7	ム	Y	1	
_	. つ	$\mathbf{\Lambda}$	- 1	

SECRET	se 2004/07/16 : CIA-RDP79T00826A00040001863945-
	OCI No. 0363/66
	Copy No. ₹ .C

WEEKLY REPORT



THE SITUATION IN SOUTH VIETNAM

9 March 1966

INTELLIGENCE AND REPORTING SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE INTERAGENCY VIETNAM COORDINATING COMMITTEE

SECRET

25X1


GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification Approved For Release 2004/07/16: CIA-RDP79T00826A000400010039-9

THIS MATERIAL CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECT-ING THE NATIONAL DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE ESPIONAGE LAWS, TITLE 18, USC, SECTIONS 793 AND 794, THE TRANSMISSION OR REVELATION OF WHICH IN ANY MANNER TO AN UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS PROHIBITED BY LAW.

Next 2 Page(s) In Document Exempt

Approved For F	Release 2004 CBAREP79T00826A000400010039-9	25X
	THE WEEK IN PERSPECTIVE	
past week, flicted heav initiated act reporting peallied spoili mounted thragainst ship	the of the war remained intense throughout the largely as a result of allied offensives which intense to losses on the Communist forces. Viet Congrivity declined considerably from the previous eriod, possibly reflecting the impact of recenting operations. The Communists, however, see large attacks and conducted harassing actions uping south of Saigon, possibly in an effort to ain channel to the port of Saigon.	
		25X1
·		

Approved For Release 2004/07/16: CIA-RDP79T00826A000400010039-9



Next 2 Page(s) In Document Exempt

25X1

Economic Situation

- 11. New Minister of Economy Au Truong Thanh held his first press conference on 7 March. The key points announced were the release of GVN foreign exchange to the extent of US \$58 million for March and April import licensing, the promise of greater exchange to meet future demand, and a new tax on GVN-financed imports, particularly on luxury items. Thanh had previously indicated a preference for increased import duties in lieu of the increased excise taxes and import deposits which were agreed to at the Honolulu meetings.
- 12. Thanh stated that there were three major problems requiring immediate attention. First, the Saigon port must be cleared. Thanh cited previously announced steps to speed up the handling and clearance of goods through customs, the expansion of the port facilities, and increased transport from the port areas. Second, supply and demand must be balanced. He noted that better port operation and the release of the GVN exchange for March and April should help close the gap between demand and supply. Third, the distribution network should be improved.

25X1

Approved For Release 2004/67/16 . CIA-RDP79T00826A000400010039-9

The GVN would do this by freeing the sales of certain goods and establishing security stocks not only in Saigon but also in the provinces.

	Thanh	has	alreadv	

implied to US officials that, for political reasons, he may proceed more slowly in introducing drastic steps to curb inflation than he had originally contemplated.

- 14. Rice deliveries from the Mekong delta totaled 33,189 MT during February, the second month in succession in which deliveries reached a nine-year low. Deliveries improved during the first week in March and the USAID of IV Corps has estimated that the current delta crop will exceed last year's by 15 percent. The wholesale price of No. 1/25 percent broken rice has fallen from about VN \$850 per 100 kg to VN \$800/810 range. Rice merchants are afraid of selling above the official prices (which the government has tolerated up to now) as a result of the recent arrests and the death sentences given to the steel dealers who sold at higher than official prices. However, high prices are still being quoted in the delta.
- 15. Retail prices in Saigon dropped substantially in the week ending 28 February. The principal decreases were in meats and vegetables but most other items, both food and non-food, also fell. The decline in prices was reportedly due to supplies arriving in normal quantities, coupled with the market psychology induced by the appointment of the new minister of economy. The USAID Index showed retail prices three percent below the level of a week ago and four percent below the level of the previous month. Import commodity prices also fell, many of them by greater amounts than retail prices. The greatest decline in prices was in wheat flour, iron and steel mill products, and newsprint. The price of cement in Saigon has also fallen.

