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## WEEKLY REPORT



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# THE SITUATION IN SOUTH VIETNAM

15 December 1965

INTELLIGENCE AND REPORTING SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE INTERAGENCY  
VIETNAM COORDINATING COMMITTEE

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THE SITUATION IN SOUTH VIETNAM  
(9 December - 15 December 1965)

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
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(The Weekly Report on the Situation in South Vietnam is based on contributions from CIA, DIA, and INR; it is edited and published by CIA without final coordination.)

THE WEEK IN PERSPECTIVE

Significant combat activity occurred during the past week, with major engagements in the delta, to the north-west of Saigon, and in the northern coastal area. Most of the fighting resulted from allied initiatives, but Communist resistance has been strong. The Viet Cong, although mounting fewer attacks than the previous week, struck in greater force while sustaining a high rate of guerrilla activity and anti-aircraft firings.

Noteworthy political activity during the week centered on the Unified Buddhist Association conference in Saigon, and on charges by certain Buddhist elements in northern South Vietnam that US troops had desecrated a pagoda near Da Nang. Serious anti-American disturbances have been avoided for the present but the issue is still simmering. The government in Saigon, meanwhile, has been turning its attention to an improved pacification effort in the coming year, as well as to certain internal weaknesses in its administration and to planning for long-range governmental institutions.



I. THE SITUATION IN SOUTH VIETNAM

A. POLITICAL SITUATION

1. A threat of anti-American disturbances was raised last week by Buddhist elements, particularly in the northern part of South Vietnam. Younger monks in the Da Nang and Hué areas charged that US Marines had been involved in the desecration of a Buddhist pagoda near Da Nang which had allegedly been entered once in a search for Viet Cong guerrillas and subsequently had been deliberately damaged. On 8 May, a group of some 500 Buddhists in Da Nang demonstrated in protest, and a ranking bonze from the pagoda was reported threatening suicide in order to force a US apology and promise of restitution.

2. An investigation into the incident is underway by US authorities, but it has not yet been established that US troops were responsible. In the meantime, tempers have been calmed by prompt expressions of concern from the US Ambassador, the consulate in Da Nang, and the deputy US Marine commander. The US military are also providing assistance in efforts to repair the pagoda, and South Vietnam's I Corps commander, General Thi, has deputized the mayor of Da Nang to work with US authorities to resolve the matter. Particularly encouraging was the cooperation of officials of the Unified Buddhist Association (UBA) in Saigon--including Thich Tri Quang, whose base of influence is in I Corps--in seeking to ward off further disturbances in Hué and Da Nang while the facts in the case were investigated.

3. Although Quang and other leaders have expressed satisfaction with the gestures made by US officials, there are indications that the pagoda matter was a subject of heated discussion at the biennial internal conference of the UBA, which convened in Saigon on 12 December. Younger monks from Quang Nam reportedly were urging the UBA to demand a formal apology from the US Embassy, and were citing recent military actions around other pagodas. One press item on the meeting stated that the UBA would send a letter to the embassy deploring the pagoda desecration.



4. Reporting on the UBA conference is still fragmentary, but information on the opening session indicates that speeches made by aged supreme bonze Thich Tinh Khiet and Buddhist Institute chairman Tam Chau both called for efforts to end the fighting in South Vietnam. Khiet's speech apparently was extremely brief, and omitted many of the points included in an original peace appeal drafted for Khiet by Tri Quang, a circumstance that could have had embarrassing repercussions. Chau's speech, although a warning that Vietnam should not become a "testing ground" for a conflict of foreign ideologies, included along with the call for a peaceful solution, a statement of loyalty to the "nationalist ideology" and a rejection of foreign ideologies--presumably intended to disassociate the Buddhists from the Communist side in the conflict. The UBA conference is expected to result in the reelection of Chau as Buddhist Institute chairman, although efforts may be made by the rival Tri Quang faction to limit Chau's power.

