

**SECRET**  
NO FOREIGN DISSEM  
BACKGROUND USE ONLY

OCI No. 0649/65

Copy No. 110

## WEEKLY REPORT



DIA, DOS Declassification/Release Instructions on File

# THE SITUATION IN SOUTH VIETNAM

8 December 1965

**INTELLIGENCE AND REPORTING SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE INTERAGENCY  
VIETNAM COORDINATING COMMITTEE**

**NO FOREIGN DISSEM  
SECRET**

THIS MATERIAL CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECT-  
ING THE NATIONAL DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES  
WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE ESPIONAGE LAWS,  
TITLE 18, USC, SECTIONS 793 AND 794, THE TRANSMIS-  
SION OR REVELATION OF WHICH IN ANY MANNER TO  
AN UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS PROHIBITED BY LAW.

OCI No. 0649/65

Published by the Directorate of Intelligence  
Central Intelligence Agency

THE SITUATION IN SOUTH VIETNAM

(2 December - 8 December 1965)

C O N T E N T S

	<u>Page</u>
THE WEEK IN PERSPECTIVE	iv
Map, South Vietnam, facing page	1
I. THE SITUATION IN SOUTH VIETNAM	1
A. POLITICAL SITUATION	1

Directorate continues plans for eventual restoration of civilian government (p. 1); Ky and other ranking generals doubt advisability of any early moves, however (p. 1); Buddhist leader Tri Quang drafts appeal for end of war (p. 2); Quang's statement could well have considerable impact on Buddhists (p. 2); Buddhist and Catholic journals reacting to increased US presence (p. 3); Catholics again express dissatisfaction with present government (p. 3); Former general Tran Van Don currently active in regionalist circles (p. 3); VC radio offers Christmas ceasefire (p. 4); Construction materials pace over-all price increases (p. 4); Rice stocks and deliveries are discussed (p. 5).

	<u>Page</u>
B. MILITARY SITUATION	6
<p>Weekly statistics reflect over-all decline in activity (p. 6); US First Division continues probe for VC in Binh Duong Province (p. 6); Allied operation protects rice harvest in Binh Tuy (p. 6); Friendly forces conduct 84 large-scale operations (p. 7); VC continue efforts to disrupt Saigon maritime traffic (p. 7); Minor Communist actions in the four corps areas (p. 8); VC terrorist attack on US quarters in Saigon (p. 8); Current status of major transportation routes (p. 9).</p>	
Map, Transportation Routes, facing page	9
C. RURAL CONSTRUCTION	10
<p>Embassy notes factors having adverse effect on popular attitudes (p. 10); II Corps psywar conference ends successfully (p. 10); Psyops seminars held in IV Corps (p. 11); Chieu Hoi ralliers show decline, especially in military category (p. 11).</p>	
Map, North Vietnam, facing page	12
II. DEVELOPMENTS IN THE BLOC	12
<p>DRV economic delegation concludes Peking visit (p. 12); Chinese switch from grants to loans may explain cautious announcement of new agreements (p. 12); Chinese again deny impeding Soviet aid to North Vietnam (p. 12); Chinese letter appears as effort to regain lost prestige in Communist circles (p. 13).</p>	

III. THIRD COUNTRY DEVELOPMENTS

14

Cambodia asks ICC port control to disprove allegations of VC assistance (p. 14); Buddhist leader Chau concludes visit to Korea (p. 14); GVN offers London post to former Quat government official Tran Van Tuyen (p. 14); GVN moves to implement observance of Geneva prisoner-of-war conventions (p. 15); ICRC to offer medical teams to DRV, GVN, and Liberation Front (p. 15); Free world aid from Japan and Luxembourg (p. 15).


ANNEX: South Vietnam Battle Statistics (Weekly)  
US Combat Casualties in Vietnam (Weekly)  
South Vietnam Battle Statistics--Incidents (Monthly)  
South Vietnam Battle Statistics--Weapons Losses (Monthly)  
South Vietnam Battle Statistics--Personnel Losses (Monthly)  
Table 1. General Statistical Data  
Table 2. Viet Cong Incidents

(The Weekly Report on the Situation in South Vietnam is based on contributions from CIA, DIA, and INR; it is edited and published by CIA without final coordination.)

THE WEEK IN PERSPECTIVE

Statistics for the week ending 4 December reflect a decline in the intensity of the fighting in South Vietnam. However, a number of Communist-initiated actions this week, together with a sharp engagement between US and Communist troops about 35 miles northwest of Saigon, suggest little more than a breathing space has occurred in the pace of combat. The Saigon government is reportedly considering a cessation of rail traffic between Nha Trang and Da Nang, a five-province stretch of track that has been repeatedly sabotaged by the Viet Cong.