Approved For Release 2057/78. EFA-RDP79T00826A000400010039-9

16. On the Saigon free market, prices of US \$10 bills and \$10 MPC (scrip) inched up one piaster per dollar each to 170 and 118 respectively. Gold was still at 233, and in Hong Kong the piaster-dollar cross rate remained at 159.

B. MILITARY SITUATION

- 1. The over-all level of Communist-initiated activity for the week ending 5 March declined considerably.
- During the period there were 733 Communistinitiated incidents compared with the preceding week's 938 - about the same as the weekly average for the last half of 1965 but about 100 less than the 1966 weekly average. There were 13 attacks (all but three were small scale) and 445 incidents of terror. is in contrast to 26 and 574 respectively for the previous week. The large-scale attacks occurred in Quang Ngai, Binh Duong and Binh Tuy provinces. The kill ratio favored Free World Forces 5.9 to 1, up from the last report of 2.2 to 1. Viet Cong casualties included 1,622 killed and 193 captured; previous totals were 1,122 killed and 92 captured. South Vietnamese casualties for the reporting period were 205 killed, 382 wounded and 97 captured or missing - a total of 684 compared to 1,388 in the last reporting period. Total US casualties dropped to 819 from the 887 of the previous week; total Free World casualties also dropped - from 58 to 49. The South Vietnamese lost 296 weapons and captured 452 from the Communists; enemy losses included 35 crew-served weapons, while friendly forces lost three.

GVN/Allied Activities

- 3. Friendly activity continued at a high level for the fourth week with emphasis on search-and-destroy operations. There were more small-unit and battalion-size operations during this period, but less contacts with the enemy. However, they resulted in the highest enemy losses recorded since November 1965.
- 4. For the second straight week, over 50 percent of ARVN casualties were suffered in I Corps area, but the large number of enemy killed (925) in this area may have seriously affected enemy offensive plans. A seven-day ARVN operation in Quang Tri Province was terminated. Results were 444 enemy killed, 12 captured, and 58 weapons seized. Friendly losses were 35 killed, 185 wounded, and three missing. The most significant

25X1A

25X1A

Approved For Release 2864/67/18. CIA-RDP79T00826A000400010039-9

battle of the week occurred in Quang Ngai Province where ARVN and US troops conducted Operation UTAH/LIEN KIET. A suspected PAVN regiment was heavily engaged, and in the ensuing battle friendly losses were 113 killed (83 US, 30 ARVN) and 324 wounded (205 US, 119 ARVN). Enemy losses were 586 killed (body count), five captured, and 39 suspects taken.

On 1 March in Pleiku Province, II Corps area, timely air support and armored cavalry reinforcement turned a Viet Cong attack on a ranger battalion into an ARVN victory. Friendly losses were four killed and three wounded, while 72 VC were killed and 23 weapons captured. In the coastal area of Phu Yen Province, during Operation forces fought a sharp engagement with the VC on 4 March, bringing cumulative VC losses for the operation to 214 VC killed, 15 captured, and 54 weapons seized. Friendly losses have been 25 killed, 75 wounded, and two missing. Since 24 January, Operahas resulted in cumulation tive losses of 1,841 VC killed, 701 captured, over 2,000 suspects detained, and 303 individual and crewserved weapons seized. Friendly losses are 377 killed (245 US, 126 ARVN, 6 ROK), 484 wounded (86 US, 370 ARVN, 28 ROK) and six US missing.

- 6. In III Corps area on 5 March during Operation in Binh Duong Province, a battalion of the 3rd Brigade, US 1st Infantry Division contacted an estimated VC battalion. Another US infantry battalion was promptly helilifted as reinforcements. The VC battalion, trapped between the 1st Division battalions for almost six hours, was subjected to infantry and artillery fire, and 55 tactical air strikes. VC losses were 189 killed and five captured; friendly losses were five killed and 15 wounded.
- 7. There was no significant friendly activity in IV Corps area this week.
- 8. Free World Forces conducted 106 operations of battalion size or larger during the week, 59 of them achieving contact: 45 ARVN, two ROK, and 12 US. There were 21,905 small-unit operations, including 3,141 conducted by US forces. Of the 150 small-unit

25X1A

-8-


operations which achieved contact with the enemy, 98 were conducted by US units.