5. Tri Quang, in a recent conversation with an embassy officer, also expressed his disapproval of the plans of the military Directorate--made public during the week--to establish an advisory council of civilians to draft a constitution. He declared that such a council would merely be a "rubber stamp" of the Directorate, and that it would be preferable either to delay the draft constitution until a national assembly could be elected, or to appoint a provisional assembly, possibly from members of the current elected provincial and municipal councils.

6. Information on recent discussions within the Directorate indicates that the generals have been concerned with ways of improving the rural construction effort, with possible personnel changes in the cabinet and certain military commands, and with the creation of either some type of "national political front" embracing responsible civilian political parties or the establishment of some form of military political party. Meanwhile, one member of the Directorate has claimed that there is a considerable morale problem among field grade and junior officers in the armed forces, stemming in large part from poor

administration. This general claimed that important reforms were needed but that Premier Ky so far had little time or inclination to tackle the problem, and that certain corps commanders were proving to be bottlenecks.

7. According to another source, Ky himself has criticized the deteriorating performance of the Special Police branch of the National Police in regard to the flow of intelligence both on the Viet Cong and on important political developments. Causes of the situation are alleged to be the political instability of the past two years, a recent reorganization in the Special Branch itself, and National Police director Colonel Lieu's apparent concentration on building his own loyal machinery. Ky reportedly has also complained to Lieu, who is a close associate of I Corps Commander Thi, about Thi's apparent willingness to permit radical students in his area to attack the government. According to a source in Hué, Thi intends to permit the recently suspended anti-American, anti-government student journal, Sinh Vien Hue, to publish clandestinely.

8. The efforts of the cabinet minister for youth and sports, Nguyen Tan Hong, to establish a National Youth Council have reportedly encountered widespread resistance among Saigon students, including both Catholic and Buddhist organizations. These groups reportedly feel that Hong's proposals for establishing the council represent blatant efforts at government control.

#### Economic Situation

9. After several weeks' stability, the black market rate for gold and currency rose: dollars and MPCs (scrip) each up 3 piasters to 167 and 126 respectively, and gold up 1 piaster to 216. The Hong Kong rate also increased from 150 to 156.

10. Retail food prices generally eased. However, wholesale and retail price ceilings on pork were instituted, apparently because of pressure for the regulation of hog prices from areas outside Saigon where prices had risen significantly in recent weeks. One result of the price control

has been the virtual cessation of pork deliveries to Saigon, with indications that a black market is developing. The pork shortage reportedly was the cause of an armed threat by the Saigon prefect against Nguyen Hoang Cuong, assistant to the minister of economy and finance. (As reported earlier this month, Cuong has submitted his resignation.) Minister of National Economy and Finance Ton is insisting on an audience with Premier Ky to demand action against the Saigon prefect. Ton has threatened to resign if he does not receive satisfaction.

11. At recent sessions conducted at III Corps headquarters to review the 1966 rural construction budgets for the Hop Tac provinces around Saigon, it was emphasized that the budgets cover only projects in new hamlets or in hamlets to be consolidated. In areas already pacified, the rural construction program must be supported by central funds from other than Ministry of Reconstruction, or by local funds. USOM and GVN officials have signed the Hop Tac provincial budgets, and have announced that funds will be made available as of 1 January 1965.

12. Looking at general economic developments in 1966, dire warnings have been sounded by Governor Hanh of the National Bank and by Mr. Harold Dunkerly, a British economist who has been consulting with Hanh on measures to cope with the inflation. Citing an increase in the Saigon price index of 50 percent over the last year and an increase in the money supply of 55 percent, Hanh attributed the causes of inflation--on the supply side--to transportation bottlenecks, decreased agricultural output, and a shortage of import commodities, and--on the demand side--to the increased GVN budget deficit and increased foreign troop spending. Hanh believes that the prospects are worse for 1966 and forecasts that little surplus production capacity will remain in the economy, that the GVN budget deficit will increase to 25 billion piasters, and that US and other foreign spending will rise to 25-30 billion piasters. The combined effect will be an increase in net purchasing power by an amount equal to one third

of Vietnam's gross national product. Hanh and Dunkerly have raised the specter of China's economic and political collapse in the 1940s, and have called for several US-GVN emergency steps. The US Mission comments that the Dunkerly-Hanh view is unduly pessimistic in view of the magnitude of external resources that will be available to Vietnam in 1966 and of the efforts already under way to combat the causes of inflation. The mission will comment further on the prospects for 1966, but notes that should the report become public, it would generate a sharply adverse reaction in the business community.

