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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
Directorate of Intelligence  
14 June 1966

INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM\*

Cuban Capability for Landing Men and Arms in Haiti

1. Cuban air and naval forces have the capability to put considerable numbers of men and amounts of materiel into Haiti quickly--by sea, air or airdrop. More than 1,000 men could be landed in a few hours' time, if the Cubans were not constrained by the need for secrecy and by the recognition that US counteraction would, at the least, prevent resupply and support of their force. In any case, we have no indication that the Cubans are considering such offensive military action.

2. Cuba's military transport fleet has a capability of airlifting about 600 troops or 60 tons of cargo in a single lift, but little training has been conducted on logistical support operations. The Cuban civilian airline has a capability of airlifting in a single airlift as many as 1,100 troops or 150 tons of materiel if its resources were pressed to the limit.

3. Altogether, Cuba has approximately 20 IL-14 (CRATE) transports, which could be used to support insurgency operations in Haiti. Each of these planes is capable of carrying up to 36 personnel or about 4,750 pounds of military cargo. The Cubans also have 35 to 45 AN-2 (COLT) short-takeoff-and-land planes capable of carrying up to 12 men or 3,000 pounds.

\*Prepared by the Office of Current Intelligence and coordinated with ONE and DD/P. Concurred in by DIA and INR.

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In addition, the Cuban Air Force has a few C-46 and C-47 transports which could be used. Cuba also has about 70 MI-4 (HOUND) cargo and troop carrier helicopters. They can carry a maximum of 16 passengers or 3,500 pounds of cargo.

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4. The Cubans have a capability to provide arms assistance by means of clandestine airdrops [redacted]

[redacted] a paratrooper school had been established at Libertad Air Base near Havana in October 1962, [redacted] classes of several hundred men were being trained there each year.

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
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5. The Cubans could hope to avoid detection of a small-scale infiltration of men and/or arms using a few of their large number of Gulf Fleet fishing vessels. In addition, the Cuban navy has about 50 coastal defense and patrol boats which could reach Haiti. The Cubans also have 3 US TACOMA class patrol escort vessels. We have no evidence that the Cubans have submarines.

6. Consideration must be given to the availability of Communist-oriented Haitian exile manpower in Cuba and their potential for directing the activities of an invasion force. A leading Haitian Communist exile in Cuba, Rene Depestre, reportedly said in January 1966 that 5,000 Haitian citizens resident in Cuba have had military service in the Cuban army or militia and that 500 of them have indicated a willingness to participate in armed action against the Duvalier regime. However, the bulk of the 5,000 are from Haitian families who were brought in originally as cane-cutters and have lived in Cuba for many years; they most probably regard themselves as Cubans rather than Haitians and probably have little desire to return to Haiti.

7. Although we have had occasional reports that Haitians have been among the groups from various Latin American countries receiving guerrilla warfare training in Cuba, we have not been able to confirm them. It is probable that some Haitians have been given this kind of training in Cuba; it is also probable that the number has been small.

8. Haiti's two Communist parties--the Party of Popular Accord (PEP) and the Popular Party of National Liberation (PPLN)--are small, lacking in discipline and poorly indoctrinated. With a maximum of 500 members and up to 2,000 fellow travelers, the Communists constitute the only internal opposition with any degree of training and organization--however primitive. Havana radio broadcasts vitriolic anti-Duvalier



propaganda to Haiti as well as ideological guidance to the Castro-oriented PPLN. The DEP is Moscow-oriented. Whether it receives financial assistance from Moscow is unknown, but it is believed to be receiving Soviet guidance via Mexico. In addition to these two parties, active Communist exile groups are based in Mexico and Europe; the leaders probably would attempt to return to Haiti should Duvalier be overthrown.

9. Communists appear to lack the membership, leadership, arms, and organization to become serious contenders in a post-Duvalier power struggle. To seize a pre-eminent position, the Communists would require the effective support either of the military, or the "Tonton Macoutes" and the militia. At the present time, there is no indication that they could attract such support. This situation could change, however, in the chaos which probably would follow Duvalier's sudden removal from power.