There were six B-52 Stratofortress missions flown over South Vietnam during the period 28 February to 6 March 1966; ground exploitation was scheduled to follow two of these missions. No bomb damage assessment has been received. During the period 25 Feb -3 Mar 1966 a total of 3,431 tactical air strikes and armed reconnaissance sorties were flown by US Navy, Air Force, Marine and VNAF aircraft. In addition to close air support, direct air support and interdiction missions in support of ground operations, the following damage was inflicted: 2,678 structures, 106 sampans, 44 bunkers, three bridges, three AW sites, one ammo storage area and one warehouse were destroyed; 2,051 structures, 73 sampans, 11 bunkers, five boats and one warehouse were damaged; one ford was cratered. One hundred sixty-five Viet Cong were reported as probably killed by aircraft. Four US aircraft were lost (two Marine, one Navy and one Air Force); all crew members were recovered.

Communist Activity

- 10. Communist activity in I Corps area declined although there was a two-battalion attack against the ARVN 1st Airborne Battalion about seven miles northwest of Quang Ngai City. Friendly losses were eight killed and 16 wounded; the enemy lost 151 killed. MACV attributes the decrease in activity to the friendly operations in this area.
- 11. There was no significant enemy activity in the II Corps, and the decline in incidents from that of the previous reporting period was substantial—210 to 132.
- 12. In III Corps area on 27 February, the SS LORINDA, a small cargo ship of Panamanian registry, was attacked by Viet Cong using small arms and 57-mm recoilless rifle fire approximately 30 kilometers southeast of Saigon on the Long Tao River. The ship was hit by ten 57-mm rounds and ran aground, but it was later refloated and proceeded to Saigon. On 3 March, on the same river, a self-propelled Vietnamese

Approved For Release 2004/07/16: CIA-RDP79T00826A000400010039-9 CURRENT OPERATIONAL STATUS OF MAJOR TRANSPORTATION ROUTES AND COASTAL RAILROAD



SECRET

61440 '

barge received 57-mm recoilless rifle fire which injured six crew members. On 4 March, a US lighter was fired on near the same location. The 225th VC Engineer Battalion has been reported in this general area with the mission of interdicting ship and barge traffic along the Long Tao River.

- 13. Over-all enemy activity in III Corps declined but there were two large-scale attacks reported. On 27 February in Binh Duong Province an estimated Viet Cong battalion supported by 60-mm mortars attacked the 7th ARVN Regiment. Two battalions of the VC 165th Regiment are reported to be in this area. The second large-scale attack was in Binh Tuy Province on 28 February when the Viet Cong attacked two ARVN positions simultaneously. An estimated reinforced battalion attacked the 1st Battalion of the 43rd Regiment (ARVN); friendly forces losses were 32 killed, 60 wounded, and 17 missing. Viet Cong losses were 48 killed and three Viet Cong captured. The captives claim to be from the 186th Main Force Battalion. This attack in normally quiet Binh Tuy Province is considered to be an effort by the Viet Cong to regain influence in areas where friendly forces have recently conducted operations.
- 14. There was no significant change in Viet Cong activity in IV Corps. One small-scale attack occurred in Binh Tuong Province on 28 February when two outposts were attacked. At the same time, heavy fire was placed on Tan Hiep Training Center and four adjacent villages. The attacking force was reported to have been elements of the 514th Local Force Battalion. According to one report, this battalion has received experienced cadre and has been given the mission of cutting Highway 4, west of My Tho.
- 15. National Route 1 is partially closed in Quang Tin, Quang Ngai, Binh Dinh, Phu Yen, Khanh Hoa, Ninh Thuan, Binh Thuan, Binh Tuy, and Long Khanh provinces. Route 14 is partially closed in Kontum, Pleiku, Quang Duc, Phuoc Long, and Binh Long provinces. Route 19 is closed west of Duc Co, Pleiku Province. Route 7 is closed in Phu Yen Province. Route 20 is closed in Lam Dong and Long Khanh Provinces. Route 21 is closed in eastern Darlac Province. Interprovincial Route 1 is closed in Binh Duong and Phuoc Long provinces.