B. MILITARY SITUATION

1. Significant military activity this week resulted from allied initiatives, but Communist reactions have been strong. Although there were fewer Viet Cong attacks than last week, more were mounted by battalion-size forces. Major engagements took place in areas controlled by the Viet Cong; PAVN regiments were not engaged in the major battles last week and may be in a regroupment and resupply phase in preparation for renewed efforts.

2. Statistically, Viet Cong activity increased during the period 5 to 11 December with 975 incidents reported, the second highest weekly total of the year. Although this was a sharp rise from last week's 757, the increase was largely due to the highest weekly total of anti-aircraft fire incidents. As usual, most Viet Cong activity consisted of terrorist acts against the population. The period was more costly to the Viet Cong, who lost at least 976 killed and 106 captured, compared to 640 and 58 for the previous week. GVN casualty totals--minus those suffered in the prolonged operation in Quang Tin Province--show 196 killed, 456 wounded, and 193 missing, a seeming improvement over the previous week's 345, 574, and 367. The US casualty total of 66 killed, 216 wounded, and 7 missing compares unfavorably with the previous week's figures of 26, 170, and 2. One ROK soldier was killed and one Australian wounded this week. The weapons-loss ratio favored the Viet Cong again this week, with 395 weapons lost and only 230 captured.

Allied Activities

3. Large-unit contacts were more frequent during the week of 5 to 11 December, and major ground actions took place over the weekend in I, III, and IV corps tactical zones (CTZ). Of 22,003 small-unit actions (including 2,438 US), 262 resulted in contact, and 180 of these contacts were made by US elements. Significant reactions occurred when friendly forces entered several Viet Cong - controlled areas.

4. Early in the week, during a brigade-size operation near the Michelin rubber plantation in Binh Duong Province, a US battalion moving along a jungle

trail was struck by a Viet Cong battalion. The enemy opened fire through narrow apertures cut out of the underbrush and detectable only from the prone position. The Viet Cong in this action were healthy, well-armed and -equipped, and apparently well trained. Five tear-gas grenades of US manufacture were used against American troops. Results of this engagement favored the US: the Viet Cong lost 236 killed, while US casualties were 35 killed, 96 wounded, and 3 missing.

5. A major ARVN - US Marine operation in the Viet Cong - dominated Quang Nam - Quang Tin border area has resulted in heavy casualties on both sides. One ARVN Ranger battalion was left marginally combat effective, and an ARVN infantry battalion was reduced to fighting in small, scattered elements. Cumulative casualties are: Viet Cong, 213 killed (including 28 confirmed killed by air action) and 82 captured; ARVN, 120 killed (6 US advisers), 139 wounded (2 US, one Australian), 180 missing, and 250 weapons lost; and US Marines, 33 killed, 106 wounded, and 1 missing.

6. In other significant actions, an ARVN division in Vinh Long Province killed 52 members of a Viet Cong battalion while losing only 3 killed and 22 wounded. Another ARVN division operation in Dinh Tuong Province concentrated more than six battalions against a Viet Cong battalion, killing 148 and capturing 10 while suffering only 15 killed and 63 wounded (3 US). In Go Cong Province of the IV CTZ, an ARVN multibattalion force surrounded an estimated Viet Cong battalion. Results of this battle were 181 Viet Cong killed and 10 captured, against friendly casualties of 16 killed and 66 wounded (3 US). A ROK Capital Division operation killed 28 Viet Cong and captured 8, with no friendly casualties.