On the political scene, as Saigon's military rulers continue to turn their attention to setting up long-range machinery for a more popularly based government, they have again come under low-keyed attack from Catholic elements expressing dissatisfaction with progress to date. Additionally, Buddhist monk Tri Quang is reportedly preparing a draft appeal for efforts to end the war to be circulated at a forthcoming Buddhist internal conference.



## I. THE SITUATION IN SOUTH VIETNAM

### A. POLITICAL SITUATION

1. South Vietnam's military Directorate evidently continues to plan governmental machinery in anticipation of an eventual restoration of civilian supremacy. The subject reportedly was discussed by the top generals at Directorate meetings on 27 and 28 November, with current plans calling for Directorate Secretary General Pham Xuan Chieu to supervise the development of new government institutions. The US Embassy now expects that following consultations with leading Vietnamese figures, an advisory council of perhaps 70 members will be appointed and announced to the public early in 1966. This council would probably be tasked with the drafting of a new constitution, which would be submitted to the Directorate for approval, and eventually, perhaps during 1967, to a public referendum.

2. At least some ranking generals have indicated doubt over the advisability of any early steps to try to increase civilian participation in the government. Premier Ky had previously indicated to Ambassador Lodge that he has reservations concerning any civilian council or committee having even quasi-official status or advisory powers; Ky also claimed that the best estimate by his pacification advisers is that it will take at least two years, and an intensive program of public education, before conditions are sufficiently favorable, militarily and politically, to permit truly free elections among a bare majority of the population. General Khang, commander of the Saigon area, is also reportedly skeptical that security in the provinces will allow any type of popular election or referendum by 1967, or that the new constitution will represent anything other than the "whims" of the Directorate. Evidently to kill any public speculation surrounding the plans for the advisory council and draft constitution, Secretary of Psychological Warfare Dinh Trinh Chinh was quoted by the official Vietnam press agency on 7 December as ruling out the establishment of an elected popular assembly in the near future.



25X1C

3. There is a report from a [REDACTED] close to monk Tri Quang that Quang has prepared a draft statement on the need for peace in Vietnam. The statement is to be issued in the name of Thich Tinh Khiet, the aged, highest ranking bonze in South Vietnam. The appeal would be issued at the forthcoming internal conference of the United Buddhist Association (UBA), which is scheduled to open on 11 December in Saigon. The statement, according to a draft [REDACTED]

25X1C

[REDACTED] calls on Buddhists to urge all parties concerned to seek ways to negotiate a peace and to stop the killing and destruction in Vietnam. It makes no attempt to distinguish between the justice of the cause of either side in the war. The statement expresses gratitude for peace movements in the US, Japan, and elsewhere, and warns that persons seeking to prolong the fighting, or to exploit peace slogans merely to try to conquer one another, will be "judged guilty by the people and history."

25X1C

4. Tri Quang was earlier reported "under pressure" from various Buddhist circles to issue a statement in the cause of peace. Although it is known that many provincial monks and other religious leaders have been concerned over the expansion of hostilities and the attendant civilian casualties, this "pressure" on Quang may merely be his public rationalization for asserting, under the authority of Khiet, ideas of his own concerning the course of the war. The statement could well have considerable impact on Buddhist faithful, posing new problems for the Saigon government and the US. Other recently expressed views of Tri Quang reflected in the appeal's emphasis on unity within the UBA, and its reference to the "mistakes and shortcomings" of officials of the Buddhist Institute--a slap at Quang's rival, Buddhist Institute chairman Thich Tam Chau. Chau, who has just returned from travel to other Asian Buddhist countries (see III. Third Country Developments, B. South Korea) and has spoken privately of organizing an anti-Communist international Buddhist organization, reportedly is now admitting that he desires reelection to his present post. There are indications that Chau may be trying to delay the UBA conference in an effort to consolidate his support.

5. Certain Buddhist newspapers have been increasingly sensitive to the greater reliance on "foreigners"--meaning the US--in South Vietnam and critical of those who "sacrifice their honor to adopt this new form of slavery." Although Catholic journals have also expressed considerable concern over the threat of US impingement on Vietnamese sovereignty, the issuance of any Buddhist appeal such as that reportedly contemplated by Tri Quang will almost certainly revive and reinforce Catholic suspicions of neutralist or pro-Communist sentiments on the part of the Buddhists.

6. Continued Catholic dissatisfaction was again expressed last week in the form of a second communiqué issued by two leading priests from the liaison office of the Saigon archbishopric. The communiqué, ostensibly a "memorandum of position" pegged to the visit of Senator Mansfield, cautioned the US that war and peace were essentially Vietnamese matters and warned the government in Saigon that it was as yet satisfying neither the political and religious aspirations of the people, nor the need for stability. References in the memorandum to the still-inadequate influence of South Vietnam's southern "majority" also point up the continuing alliance of militant refugee Catholics from North Vietnam with southern regionalist circles.