16. The National Railroad is operating between Saigon and Xuan Loc, Long Khanh Province; between Song La Song, Binh Thuan Province, and Ninh Hoa, Khanh Hoa Province; and between Da Nang and Hué.

Approved For Release 20040746. BIFEP79T00826A000400010039-9

C. REVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT (Formerly Rural Construction)

- 1. The new training cycle for cadres for pacification work in the provinces under the Revolutionary Development program began at Vung Tau on 21 February with a class of nearly 4,800 trainees, Officials credit the excellent recruiting response to deferment from the draft, good pay, and the logical, but often abused, practice of returning cadres to their own provinces. The Vung Tau training site for the 59-man groups is the one used successfully in the past year to train the People's Action Teams (PATs).
- 2. The 59-man revolutionary development cadre groups are broken down into four sections. Basic security will be provided by a 33-man PAT element. Under this protection, a six-man civil affairs team, a six-man census grievance team, and a six-man new life development team will operate. The remaining eight men are either team chiefs or members of the group's small staff. All of the above elements making up the 59-man group previously existed separately. It was agreed at the recent Honolulu conference to combine the most productive aspects of previous pacification attempts to make the program more appealing to a greater cross section of the target population.
- On 4 March, Colonel Le Tuong was replaced as Binh Dinh Province chief by Colonel Tran Dinh Vong, a protege of II Corps commander General Vinh US observers fear that the change will have a deleterious effect on the II Corps national priority Pacification progress to date area in the province. in Binh Dinh has been credited largely to Colonel Tuong and his deputy, Major Nguyen Be, who is expected to leave as well. Major Be has been most effective in utilizing cadres, especially the PATs, who are considered to be the best Vietnamese units operating in the province. The national priority area in Binh Dinh will utilize 14 revolutionary development cadre groups of 65 men each instead of the 59-man standard group. In view of the change of province chiefs, the final composition of the development program may undergo further revision.

- 4. Students from the National Institute of Administration will be made available for field assignments in a few weeks, in accordance with Premier Ky's decree. The 400 trainees are at various stages in the three-year program and will be divided between the Ministry of Interior and the Ministry of Revolutionary Development.
- 5. In a statement to newsmen, Lt. General Dang Van Quang, IV Corps commander, said that, as of mid-February, 58 percent of the IV Corps population is under government control. He cited the following numbers of persons and hamlets as having fulfilled the criteria of a secured area:

	Population	Number of Hamlets
1965	2,700,000	1,515
1966 (thru mid-February)	+ 400,000	+ 331
	3,100,000	1,846

The MACV estimate for 1965 is approximately the same.

6. Returnees (Chieu Hoi). Although final figures are still being compiled in the field, the number or returnees in February set a new high, according to the US mission.

25X1 25X1

7. Refugees. Special Commissioner for Refugees Dr. Nguyen Phuc Que, although attached to the premier's office, does not have ministerial status. He has the military rank of major, and therefore is subordinate to the corp commanders and most province chiefs. The degree of support his office receives is not yet clear,

Approved For Release 2004/07/16: CIA-RDP79T00826A0004000(10039-9)

but from talks with Dr. Que and Chief of State Thieu US officials indicate that the attitude of the GVN has changed from its former narrow concept of refugee problems. The influx of displaced persons continues, as indicated in the following comparison of refugee figures for the last two reporting periods:

	Total	In Tempo- rary Shelters	Resettled	Returned to Their Villages		
20 Feb	833,875	444,549	294,902	94,424		
28 Feb	868,712	458,194	316,094	94,424		