7. Sea, river, and coastal force units searched 3,490 junks and 13,717 persons, with coastal force elements performing the majority of these operations. No detainees were confirmed as Viet Cong. Interrogations of fishermen reveal that the Viet Cong are placing greater reliance on overland transport of materiel because of the effectiveness of coastal patrols. The presence of large numbers of US and GVN troops in coastal enclaves probably contributes to this situation.

Increased Viet Cong river-mining activity has been noted, however,

8. Nine B-52 Stratofortress strikes were flown during the week in Pleiku, Tay Ninh, Binh Duong, and Quang Tin provinces, bringing the total number of such missions to 114.


#### Communist Activities

9. The major Viet Cong reaction this week occurred in Quang Tin Province, I CTZ, where on 8 and 9 December an ARVN Ranger battalion and a battalion of the 5th Regiment (ARVN) were engaged by a multi-battalion Viet Cong force. The ARVN Ranger battalion was hit first by the Viet Cong on the afternoon of 8 December, and was quickly overrun. The following day, the Viet Cong attacked the battalion of the 5th Regiment (ARVN), which then retreated to the south and broke into several smaller groups that were subsequently defeated on a piecemeal basis. US Marines entered the area to reinforce the ARVN units. The enemy units encountered in this operation remain unidentified. Elsewhere in the I CTZ, there was a moderate increase in Viet Cong activity but a decline in its intensity.

10. One major attack was mounted in the II CTZ during the past week, an assault by an estimated battalion on 4 December against an outpost in Phu Yen Province. In eastern Binh Dinh Province on 7 and 8 December, anti-American demonstrations, probably Viet Cong inspired, were conducted in protest against air strikes, artillery fire, and the American presence in South Vietnam. In the western highland regions, Communist forces may be resupplying and regrouping. For the sixth consecutive week, the II CTZ incident total (138) was remarkably low, and only ten percent (59) of all terroristic incidents occurred there.

11. In the III CTZ, Viet Cong - initiated activity remained at the same high level as during the previous week. Major actions occurred on 8 and 11 December when an estimated Viet Cong battalion mounted two attacks on a post in southern Bien Hoa Province. The post was overrun during the 11 December attack. An outpost in Long Khanh Province was also attacked, but without

# CURRENT OPERATIONAL STATUS OF MAJOR TRANSPORTATION ROUTES AND COASTAL RAILROAD



Information as of 11 December 1965

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significant results. In Hau Nghia Province, a battalion of the ARVN 49th Regiment was ambushed on 5 December by an unknown Viet Cong force, and suffered 14 killed, 21 wounded, and 2 missing; 19 weapons were also lost.

12. Terrorist activities in the Saigon area continued during the week. A female Viet Cong threw a grenade into a police station, causing the wounding of two civilians; the woman was killed. Two police stations in Cholon, the predominantly Chinese section of the capital, and an outpost near the petroleum storage area south of the city were also attacked.

13. In the IV CTZ, there was an over-all increase in Viet Cong incidents, and harassment continued against lightly defended, isolated posts. In Vinh Binh Province, an estimated Viet Cong battalion attacked a post defended by one regional force company. In Kien Giang Province, a Communist force estimated at two companies struck a regional forces post. An estimated two platoons of Viet Cong attacked a Buddhist temple in Binh Tuong Province, where 50 laborers from a canal project were sleeping. Twenty-three workers were killed and eight were wounded in the attack.

14. National Route 1 is reported closed in Quang Ngai, Binh Dinh, Phu Yen, Binh Thuan, Binh Tuy, and Hau Nghia provinces. Route 9 is closed in Quang Tri Province. Route 14 is closed in Kontum, Pleiku, Quang Duc, Phuoc Long, and Binh Long provinces. Route 19 is closed west of Pleiku city. Route 7 is closed east of Cheo Reo, Phu Bon Province. Route 11 is closed in Tuyen Duc Province.