7. Also reported to be currently active among southern regionalist circles is a retired former general from the Minh junta, Tran Van Don. Don, who has often boasted in the past two years of his continued contacts with various coup plotters, is alleged to have claimed recently that he possessed sufficient strength to mount a coup. Don reportedly stated that any coup move at this time would be potentially disastrous for the stability of the armed forces, but he implied that he would not hesitate to exploit for his own ends a coup attempt by any faction. He also commented that he anticipated a prominent role for himself under General Thieu should Premier Ky be removed from office. Don is said to have been drumming up funds to try to finance the return to South Vietnam of former junta chairman General "Big" Minh, now exiled in Bangkok. Minh's latest request to return to Saigon, however, has been denied by the Directorate.

~~SECRET~~

8. The Viet Cong clandestine radio on 7 December broadcast a Liberation Front offer of a 12-hour ceasefire from Christmas eve until early on Christmas morning to permit Catholics in the South Vietnamese army and in US and allied forces to attend church services. The ceasefire offer, however, is contingent on these troops circulating without arms during the ceasefire, and on the absence of aggressive military actions by government and allied forces. A similar Viet Cong Christmas standdown has been offered on at least one occasion in the past, evidently as a propaganda gesture toward Catholic elements. As in the past its implementation is likely to be reflected in a decline in overall Viet Cong activity during the period set, provided there is at least some tacit reciprocation by the government. Meanwhile, the Front has also urged South Vietnam to mark the fifth anniversary of the Front's establishment on 20 December in a "dignified" fashion. The significance of this exhortation is not yet clear, but it may reflect some sensitivity to the Front's public image.

#### Economic Situation

9. A capable key official in the Ministry of National Economy, Assistant Minister Ngyuen Hoang Cuong, has submitted his resignation. This action stems from blame heaped on the ministry for the current inflation, as well as from criticism directed at Cuong's personal life. The US Embassy in Saigon comments that if his resignation is accepted, it may indicate that disintegration of the GVN's "Economic Group" has begun.

10. Retail food prices rose only slightly last week, but construction materials (cement, iron, and steel) continued to experience sharp price increases due to unsatisfied demand and to speculation. Prices of most imported commodities rose moderately, apparently in anticipation of the increase in freight surcharges requested by steamship interests serving Vietnam.

11. Rice stocks in Saigon totalled about 30,000 metric tons (MT) at the end of November, down 10,000 mt from the middle of the month. Known stocks in the Mekong delta and central Vietnam remained steady, but average daily delta rice deliveries to Saigon during the month were at the year's low of 842 mt, contrasting

~~SECRET~~

sharply with the daily average delivery of 1,243 mt for the first half of the month. Provincial economic officials have predicted that 1966 deliveries to Saigon will total a 420,000 mt equivalent of milled rice, only marginally above the 1965 estimated total of 412,000. Only three delta provinces report poor crops, but domestic supply is still inadequate to meet demand. The scheduled import of 175,000 mt of rice will still be necessary in order to fulfill demand at reasonable prices.

12. Coastal shipping rates have dropped by 85 percent since USOM started contracting in August and September for coastal vessels to supplement GVN capabilities. USOM has taken steps to extend the contract of the eight coasters originally employed and will add two more for extended periods.

~~SECRET~~

NO FOREIGN DISSEM/BACKGROUND USE ONLY

B. MILITARY SITUATION

1. Communist activity for the week ending 4 December declined from the previous week when the 1,038 Viet Cong - initiated incidents reached the highest of the war. However, the total of 757 incidents reported this week is consistent with the weekly average maintained during the months of October and November. The intensity of the war also decreased, with the most significant ground activity occurring near the Michelin rubber plantation in Binh Duong Province of III Corps where US and Vietnamese forces conducted a search-and-destroy operation against Communist elements that had mauled the 7th Regiment (GVN) on 27 November.

2. Statistically, Viet Cong activity in all categories decreased. There were 14 attacks this week compared to 20 last week. None of the attacks recorded were larger than company size, although delayed reports indicate a battalion-size attack on 4 December against a hamlet in Phu Yen Province. Terrorism decreased from 679 to 508 incidents; acts of sabotage declined from 147 to 77; propaganda incidents were down from 65 to 57; and anti-aircraft fire dropped from 127 incidents to 101. Viet Cong casualty losses also dropped from 1,609 last week (1,539 killed, 70 captured) to 698 this week (640 killed, 58 captured). South Vietnamese casualties increased, however, largely as a result of the losses sustained by the 7th Regiment. A total of 1,286 casualties were suffered: 345 killed, 574 wounded, and 367 missing. This compares to last week's casualties of 240 killed, 470 wounded, and 135 missing. There were 35 US combat deaths this week compared to 39 last week. Also, one New Zealander and two Republic of Korea soldiers were killed, whereas none were lost last week. The Viet Cong lost 203 weapons this week compared to South Vietnamese weapons losses of 366.

