probable or possible categories. In addition, there are a number of units

which are not included in the above-mentioned categories. There is presently insufficient evidence on these reported units to include them in the order of battle but, if the reports are accurate, the total number of North Vietnamese troops now in South Vietnam would be well over 50,000 men.


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CURRENT OPERATIONAL STATUS OF MAJOR TRANSPORTATION ROUTES AND COASTAL RAILROAD



THE REPORT OF THE PARTY OF THE PARTY.

- One such recently reported unit is of particular interest. Two North Vietnamese soldiers captured in late May in western Pleiku Province in the vicinity of Chu Pong Mountain stated that they were members of the 95th Artillery Battalion of the 68th Artillery Regiment. They stated that their regiment was formed in October 1965 in the DRV using cadre from the 304th Division and the 351st Artillery Division. The units making up the regiment were the 95th Battalion (120-mm. mortar) and the 10th and 11th battalions (105-mm. howitzer). The 95th Battalion left North Vietnam in February 1966 and arrived in the Chu Pong area in May. did not bring their weapons with them but had them issued upon arrival. According to their ID cards, their final destination was the Central Office for South Vietnam (COSVN) in the southern part of South Vietnam (Nambe). According to MACV, this is the first instance since early 1965 indicating that infiltration groups have been destined this far south rather than Military Regions 5 or 6.
- 5. A recently received translation of a note-book captured from a member of Infiltration Group 623 which left the DRV in August 1965 indicates that this unit arrived in War Zone "D" in late 1965. This was one of the first indications that entire North Vietnamese units--probably battalions--were being sent to Nambe.

Operational Status of Major Surface Lines of Communications

There was a limited decline in the operational capability of South Vietnam's major highways during the period 4-11 June. Specifically Route 13 in Binh Duong Province, Interprovincial Route 4 in Vinh Binh Province, and Route 17 "A" in Bac Lieu Province were closed. No change was reported in the operational capability of the nation's coastal railway.

Weekly Review of South Vietnam Battle Statistics

7. The week of 4-11 June compared with the previous week of 28 May -4 June

I. Viet Cong Incidents

Time Period	At- tacks	Regimental size	Battalion size	Company size	Terrorism
28 May - 4 June	9	0	2	5	457
4-11 June	9	0	4	0	525
Time Period	Sabota	age Prop	aganda Ai	Anti- ircraft	Total Incidents
28 May – 4 June	88		16	121	691
4-11 June	49	•	11	139	733

II. Casualties

	VC/PA		GVN			
	28 May-4 June	4-11 June	28 May-4 June	4-11 June		
Killed Wounded	902	1,240	121 219	151 328		
Missing/Captured	120	166	23	30		
TOTALS	1,022	1,406	363	509		
	US	5	FREE WOF	RLD		
	28 May-4 June	4-11 June	28 May-4 June	4-11 June		
Killed Wounded	109 636	$142\\741$	14 18	6 14		
Missing/Captured	4	4	0	0		
management, corporation						
TOTALS	749	887	32	20		

III. Weapons Captured

	VC/P	PAVN	GVN					
	28 May-4 June	4-11 June	28 May-4 June	4-11 June				
Individual Crew-served	291 22	$\begin{array}{c} 413 \\ 22 \end{array}$	38 0	91 0				
CICW BOIVE								
TOTALS	313	435	38	91				

II. POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS IN SOUTH VIETNAM

Government Forces Move in Hue

- The impasse between government forces and dissident elements in Hue was broken today when police field forces from Saigon and a battalion of progovernment airborne troops began clearing away Buddhist altars which have been blocking the streets for some ten days. Buddhists protesting the removal of the altars were dispersed by tear gas, and eligible draftees among them were detained for possible induction into the armed forces. By evening (Vietnam time), government troops were in control of the main roads leading into the city after having cleared them of obstructions. Today's action followed hours of effort last night by government commanders to persuade Buddhists to remove their altars and disperse peacefully.
- Buddhist and "struggle" force elements in the city are apparently maintaining their nonviolent approach to the government's action thus far. a broadcast over the clandestine "Voice of Buddhist Salvation" today, the 1st Division Buddhist chaplain appealed to troops to remain nonviolent in their protests of the government's "repression of Buddhism." During the day one group of some 400 1st Division troops reportedly demonstrated against the government's action but dispersed without violence. Other dissident troops and Buddhists gathered at pagodas and at 1st Division headquarters in the city. Reports of a clash between local troops and the airborne battalion during the early evening hours (Vietnam time) remain unconfirmed as yet. At last report, the city was quiet at midnight (Vietnam time).
- 3. Tri Quang, continuing his hunger strike in a city hospital, reportedly is to be placed under "informal" detention by the government and will be allowed no contact with visitors.