15. The national railroad is closed between Xuan Loc in Long Khanh Province and Song La Song in Binh Thuan Province, and between Ninh Hoa in Thanh Hoa Province and Da Nang.

C. RURAL CONSTRUCTION

1. At the 10 December joint South Vietnam/US Mission Council Meeting, General Nguyen Duc Thang, minister of rural construction, presented his views on rural construction, representing the consensus arrived at in an 8 December meeting of the Vietnamese Rural Construction Council that was chaired by Premier Ky and attended by all four corps commanders. Thang's presentation included a discussion of the concept of rural construction, the problems of administrative support for rural construction cadre; and the 1966 rural construction plans.

2. As presented by Minister Thang, the concept of rural construction includes three phases: military clearing, pacification, and development. The objective of Phase One is to destroy or drive out local and main force Viet Cong military units, and is the primary responsibility of the Ministry of Defense. Phase Two--destroying the Viet Cong political and military infrastructure and building up a GVN infrastructure to replace it--is the primary responsibility of the ministries of Interior and Rural Construction. Phase Three covers the implementation of GVN rural policy to meet the economic, political, and social aspirations of the rural population, and is the responsibility of every ministry.

3. Thang stated that contrary to views often expressed by both Vietnamese and Americans that "pacification is impossible"--because village manpower pools are exhausted and because people are war weary and lack confidence in the GVN--he remains personally convinced that pacification is indeed feasible, and that now is the time to go ahead. For the first time, according to Thang, the GVN has well-trained pacification cadres, sympathetic and "correct" toward the people, and willing to stay in the villages long enough to get the job done. Thang is confident that the GVN now has the means to follow up and destroy Viet Cong village infrastructures, and to remove and replace corrupt local GVN officials.

4. Concerning the question of administrative support for rural construction cadre, the Rural Construction Council, according to Thang, has proposed that

relevant US agencies--specifically those supporting PAT, APA, and Census Grievance Cadre programs--extend their support to other rural construction cadres, which the Ministry of Rural Construction will, in turn, screen and then use. The GVN currently has 20,000 rural construction cadre, with 30,000 to 36,000 expected by the end of 1966.

5. With respect to provincial rural construction plans for 1966, Thang indicated that a just-completed survey of six provinces in the Hop Tac area has revealed that one million people, or 47 percent, of the Hop Tac area population are GVN controlled (excluding Saigon). The GVN has allocated \$VN 238,000,000 to these provinces for 1966, with the objective of bringing 1.5 million people, or 71 percent, of the Hop Tac population under GVN control by year's end. All province chiefs have been required to pledge that they would achieve at least 75 percent of their 1966 rural construction programs.

6. In addition, the GVN will employ 338 pacification cadre teams (80 men each) to pacify 134 new hamlets and to consolidate 204 existing hamlets in the Hop Tac area. A 40-man Peoples Action Team (PAT) will form the core of the 80-man pacification cadre team, which will also include a 12-man civil affairs group (responsible for interim leadership of the area, representing GVN administration), a 12-man security force (responsible for screening the villagers, rooting out Viet Cong infrastructures, and discovering the aspirations of the population), and a 12-man development unit (responsible for bringing government services to the people). The remaining four men constitute the command group, and will be either experienced cadre or military officers. The cadre teams will be reinforced by 39 companies of regional forces troops.

7. Official GVN statistics indicate that 562 Chieu Hoi ralliers returned to government control during the past week compared to the previous week's total of 429. Increases were noted in the number of military returnees and civil refugees--376 and 129 respectively, in contrast to the previous week's totals of 311 and 37. Communist political cadre ralliers again declined, 55 this week against 78 last week. The number of draft dodger/deserter returnees continued at a low level, two this week following last week's total of three.

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8. [REDACTED] has forwarded a report alleging that Viet Cong soldiers in Khanh Hoa Province are becoming disheartened by the prospect of increased pressure from government and US forces. Viet Cong desertions in the province have increased since October, according to South Vietnamese reports.