25X1

II. DEVELOPMENTS IN THE BLOC

25X1

25X1

25X1

presence of four additional SAM sites in North Vietnam. These sites—numbers 93 through 96—are located at scattered points within the already established SAM envelope and give added depth to the DRV's air defense posture. 2. An increase in the number of operational MIG-21 Fishbed fighter aircraft also was revealed in the Hanoi area was continuing. Forty-nine large aircraft revetments now are completed at Phuc Yen, and 12 temporary revetments have been constructed on the parking apron along the taxiway. At Kep Air—

aircraft revetments now are completed at Phuc Yen, and 12 temporary revetments have been constructed on the parking apron along the taxiway. At Kep Airfield, 15 large revetments are complete and 12 are under construction. Four temporary revetments have been built on the parking apron. A runway extension effort is under way on one of Hanoi's Gia Lam Airfield's two runways.

POLITICAL SITUATION

Chinese Policy

В.

4. The Chinese Communists appear to have sent letters last month to various neutral nations reiterating Peking's opposition to a negotiated settlement of the Vietnam conflict except on Communist terms. Peking probably hopes that this tactic will help to generate

-15-

25X1

25X1

neutral-nation pressures on the US to	accept a solution
along lines sought by the Communists.	

5. Chinese intransigence on the Vietnam issue was also reflected in the latest "secret" letter to the Soviet Communist Party. The letter's major emphasis rested on the assertion that Peking no longer expects Moscow to honor its treaty commitment to China's defense, but the Chinese also boldly reiterated charges which have appeared more or less explicitly in Chinese propaganda. These are that Moscow has supported "American peace fables," tried to sow dissension between Hanoi and Peking, and passed on secret information to the US.

Soviet Objection to UN Consideration of Vietnam

6. On 1 March, in a pro forma statement, Soviet Ambassador to the UN Fedorenko "resolutely objected" to the attempts made by Security Council president for February-Japanese Ambassador Matsui--to sum up "the general sentiment" of the council members on Vietnam. The Soviet ambassador claimed that the Japanese delegate's actions violated the Council's rule of procedure, and labeled Matsui's recent letter to the Security Council members an "illegal and arbitrary act" designed to support US attempts to disguise its "widening aggression." This Soviet objection together with that of Mali and Bulgaria has probably quashed the Vietnam issue in the UN for the time being.

25X1

25X1

25X1

-16-

C. REPUBLIC OF KOREA

1. A Korean press service reported on 8 March
that Chief of State Thieu will pay a four-day visit to
South Korea on 2 May. Accompanied by Deputy Premier Co,
Foreign Minister Do, and economic adviser Ton, Thieu
reportedly plans to discuss ROK-GVN political, economic,
and military cooperation as well as the possibility of
an Asian anti-Communist summit conference.

25X1

Ε.	DIPLOMATIC	
L.	DIPLOMALIC	AFFAIDO

1. Embassy Rabat reports that there has been some annoyance within the Moroccan Government with Saigon's failure to forward letters of credence to the Vietnamese ambassador-designate even after Morocco had granted agreement and had invited him to present his credentials. Embassy Saigon urged the GVN to forward letters of credence to its ambassadors in Morocco and the Ivory Coast.

F. FREE WORLD AID


1. AUSTRALIA: Prime Minister Harold Holt announced on 8 March that the Australian military contingent in South Vietnam will be increased from 1,700 to
4,500 personnel. The battalion now in Vietnam will be
replaced by a task force which will include two infantry
battalions, a Special Air Service squadron, and other
support elements. This new commitment is very near the
limit in military manpower which Australia can contribute
short of going on a wartime footing.