4. Further government action will probably include completing a sweep of the city and a blockade of pagodas in which some "struggle" force leaders have reportedly taken refuge. Government force may also be applied soon in the northernmost provincial capital of Quang Tri, where "struggle" influence has also been strong.

Buddhists in Saigon

- 5. Buddhist monks today continued their efforts to organize demonstrations in the capital area for the fourth consecutive day. Police, meanwhile, continued to make arrests and set a 9 p.m. (Vietnam time) curfew in Saigon this evening. One tactic recently introduced by the Buddhists has been to block major roads leading into the city with burning piles of trash, which, according to the US Embassy, has thus far worked to the disadvantage of the Buddhists by irritating drivers stuck in rush-hour traffic.
- 6. Conversations between US Embassy officers and two Buddhist Institute leaders today tend to confirm that the militants are now determining Buddhist policy in Saigon. Although Tam Chau remains chairman of the Buddhist Institute, he has lost control over policy and has been absent from Institute proceedings for the past several days. More militant monks on an 11-man Institute policy council are determined to maintain a hard line until Ky and Thieu are deposed. In addition, the General Association of Young Monks and Nuns in Saigon has also come under the control of extremist monks, who have declared that if the Buddhist Institute council does not enforce the policy of Tri Quang, they will.
- 7. One of the Buddhist leaders also told a US Embassy officer today that "all top Institute leaders" (excluding Tam Chau) will go to Saigon city hall tomorrow and ask to be put in jail, in accordance with an earlier, militant Institute communique.

Next 1 Page(s) In Document Exempt

IV. OTHER COMMUNIST MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS

1. There is nothing of significance to report.

V. COMMUNIST POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS

- The Asian Director of the French Foreign Office, Manac'h, has characterized as "much too optimistic" the 13 June report out of Hanoi by the French Press Agency (AFP) to the effect that the idea of a peaceful solution to the Vietnam war is making headway among the North Vietnamese leaders. Manac'h stated that the AFP report did, however, tend to confirm French views that a growing sentiment of nationalism among the North Vietnamese leaders, plus the internal crisis in China, might eventually result in a less rigid attitude by Hanoi. The British consul in Hanoi has also stated his belief that the AFP report is overly optimistic. pointed out that the AFP man has only been in Hanoi a few months and is "very ambitious." He said he thought that the AFP representative does not have special access to high Hanoi officials and his reports are probably based on diplomatic corps rumors.
- 2. Manac'h expressed the opinion that the North Vietnamese Government must have been aware of the content of the AFP report because it was filed in the Hanoi post office. Since Hanoi did not refuse to allow the story to be sent, the French official reasoned, the North Vietnamese at least were not opposed to having AFP's interpretation of Hanoi's attitude on peace negotiations spread through the Western press.
- 3. The AFP report had cited certain factors which it alleged had led to the feeling in Hanoi that a "new atmosphere" had developed "within the past few days." The factors cited were: (1) All of Hanoi's allies with the exception of Peking ardently desire an early end to the Vietnam war; (2) "Reliable" sources indicate that Hanoi is now prepared to help the US "lose gracefully"; (3) Hanoi now believes it is in a position of strength and can therefore seek an end to the war without losing face; and (4) The forthcoming visit to Hanoi of former French cabinet minister Jean Sainteny could provide an opening for peace moves.

4. The first two factors cited are, of course, not new. Hanoi has long stated its position that it would help the US withdraw gracefully from South Vietnam. The Eastern European bloc nations have long made it clear that they wish the war would end. As for the third factor, there is nothing to indicate that Hanoi believes its military position is any stronger now than it was in the past. Manac'h downplayed the significance of Jean Sainteny's trip, claiming that the AFP story "exaggerated" its importance. North Vietnamese statements in recent days have indicated no change in Hanoi's insistence on US acceptance of the "four points."