GVN/Allied Operations

3. The US and Vietnamese operation in Binh Duong Province failed to make contact with the Communists until 5 December, when a battalion of the US 1st Infantry Division engaged an estimated 1,000 Viet Cong reinforced with mortars, machined guns, and recoilless rifles. Casualties to date are 39 US killed and 109

~~SECRET~~

wounded. Viet Cong losses are 236 killed. The operation continues and with present information indicating that the Viet Cong are remaining in the area, renewed activity can be expected.

4. A combined allied operation to protect the rice harvest continues in Binh Tuy Province but the Viet Cong avoided contact with this US, Australian, and Vietnamese force during the past week. Results of the operation thus far are 18 Viet Cong killed and 158 captured, with 90 tons of rice, some medical supplies, and seven tons of cement also taken. Friendly losses are two US killed and 33 wounded (1 US).

5. An amphibious operation was conducted by the US Marine Corps (USMC) along the coast in Binh Tuy Province from 30 November to 2 December with minor results; however, similar operations are planned for the future.

6. A total of 84 battalion-size or larger operations were conducted by friendly forces this week. Of these, three were combined operations and six were US operations. These operations made 37 contacts with the Communists, two of which occurred during combined operations and three during US operations. A total of 22,235 small-unit actions were conducted, with contact being made 131 times during daylight hours and 86 times during the hours of darkness.

7. B-52 Stratofortress strikes were made against Communist targets in Pleiku, Tay Ninh, and Binh Duong provinces. Thirteen missions consisting of 81 sorties were flown during the week.

8. US and Vietnamese navy surveillance activities resulted in the search of 12,410 persons and 3,200 junks. Twelve junks and 23 persons were detained, but no confirmed Viet Cong were captured. Three naval incidents occurred about 20 kilometers south and southeast of Saigon. On 1 December, a Viet Cong mine was detonated by a Vietnamese Navy patrol craft, resulting in four wounded and damage to the boat. On 2 December, an unsuccessful attempt was made to mine a Danish merchant ship in the channel south of Saigon. On the same day, the Viet Cong fired at a cargo LST but no damage resulted. The attempt to mine the Danish vessel is another example of the Viet Cong efforts to disrupt logistical support destined for the port of Saigon.


Communist Activities

9. In I Corps, the Communists reversed the trend of recent weeks by not attacking although a group of three hamlets in Quang Ngai Province were heavily harassed. Harassing fire directed against USMC bases probably was designed to keep US forces from making incursions into areas of Viet Cong control. In the II Corps zone, the Viet Cong concentrated their activities in the coastal areas. This was probably to take advantage of the relatively poor flying weather in the area and to divert attention from the central highlands where infiltration is believed to be continuing. Inactivity of other enemy forces in the highlands area is probably caused by the need to regroup and recover from recent losses, and to plan and rehearse their next offensive.

10. In III Corps, the intensity of Viet Cong - initiated actions decreased. Viet Cong emphasis was on acts of terror with only one small-scale attack reported in addition to the major engagement with the US First Division on 5 December. In IV Corps, the Viet Cong initiated five attacks. Four of the attacks were against isolated, lightly defended regional and popular forces posts and watchtowers. The fifth attack--against a CIDG camp--was the first Viet Cong attack on CIDG forces in the IV Corps area since June 1965.

11. Communist-initiated incidents increased in the Capital Military Region where on 29 November the Viet Cong simultaneously mined four bridges and attacked a watchtower ten kilometers east of Saigon. Terrorist acts in Saigon rose sharply, highlighted by the highest casualty producing terrorist incident of the war in which a panel truck loaded with TNT exploded outside the Metropole BEQ. One American and one New Zealander were killed and 72 US and three New Zealand personnel were wounded; South Vietnamese losses were six killed and 64 wounded. This latest incident may indicate that the Viet Cong will redirect their terrorist activities against US installations; in recent months their activity has been directed mainly against national police facilities.

### CURRENT OPERATIONAL STATUS OF MAJOR TRANSPORTATION ROUTES AND COASTAL RAILROAD



**SECRET**

*Information as of 8 December*  
60007



12. National Route 1 is closed in Quang Tin, Quang Ngai, Binh Dinh, Phu Yen, Binh Thuan, and Binh Tuy provinces. Route 14 is closed in Kontum, Pleiku, Quang Duc, Phuoc Long, and Binh Long provinces. In Binh Duong and Phuoc Long provinces, Interprovincial Route 1 is closed. Route 19 is closed west of Pleiku city, and Route 7 is closed east of Cheo Reo, Phu Bon Province. In Hau Nghia Province, Provincial Route 10 is closed.

13. The national railroad is closed between Xuan Loc in Long Khanh Province and Song Long Song in Binh Thuan Province, and between Ninh Hoa in Khanh Hoa Province and Hué in Thua Thien Province. On 25 November, the Republic of Vietnam railway system stopped all repair activity and reduced general operations in the area between Da Nang and Nha Trang. This is in anticipation of a possible closedown of rail operations in this region by the GVN as an economy measure.