25X1

- 2. REPUBLIC OF KOREA: The ROK announced on 28 February that it will send a regimental combat team and a full division, plus supporting units, to augment its forces in South Vietnam. The consent bill to send these forces was submitted to the National Assembly and formally taken up on 2 March. Debate on the measure is under way, and passage by the National Assembly is expected around 19 March. There seems little doubt that the Assembly will give its consent despite objections of the opposition parties.
- 3. FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY: On 4 March, the German chargé in Saigon formally donated two mobile dental clinics worth about US \$70,000.
- 4. JAPAN: According to a Japanese news agency, the Japanese Government decided on 1 March to donate 72,034,000 yen (about US \$200,000) in cotton fabrics, blankets, and home medicines through the Vietnam Society, a private Japanese organization.
- 5. SWEDEN: On 1 March, a National Fund Collection Drive for Vietnam was announced in Sweden. The drive has the support of the Swedish prime minister, all political party leaders, and many prominent businessmen and intellectuals and is professedly "humanitarian, nonpolitical, and impartial." The funds will be distributed to Vietnam as a whole through the Swedish Red Cross which will ensure that the money is "properly spent." Embassy Stockholm presumes that this means a three-way split between South Vietnam, North Vietnam, and the Viet Cong, as was done in September 1965 with a \$60,000 donation from the Swedish Red Cross.

SOUT Hop VI FIN AM e BAT TO 1/108/TA: TO 1/1

WEEKLY REPORT 27 FEBRUARY - 5 MARCH 1966




Approved For Release 2004/07/16: CIA-RDP79T00826A000400010039-9

SOUTH VIENDAMA BARFLEESeSTATOSTOCSIA-RDP79T00826A000400010039-9


WEEKLY REPORT 27 FEBRUARY- 5 MARCH 1966

SECRET







Viet Cong Attacks



Weapons Losses











FEBRUARY, 1966






1111;



Approved For Release 2004/07/16: CIA-RDP79T00826A000400010039-9





Annual Totals


Military Totals

1964 1,903 14,465
1965 9,472 42,552
1966 1,318 4,173

*Only thru 12 Feb

Monthly TotalsMilitary





GVN statistics do not differentiate between deserters who eventually return or enlist in other government units, remain AWOL, or defect to the Viet Cong. Statistics do show that 53% of the regular force desertions are among drafts by book of Release 2004/07/16 : CIA-RDP79T00826A000400010039-9

Approved For Release 2004/07/16: CIA-RDP79T00826A000400010039-9

SECRET

25X1

South Vietnamese and Viet Cong Casualties and Weapons Losses: 1962 - 28 February 1966

1. General Statistical Data:

Time		Viet Cong Inci- dents	i	led n ion VC	Wour Acti GVN	in	Captur or Mis GVN		Tot Casua GVN		Wea Los GVN	pons ses VC
Jan	1962 1963 1964 1965 1966	1825 927 1770 2206 3914	299 453 343 904 747	1294 1754 1223 2203 2648	475 908 913 1938 1557	212 318 - - -	116 102 555 471 450	390 379 240 565 588	890 1463 1811 3313 2754	1896 2451 1463 2768 3236	457 917 1700 935	683 532 711 979
Feb	1962 1963 1964 1965 *1966	1460 788 2078 1982 3100	244 379 374 880 1015	1205 1082 1055 1564 4727	300 656 916 1840 2095	316 303 - - -	124 82 303 1394 477	353 292 289 309 508	668 1117 1593 4114 3587	1874 1677 1344 1873 5235	253 708 2454 1076	399 471 620 1219
Mar	1962 1963 1964 1965	1961 1282 2160 2056	523 410 439 751	1456 1443 1456 2022	737 851 1249 1633	551 368 - -	140 66 345 720	523 222 531 394	1400 1327 2033 3104	2530 2033 1987 2416	467 814 1442	367 532 698
Apr	1962 1963 1964 1965	1933 1331 2284 1860	387 506 594 591	1596 1660 1671 1909	532 878 1584 1650	292 256 - -	151 96 398 232	415 388 245 529	1070 1440 2576 2473	2303 2304 1916 2438	797 990 757	468 424 973
May	1962 1963 1964 1965	1825 1208 2143 2263	390 435 458 1049	1756 1895 1135 1975	509 889 987 2143	352 295 - -	94 94 202 873	524 695 242 548	993 1418 1647 4065	2632 2885 1377 2523	463 723 1701	564 281 831
Jun	1962 1963 1964 1965	1477 1311 2062 2597	325 389 494 1211	1666 1863 1005 2208	613 772 1145 1920	413 310 -	77 90 313 1260	441 437 230 189	1015 1251 1952 4391	2520 2609 1235 2397	580 718 2387	394 387 793
- Jul	1962 1963 1964 1965	1564 1368 3045 2520	384 529 900 1160	1544 1918 1427 2980	686 1071 1812 1591	424 372 -	212 306 510 540	542 387 219 580	1282 1906 3222 3425	2510 2677 1646 3560	663 1889 1375	374 447 882