9. While the alleged rise in desertions cannot be confirmed, the over-all rate of defection from the Viet Cong to the government seems to be staying at roughly the level it reached in November, about 7.5 per thousand. In the first 11 days of December some 550 Viet Cong returned to the government, a rate--if it continues for the rest of the month--of eight per thousand. This compares to the rate of about 2.5 per thousand in the first three months of this year, and of about five per thousand from June through October.

10. The latest refugee statistics released by the US Embassy in Saigon show an over-all rise to 730,000, but indicate a decline to 453,000 of those in temporary camps. Among the new refugees are 3,000 former settlers in the Vo Dat valley, a result of the joint US-ARVN rice-harvesting operation in Binh Tuy Province, and 750 refugees in Binh Long Province. The cumulative total for 1965 is now considered unlikely to exceed 850,000.



EFFECTS OF THE NORTHEAST MONSOON ON U S AIR OPERATIONS OVER  
NORTH AND SOUTH VIETNAM AND LAOS

## II. DEVELOPMENTS IN THE BLOC

1. US air operations over North Vietnam during the past week were hampered by poor flying weather resulting from the Northeast Monsoon. This seasonal phenomenon will prevail over all of North Vietnam and the northern portion of South Vietnam from now until February, restricting air operations for more than 60 percent of the time. During this period, extensive low cloudiness and showers will dominate the weather of the eastern lowlands and the windward slopes of northern and central Vietnam.

2. The poor flying weather has been responsible for a recent increase in the number of armed reconnaissance missions being flown over the DRV. Strike aircraft diverted from their primary target because of weather are given the secondary mission of armed reconnaissance.

3. Asian Communist propaganda was highlighted this week by reactions to recent statements in Washington about the situation in Vietnam. In a broadcast on 10 December, Hanoi took sharp issue with the suggestion made by Secretary of State Rusk on 1 December that a second pause in the air strikes against North Vietnam could be possible. In the broadcast, Hanoi laid the propaganda groundwork for discrediting any such US action, terming the possibility of a second pause part of a US effort designed only to "hoodwink" world public opinion. Hanoi declared the first pause had been "shameful trickery" that had "failed miserably," and asserted in regard to a second pause that the US could not harbor any hope of the Vietnamese people being taken in by such a "shopworn trick."

4. The North Vietnamese criticism of this possible US course of action probably stems from a fear that a negative response on their part to a suspension might undercut the carefully nurtured image of "reasonableness" toward ending the war that Hanoi has been fostering for several months. The broadcast concluded by insisting that the US must not only recognize the DRV's "reasonable" position as outlined in the "four-points," but must prove by concrete deeds that it accepts them.

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5. Communist China's response to alleged US "propaganda" for Vietnam peace talks came in the form of a People's Daily editorial on 14 December which reiterated Peking's promise to give the DRV whatever was "required" to carry on the war. This editorial--the first major Chinese pronouncement on assistance to North Vietnam since early October--also appeared as a reply to various recent statements of US determination to push ahead with plans to increase military pressure on the Communists. Alleging that Secretary Rusk had said on 9 December that Peking "must face the problem of confrontation with the US," People's Daily asserted that the Chinese people "were not frightened" by this and would support the Vietnamese "as much and as long" as was necessary.

6. The editorial made no repetition of earlier promises to send "volunteers" to Vietnam if they are called for, and skirted the entire question of direct Chinese involvement in the hostilities. The editorial did take note of the possibility of another pause in the US air attacks on North Vietnam, however, declaring that such a move would be nothing more than a scheme to facilitate further US escalation of the war. It concluded by restating the standard Chinese position on negotiations.