C. RURAL CONSTRUCTION

1. A recent US Embassy assessment cites the following factors as continuing to affect adversely the attitudes of the people in government-controlled areas: rise in the cost of living, inflation, shortages of basic materials, and security. While increased Viet Cong harassment and intimidation has cost the Communists some degree of popular support in the countryside, enemy activity generally has contributed more importantly to a feeling of uncertainty. For example, in the IV Corps, Route 4--the main road from the delta to Saigon--is considered less secure today than at the height of the Viet Cong summer monsoon campaign. Daylight roadblocks have appeared recently for the first time in many weeks. Throughout the Vietnamese countryside, the expectation of better security resulting from the expanded US military presence has not materialized, the Viet Cong having continued to demonstrate their power in spite of the increased American commitment.


2. From 11 to 13 November, a II Corps - wide psywar conference was held at Dalat, bringing together for the first time a large number of Vietnamese and American civilian and military personnel including the II Corps Vietnamese military commander, General Vinh Loc, as well as top officials of the Ministry of Psywar, all senior US military advisors, and the JUSPAO director. The conference recommended the formation of a II Corps psyops committee, as well as the revitalizing of the provincial psyops committee. General Loc ordered that this be done. The conference also established priority themes for psychological warfare objectives in support of national goals. Overall, the conference provided a much-needed opportunity for greater coordination and for discussion leading to better utilization of available resources.

3. The conference was considered a success by all involved. It served to quicken the enthusiasm of General Loc, who in the past has been lukewarm toward psyops. General Loc called for quarterly corps-wide psyops meetings and suggested that the site be rotated, with the next meeting to be held in Pleiku.

4. Less ambitious but nonetheless important psyops seminars were also held during November in IV Corps at the initiative of the GVN 9th Division commander and the JUSPAO representative stationed at My Tho. Among the principal items stressed in these seminars was the need for psyops committees, continuous training in field techniques, expansion of Chieu Hoi propaganda, exploitation of ranking defectors, increased use of loudspeakers, and heavy emphasis on the theme of the inevitability of government victory.

5. Official GVN statistics show that 429 Chieu Hoi ralliers returned to government control during the past week, as compared to the previous week's total of 556. The sharpest decline was reflected in the number of military returnees--311 for the current reporting period against 407 last week. Communist political cadre ralliers dropped from 114 last week to 78 this week. The only category reflecting a net gain was that of civil refugees, 38, an increase of nine over the previous week. The number of draft/dodger deserter returnees continued at a low level, three this week following last week's total of seven.

6. In the 1 December issue of The Situation in South Vietnam, C. Rural Construction, the figure appearing as the total under the 3 October column of the chart in paragraph 3 should read 680,000 instead of 670,000. In addition, under the Net Change column, 57,901 should read 47,901.



## II. DEVELOPMENTS IN THE BLOC

1. The North Vietnamese economic delegation headed by politburo member Le Thanh Nghi--which arrived in Peking on 29 November on the first stage of a trip to China, the USSR, and North Korea--signed an agreement on loans and a protocol on mutual trade and payments for 1966 with the Chinese on 5 December. No further details were disclosed. During Nghi's trip to China last summer, however, the North Vietnamese secured assistance from the Chinese in the form of grants.

2. The fact that the Chinese would change the nature of their aid--from grants to loans--at a time when the North Vietnamese need for assistance is increasing hardly supports Peking's protestations of all-out support for North Vietnam. This may partially explain why both Hanoi and Peking have thus far treated the new agreements cautiously and have avoided the normal expressions of close support and friendship that usually accompany such pacts. It is also possible that the Chinese are avoiding any comment on the agreement pending the return of the DRV delegation from the Soviet Union. It was only after Nghi's delegation had concluded talks in Moscow last summer and was passing through Peking on the way home that the Chinese made any comment on their agreements with the North Vietnamese. The delegation left for Moscow on 6 December, but no details of its meeting in the Soviet capital are as yet available.

3. In a letter of 5 November to the Soviet Union, which was apparently also circulated widely to other Communist parties, the Chinese once again attempted to refute Moscow's charges that they were impeding Soviet efforts to aid Vietnam. This attempt at justification is perhaps the best indication to date that Chinese restrictions have hampered Soviet military aid to North Vietnam. To date, more than 50 SAM sites have been detected in North Vietnam but only 12 to 15 of these are believed to be equipped with missiles. Moreover, it is probable that the general delay in installing a more effective air defense capability is due in some measure to Chinese interference. In view of Peking's interference last spring and of increasing Sino-Soviet tensions over recent months, it seems unlikely that disputes over deliveries can easily be resolved.