SECRET

-S1-

Approved For Release 2004/07/16/2014/RDP79T00826A000400010039-9

25X1

Time Perio	od	Viet Cong Inci- dents	Kil i: Act GVN	n	Wou: i Act GVN		Captur or Mis GVN	ed sing VC	Tota Casual GVN		Wear Loss GVN	
Aug	1962 1963 1964 1965	1642 1349 2580 2498	377 411 721 808	2271 1685 1449 3624	626 804 1612 1945	367 237 - -	63 352 478 287	669 482 282 606	1066 1567 2811 3040	3307 2404 1731 4230	637 1106 705	428 619 1074
Sep	1962 1963 1964 1965	1375 1763 3091 2473	419 672 819 655	2218 1982 1187 3485	646 1155 1759 1724	365 234 - -	59 566 737 266	446 347 230 838	1124 2393 3315 2645	3029 2563 1417 4323	878 1465 778	389 525 838
Oct	1962 1963 1964 1965	1357 1422 2827 3330	365 428 739 961	1967 1520 1617 3874	619 989 1583 2416	286 244 - -	64 398 693 225	373 236 576 660	1048 1815 3015 3602	2626 2000 2193 4534	753 1510 762	330 482 1013
Nov	1962 1963 1964 1965	1311 3182 1982 3638	410 664 574 1034	1982 2333 1747 5516	834 1554 1404 2056	368 373 - -	92 665 410 520	561 252 570 592	1336 2883 2388 3610	2911 2958 2317 6108	1595 1104 1126	455 515 2164
Dec	1962 1963 1964 1965	1346 1921 2504 4106	294 389 1002 1239	2203 1440 1813 4076	618 961 2053 2262	191 -	78 320 1092 926	463 190 503 516	990 1670 4147 4427	2955 1821 2316 4592	724 2111 1728	546 666 1158

Composite Annual Totals

Time		VC Indi-	KI.	A	W I		Captur or Mis	sing	Total Casua GVN		Weapo Losse GVN	
_	eriod	dents	GVN	VC	GVN	VC	GVN	VC	GAN	VC	3711	
- 1 1	.962 .963 .964 .965	19076 17852 28526 31529 7014	4417 5665 7457 11243 1762	21158 20575 16785 35436 7375	7195 11488 17017 23118 3652	4235 3501 - -	1270 3137 6036 7848 927	5700 4307 4157 6326 1096	12882 20290 30510 42209 6341	31093 28383 20942 41762 8471	5195 8267 14055 16915 2011	4049* 5397 5881 11755 2198