South Vietnamese and Viet Cong Casualties and Weapons Losses: 1962 - 31 May 1966

1. General Statistical Data:

Time - Peri		Viet Cong Inci- dents	į	lled in ion VC	Wour ir Acti GVN	1	Capti or Mis GVN		Tot Casua GVN		Wea Los: GVN	pons ses VC
. ·Jan	1962 1963 1964 1965 1966	1825 927 1770 2206 3914	299 453 343 904 747	1294 1754 1223 2203 2648	475 908 913 1938 1557	212 318 - -	116 102 555 471 450	390 379 240 565 588	890 1463 1811 3313 2754	1896 2451 1463 2768 3236	- 457 917 1700 935	- 683 532 711 979
Feb	1966 1962 1963 1964 1965	1460 788 2078 1982 3100	244 379 374 880 1015	1205 1082 1055 1564 4727	300 656 916 1840 2095	316 303 - -	124 82 303 1394 477	353 292 289 309 508	668 1117 1593 4114 3587	1874 1677 1344 1873 5235	- 253 708 2454 1076	399 471 620 1219
Mar	1962 1963 1964 1965	1961 1282 2160 2056 3670	523 410 439 751 938	1456 1443 1456 2022 5685	737 851 1249 1633 1961	551 368 - -	140 66 345 720 466	523 222 531 394 604	1400 1327 2033 3104 3365	2530 2033 1987 2416 6289	- 467 814 1442 1393	367 532 698 1632
Apr	1962 1963 1964 1965	1933 1331 2284 1860 3235	387 506 594 591 573	1596 1660 1671 1909 2818	532 878 1584 1650 1522	292 256 - -	151 96 398 232 121	415 388 245 529 483	1070 1440 2576 2473 2216	2303 2304 1916 2438 3301	- 797 990 757 594	- 468 424 973 829
May	1962 1963 1964 1965	1825 1208 2143 2263 3566	390 435 458 1049 661	1756 1895 1135 1975 4239	509 889 987 2143 1454	352 295 - -	94 94 202 873 196	524 695 242 548 652	993 1418 1647 4065 2311	2632 2885 1377 2523 4891	463 723 1701 493	- 564 281 831 1087
- Jun	1962 1963 1964 1965	1477 1311 2062 2597	325 389 494 1211	1666 1863 1005 2208	613 772 1145 1920	413 310 - -	77 90 313 1260	441 437 230 189	1015 1251 1952 4391	2520 2609 1235 2397	580 718 2387	394 387 793
Jul	1962 1963 1964 1965	1564 1368 3045 2520	384 529 900 1160	1544 1918 1427 2980	686 1071 1812 1591	424 372 - -	212 306 510 540	542 387 219 580	1282 1906 3222 3425	2510 2677 1646 3560	- 663 1889 1375	- 374 447 882

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Time Peri		Viet Cong Inci- dents		illed in ction VC	Wou i Act GVN			tured issing VC	Tot Casua GVN	al lties VC	Wea Los GVN	
Aug	1962 1963 1964 1965	1642 1349 2580 2498	377 411 721 808	2271 1685 1449 3624	626 804 1612 1945	367 237 - -	63 352 478 287	669 482 282 606	1066 1567 2811 3040	3307 2404 1731 4230	637 1106 705	- 428 619 1074
Sep	1962 1963 1964 1965	1375 1763 3091 2473	419 672 819 655	2218 1982 1187 3485	646 1155 1759 1724	365 234 - -	59 566 737 266	446 347 230 838	1124 2393 3315 2645	3029 2563 1417 4323	- 878 1465 778	- 389 525 838
Oct	1962 1963 1964 1965	1357 1422 2827 3330	365 428 739 961	1967 1520 1617 3874	619 989 1583 2416	286 244 - -	64 398 693 225	373 236 576 660	1048 1815 3015 3602	2626 2000 2193 4534	753 1510 762	330 482 1013
Nov	1962 1963 1964 1965	1311 3182 1982 3638	410 664 574 1034	1982 2333 1747 5516	834 1554 1404 2056	368 373 - -	92 665 410 520	561 252 570 592	1336 2883 2388 3610	2911 2958 2317 6108	1595 1104 1126	- 455 515 2164
Dec	1962 1963 1964 1965	1346 1921 2504 4106	294 389 1002 1239	2203 1440 1813 4076	618 961 2053 2262	289 191 - -	78 320 1092 9 26	463 190 503 516	990 1670 4147 4427	2955 1821 2316 4592	724 2111 1728	- 546 666 1158

Composite Annual Totals

٠.	Time	VC Inci-	K	ΞΙΑ	WI	A	_	ured ssing	Tota Casua	l lties	Wear Loss	oons ses
	Period	dents	GVN	VC	GVN	VC	GVN	VC	GVN	VC	GVN	VC
* -	1962	19076	4417	21158	719 5	4235	1270	5700	12882	31093	5195	4049*
	1963	17852	5665	20575	11488	3501	3137	4307	20290	28383	8267	5397
	1964	28526	7457	16785	17017	-	6036	4157	30510	20942	14055	5881
	1965	31529	11243	35436	23118		7848	6326	42209	41762	16915	11755
* 1	* 1966	17485	3934	20117	8589	_	1710	2835	14233	22952	4491	5746

