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
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Office of Current Intelligence
9 October 1965

INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM

The Indonesian Situation
(Report #25 - As of 4:00 PM EDT)

1. The Indonesian situation appears to be moving into a struggle employing maneuver and shifting alliances as the army seeks to keep Sukarno and the Communist Party (PKI) on the defensive, and they in turn seek to retrieve their positions. The army, although looking ahead toward a possible contest of force with the PKI, does not seem willing to defy Sukarno by a major and direct crackdown on the Communists.

2.



the army will proceed with its investigations of the 30 September movement and try to build a case against the individuals responsible. The army is continuing its house to house sweep in Djakarta and environs for weapons and suspects.

3.

[redacted] the army itself cannot take direct action against the Communist Party (PKI) and its affiliated groups. Instead it is obliged to rely on anti-Communist civilian organizations. Sukarno's continued absence from Djakarta--he is still 40 miles away at his Bogor palace--makes it easier for the army to wink at actions which go against the spirit of Sukarno's public pronouncements. [redacted]



DIA review(s) completed.

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


4. The army has placed the Antara news agency temporarily under the control of the Regional War Administrator for Greater Djakarta. Antara, the official government news agency, has been Communist-dominated for some time. The army has also issued orders to all newsmen covering President Sukarno's press conferences to apply for new passes since the ones in use are no longer valid. The order seems to be a move to screen news personnel who have access to the president and thereby partially control his use of public media.

5. The US Army Attache learned from one of his contacts that Third Deputy Prime Minister Chairul Saleh returned from Communist China on 7 October. Army troops dismissed elements of Sukarno's palace guard that had come to meet him and the army escorted him from the airport. The source avoided stating whether the army is holding Saleh or protecting him. During the past year, Saleh had become a target of the PKI.

6. Brig. Gen. Sukendro, who has been in China on an economic mission, is also back in Djakarta and will be working with General Suharto and General Nasution. Sukendro was one of the officers targeted for assassination.

7. Meanwhile Sukarno's influence seems evident in the latest pronouncement by the executive board of the large Moslem party, Nahdatul Ulama (NU). The announcement of 8 October states that although the NU leadership understands the people's anger against elements involved in the 30 September movement, it cannot condone forceful actions which can only benefit the neocolonialists and imperialists. It urges party members to realize the need for discipline. It places full confidence in the policy of President Sukarno "which he will set forth within the shortest possible time and which is eagerly awaited by all Moslems." Affiliated organizations of the NU have been in the forefront of some of the recent anti-Communist demonstrations in Djakarta.



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


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9. There is still no firm evidence as to Aidit's whereabouts; he has been variously reported to be in hiding in the Chinese Communist Embassy in Djakarta or to be somewhere in Central Java.



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