4. The letter also appeared as an effort by Peking to regain the prestige it had lost among Communist circles because of Soviet charges of Chinese obstructionism. In the letter, the Chinese taunted the Soviets by suggesting that Moscow overcome its fears of US seapower and send its aid directly to Haiphong by ship. Replying to Soviet allegations said to have been made in a letter of 21 October, the Chinese admitted that late last summer they held up certain Soviet materiel, but Peking claimed this was due solely to technical and bureaucratic problems.

### III. THIRD COUNTRY DEVELOPMENTS

#### A. CAMBODIA

Cambodia has repeatedly denied recent charges that the Viet Cong are utilizing Cambodian territory in the conduct of the war in South Vietnam. On 8 December, the Cambodian prime minister formally asked the ICC to consider establishing strict ICC control over the port of Sihanoukville to disprove the allegations that it was being used as an entrepot for supplies to the Viet Cong. Similarly, in a follow-up to Sihanouk's earlier deploring of rice smuggling into South Vietnam, the RKG and the FARK are reportedly organizing efforts to stop all such smuggling. There is other evidence that Cambodia is taking additional steps to improve its border controls. On the other hand, according to a low level and suspect GVN report, the FARK general staff had agreed to let the Viet Cong establish a medical installation in Cambodia opposite Duc Co in Pleiku Province and to provide several helicopters to the hospital for evacuating wounded Viet Cong to Phnom Penh.

#### B. SOUTH KOREA

Buddhist leader Thich Tam Chau led a seven-man delegation to the Republic of Korea in late November for a five-day visit ostensibly to elicit support from Korean Buddhist leaders for a second world Buddhist organization. Although he also sought audiences with high-level ROK officials, Chau only managed to see briefly the minister of education. The US embassy in Seoul speculated that the ROK ignored the Chau group possibly in order not to give the impression that Korean Buddhists are a political force. However, it is also possible that Korean officials were not aware of Chau's importance in South Vietnam (see I. The Situation in South Vietnam, A. Political, paragraph 4).

#### C. DIPLOMATIC ASSIGNMENTS

Tran Van Tuyen, former deputy prime minister in the Quat government, informed the US Embassy in Saigon that the GVN had offered him the post of ambassador to London, replacing Vu Van Mau who recently resigned. Tuyen admitted that he was tempted by the offer but had

not yet reached a decision. During his tenure as deputy prime minister, Tuyen made moderately successful diplomatic swings through several African countries.

#### D. ICRC AND PRISONER TREATMENT

1. The secretary general of the GVN Foreign Office informed the US Embassy in Saigon last week that Premier Ky had endorsed the Foreign Office's brief on GVN observance of the Geneva Convention on treatment of prisoners of war. The secretary general added that Foreign Minister Do was sending implementing instructions to the ministers of defense and interior, specifically asking for early action on the questions of forwarding the lists of prisoners to the ICRC and of permitting the ICRC representatives to visit prisoners. The Embassy believes this constitutes a significant breakthrough on the prisoner-of-war issue.

2. The US mission in Geneva reports that the ICRC expects to be ready in one week to offer medical teams of doctors and nurses to the DRV, GVN, and the Liberation Front. The ICRC reportedly views the project as a way of getting into Viet Cong areas and North Vietnam, and would authorize its doctors to visit US prisoners and otherwise observe compliance with the Geneva Conventions.

#### E. FREE WORLD AID

##### 1. JAPAN

A Japanese group headed by Ryutaro Nemoto, formerly minister of agriculture, is planning to establish a Japanese - South Vietnamese economic cooperation organization that may help to encourage greater Japanese involvement in Vietnam. To be known as ASAVINA (Association for Assistance to Vietnam), the organization will train Vietnamese agricultural and technical students in Japan, and will send Japanese instructors and machinery to Vietnam. Nemoto thinks the training program would be able to begin with 50 to 100 Vietnamese in Akita Prefecture in April 1966, and be expanded to other prefectures through the agricultural cooperative movement. A Japanese delegation, including Nemoto and a Ministry of Agriculture expert, plans to go to Vietnam in mid-January to develop a specific program in cooperation with the Vietnamese and USOM.



2. LUXEMBOURG




The Luxembourg Government has offered \$20,000 in medicines to South Vietnam.