*Monthly data unavailable for 1962 Weapons Losses.
**Through 28 February 1966

, Approved For Release 2004/07/16 ; CIA-RDP79T00826A000400010039-9 $^{\sim}$

2. Viet Cong Incidents: 1962 - 28 February 1966

		ATTACKS						!	
Time Period		Small- Scale	Co. Size	BN. Size	Total	Terrorism	Sabotage	Propa- ganda	Anti- Aircraft
1062	1025	528	21	0	549	839	180	257	-
1962		242	8	2	252	447	49	179	-
Jan 1963			2	3	223	1244	129	174	-
1964		218	5	1	63	1489	272	170	212
1965		57	27	5	70	2490	312	299	743
1966	3914	42	23	5	, 0	2430			
7040	1460	480	20	0	500	613	137	210	-
1962		181	13	ĺ	195	433	69	91	-
Feb 1963			3	3	217	1389	201	271	-
1964		211	6	3 3	82	1411	267	91	131
1965		73		9	69	1829	201	172	829
*1966	3100	50	10	9	0,5	1025	201	-	
	10/1	561	27	0	588	660	290	423	-
1962		333	11	Ö	344	653	131	154	-
Mar 1963			4	ĭ	203	1632	158	167	-
1964		198	3	3	86	1476	240	90	164
1965	2056	80	3	3	00	1470	• • •		
1063	2 1933	470	27	0	497	1024	220	192	-
1962		371	9	3	383	688	105	155	-
Apr 1963	1331	211	6	3	22 0	1738	169	157	-
1964			1	4	43	1407	149	96	165
1969	1860	38	1	7	, -	1107			
1060	1825	490	28	0	528	892	154	251	-
1962		344	13	0	357	608	93	150	
May 1963	3 1208		3	2	175	1418	217	140	193
1964		170	3 7	11	58	1555	365	115	170
1969	5 2263	40	1	**	20	1555			
1066	2 1477	339	23	0	362	736	157	222	-
1962		398	11		410	652	107	142	<u>-</u>
Jun 1963			10	1 2	140	1390	176	162	194
1964		128		6	69	1784	469	103	172
196	5 2597	62	1	U		1704		-	

, Approved For Release 20049716 10 10039-9


	•	,		<u> </u>	JUILLI				
							1	T	
		T	ATTACKS			ļ		Propa-	Anti-
ime eriod	Viet Cong Incidents	Small- Scale	Co. Size	BN. Size	Total	Terrorism	Sabotage	ganda	Aircraft
eriou	<u> </u>			1	448	735	158	223	- -
1962	2 1564	437	10	1	407	698	80	183	
Jul 1963		398	8	1	185	2132	286	224	218
1964		166	12	7	48	1706	400	154	212
1965	•	42	0	6	40	1,00			
150.) 2020			•	378	885	146	233	-
1967	2 1642	368	10	0		647	113	221	<u>.</u>
		356	11	1	368		315	173	204
Aug 1963		107	3	3 5	113	1775	349	200	300
1964		38	9	5	52	1597	343		
196	55 2498	30	-				178	182	. -
		382	9	0	391	624		207	•
196			17	3	503	889	164	178	375
Sep 196	53 1763	483		4	118	1938	482		449
196	54 3091	110	4	5	31	1530	278	185	772
196	55 2473	19	7	ن					-
			1.0	1	419	583	189	166	-
196	62 1357	406	12	1	365	802	105	150	- 277
Oct 196		359	6	0	83	1790	480	197	277
196		75	2	6		1969	415	198	704
		24	8	12	44	1909			
196	15 2220					61/	144	132	-
- '-	1711	411	7	3	421	614	269	278	-
196	62 1311	631	11	3	645	1990	247	109	175
Nov 196		57	2	1	60	1391	486	255	611
196		3/	16	10	52	2234	400	233	
196	65 3638	26	10	 -			107	185	-
		a a c	8	1	384	670	107	251	_
196		375	3	ō	261	1298	111		243
Dec 196	63 1921	258			96	1719	318	128	718
190		81	9	6 7	57	2572	442	317	/10
190		32	18	/	5,				
1.	55 .=-								
				Composite	e Annual	Totals			
							2060	2676	No Data
		F247	6	212	5465	8875		2161	No Data
19	962 19076	5247	15	121	4490	9805	1396	2080	1879
19	963 17852	4354		60	1833	19556	3178		4008
	964 28526	1732	41	81	685	20730	4132	1974	1572
	965 31529	531	73		139		513	471	13/2
*10		92	33	14	133	,			

^{*}Through 28 February 1966


-S4-

Approved For Release 2004/07/16 ECHNDRATO 1826A000400R19039-9

Consumer Price Index (For Working-Class Family in Saigon)
(1959=100)



Money Supply (Millions of Piasters)



Foreign Exchange Reserves (Millions of US Dollars)

