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INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM

WEEKLY REPORT

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SENIOR INTERDEPARTMENTAL GROUP

DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE

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1. RHODESIAN DEVELOPMENTS


Prime Minister Verwoerd last week refused to mediate between London and Salisbury, although he did say he would help set up a meeting between Smith and Wilson. Faced with the need to choose between two unpleasant alternatives--running the risk of offending Britain and the US, or giving in to their pressure and working for a change in Salisbury--Verwoerd chose the former. He probably will not obstruct private shipments of oil to Rhodesia or private South African participation in Rhodesian tobacco sales. He is doubtless banking on the US and Britain to head off, in their own self-interest, economic sanctions against South Africa. Verwoerd apparently believes that Britain's relative weakness and US commitments elsewhere preclude military intervention.

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The UN's Committee on Colonialism has adopted a resolution calling on Britain to use military force in Rhodesia. The more moderate Africans would prefer to call a Security Council meeting later in May, and Secretary General U Thant has asked that a council meeting not be held until he returns from Europe on 6 May. There is still pressure for further UN action from the Africans who doubt that anything good can come from possible British-Rhodesian talks.

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2. CYPRUS

New Turkish initiatives may soon raise the Cyprus dispute again to crisis level. The basic problem to be faced will be no different from that of previous crises over Cyprus, but Turkey's generally hardening attitude toward the US suggests that Ankara will be less receptive to US efforts to prevent a serious confrontation.

In an aide memoire delivered to us and the British last week, the Turks have indicated that they intend to issue a virtual ultimatum to Athens and Nicosia demanding the removal of economic restrictions on the Turkish Cypriot community and an end to alleged harassment of the Turkish Cypriots. The Turks further imply that they may intervene on Cyprus if their demands are rejected. US representatives in both Athens and Nicosia appear certain that such an "ultimatum" would be rejected out of hand.

The Demirel government in Ankara has been under heavy domestic pressure to take a firmer stand on Cyprus, and it has been reviewing its over-all Cyprus policy for several months. Continued Greek Cypriot military construction and the expected delivery this summer to Cyprus of Soviet SAMs from Egypt have probably added to Turkey's sense of urgency now. Makarios has also continued to inject new abrasive factors.

The Turkish military has updated contingency plans regarding Cyprus, held extensive amphibious exercises this spring, and markedly increased its naval lift capability. The US attaché in Ankara believes that Turkish military forces are in a much better state of readiness now than they were during previous crises and that plans have been completed for execution should intervention become necessary.

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3. UNITED NATIONS

The Special UN Committee on Peacekeeping Operations will resume meetings on 28 April amid a general lack of enthusiasm. Most members feel there has been no significant change in the conflict over the proper roles of the General Assembly and the Security Council in peacekeeping, and there appears to be little prospect of a break in the deadlock.

The UN's financial crisis continues, the result of the Soviet and French refusal last year to pay assessments for peacekeeping operations authorized by the General Assembly. France refused to contribute to the Congo operation and the USSR refused to contribute to the operations in the Congo and the Gaza Strip area. Both contend the Security Council has the exclusive power to authorize and finance a peacekeeping operation, although they concede the assembly can make recommendations. The Afro-Asians and most of the Western powers have held that the assembly may undertake a peacekeeping role when there is lack of unanimity among the permanent members of the Security Council.

Most members of the Peacekeeping Committee agree that these constitutional questions will not be resolved when the committee reports to the General Assembly next fall. There seems to be a general wish to avoid unnecessary controversy by concentration on the question of how to finance past debts, for which there is some hope of finding an acceptable answer. The principal methods proposed include voluntary contributions, collective responsibility and compulsory assessment, apportionment among all the members, and special arrangements among the parties involved.

U Thant is extremely concerned about the financial difficulties of the UN, especially in connection with the peacekeeping operations on Cyprus and in the Gaza area. The Scandinavian countries and Ireland are threatening to withdraw their troops unless they are reimbursed for their expenses. The Canadians also may soon be pressing for reimbursement. U Thant has taken the position, on which he has the support of many countries, that the system of voluntary financing is totally unreliable.

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4. INDIA-PAKISTAN

Recent events in India and Pakistan have further dissipated the "spirit of Tashkent" and reduced the prospect for any early normalization of relations between the two countries.

The government-inspired enthusiasm with which the Chinese Communist leaders were welcomed on their recent official visit to Pakistan, combined with the display of Chinese military equipment in Rawalpindi in late March, has reinforced Indian fears of Sino-Pakistani military collusion. New Delhi has also denounced the Pakistanis for reviving hostile propaganda against India--in violation of the Tashkent Declaration--and for refusing to negotiate solutions to economic problems which resulted from the Indo-Pakistani hostilities of last fall. A joint ministerial meeting held in early March was generally unproductive although it did result indirectly in elimination of the last problem involving withdrawal of military forces to prehostilities positions.

Pakistani spokesmen are equally critical of India's refusal to proceed with negotiations on Kashmir. They maintain that until the Indians indicate a willingness to begin meaningful discussions on this dispute, little progress will be possible on other issues between the two countries. The Ayub government, pressed by growing separatist sentiment in East Pakistan and continued hostility to the Tashkent "sell-out" in West Pakistan, is reacting angrily to repeated statements by leaders in New Delhi that Kashmir is and must remain an integral part of India.

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5. GUINEA

The majority of Touré's advisers apparently have convinced him that Guinea was becoming dangerously isolated in Africa because of his extreme support of Nkrumah following the February coup in Ghana. They also argue that hopes of extensive new Soviet support are unrealistic and that US aid should not be jeopardized. Touré has scheduled a review of economic aid and reportedly plans to reconsider the IMF stabilization proposal. If he does in fact proceed with a serious attack on Guinea's economic problems, this may ultimately contribute to reducing internal discontent. Meanwhile, the activities of antiregime Guinean exiles, supported from the neighboring Ivory Coast and from France, are still in the organizational phase and pose little immediate threat to Touré.

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