## SOUTH VIETNAM BATTLE STATISTICS, 1965

**SECRET**

WEEKLY REPORT


27 NOV - 4 DEC




**SECRET**

**SECRET**

**US COMBAT CASUALTIES IN VIETNAM  
INCLUDING NORTH VIETNAM**



**VIET CONG ATTACKS**




60075

**SECRET**

# SOUTH VIETNAM: BATTLE STATISTICS MONTHLY REPORT

NOVEMBER, 1965

## PERSONNEL LOSSES (Killed in Action, Missing in Action, Captured)



— Viet Cong      — Government  
Wounded not included; Viet Cong figures unavailable

**SECRET**


60092

# SOUTH VIETNAM: BATTLE STATISTICS

MONTHLY REPORT

NOVEMBER, 1965

## WEAPONS LOSSES (South Vietnamese and Viet Cong)



**SECRET**


60093

# SOUTH VIETNAM: BATTLE STATISTICS

## MONTHLY REPORT

NOVEMBER, 1965

### VIET CONG INCIDENTS



Attacks Terrorism Sabotage Propaganda Antiaircraft fire

**SECRET**

60091

SECRET

NO FOREIGN DISSEM

South Vietnamese and Viet Cong Casualties and  
Weapons Losses: 1962 - 30 November 1965

## 1. General Statistical Data:

Time Period	Viet Cong Incidents	Killed in Action		Wounded in Action		Captured or Missing		Total Casualties		Weapons Losses		
		GVN	VC	GVN	VC	GVN	VC	GVN	VC	GVN	VC	
Jan	1962	1825	299	1294	475	212	116	390	890	1896	-	-
	1963	927	453	1754	908	318	102	379	1463	2451	457	683
	1964	1770	343	1223	913	-	555	240	1811	1463	917	532
	1965	2206	904	2203	1938	-	471	565	3313	2768	1700	711
Feb	1962	1460	244	1205	300	316	124	353	668	1874	-	-
	1963	788	379	1082	656	303	82	292	1117	1677	253	399
	1964	2078	374	1055	916	-	303	289	1593	1344	708	471
	1965	1982	880	1564	1840	-	1394	309	4114	1873	2454	620
Mar	1962	1961	523	1456	737	551	140	523	1400	2530	-	-
	1963	1282	410	1443	851	368	66	222	1327	2033	467	367
	1964	2160	439	1456	1249	-	345	531	2033	1987	814	532
	1965	2056	751	2022	1633	-	720	394	3104	2416	1442	698
Apr	1962	1933	387	1596	532	292	151	415	1070	2303	-	-
	1963	1331	506	1660	878	256	96	388	1440	2304	797	468
	1964	2284	594	1671	1584	-	398	245	2576	1916	990	424
	1965	1860	591	1909	1650	-	232	529	2473	2438	757	973
May	1962	1825	390	1756	509	352	94	524	993	2632	-	-
	1963	1208	435	1895	889	295	94	695	1418	2885	463	564
	1964	2143	458	1135	987	-	202	242	1647	1377	723	281
	1965	2263	1049	1975	2143	-	873	548	4065	2523	1701	831
Jun	1962	1477	325	1666	613	413	77	441	1015	2520	-	-
	1963	1311	389	1863	772	310	90	437	1251	2609	580	394
	1964	2062	494	1005	1145	-	313	230	1952	1235	718	387
	1965	2597	1211	2208	1920	-	1260	189	4391	2397	2387	793
Jul	1962	1564	384	1544	686	424	212	542	1282	2510	-	-
	1963	1368	529	1918	1071	372	306	387	1906	2677	663	374
	1964	3045	900	1427	1812	-	510	219	3222	1646	1889	447
	1965	2520	1160	2980	1591	-	540	580	3425	3560	1375	882
Aug	1962	1642	377	2271	626	367	63	669	1066	3307	-	-
	1963	1349	411	1685	804	237	352	482	1567	2404	637	428
	1964	2580	721	1449	1612	-	478	282	2811	1731	1106	619
	1965	2498	808	3624	1945	-	287	606	3040	4230	705	1074

-S1-

NO FOREIGN DISSEM

SECRET

SECRET  
NO FOREIGN DISSEM

Time Period	Viet Cong Incidents	Killed in Action		Wounded in Action		Captured or Missing		Total Casualties		Weapons Losses		
		GVN	VC	GVN	VC	GVN	VC	GVN	VC	GVN	VC	
Sep	1962	1375	419	2218	646	365	59	446	1124	3029	-	-
	1963	1763	672	1982	1155	234	566	347	2393	2563	878	389
	1964	3091	819	1187	1759	-	737	230	3315	1417	1465	525
	1965	2473	655	3485	1724	-	266	838	2645	4323	778	838
Oct	1962	1357	365	1967	619	286	64	373	1048	2626	-	-
	1963	1422	428	1520	989	244	398	236	1815	2000	753	330
	1964	2827	739	1617	1583	-	693	576	3015	2193	1510	482
	1965	3330	961	3874	2416	-	225	660	3602	4534	762	1013
Nov	1962	1311	410	1982	834	368	92	561	1336	2911	-	-
	1963	3182	664	2333	1554	373	665	252	2883	2958	1595	455
	1964	1982	574	1747	1404	-	410	570	2388	2317	1104	515
	1965	3638	1034	5516	2056	-	520	592	3610	6108	1126	2164
Dec	1962	1346	294	2203	618	289	78	463	990	2955	-	-
	1963	1921	389	1440	961	191	320	190	1670	1821	724	546
	1964	2504	1002	1813	2053	-	1092	503	4147	2316	2111	666