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### III. THIRD COUNTRY DEVELOPMENTS

#### A. CAMBODIA

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1. [REDACTED] Khmer Serei leader Son Ngoc Thanh met with Premier Ky and Minister of Defense Co in early December to discuss the transportation of Khmer Serei troops to Thailand. Ky reportedly told Thanh that the GVN's support of the Khmer Serei remains firm, and agreed to finance and arm eight Khmer Serei battalions. [REDACTED]

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25X1C

[REDACTED], it was agreed after subsequent meetings between Thanh and the GVN's Central Intelligence Organization (CIO) that a Vietnamese Navy ship would be at the disposal of the Khmer Serei, and that this ship would leave Saigon on 20 December to transport a 300-man force to Bangkok. Fifty additional personnel, trained in espionage and sabotage by the CIO, will accompany the force and participate in an attack into northwest Cambodia before the end of this year. There have been other reports indicating that the Khmer Serei was planning some action in the near future. The report of Ky's assistance is at variance with his assurances to the US Embassy in Saigon that the GVN would stop supporting the Khmer Serei.

2. [REDACTED] who obtained the information from an RKG official, the Cambodian Government has agreed to sell to the Viet Cong 5,000 tons of rice from the coming harvest. The rice is to be paid for by Communist China in US dollars. The Viet Cong also wish to purchase salt and additional rice. The Cambodians will reportedly make another donation of medicines to the Viet Cong.

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3. On 7 December Cambodian Premier Kantol asked the International Control Commission (ICC) at Phnom Penh "to consider the possibility of conducting a strict control over the port of Sihanoukville," ostensibly to counter Western press accusations that the port was being used to supply arms to the Viet Cong. In a public speech on 13 December, Prince Sihanouk expanded the scope of the invitation by stating that in addition to the port, the ICC could also "control... the transportation of arms received for our military camps, the camps themselves, our general staffs, our logistics centers, our account books, and so forth."



4. Representatives of the three ICC nations-- India, Canada, and Poland--made a preliminary investigation in Sihanoukville on 8 December and were invited to inspect manifests of ships calling at the port since October.

#### B. AMBASSADORIAL APPOINTMENTS

1. On 8 December, the Directorate apparently approved the appointment of Bui Diem, presently special assistant in the premier's office, as ambassador to Japan to replace Nguyen Duy Quang. Elements within the GVN military, including I Corps Commander Thi, have been seeking to remove Diem from the premier's office. However, there are indications that Premier Ky is reluctant to release Diem until a replacement can be found.

2. At the 8 December meeting, the Directorate also appears to have approved appointment of Tran Van Tuyen, deputy prime minister in the Quat government, to replace Vu Van Mau as Vietnamese ambassador to London. Mau recently resigned.

#### C. SWITZERLAND

The GVN Foreign Ministry supplied the US Embassy with a copy of an aide-memoire to the Swiss reopening the question of GVN representation in Switzerland. The aide-memoire reviewed the past history of Swiss-GVN discussions on this subject, and attributed the GVN's failure to establish a legation solely to a shortage of personnel. Secretary-General Think of the Foreign Ministry asked that the US attempt to facilitate Swiss agreement, but Ambassador Porter suggested that the Swiss be given more time in which to respond to the aide-memoire.

#### D. FREE WORLD ASSISTANCE

1. An increasing number of Free World nations have indicated interest in providing medical and public health assistance to the GVN. Countries involved in developments in this area during the past week included Spain, Canada, Iran, and Great Britain.

2. SPAIN. The Spanish Army has indicated interest in sending a 12-man medical team to Go Cong Province in the delta.

3. CANADA. The Canadian Government is making arrangements for establishing a rehabilitation center staffed by 22 physicians and nurses, the physicians to be rotated on a six-month basis.




4. IRAN. The head of the Iranian Red Lion and Sun Society stated that its medical team was now ready to go to Vietnam.

5. GREAT BRITAIN. Prime Minister Wilson told Parliament that a UK medical representative was now in Vietnam studying the possibility of sending an ambulance unit to aid refugees.

## SOUTH VIETNAM BATTLE STATISTICS, 1965

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
WEEKLY REPORT  
4-11 DECEMBER




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**US COMBAT CASUALTIES IN VIETNAM  
INCLUDING NORTH VIETNAM**



**VIET CONG ATTACKS**



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