^{*}Monthly data unavailable for 1962 Weapons Losses. **Through 31 May 1966



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2. Viet Cong Incidents: 1962 - 31 May 1966

	r	Τ	1 A TT T	ACKS					
Time	Viet Cong	Small-						Propa-	Anti-
Period	Incidents	Scale	Co. Size	BN. Size	Total	Terrorism	Sabotage		Aircraft
			<u> </u>	<u> </u>				2	
196	2 1825	528	21	0	549	839	180	257	-
Jan 196		242	8	2	252	447	49	179	_
196	1770	218	2	3	223	1244	129	174	-
196		57	5	1	63	1489	272	170	212
196	3914	42	23	5	70	2490	312	299	743
196		480	20	0	500	613	137	210	_
Feb 196		181	13	1	195	433	69	91	-
196		211	3	3	217	1389	210	271	-
196		73	6	3	82	1411	267	91	131
1960	3100	50	10	9	69	1829	201	172	829
100			.=	•	500				
196		561	27	0	588	660	290	423	-
Mar 196		333	11	0	344	653	131	154	-
196		198	4	1	203	1632	158	167	-
196		80 32	3 10	3	86	1476	240	90	164
196	36 7 0	32	10	10	52	2332	212	154	920
196	2 1933	470	27	0	497	1024	220	192	_
Apr 1963		371		3	383	688	105	155	_
196		211	9 6	3	220	1738	169	157	_
196		38	ĭ	3 4	43	1407	149	96	165
196		61	7	9	77	2238	252	110	513.
				•					
196	2 1825	490	28	0	528	892	154	251	-
May 1963	3 1208	344	13	0	357	608	93	150	_
196	1 2143	170	3	2	175	418	217	140	193
196		40	7	11	58	1558	365	115	170
*196	3566	37	9	7	53	2 552	295	106	560
				_					
196		339	23	0	362	736	157	222	-
Jun 1963		398	11	1	410	652	107	142	-
196		128	10	2	140	1390	176	162	194
196	5 2597	62	1	6	69	1784	469	103	172


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
			АТТ	ACKS					
Time	Viet Cong	Small-				_		Propa-	Anti-
Period	Incidents	Scale	Co. Size	BN. Size	Total	Terrorism	Sabotage	ganda	Aircraft
1962	1564	437	10	1	448	735	158	223	_
Jul 1963		398	8	ī	407	698	80	183	_
1964	3045	166	12	7	185	2132	286	224	218
1965		42	0	6	48	1706	400	154	212
1903	2320	42	Ū	U	40	1700	400	134	212
1962	1642	368	10	0	378	885	146	233	_
Aug 1963	1349	356	11	1	368	647	113	221	_
1964		107	3	3	113	1775	315	173	204
1965		38	9	5	52	1597	349	200	300
1962		382	9	0	391	624	178	182	-
Sep 1963		483	17	3	503	889	164	207	_
1964		110	4	4	118	1938	482	178	375
1965	2473	19	7	5	31	1530	278	185	449
1962	1357	406	12	1	419	583	189	166	_
Oct 1963		359	6	Ö	365	802	105	150	_
1964		75	2	6	83	1790	480	197	277
1965		24	8	12	44	1969	415	198	704
1,00	3330	24	Ü		• •	1000	123	200	, , ,
1962	1311	411	7	3	421	614	144	132	-
Nov 1963	3182	631	11	3	645	1990	269	278	-
1964	1982	57	2	1	60	1391	247	109	175
1965	3638	26	16	10	52	2234	486	255	611
1962	1346	375	0	1	384	670	107	185	
			8	0	261	1298	111	251	-
Dec 1963		258	3		261 96	1719	318	128	243
1964		81	9	6 7	96 57				
1965	4106	32	18	,	5/	2572	442	317	718
			Comp	posite Annu	al Totals	5			
1000	10076	E 2 4 77	_	212	FACE	0075	20.60	2676	Ma Dali
1962		5247	.6	212	5465	8875	2060	2676	No Data
1963		4354	15	121	4490	9805	1396	2161	No Data
1964		1732	41	60	1833	19556	3178	2080	1879
1965		531	73	81	685	20730	4132	1974	4008
*1966	17485	222	59	40	321	11486	1272	841	3 565


*Through 31 May 1966

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
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






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GVN statistics do not difficientiate between deserters who eventually return or enlist in other government units remain AWOL, or defect to the Viet Cong. Statistics do show that 53% of the regular force desertions are among draftees who comprise 13% of the regular force strength.

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