Composite Annual Totals

Time Period	VC Incidents	KIA		WIA		Captured or Missing		Total Casualties		Weapons Losses	
		GVN	VC	GVN	VC	GVN	VC	GVN	VC	GVN	VC
1962	19076	4417	21153	7195	4235	1270	5700	12882	31093	5195	4049*
1963	17852	5665	20575	11488	3501	3137	4307	20290	28383	8267	5397
1964	28526	7457	16785	17017	-	6036	4157	30510	20942	14055	5881
**1965	27423	10004	31360	20856	-	6922	5810	37782	37170	15187	10597

\*Monthly data unavailable for 1962 Weapons Losses.  
\*\*Through 30 November 1965

-S2-

SECRET  
NO FOREIGN DISSEM



SECRET  
NO FOREIGN DISSEM

2. Viet Cong Incidents: 1962 - 30 November 1965

Time Period	Viet Cong Incidents	A T T A C K S			Co. Size	Total	Terrorism	Sabotage	Propa- ganda	Anti- Aircraft
		Small- Scale	BN. Size	BN. Size						
1962	1825	528	0	21	549	839	180	257	--	
Jan 1963	927	242	2	8	252	447	49	179	--	
1964	1770	218	3	2	223	1244	129	174	--	
1965	2206	57	1	5	63	1489	272	170	212	
1962	1460	480	0	20	500	613	137	210	--	
Feb 1963	788	181	1	13	195	433	69	91	--	
1964	2078	211	3	3	217	1389	201	271	--	
1965	1982	73	3	6	82	1411	267	91	131	
1962	1961	561	0	27	588	660	290	423	--	
Mar 1963	1282	333	0	11	344	653	131	154	--	
1964	2160	198	1	4	203	1632	158	167	--	
1965	2056	80	3	3	86	1476	240	90	164	
1962	1933	470	0	27	497	1024	220	192	--	
Apr 1963	1331	371	3	9	383	688	105	155	--	
1964	2284	211	3	6	220	1738	169	157	--	
1965	1860	38	4	1	43	1407	149	96	165	
1962	1825	490	0	28	528	892	154	251	--	
May 1963	1208	344	0	13	357	608	93	150	--	
1964	2143	170	2	3	175	1418	217	140	193	
1965	2263	40	11	7	58	1555	365	115	170	
1962	1477	339	0	23	362	736	157	222	--	
Jun 1963	1311	398	1	11	410	652	107	142	--	
1964	2062	128	2	10	140	1390	176	162	194	
1965	2597	62	6	1	69	1784	469	103	172	
1962	1564	437	1	10	448	735	158	223	--	
Jul 1963	1368	398	1	8	407	698	80	183	--	
1964	3045	166	7	12	185	2132	286	224	218	
1965	2520	42	6	0	48	1706	400	154	212	
1962	1642	368	0	10	378	885	146	233	--	
Aug 1963	1349	356	1	11	368	647	113	221	--	
1964	2580	107	3	3	113	1775	315	173	204	
1965	2498	38	5	9	52	1597	349	200	300	

SECRET  
NO FOREIGN DISSEM

Time Period	Viet Cong Incidents	A T T A C K S				Terrorism	Sabotage	Propaganda	Anti-Aircraft
		Small-Scale	BN. Size	Co. Size	Total				
1962	1375	382	0	9	391	624	178	182	--
Sep 1963	1763	483	3	17	503	889	164	207	--
1964	3091	110	4	4	118	1938	482	178	375
1965	2473	19	5	7	31	1530	278	185	449
1962	1357	406	1	12	419	583	189	166	--
Oct 1963	1422	359	0	6	365	802	105	150	--
1964	2827	75	6	2	83	1790	480	197	277
1965	3330	24	12	8	44	1969	415	198	704
1962	1311	411	3	7	421	614	144	132	--
Nov 1963	3182	631	3	11	645	1990	269	278	--
1964	1982	57	1	2	60	1391	247	109	175
1965	3638	26	10	16	52	2234	486	255	611
1962	1346	375	1	8	384	670	107	185	--
Dec 1963	1921	258	0	3	261	1298	111	251	--
1964	2504	81	6	9	96	1719	318	128	243

Composite Annual Totals

1962	19076	5247	6	212	5465	8875	2060	2676	No Data
1963	17852	4354	15	121	4490	9805	1396	2161	No Data
1964	28526	1732	41	60	1833	19556	3178	2080	1879
1965	27423	499	66	63	628	18158	3690	1657	3290

Through 30 November 1965

---

Approved For Release 2001/08/31 : CIA-RDP79T00472A001800060002-5

**SECRET**  
*NO FOREIGN DISSEM*

*NO FOREIGN DISSEM*  
**SECRET**

Approved For Release 2001/08/31 : CIA-RDP79T00472A001800060002-5